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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis examines the evolution of nationhood in international law through the prism 
of partition.  It argues that partition broadly refers to the division of a nation that is 
undertaken without obtaining the prior consent of that nation.  In part one of the thesis the 
origins of partition is traced back to the 1698 and 1700 partition treaties when the word 
“partition”  was  first  used in an international treaty.  These treaties are then compared to 
the treaties that partitioned Poland (1772, 1793, and 1795) in order to explain how the 
idea of self-determination emerged, which arose out of the opposition expressed to those 
partitions, to suppressing revolution, and to acquiring territory by conquest.   Part two of 
the thesis then examines the manner in which self-determination was applied in the Age 
of Imperialism to non-European territory and how a distinction was made between 
European and non-European peoples.  In this era the idea of numerical self-determination 
was explicitly ruled out. A nation had to attain certain standards before it would be 
deemed ready for independence.  The third part of the thesis examines partition in the 
Age of Decolonization when self-determination was applied for the first time to non-
European peoples.  However, in those colonies where Europeans inhabited non-European 
territory, the colonial power tended to self-identify with the European community and 
proposed partition to safeguard the national identity of that community.  This led to the 
Third World advancing an understanding of self-determination that was based on 
majority rule in order to prevent self-determination from being applied to minorities. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In keeping with my general outlook as a lawyer, I shall, however, also try to go beyond the 
realm of law.  Indeed, a modern doctrinal account [of self-determination] should not closet 
itself   in   the   lawyer’s   hermetically   sealed   chamber.      This   study   is   therefore   committed   to   a  
contextual approach to law in which history, politics, and jurisprudence are all employed in 
the service of legal elucidation. 
 The case for a historical approach is easily made. A still photograph of the current 
state of law would be incomprehensible – how could one understand the way the law is today 
if one does not study its evolution into its current state?  Can we understand a human being 
without delving into his or her biography? Can we understand a polity without exploring its 
history?   
 
Antonio Cassese, Self-determination of peoples: A legal reappraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), pp. 2-3 (emphasis in original). 
 
 
Throughout the vicissitudes of history partitions have ruptured the delicate fabric of 
international relations— cultural, economic, and social—between existing states and 
those communities struggling for recognition.  In the process these partitions have 
uprooted and displaced millions of peoples: men, women, and children, the poor, the 
rich, the meek, the indignant.  They have been the cause of numerous wars and 
insurrections and have brought untold miseries to all those who lost their homes, their 
loved ones, and ultimately their homelands where their very identities and sense of 
being had been forged and rooted in the soil where it had been inculcated in the 
collective memory of time and place.  Out of these struggles, beginning with the 
partitions of Poland in the eighteenth century, a new notion of the nation was born as 
dislocated revolutionary émigré communities in America, France, and Russia 
conspired to recreate very different visions of international society.  These struggles 
would continue against the British Empire, the biggest European Empire of its day, 
and was expressed in opposition to the partitions of Ireland, India, Palestine, Cyprus, 
and in the British colonies dotted throughout southern Africa.  Decolonization marked 
the high point of imperial decline and decay but it was also out of that struggle that the 
modern doctrine of self-determination was born, which was in itself a revolution.  
Whilst I wholeheartedly agree with the view expressed by the late Antonio 
Cassese (in the quotation above), in that I believe that history is integral to 
understanding the evolution of self-determination, I do not agree with all the 
conclusions that he reached in his study.  The cause of my disagreement is not legal.  
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It is historical.  For I do not believe that self-determination was primarily a twentieth 
century phenomenon as Cassese seemed to assume, since he only devoted three pages 
in his book to its pre-twentieth century history.  And it is primarily due to his neglect 
of certain aspects of self-determination’s history, and his attempt to mould that history 
into the lexicon of international law that his conclusions appear hollow. Self-
determination has never really been about the law, even if it may interest many 
international lawyers who have given it considerable attention.   Rather self-
determination is the primordial principle of international relations, which forms the 
bedrock upon which an edifice can be constructed in the form of the state where the 
law can then be enforced within the polity.  Ultimately, self-determination masks 
competing and distinguishing ideologies, whose prospects for the peoples that invoke 
it, will always ebb and flow, depending on the dominant political ideology of the day.   
It is principally due to the lack of international lawyer’s   engagement   with  
history that the reader will not find many references to the numerous international law 
studies of self-determination in the text that follows.  This is not because I have 
ignored them.  Rather, it is because I found it very difficult, if not impossible, to 
engage with studies that have either ignored self-determination’s   pre-twentieth 
century history, or that have focused excessively on the decisions of the International 
Court of Justice, which whilst interesting, do not tell us that much.  To say that self-
determination is a customary norm of international law is very well, but is it not 
striking that Western international lawyers only felt comfortable saying this towards 
the tail end of decolonization in the 1960s when the destruction of colonialism had 
already become inevitable?  Nor is UN practice, examined in isolation, or divorced 
from its political context, very useful, without looking at the subject from a very broad 
vantage point—for reasons, which will become clearer later in this study.  The fact 
that hardly any international lawyers have even remotely touched on the subject of 
partition, despite its repeated reappearance over three centuries, may make the sources 
I have had to resort to, appear rather  “unconventional”. But since the purpose of this 
study is to examine the relationship between partition and self-determination, I had 
little  choice  but  “to  go  beyond the  realm  of  law”,  as  Cassese  so  succinctly  expressed it.  
 Although the word “self-determination” as a political slogan only came into 
popular usage in the late nineteenth century, when it was first invoked by European 
socialists, it began its life as a neologism, as almost all concepts do.  Nonetheless, it 
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would be wrong to assume that the ideas, which give it cohesion, did not exist before 
then.  Similarly,   the   concept   of   “the   people”   or   “the   nation”   that   was   destined   to  
exercise this right did not suddenly emerge in the late nineteenth or twentieth century.  
For   “the  people”  or   “the  nation”, and I use the terms interchangeably, as they have 
themselves been used, have existed for centuries, although the relationship between 
these communities (however described) and public authority has changed 
considerably.  Moreover, as  a  rhetorical  devise,  “the  people”  or  “the  nation”  can  refer  
to almost anything.  These terms hide racial, religious, and class divisions in the form 
of an all-encompassing rubric. Accordingly, political ideologies that promote differing 
conceptions of society, in other words, differing conceptions of the people or the 
nation which are entitled to invoke or exercise this right, will self-evidently have an 
impact on the course of international relations, and thus the course of international law.  
 In   this   connection,   I   chose   to   title   this   thesis   “the   tyranny   of   the   majority”  
because one of the major political ideologies that altered the course of international 
law and relations promoted a particular view or understanding of the people or the 
nation.  This particular vision of the people or nation brought it into conflict with 
another political ideology, which rather   than   fearing   “the   tyranny   of   the  majority”,  
embraced it.  In other words, the latter ideology did not view vesting political 
authority in the masses as a form of tyranny.  I am, of course, referring to the 
contrasting ideologies generally referred to as liberal democracy when I refer to the 
ideology that fears the majority, and I am referring to social democracy, when I refer 
to the ideology that embraces the majority. Whilst these labels did not exist in the 
centuries preceding the twentieth, the visions that they promote of sovereignty and 
society, did, of course, exist long before then, even though they were expressed in 
different tongues.  I say more about these contrasting and competing ideologies later, 
but the point is that these differing visions had major consequences for those 
communities that were subject to the authorities of differing ideological systems, and 
that when they clashed, they had an impact on the ground in the political geography 
through which these differing ideologies found expression. Ultimately, the primary 
political prerequisite before self-determination can even be conceived or become 
meaningful in any way is ascertaining “the people”  or  “the  nation” that is entitled to 
exercise it.  Usually this right is expressed in the constitutional structure of the state. 
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The Tyranny of the Majority 
 
Preventing majority   rule,   or   “the tyranny of the majority” was a central concern of 
America’s   Founding   Fathers   when they first put pen to paper to establish the 
foundations of the Republic over two hundred years ago.1  This was because the 
Founding Fathers associated majority rule with rule by “the lower sort of people”, 
which it was feared would lead to corrupt and inefficient government. 2  Similar 
considerations preoccupied British constitutionalists who resolved that the King, 
Lords, and Commons, would respectively represent the different socio-legal estates in 
England and Wales, and after 1707 in the United Kingdom.   It was believed that men 
of leisure who had the time to contemplate the complexities of life would be better 
placed to rule and to choose their rulers from their peers. 3   In this regard, the 
American Revolution that began in 1776 and during which the constitutional link with 
Britain was severed should not be analogized to the French Revolution, which was an 
altogether very different endeavour.4  What the American revolutionaries objected to 
was taxation without their consent and rule by a hereditary aristocracy and Monarchy 
from distant shores, which had lead to arbitrary rule in the Americas.5  It did not 
                                                            
1 See The Federalist No. 10. The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and 
Insurrection (continued), The Daily Advertiser, 22 November 1787 [James Madison]. 
2 And of course, the Constitution took no position on the basic institution of slavery, since slaves were 
considered   the   private   property   of   their   owners.      See   Earl  M.  Maltz,   “Slavery,   Federalism,   and   the  
Structure  of  the  Constitution”,  36  The American Journal of Legal History (1992), pp. 466-498. 
3 This is why Rousseau who endowed the majority with unlimited power, provided they acted for the 
common good, went almost unnoticed in the public deliberations of the first American constitutions, 
who instead used the concept of a Bill of Rights to curtail the General Will.  See Willi Paul Adams, The 
First American Constitutions: Republican Ideology and the Making of the State Constitutions in the 
Revolutionary Era (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1980), pp. 144-145.   
4 See J.L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (London: Sphere Books, 1970), p. 27.  See 
also, David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam (eds.), The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, c. 
1760-1840 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2010), p. xv.  In this connection, it is disconcerting how 
some international lawyers have referenced both the American and French Revolutions as the starting 
points for their histories of the self-determination without distinguishing them.  They were very 
different revolutions.  I am not going to list references here for the international lawyers that have 
indiscriminately referenced these revolutions because it would take half a page.  Intriguingly, I have yet 
to come across an international lawyer make reference to the 1649-1660 Commonwealth in Britain or 
the 1688 Revolution as the starting point of their histories of self-determination even though these 
revolutions influenced in different ways both the American and French Revolutions. 
5 They also objected to the corrupt colonial courts, dishonest sheriffs, and the Quebec Act of 1774, 
which  had   recognized  Catholic   rights   in  Quebec,   and   extended  British  Canada’s   frontiers   into  Ohio,  
Indiana, and Illinois, territories full of Native Americans, which the American settlers regarded as their 
land and enemies. The settlers in North Carolina also opposed British attempts to thwart their ambitions 
to occupy and annex native territory to the west in Tennessee.  In other words, the American struggle 
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amount to a wholesale rejection of British values.6  On the contrary:  “For  many  of  the  
most learned and articulate Americans, it was the perversion of the English 
constitution, complained of by opposition thinkers in England as well as in America, 
which   had   caused   the   oppression;;   their   revolution   was   ‘not   against   the   English  
constitution,   but   on   behalf   of   it’”.7  In other words, the American revolutionaries 
sought to create a constitution that would remedy the defects (as they saw them) 
inherent in Britain’s   “unwritten”  constitution as well as to adapt that constitution to 
provide for a good government comprised of men of property in the Thirteen Colonies.   
At the Constitutional Congress, Madison—the principal author of the 1787 
Constitution, The Federalist, and of the constitutional amendments, warned of the 
possible threat posed to property rights in a democracy where under an equal suffrage 
“power  will  slide  into  the hands of the [indigent]”.8 As a result of his experience in the 
Virginia Assembly, Madison had come to realise that “not  all  legislators  were  going  to  
be   like   him  or   Jefferson;;  many   of   them  did   not   even   appear   to   be   gentlemen”.9  In 
order to resolve majority tyranny and rule by “the lower sort”, the men who drafted 
the American constitution created an elaborate federal system of checks and balances, 
with power being vested in both a Senate and a House of Representatives, as well as 
in the State legislatures, and in an executive that was elected by a separate electoral 
college.  In the United States, the legislature could not be internally divided as it was 
in Britain between the commons and the nobility, because America had expressly 
abolished titles of nobility.10  Instead, a Senate (modelled on Rome) was established in 
which  the  senators  would  be  “representatives of representatives; they are selected by 
the best, by those whom the people of the state have already chosen as their best,—
they are, suggests Madison…a  republican  aristocracy  of  merit.  The age and residence 
qualifications for senators are more demanding, their term of office longer, and their 
elections staggered.  All of these qualities make it a more conservative body and less 
                                                                                                                                                                           
for Independence was not undertaken for the high-minded principles that it is often credited.  See 
Richard Gott, Britain’s  Empire:  Resistance,  Repression  and  Revolt (London: Verso, 2011), pp. 57-67.  
6 See   Jack   P.   Greene,   “Empire   and   Liberty”   in   Jack   P. Greene (ed.) Exclusionary Empire: English 
Liberty Overseas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 13. 
7 Iain Hampsher-Monk, A History of Modern Political Thought (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 204. 
8 Hampsher-Monk, ibid, p. 219, footnote 103. 
9 Jack  N.  Rakove,   “The  Madisonian  Theory   of   Property  Rights”,   31  William and Mary Law Review 
(1989-1990), p. 245 at p. 251. 
10 See Article 1, Section 9—Limits  on  Congress,  The  United  States  Constitution.    (“No Title of Nobility 
shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, 
shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any 
kind whatever, from any King, Prince or foreign State”) 
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immediately responsive  to  the  ‘passions’  associated  with  popular  opinion”.11  Madison 
additionally sought to establish safeguards for the smaller states against the larger 
ones, and to protect its  citizen’s  minority rights—although he did not consider slaves 
as citizens and only men of substantial means could qualify to vote and hold office. 
The reason why I have opened this study by making reference to American 
constitutional history is to draw attention to a striking similarity to the English system 
of government in which a central concern was also to prevent rule by the masses.  
What I  term  “the  Anglo-American tradition” had a major impact on the evolution of a 
particular form of self-determination, which in the Age of Empire, and during 
decolonization, contributed to the partitions that I consider in this study, and which 
had in common a restricted notion of the social contract.  This was very different to 
the ideas that inspired the men of the French Revolution who sought to establish a 
system of government that would be more representative and would attempt to 
disperse political power more widely among the populace by enfranchising more of its 
citizens and by abolishing the aristocracy.  In France, prior to the French Revolution, 
there had emerged a huge social gap between the rich and the poor to the extent that 
France appeared to be divided between two separate cultural spheres.  This was 
reflected in the great Enyclopédie of   Denis   Diderot   and   Jean   d’Alembert   who  
commented, in reference to the peasantry, “many   [educated] people see little 
difference  between   this  class  of  men  and   the  animals   they  use   to   farm  our   lands”.12  
The men of the French Revolution like Robespierre and Saint-Just sought to tackle the 
attitudes that were expressed by the aristocracy towards the vast majority of 
Frenchmen and which had led to the inequalities associated with the ancien régime by 
abolishing the aristocracy and enfranchising more men. In time, their ideas and 
struggles gave inspiration to Marxists and socialists alike who in their quest to abolish 
the inequalities associated with the ancien régime, articulated a new understanding of 
self-determination that imputed majority rule in the sense of a numerical majority in 
which each citizen would have a vote and therefore a say in choosing their leaders. 
In this connection, it is striking that the issues of class and social inequality 
have generally been overlooked in most historical accounts of international law, 
including accounts of the history of self-determination.  Could this be due to the fact 
                                                            
11 Hampsher-Monk, A History of Modern Political Thought, supra n. 7, p. 249. 
12 See  David  A.  Bell,   “Culture  and  Religion”   in  William  Doyle   (ed.)  Old Regime France 1648-1788 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 78-104, at p. 82. 
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that men of high social standing have dominated the profession of international law?  
If so, such men would have strived to preserve the cultural, economic, and political 
status quo, which would explain why the clamour for equality and majority rule has 
been a thoroughly Marxist notion that has been repeatedly invoked by the Left.13   By 
majority rule the Marxists meant rule by the majority of citizenry without distinctions 
of any kind, which was considered an anathema to the men who ruled Britain, and 
who in common with the Americans were preoccupied with preventing political 
power from being vested in the majority of its inhabitants, which invariably would 
have meant vesting political power in the lower classes since the poor will always 
form the majority of the populace in a capitalist society.  This would also explain why 
there was no mention of equal rights in the American Bill of Rights.14   As the late 
Louis  Henkin  observed:    “The  Bill  of  Rights  had  notorious  lacunae.    It  did  not  abolish  
slavery or guarantee freedom from slavery or from involuntary servitude in the future.  
It did not forbid the federal government to practice racial or other invidious 
discrimination”.  He  added,  “the  commitment  to  equality,  prominent  in  the  Declaration  
of Independence, was not in the Constitution of 1787 and was not in the Bill of 
Rights.” 15   I would add that the commitment to equality in the Declaration of 
Independence (“that all men are created equal”) was a peculiar kind of equality at that, 
and (as was apparent from   Jefferson’s   ownership   of   slaves)   was   not to be taken 
literally.16 “All men are not, and  never   can  be   equal”, would be a more appropriate 
motto to describe the Anglo-American approach to self-determination, which as 
explained in the following pages, was based upon a negation of the idea of equality.   
This is because in England, during the Glorious Revolution (1688) a political 
system was created by the ruling aristocracy which ensured that England remained a 
Protestant country by vesting sovereignty in the King-in-Parliament, which in reality 
meant vesting power in an arrangement that was akin to an oligarchy, with the 
sovereign lord forming the apex of this intricate and aristocratic relationship.  In other 
words, the idea of self-determination developed initially in England after two 
                                                            
13 And because it is impossible to give expression to the masses, a dictatorship or a revolutionary 
vanguard was established in which they determined what was in the interests of the masses.  See 
Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, supra n. 4, pp. 6-7. 
14 Intriguingly,  even  today,  Israel’s  Basic Laws do not explicitly protect the right to equality. 
15 Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 114. 
16 Neither,  as  Richard  Gott  ruefully  noted,  was  the  injunction  “no  taxation  without  representation”  to  be  
taken at face value since the American revolutionaries had no intention of allowing representation to 
their black slaves or to the Native Americans.  See Gott, Britain’s  Empire, supra n. 5, p. 58. 
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revolutions (1640-1660) and (1688), and after 1707 in the United Kingdom, from the 
theory of a social contract, in which the ruling classes were to be comprised of an 
exclusive club of elite individuals.  This had important ramifications.  This is because 
ultimately the social contract is about the ability to participate in a community of like-
minded individuals. Accordingly, there was an implicit assumption that a people who 
did not think alike could not possibly participate in the social contract.  In seventeenth 
century England this would have excluded a lot of people.  Moreover, unlike the US 
constitution with its elaborate system of checks and balances, and the dispersal of 
power between the states and the federal government, the British constitution is based 
on the notion of parliamentary supremacy—although some of the excesses of that 
majoritarian system (to the extent that it affects minority rights) have been limited to 
some extent by the passage of the Human Rights Act (1998).17   It is of the utmost 
importance to remember that prior to the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949, the 
House of Lords was vested with considerable powers.  Indeed, prior to the 1911 Act 
the Lords could prevent the passage of legislation approved by the Commons.  In 
other words, at the height of British imperialism, Britain was ruled by the monarchy, 
the aristocracy, and the state church that dominated Parliament, a  “parasitic  caste”  or 
“squirerarchy”  as  Trotsky   liked   to  call   it,   in which the majority of the population of 
Britain was expressly precluded from the franchise or from holding public office.18   
These restrictions had important ramifications in the Age of Empire, especially 
because a common attribute of imperialism is the reproduction of constitutional 
arrangements that the imperial power is familiar with.  In other words, when Britain 
ruled its colonies, it reproduced a system of government that was similar to its own.  
Thus, there was a tendency in the British colonies to recreate a system of government 
in which kings, queens, and tribal leaders were appointed to do business with specially 
appointed advisers.  As Britain incrementally devolved power to its colonies, first to 
the dominions of “white” settlement (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa), 
and later to the colonies that would be ruled by non-Europeans (such as India, Malaya, 
Jamaica), it established an aristocratic elite (invariably educated at Oxbridge or the 
London universities) who would dominate the judiciary and the parliamentary 
assemblies.  Because the British system of government was not devised for 
                                                            
17 Although not completely. See Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (London: Penguin 2011), pp. 160-170. 
18 See Leon Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution (London: Victor Gollancz, 1965), p. 119 
(reflecting on the history of British government and its role in imperial affairs). 
9 
 
heterogeneous societies, the operation of government was often impeded due to 
differences between various parliamentary factions in the colonial legislatures.  
Similar problems had also affected the British system of representative government in 
its earliest days which is why the franchise was restricted to the upper classes and to 
Protestants.  The Penal Laws in Ireland that disenfranchised Catholics were employed 
by Britain in order to prevent political power on that island from passing into the 
hands of the Catholic majority, and which prevented Catholics from voting, holding 
office, becoming lawyers, or even receiving a good education.19  Having perfected 
that system in Ireland, similar systems of legal disenfranchisement would be 
employed across the rest of Empire from the United States to South Africa, and from 
India to Palestine.  Accordingly, in the Age of Empire, Britain created an imperial 
system based on indirect rule, whereby indigenous populations were given 
administrative authority within a stratified social hierarchy that developed 
haphazardly, because the social contract was never thought to be inclusive.  
Consequently, in contrast to the other empires, most notably the French with their 
mission civilisatrice, those who ruled the British Empire did not seek to make 
everyone the same.20  Instead, colonial communities were allowed to maintain their 
separate identities on the strict understanding that they were different, whether this 
difference  was  manifested  in  terms  of  that  community’s  class,  colour,  or  creed. 
In the British context partition principally arose during decolonization when 
political power was being passed from the empire to the colony, and when it became 
necessary to devolve power to a competent authority or authorities in case of internal 
discord.  In heterogeneous societies there would often be a competition for political 
power between rival factions when it became apparent that the colonial power was set 
to depart.  This is the usual explanation advanced by most historians to justify the 
partitions of Ireland, India, and Palestine, which are invariably described as a clash of 
nationalisms—although it is often not explained why these nationalisms evolved 
under British rule and why they outwardly took the form of religious movements.  As 
I explain in the following pages, there is something more to partition than the 
                                                            
19 The experience of the young Edmund Burke in  Ireland  is  worth  noting.    See  Conor  Cruise  O’Brien,  
Edmund Burke (London: Vintage 2007), pp. 1-41. 
20 On French colonial policy see Raymond. F. Betts, Assimilation and Association in French Colonial 
Theory 1890-1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961); and Stephen H. Roberts, The History 
of French Colonial Policy, 1870-1925 (London: Franck Cass, 1963), pp. 95-123. 
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simplistic notion that it was a result of a clash of nationalisms or even the 
impossibility of reconciling competing interests in a single parliamentary assembly 
based on majority rule due to opposition from a significant minority preventing the 
passage of legislation.  I suggest that this had something to do with a clash between 
the Anglo-American and the Social Democratic / Marxist conception of self-
determination, which both advanced very different visions of international society.  
 
 
The state of the literature 
 
In 1984, the Irish historian T.G. Fraser produced the first (and only) comparative 
history  of  partition  in  Ireland,  India,  and  Palestine,  noting  that,  “all  of  them  were  part  
of   the   British   system”.      He   distinguished   these   partitions (as this study does) from 
those in Germany, Korea, and Vietnam, explaining that they originated in 
international tension rather than communal aspirations or conflict.21  Fraser explained 
that  it  was  only  in  the  eighteenth  century  that   the  term  “partition”  came  to  assume  a  
political meaning.  As he observed, it was during the three partitions of Poland in 
1772,   1793,   and   1795,   that   partition   “became   firmly   fixed   in   English   political  
usage”. 22   He did not, however, draw any conclusions from this usage or make 
connections between those partitions and the partitions of Ireland, India, and Palestine, 
as this study does.  Instead, he concentrated—as a good historian does—on the 
debates and views of the major actors involved in those partitions, and thus missed the 
bigger picture, which can only be fully appreciated if one adopts a broad view of 
history.  This is because political ideas often evolve over substantial periods of time in 
which they often mutate, which may make them appear to be different to us today.  
Thus, Fraser concluded—in my opinion erroneously, or at least incompletely—that 
partition   “was   agreed   to by weary men desperate to see a way out of seemingly 
intractable  bloody  struggles”.23  My approach to partition is very different to Fraser’s 
and I do not quite subscribe to his view that partition was seen as a way out of 
nationalist strife, although I understand how that might be perceived if one focuses in 
                                                            
21 See T.G. Fraser Partition in Ireland, India and Palestine: Theory and Practice (London: MacMillan, 
1984), p. 2. 
22 Fraser Partition in Ireland, India and Palestine, ibid, p. 4. 
23 Fraser Partition in Ireland, India and Palestine, ibid, p. 196. 
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detail on the minutiae of diplomatic correspondence over a relatively short historical 
period, which is what Fraser does. What Irish, Indian, and Palestinian nationalists 
were demanding above all were the establishment of states based on the principle of 
majority rule, and which was related to a particular understanding of self-
determination and government that Britain had implacably opposed for centuries. 
With the exception of Fraser’s  study  and  a few studies in political science and 
political geography, which are largely ahistorical, it is rather surprising that so little 
has been written on partition in both the literature on nations and nationalism, and in 
the specialist international law literature.  This is surprising when one considers how 
much interest partition has attracted in popular literature, history, and film.24  As Joe 
Cleary  observed,  “[t]he  subject  of  partition  receives  little  attention  in  the  remarkable  
corpus of writing on nations and nationalism that has emerged over the past two 
decades or so. In the now canonical works of Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, Eric 
Hobsbawm, Etienne Balibar, and Immanuel Wallerstein, Tom Nairn, Anthony D. 
Smith, Miroslav Hroch, and Liah Greenfeld, the topic never emerges as an issue for 
serious   reflection”.25    Cleary also notes that partition is virtually ignored in the 
influential works on anti-colonial and postcolonial nationalism. 26   Indeed, the 
literature that does exist on partition tends to focus on individual case studies, with the 
overwhelming majority of works devoted to the 1947 partition of British India.   
Within international law, the situation is even bleaker.  The word partition 
does not even appear as a category in any of the editions of the Max   Planck’s  
Encyclopaedias of Public International Law, including in its most recent online 
incarnation. 27   Nor does partition feature much in the general textbooks on 
international law and self-determination. 28   A typical example is Tom Franck’s  
                                                            
24 For  instance,  there  is  Richard  Attenborough’s  Academy  Award  winning  biographical  film  on  the  life  
of Gandhi who is played by Ben Kingsley, which addresses partition, as does a lesser well-known film 
by Jami Dehlavi on the life of Mohammed Ali Jinnah who is played by Christopher Lee.  There is a 
university course on the idea of partition and literary representations from India/Pakistan, 
Israel/Palestine, and Ireland/Northern Ireland at York University as well as a course on the Histories of 
Partition: India and Pakistan at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.  
25 Joe Cleary, Literature, Partition and the Nation-State: Culture and Conflict in Ireland, Israel, and 
Palestine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 15. 
26 Cleary, ibid, p. 15 mentioning Partha Chatterjee, Homi Bhabha, James M. Blaut, and Basil Davidson. 
27 Partition  does  not  appear  on  the  Encyclopaedia’s complete list of all planned articles, including those 
not yet published at << http://www.mpepil.com/pdf/full_article_list.pdf>> 
28 There is no mention of partition in the subject indexes to Oppenheim’s  International  Law; Brownlie’s 
Principles of Public International Law, Dugard’s, International Law: A South African Perspective; 
Akehurst’s  Modern  Introduction  to  International  Law, or Shaw’s   International Law. 
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Fairness, which merely devotes a paragraph to describing its application to British 
India.29    Even Hurst Hannum, who wrote an entire book on self-determination, 
merely observed that despite the repeated affirmations by the United Nations on the 
necessity of respecting the national unity and territorial integrity of a colonial territory 
at the time of its accession to independence, partition has not been uncommon.30  He 
did not, however, elaborate. The only author to have mentioned partition at all is Rigo 
Sureda in a book he published on self-determination in 1973.31  However, he did not 
treat it as a separate juridical or political phenomenon.  This general neglect of 
partition in the mainstream literature on international law has not gone unnoticed.  A 
2005 book entitled Partitions: Shaping States and Minds, made the same 
observation,32 although it was promptly criticised by the political geographer Victor 
Prescott and by the international lawyer Gillian Triggs in a jointly authored book on 
boundaries, when they wrote:  “It   seems   bizarre   that   the army of academics from 
various disciplines who have studied and are still studying borderlands, frontiers, 
boundaries  and  enclaves,  should  be  accused  of  neglecting  these   topics”.33  However, 
Triggs and Prescott failed to note that the passages they criticised from the book were 
about partition specifically, as well as differing approaches to self-determination, and 
not boundaries as such.  In this respect, one must not confuse partition with boundary 
delimitation and demarcation.  This is because partition involves an evaluative 
judgment by a third agency as to the geographical arrangement in which one or more 
national groups will be allowed to exercise self-determination in the form of 
establishing an independent state.  As a result, partition often involves drawing a 
boundary   through   someone   else’s   homeland.      On these accounts the authors of 
Partitions: Shaping States and Minds are right to highlight the dearth of scholarship 
on partition in historical and legal scholarship.  This is perhaps underlined by the fact 
that  the  word  “partition”  does  not  even  appear  in  the  index  to  the  Triggs and Prescott 
                                                            
29 Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995, paperback edition, 2002), p. 151.  See also, J.E.S. Fawcett, The Law of Nations 
(Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1971), pp. 53-54 (mentioning the partition of India). 
30 Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting 
Rights, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), p. 36. 
31  A. Rigo Sureda, The Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination: A Study of United Nations 
Practice (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1973). 
32  Stefano Bianchi, Sanjay Chaturvedi, Rada  Iveković, and Ranabi Sammddar (eds.), Partitions: 
Shaping States and Minds (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 2005), p. 3. 
33 Victor Prescott and Gillian D. Triggs, International Frontiers and Boundaries: Law, Politics, and 
Geography (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), pp. 75-76. 
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book. The one major exception to this general ambivalence in the international law 
literature is Anthony Carty’s  book  on  the conquest of Ireland where he does examine 
the rationale and method of the 1920 partition of Ireland and the Boundary 
Commission that was established pursuant to the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty.34  However, 
because his focus was limited to Ireland, he was not in a position to explore the wider 
linkages between the partition there, and elsewhere.  Thus, the very concept of 
partition, the rationale behind it, its history, and development, the role of third actors 
in implementing it, and its international legal consequences, have been overlooked.  
 
 
International law and its histories 
 
The history of international law is still in its infancy.  The books that have been 
written on its history in the English language over the past two hundred years would 
probably struggle to fill a single bookcase.35  The last decade, however, has seen an 
outpouring of books and journals that have taken the history of international law 
seriously and critically.36  In 1999, the Journal of the History of International Law 
published its inaugural issue.  This was the first journal dedicated to the history of 
public international law.  Since then, several serious monographs have been published.  
In   2000,  Wilhelm  Grewe’s  The Epochs of International Law was published for the 
first time in the English language followed three years later by the translation and 
publication  of  Carl  Schmitt’s  The Nomos [Order] of the Earth.37   The better-known 
examples of the histories of international law that have been published in English have 
                                                            
34 See chapter 7 in Anthony Carty, Was Ireland Conquered?  International Law and the Irish Question 
(London: Pluto Press, 1996), pp. 135-166. 
35 Until relatively recently, histories of international law have been largely the province of German 
international lawyers.  See Peter Macalister-Smith  and  Peter  Haggenmacher’s  review  essay  of  Wilhelm  
Grewe’s  The Epochs of International Law in 3 Journal of the History of International Law (2001), p. 
242   at   p.   244   (“A   good   knowledge   of   the  German   language   is almost a precondition for historians 
working   in   the   field  of  public   international   law…The  contribution  of  German  writers   in   international  
law   can   hardly   be   …ignored.   Recourse   to   original   German   sources,   both   primary   documentary  
materials and academic resources,  cannot  be  avoided  by  serious  researchers”.)   
36  See   Matthew   Craven,   “International   Law   and   its   Histories”   in   Matthew   Craven,   Malgosia  
Fitzmaurice, and Maria Vogiatzi (eds.), Time, History, and International Law (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2007), pp. 2-3. 
37 See Wilhelm G. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2000).  This is 
a translation of the 1984 edition published in German. Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the 
International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum (New York: Telos Press, 2003). This is a translation 
of the second German edition that was published in 1974. 
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included the late David Bederman’s   International Law in Antiquity (2001), Martti 
Koskenniemi’s  Gentle Civilizer of Nations (2001), Gerry Simpson’s  Great Powers 
and Outlaw States (2004), and Antony   Anghie’s   Imperialism, Sovereignty and the 
Making of International Law (2005), all published by Cambridge University Press.38   
Intriguingly, in a review of Gerry  Simpson’s  Great Powers and Outlaw States, 
Randall Lesaffer critiqued Simpson’s  claim that his book was a work of legal history, 
arguing  instead  that  “it   is  a  brilliant  work  of   theory  of international law, drawing on 
history  as  is  so  often  done”.39  The  question  of  the  “boundaries”  of  international  legal  
history, and what is law, what is politics, and what is history, has plagued international 
law since its founding.  The truth is that international law engages with all three 
disciplines, as well as others, and whether a work emphasises one discipline to the 
exclusion of another, will depend on the subject and the questions the author seeks 
answers to.  This is especially when writing history.  Take partition as an example.  If 
I had to rely on purely legal sources, I would not be able to write a thesis on partition 
because the international lawyers have on the whole overlooked it.  As Lesaffer writes 
elsewhere,   “studying   historical   international practice is a multidisciplinary 
endeavour…   if   one  wants   to   take   the   context   of   the   legal   practices   one   studies   into  
account, one needs to take diplomatic history on board.  The reasons behind a certain 
clause in a treaty or a certain justification for a war are almost always at least partly of 
a political or diplomatic nature.  This in itself multiplies the sources international legal 
historians will have to deal with”.      He   added:   “Next   to   the   strictly   legal   sources,  
diplomatic and political sources such as diplomatic instructions and correspondence, 
the reports of political debates in government councils and parliamentary assemblies 
as well as private letters will in many cases have to be perused by the international 
legal  historian”.40  This is a view I completely concur with.  In fact, I would include in 
addition to the list of sources that Lesaffer references studies produced by other 
academic disciplines in order to provide a more complete account.  In my opinion it is 
                                                            
38 See David J. Bederman, International Law in Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 
1870-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw 
States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004); and Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005).   
39 See Randall Lesaffer, 7 Journal of the History of International Law (2005), p. 255 at p. 259.   
40 Randall  Lesaffer,  “International  Law  and  Its  History:  The  Story  of  an  Unrequited  Love”   in  Craven  
(ed.) Time, History, and International Law, supra n. 36, pp. 27-41 at p. 33. 
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wrong to try to categorise a historical work as either legal or theoretical, since a good 
historian of international law will invariably engage with both theory and practice.  
The Western proclivity for categorising academic and human subjects is a peculiar 
product of Enlightenment thinking as exemplified by the notion of positivism and by 
d’Alembert’s   and  Diderot’s  vast Encyclopédie which tried to categorise and ascribe 
meaning to all subjects (even the most mundane) as well as the imperial project of 
categorizing and defining its colonial subjects in order to include certain peoples in 
the colonial polity, whilst excluding others, to perfect the task of divide and rule. 
Matthew Craven has identified at least three different ways in which the 
relationship between international law and history may be conceived. First, there is a 
history mapped out in terms of its trajectory or teleology; a history written in narrative 
form that provides a story about its origins, development, progress or renewal.  
Second, there is history in international law, that is, a history that places historical 
events or persona within substantive discussions of law, and of the role they play in 
arguments about law itself.  And third, there is international law in history, of 
understanding how international law, or international lawyers have been engaged, or 
have engaged themselves in the creation of history outside international law.41  Of 
course, it is possible to engage with all three ways of writing histories of international 
law that Craven has identified, and one need not confine oneself to a specific approach.  
Thus, for example, this study has taken two ideas: partition and self-determination and 
has traced their interaction in history through 500 years.  In the process of undertaking 
this teleology, historic events such as the English, American, French, and Russian 
Revolutions have been dispersed with substantive discussions of the development of 
self-determination.  And finally, I have addressed the extent to which international 
lawyers engaged in debates on self-determination through a discursive analysis of the 
arguments they advanced for and against certain partitions.  But because the 
professionalization of international law did not happen until the late nineteenth 
century as Koskenniemi explains in The Gentle Civilizer of Nations,42 I could only 
engage with what international lawyers thought about partition in Part Three of my 
thesis which addresses the partitions of the twentieth century.  In the United Kingdom 
                                                            
41 Craven,  “International  Law  and  its  Histories”,  supra n. 36, p. 7. 
42 Koskenniemi’s  thesis  is  essentially  that  the  professionalization of international law began from 1869 
onwards when the first meetings of the Institut de droit international met, and came to an end in 1960 
when the reformist sensibility of international law could no longer enlist political enthusiasm.  
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it was not until 1886 that a full-time legal adviser, W.E. Davidson, was appointed to 
serve within the Foreign Office.43  Accordingly, in Parts One and Two of this study I 
combined what jurists said about the law of nations with that of the philosophes.  I 
also engaged with the ideologies of the statesmen who determined state practice 
because as, I explain, political leaders, not international lawyers, determine state 
practice. This is because a Foreign Office or State Department Legal Adviser’s advice 
can always be dismissed, ignored, overruled, or questioned by his political superior.  
 Finally, a word should be said about evolutionary history to prevent any 
misunderstandings.  The word “evolution” that I have employed in the subtitle to this 
study should not imply that the work that follows presents history   in   terms   of   “an  
enlightenment  narrative  of  progress”  or employs “historical material in terms of some 
smooth   evolution   from  past   to   present”.44  Inevitably, in any work one will have to 
break down the past into some schema in order to present something intelligible for 
the reader, and I say more about this later in explaining my methodology.  The point I 
want to make is that the world evolution does not necessarily imply some linear 
narrative. Ideas—like people—evolve differently, according to time and place.  
Whether one sees history as a story of “continuity, progress, and inclusion” or whether, 
on the contrary, one sees history as a  story  of  “change, regress, and exclusion”, will all 
depend on the topic that one is studying.  If one is studying genocide, slavery, ethnic 
cleansing, and partition, it will be very difficult (unless one is morally inept) to present 
it as a story of continuity or progress.  In fact, the historian need not take a position for 
the facts will in most cases speak for themselves without the need for embellishment.  
 
 
The approach chosen: the longue dureé  
 
The approach that I have adopted for my study of partition is   similar   to   Braudel’s  
longue dureé in which he objected to the notion that history should be condemned to 
the study of well-walled gardens.45  As Braudel explained, the longue dureé is   “a  
                                                            
43 See  Geoffrey  Marston,  “The  Evidences  of  British  State  Practice  in  the  Field  of  International  Law”,  in  
Anthony Carty and Gannady M. Danilenko (eds.), Perestroika and International Law: Current Anglo-
Soviet Approaches to International Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990), p. 39. 
44 Craven,  “International  Law  and  its  Histories”,  supra  n.  36, p. 9, and p. 16. 
45 Fernand Braudel, On History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 4. 
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history to   be  measured   in   centuries…the   history   of   the   long,   even   of   the   very   long  
time  span”.46  This approach to history is particularly apt to this study in which I trace 
partition to the dawn of modern international relations. In this regard, I chose 1492, 
the year Columbus discovered the Americas, when Western colonialism can be said to 
have begun, which may seem a rather conventional date to begin my study.47  But the 
date is appropriate since it coincided with the success of the Reconquista when the 
Moors and later the Jews were expelled from the Iberian Peninsula—and which in 
many  respects  presaged  later  attempts   to  get  rid  of  “disloyal  minorities”.48  The land 
that was recovered from the Muslims and Jews was known as realenga, royal land, to 
be recognised as the property of the king, and which was redistributed to Christian 
soldiers and farmers. 49  Britain would adopt a very similar model of territorial 
acquisition until it was challenged during the American War of Independence.50   
I chose a less conventional date to end this study, the year that apartheid 
collapsed in South Africa in 1994, and which amounted to a complete negation of the 
Anglo-American liberal approach to self-determination (as it was originally conceived) 
and the triumph of the social democratic model of self-determination which provided 
for a multicultural society in place of minority rule. In this connection it is intriguing 
that many leaders of the apartheid government used to justify their policies by arguing 
that what they were doing was no different to what Britain and America had employed 
to  resolve  their  “minority  problems”,  and  of  course  they  were  right;;  it  was  just  that  the  
emergence of human rights law after World War II, and the civil rights movement in 
1960s America had caused complexities that the apartheid government was unable or 
                                                            
46 Braudel, ibid, p. 27. 
47 Carl Schmitt, Wilhelm Grewe, and Antony Anghie also began their histories of international law with 
reference  to  the  European  discovery  of  the  Indies.  Schmitt  put  it  most  succinctly:    “The  first  attempts  in  
international law to divide the earth as a whole according to the new global concept of geography began 
immediately  after  1492”.    See  Carl  Schmitt,  The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus 
Publicum Europaeum (New York: Telos Press, 2003, first published 1950), p. 87. 
48 See Josep R. Llobera, The Making of Totalitarian Thought (Oxford: Berg, 2003), pp. 17-26. 
49 The notion of realenga would be transferred to the Americas, first to Hispaniola and then to Cuba, 
where  the  island’s  lands  were  declared  the  property  of  the  King  of  Spain.  See Richard Gott, Cuba: A 
New History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), pp. 16-17.  
50 This coincided with what some have called the First British Empire. See Frederick Madden and 
David Fieldhouse (eds.), The Classical Period of the First British Empire, 1689-1783: The Foundations 
of a Colonial System of Government (London:  Greenwood  Press,  1985),  p.  190.      (“Two  propositions  
had been established long before the Revolution [1688]: that settled colonies enjoyed the benefit of the 
‘law  of  England’;;  and  that  ceded  or  conquered  colonies  retained their own law until it was changed by 
the  Crown  as  conqueror”.    See  also,  the  Constitutions of the Carolinas that is referenced in Part Two of 
this study for an example of early English colonial policy in North America. 
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unwilling to address.51  With the end of the cold war and the triumph of liberal 
democracy, partition is a phenomenon that is unlikely to make a comeback unless 
another ideology emergence to challenge liberal democracy.  The division of Bosnia 
in 1995 by the inter-entity line, which divides Republika Srpska from Bosnia 
Herzegovina, was not really a partition, and it was significant that the division was 
only marked by an internal boundary that did  not  affect  Bosnia’s territorial integrity.52   
 In order to explain why I have adopted the longue dureé approach to study the 
history of partition and self-determination, consider the extract I reproduce below 
from an article that Malcolm Shaw, the well-known international lawyer, wrote:  
 
The gradual evolution of self-determination resulted in a breaking of the link 
between overseas colony and metropolitan power in so far as the principle of 
territorial integrity was concerned.  But this was accomplished in a way that 
preserved the now separate territorial integrity of the colonial unit.  Self-
determination, therefore, ensured the distinct identity of the colony and its 
decolonization, but on the basis of accepting the existence of a discreet 
territorial unit under international law.  It did not operate as a general rule as a 
means whereby each group within the territory had the right in international 
law to determine its own future up to and including separate statehood.53 
 
When Shaw wrote these words in 1997 he was undoubtedly correct.  The state 
practice of the period that he considered (1970-1997) supported his assertion that self-
determination did not grant a group within a territory the right to separate statehood.  
If he had wanted he could have referenced the non-recognition of North Cyprus and 
South  Africa’s  Bantustans  to  support  his  claim as well as the decision of the Canadian 
                                                            
51 As I explain in Part Two Britain had no problem transferring political power to the white minority 
when it passed the Government of South Africa Act in 1909.  Nor did Britain have any qualms with the 
referendum that took place in Rhodesia in 1922 when only Europeans were allowed to vote whether 
they wanted to join the Union of South Africa. There were 34,000 Europeans in Rhodesia in 1922, and 
they voted 8,774 to 5,989 to remain separate.  The black majority was ignored.  See Ralph Zacklin, The 
United Nations and Rhodesia: A Study in International Law (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 12.    
52 On Bosnia, see Radha Kumar, Divide and Fall? Bosnia in the Annals of Partition (London: Verso, 
1999).  For a different perspective, see Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 
1998). See also, the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (The Dayton 
Peace Accords), 14 December, 1995, 35 International Legal Materials (1996), p. 112. 
53 Malcolm  N.  Shaw,  “Peoples,  Territorialism,  and  Boundaries”,  8  European Journal of International 
Law (1997), pp. 478-507 at p. 481. 
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Supreme Court in the Quebec case.54  But his characterisation of this as some gradual 
evolution of the international law of self-determination is questionable.  For had Shaw 
taken the period from 1945 to 1970 he may have been more circumspect as British 
India was partitioned by an Act of the British Parliament in 1947, the UN General 
Assembly had recommended the partition of Palestine in 1947, and Britain had 
attempted to partition Cyprus in 1957. Nor could he have written that with respect to 
state practice during the interwar years (1918-1939) when Ireland was partitioned by 
an Act of the British Parliament (1920).  In every one of these cases the colonial 
power had expressly recognised and provided the mechanism through which a group 
within the territory of the colonial unit had the right to determine its own future in a 
separate state.  But of course Shaw was not writing a history of international law but 
an article on contemporary practice, so he rightly considered the most relevant period. 
 My point is that it is sometimes necessary to have regard for the very long time 
span (the longue durée) if one wants to understand how ideas have evolved.  As 
Braudel observed, ideas and words, like Chinese whispers, “are   constantly   on   the  
move from one language to another, from one author to another.  The word is tossed 
back and forth like a ball, but when it comes back the ball is never quite the same as 
when  it  left”.55  This is particularly the case with a topic like self-determination. This 
is because what self-determination meant in 1918 was different to what it meant in 
1945, and was different to what it meant in 1960 and after 1989, and so on.  In fact, as 
I argue below, the ideas that underpin self-determination existed long before the word 
“self-determination”  entered  the international lexicon in the late nineteenth century.56    
 
 
Epochal history and inter-temporal law 
 
Mindful of the unfortunate omissions and the criticisms that Martti Koskenniemi 
rightly levelled at The Epochs of International Law when it was first published in 
                                                            
54 Reference re Secession of Quebec, Aug. 20, 1998, p. 66, para. 111. 
55 Braudel, On History, supra n. 45, p. 181. 
56 Although self-determination only became a principle of international politics after the reunifications 
of Germany and Italy, and during the re-establishment of Poland in 1918, it would be a mistake to 
discard the role played by national sentiment and patriotism during the ancien régime. See C.G. 
Roelofsen,   “The   Right   to   National   Self-Determination in the 18th and 19th Century:  An Emerging 
Principle  of  Public  International  Law?”  in  Neri  Sybesma-Knol en Jef Van Bellingen (eds.), Naar een 
nieuwe interpretatie van het Recht op Zelfbeschikking? (Brussels: VUB Press, 1995), p. 109.   
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English in 2000,57 I nevertheless agree with the German  diplomat’s central thesis that 
the history of international law has been marked by specific epochs in which a single 
power or powers dominated and whose ideas and concepts became prevalent: 
 
The international legal order of any particular period emerges out of the 
struggle between the political and international ideas and postulates of rival 
powers.  The political and international legal programmes of the modern 
European states were all, however, expressions of ideologies of national 
expansion.  The stronger the leading position of the particular predominant 
power, the more that state marked the spiritual vision of the age, the more its 
ideas and concepts prevailed, the more it conferred general and absolute 
validity on expressions of its national expansionist ideology.58 
 
This argument is particularly relevant to the particular topic of this thesis concerned as 
it is with partition and self-determination, which evolved through the imperial system.  
As  Koskenniemi  observed  Grewe’s  thesis  was strikingly similar to the arguments that 
were popular in Germany when he first wrote that book during the Second Word War, 
and in particular attuned to the views of Hans Morgenthau, Max Weber, and Carl 
Schmitt.59  Grewe broke his epochs down into different ages arguing that Spain was 
the predominant power in the international system from 1494-1648, France from 
1648-1815, Britain from 1815-1919, the Anglo-Americans from 1919-1944; and the 
American Soviet rivalry and the rise of the Third World from 1945-1989.60   One does 
not have to agree with the exact dates that Grewe uses for particular epochs to see the 
utility of his approach (for instance, many historians would argue that the decline of 
France as a great power began with its defeat during the Seven Year’s  War of 1756-
1763).  The reader will note that the vast majority of partitions that are covered in this 
study occurred close to the epoch that Grewe claims the Anglo-Americans were the 
                                                            
57 See the book review by Martti Koskenniemi in 51 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 
(2000), pp. 746-751,  at  p.  747  (noting  that  Germany’s  destruction  of  European  Jewry  during  the  Second  
World War is glossed over, and that the Nuremberg tribunal is presented as Victor’s  justice). 
58 Grewe, The Epochs of International Law, supra n. 37, p. 23. 
59 Koskenniemi, book review, supra n. 57, p. 747. 
60 Of  course,  Grewe’s  methodology  can  be  criticised  for  being  Eurocentric,  but  I  would  argue  that  his  
thesis is sound and would also apply to a non-European power should it become a superpower, and that 
the focus on European states is justified by the historical period that Grewe covers in his Epochs.   
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predominant powers, although most historians cite the aftermath of Suez in 1956 as 
marking the end of the British Empire, when America became the ascendant power.61    
Dividing the history of international law into epochs associated with great 
powers is useful, because state practice is largely influenced by the ideas and practices 
of great powers.  Accordingly, it is often the case that the ideology of a great power 
will have greatest significance in the epoch when it is at the peak of its powers, when 
it can influence the policies of the other powers, which influences state practice, 
which once combined with opinio juris, the psychological element or mentalité of 
state practice, can contribute to the formation of customary international law.  And of 
course, this influence need not be military; indeed it is often cultural.  Few would 
disagree with the view that the cultural, political, economic, and military powers of 
the Anglo-Americans over the past century has been considerable, and has shaped the 
trajectory of the international economic and political system that we are familiar with 
today.  And because one of the defining features of imperialism is the reproduction of 
systems of imperial control that the great powers are familiar with that partition, 
which I argue was a phenomenon peculiarly associated with the Anglo-Americans, 
occurred mostly in the twentieth century, and was related to their conception of the 
social contract, which took the form of minority rule and racially exclusive politics.  
This limited understanding of the social contract influenced the Anglo-American 
approach to self-determination for most of the twentieth century, and which was not 
successfully challenged until the Cold War confrontation during decolonization in the 
1960s.  It was as a result of the ideological competition between the USA and the 
USSR and their rival camps, that their differing approaches to self-determination 
resulted in the human rights revolution encapsulated in the adoption of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. The adoption of these Covenants coincided 
with the civil rights movement in America, in Ireland, in South Africa, and elsewhere, 
after which support for the traditional Anglo-American approach to self-determination 
                                                            
61 For   a   recent   critique,   see   A.J.   Stowell,   “Suez   1956   and   the   Moral   Disarmament   of the British 
Empire”   in   Simon   C.   Smith   (ed.),   Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and its 
Aftermath (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), pp. 227-238. 
22 
 
became untenable.62  Instead, from that moment, they articulated a new approach to 
self-determination, which incorporated the social democratic principle of equal rights. 
 Support for epochal history comes from other German giants of legal history.  
Thus, Wolfgang Presier argued  “that  writers  of   the  history  of   international   law  must  
also be allowed to apply the intellectual principle of order called categorization by 
period which is utilized by all historians, irrespective of specialization, when they 
perceive their task to be the comprehension retrospectively of an uninterrupted flow of 
events.  It is regrettable that a living process should be thus divided into chronological 
and locational sections; yet, taking our limited powers of absorption into consideration, 
it cannot  be  avoided”.63  It should be added that an additional and important advantage 
of adopting an epochal approach to the history of international law by breaking it 
down into digestible periods of time, is that the narrative becomes consistent with the 
all-important rule of inter-temporal law, according to which the law must apply as it 
exists at the time a dispute is to be settled and not as the law subsequently develops.64  
It is this rule that prevents Irish, Palestinian, and Indian nationalists from challenging 
the legality of the partitions of their homelands, and prevents anti-imperialists from 
challenging the colonial legacy, and which has prevented claims for compensation for 
slavery, and for the restitution of ancient artefacts that were looted in the imperial age. 
A further advantage of taking this approach is that in examining partitions that 
have taken place in different historical epochs one is provided with a broader 
understanding of the evolution of self-determination since the relationship between the 
sovereign and the individual has undergone a fundamental transformation over the 
past five centuries.  Although this has resulted in an approach to history, which is both 
generalised and sweeping, in approaching the history of international law through the 
prism of partition it has been possible to penetrate the identity of the state to examine 
the basic political philosophy and super structure that gives it sustenance. Admittedly, 
law may not govern either the coming into existence or the disappearance of states, 
                                                            
62 On the Cold War struggle and American civil rights see Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights:  
Race and the Image of American Democracy (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), 
63  Wolfgang   Preiser,   “History   of   the   Law   of   Nations”,   Volume   Two,   Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1999), pp. 716-722, at p. 721. 
64   In the   words   of   Max   Huber,   “a   juridical   fact   must   be   appreciated   in   the   light   of the law 
contemporaneous with it, and not of the law in force at the time such dispute in regard to it arises or 
falls   to   be   settled”.  See Island of Palmas Case 2 United Nations Reports of International Arbitral 
Awards (1949), p. 845. 
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but it does interact with politics particularly in the areas of sovereignty and self-
determination, which ultimately underpin the entire international legal order.65   
 
 
Mentalités and opinio juris 
 
When writing a history of international law, the historian of international law needs to 
be cognizant of the broader political and historical contexts through which particular 
principles of law were articulated and formed.  This is because words and phrases can 
mean different things to different people depending on how they are interpreted and 
understood at a specific historical moment. We should not take colonial or historical 
documents at face value. They are a product of time, place, and circumstance, and 
reflect the prejudices of their authors.  Moreover,  as  Howard  Zinn  reminds  us,  “there  
is no such thing as a pure fact, innocent of interpretation.  Behind every fact presented 
to the world ... is a judgement”.66  This is why it is ultimately important to focus on 
the judgements of the men who were responsible for making the decisions they did 
when they ruled the Empire, for not only did they contribute to the development of 
international law, but they also influenced the evolution of self-determination. 
In this respect I have been influenced by what some scholars have called 
cultural history, which has an older tradition in France where it is known as l’histoire  
des mentalitiés.67  This emerged from the French school of history known as the 
Annales.68  Cultural history is broadly understood to refer to an approach to the past 
that focuses upon the ways in which human beings made sense of their worlds, which 
places human subjectivity and consciousness at the centre of cultural enquiry. 69  
Mentalitiés looks at what is distinctive about the thought processes or sets of beliefs of 
groups or of whole societies, in general or in particular periods of time, and describes 
                                                            
65 Anthony Carty, The Decay of International Law? A Reappraisal of the Limits of Legal Imagination 
in International Affairs (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), pp. 2-5. 
66 Howard Zinn, Voices   of   a  People’s  History   of   the  United   States (New York: Seven Stories Press, 
2004), p. 25. 
67 For a classic exposition of this in English, and for a thoroughly good read see Robert Darnton, The 
Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History (New York: Vintage, 1985), p. 3. 
68 See Anna Green, Cultural History (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), p. 6. 
69 Green, Cultural History, ibid, p. 4.  See also, Peter Burke, What is Cultural History? (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2008).  The many names associated with this field have included Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, 
Jacob Burckhardt, Marc Bloch, Lucien Febvre, Michel Foucault, and Edward Said.  
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the changes or transformations that such processes or sets of beliefs have undergone.70 
In essence, it is concerned with a state of mind, a way of feeling, a disposition, a 
pattern of mental, and emotional elements similar to those engendered by religion.71  
Mentalitiés differ from other registers of history because it utilises the longer time 
frame   associated   with   Braudel’s   longue durée. 72   This makes sense since the 
philosophy of an age or of different ages is not that of a single philosopher, (or even of 
a particularly enlightened public international lawyer), or group of intellectuals, or 
even a broad section of the masses, but a combination of all of these elements, which 
culminate in an overall trend, in which that culmination becomes a norm of collective 
action.73  This is why it is necessary to give a sense of perspective and proportion to 
what, for instance, a certain philosopher was saying at a certain moment in time, and 
to place his views on contemporary issues in the light of the world as he knew it.  This 
is why I have sought to give life to the lives of the philosophers, and to contextualise 
their views on sovereignty and society, since they influenced the men who in later 
ages would make certain assumptions and decisions that heralded the age of Empire. 
And some of these cultural assumptions had horrific and long-lasting consequences.74 
It goes without saying that the men who ruled the empire assessed the 
challenges posed by nationalism and self-determination in the context of their times, 
and not ours.  This is why at certain points in this study I have provided biographical 
information of certain key statesmen to give life to their views on self-determination.  
As   G.   N.   Uzoigwe   reminds   us,   “any   historical   explanation   which   separates   the  
historical actor from the act, the man from the politician, is bound to be sterile, 
without life, without colour, without substance, and consequently without  meaning”.75  
Accordingly, in this study, I sought to investigate the way in which statesmen 
understood what self-determination entailed at the turn of the twentieth century as 
expressed and formed through the language they employed.  Ultimately, international 
law is formed through language.  But it is not the language of the common man, or 
even the language of the international lawyer furiously working from behind a desk in 
                                                            
70 G.E.R. Lloyd, Demystifying Mentalities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 1. 
71 Talmon, Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, supra n. 4, p. 11 (explaining his methodology). 
72 Michel Vovelle, Ideologies and Mentalities (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), p. 8. 
73  See   Antonio   Gramsci   on   “Problems   of   Philosophy   and   History”   in   Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2007, originally written between 1929 and 1935), p. 345. 
74 For specific examples, see Part Two of this study. 
75 G.N. Uzoigwe, Britain and the Conquest of Africa: The Age of Salisbury (Ann Arbor: The University 
of Michigan Press, 1974), p. 3. 
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the numerous ministries of Foreign Affairs around the world that contributes to the 
formation of international law.  Rather, it is the language employed by those who 
make   the   key   foreign   policy   decisions.  And   language,   as   Edward   Said   noted,   “is   a  
highly organized and encoded system, which employs many devises to express, 
indicate, exchange  messages,  and  information”.76  This is why in writing a history of 
international law, (which by its very essence involves a top-down approach to history, 
since international law is still made by, and for states, without regard for the masses), 
it is important for us to pay close attention to the language of imperial decision 
makers.  Although the masses have no role in making international law, this does not, 
however, mean we should ignore their interests altogether, or write them out of history. 
This is especially as state formation is often a violent process, which is often 
forged through revolution, when the masses seek to alter the orientation of the state, 
and when a new notion of the nation is forged.  And during this process, the source of 
its legislation and its political institutions are prescribed and written into the 
constitutional structure of the state. This is why, as I explain in Part Three, the key 
individual in terms of the formation of Marxism-Leninism was Lenin, not Karl Marx 
or Karl Kautsky, because as the founder of the USSR, he was in a position to 
influence state practice. Similarly, Stalin, Trotsky, and other Soviet leaders like Nikita 
Khrushchev were just as important in terms of the formulation of later Soviet foreign 
policy. This is why an individual like Kautsky, whilst he was undoubtedly the leading 
Marxist theoretician of his day, and who also played an important political role in 
Austria after the First World War, was not in a position to influence state practice to 
the extent that the leaders of the USSR were, through their allies and proxies during 
the Cold War struggle against the capitalist bloc, which determined the course of 
decolonization. Those statesmen responsible for partition, also influenced state 
practice, many of whom were familiar with the politics of international law, because 
they studied and practiced law, and thus knew how to articulate nationalist demands in 
the language of international legality, for instance, by demanding recognition as a 
nation, rather than as a minority.  This undoubtedly influenced Carson who favoured 
maintaining the Union with the United Kingdom and Jinnah when he articulated his 
demand for Pakistan in the 1940s.77  Both these men were skilled lawyers who trained 
                                                            
76 Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 2003), p. 21. 
77 See Part Three of this study. 
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at the English Bar and they knew exactly what they were doing when they articulated 
their demands for partition.  And the British Government perfectly understood the 
demands that they were making, especially men like Balfour (and even Professor 
Woodrow Wilson) who were philosophers and academicians in their own right.  
 In this respect, the notion of mentalitiés is a particularly useful technique in 
which to assess the mindset of these men and of British imperialists, more generally.  
In terms of international law, the mindset or thinking of state actors is crucial in 
determining opinio juris – which along with state practice is central to the formation 
of custom in international law.  Whilst custom is notoriously difficult to prove, and it 
is not the purpose of this thesis to argue that partition was a customary rule of 
international law, it is nonetheless a useful device to try to get to grips with the 
relationship between partition and self-determination.  Therefore, the focus in the 
thesis that follows is on the mindset of key decision makers or influential thinkers that 
contributed or led to the decisions that state actors made in particular instances, rather 
than what their legal advisers may have advised them, since states, not international 
lawyers, make international law.78  Admittedly, it is useful to know what a legal 
adviser may have advised and whether the government followed that advice because 
this allows us to understand the circumstances and motivations of a particular decision. 
As Sir Cecil Hurst, the British Legal Adviser explained in a 1920 memorandum:   
 
What makes international law is the practice of governments, and to know in 
any particular case not merely what the Government did but why it did it, i.e. 
the particular circumstances of the case on which its view is based, is what 
makes the precedent valuable as a guide for the future.79 
 
What is significant about this admission, as Carty explains, is  that  “legal  advice  only  
becomes   the   position   of   the   government  when   the   government   actually   follows   it”.    
Nonetheless, “where   the   government   has   heard   legal   suggestions   but   not   followed  
them, that fact can indicate a great deal about the political character of the state 
                                                            
78 Indeed,  this  is  one  criticism  that  could  be  levelled  at  Koskenniemi’s  Gentle Civiliser of Nations, apart 
from its Eurocentricity, in that it was not a history of international law, as such, but rather a history of 
what international lawyers thought international law was—and a very good one at that.  This study 
takes an altogether different approach and tries to assess the mindset of the key decision makers who 
altered the course of history through state practice and thus the course of self-determination. 
79 Marston,  “The  Evidences  of  British  State  Practice”  in  Carty,  Perestroika, supra n. 43, p. 40. 
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decision,  even  where  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  state  has  acted  legally”.80 I would add 
that whether or not a government follows the advice of its legal adviser, its interaction 
and reaction to that advice, tells us a lot about the mentalité of the decision maker.  
This is why the work that follows places emphasis on those men whose ideas (whether 
or not they were any good) had the greatest influence on the subjects of this study; 
namely self-determination and partition. So the writings of Gentili, Hobbes, Grotius, 
Locke, Pufendorff, Wolff, Rousseau, Vattel, Voltaire, Burke, Gentz, Jefferson, Marx, 
Lorimer etc. are interspersed with references to Cromwell, Pitt,  Catherine II, Louis 
XVI, Robespierre, Disraeli, Salisbury, Balfour, Lloyd George, Wilson, Lenin, Stalin, 
Trotsky, Churchill, Carson, de Valera, Nehru, Jinnah, Dr. Verwoed, Arafat, etc.81 
 
 
A Summation of the thesis:  partition and competing conceptions of self-determination 
 
This brings me to my thesis, the purpose of which is to inquire into what the history of 
partition tells us about the evolution of self-determination in international law and 
relations.  In this connection, I argue that partition represented a fissure, rupture, 
schism, or fault line between two competing and diametrically opposed views of self-
determination.  This was often manifested in the form of a new boundary that was 
established that did not previously exist in the territory that was being divided, and 
which led, or purported to lead, to a change of sovereignty in a part of, or in all of, the 
territory concerned.  This may have led either to the complete subjugation of the state 
or it may have lead to a situation whereby one part of the population and territory 
seceded.  Partitions have often been unilateral, externally imposed by a third agency, 
which has usually taken the form of an imperial power.  In this connection, those 
communities, peoples, or nations, who believed that their homeland was despoiled 
through its division often castigated it as a “partition”. Thus, it was the lack of consent, 
from the majority of those over whose homeland it was proposed to partition, or 
which was actually being partitioned, which is crucial to the understanding how 
partition came into being and became a pejorative term.  For if the arrangement was 
                                                            
80 Anthony Carty and Richard A. Smith (eds.), Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and the World Crisis: A Legal 
Adviser in the Foreign Office 1932-1945 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), p. 2. 
81 Unfortunately, women are not represented on this list, but one cannot change history. Women were 
not given the vote in most countries until well into the twentieth century, and in France as late as 1946.  
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consensual then it is unlikely to have been opposed or viewed as a partition, and it 
would  not  have  acquired  its  sinister  reputation.    As  Brendan  O’Leary  colourfully  puts  
it,  what  is  protested  about  partition  is  “the  freshness,  the  novelty,  the  brutality,  and  the  
artificiality  of  dividing  a   ‘national’   territory,  a  homeland,  and  a  province”.     Quoting  
Chatterji,   O’Leary   notes   that   opponents   of   partition   often   used  medical   metaphors:    
“an   operation,   an   amputation,   a   dismemberment   or   vivisection”. 82  Partition thus 
appeared as a rupture or schism between diametrically opposed views of self-
determination because only one of the communities—usually the community that 
formed a majority of the population—viewed the division as a partition because it 
viewed the entirety of the territory that was subject to division as its own; whereas, the 
community that benefitted from the partition i.e. the community that obtained its 
national independence as a result of the secession, did not view it in this negative light.   
The first view of self-determination that I consider in this study, I term the 
Liberal view, which is associated with representative government and constitutional 
democracy, and the second I term the social view or Social Democracy, which for 
most of the twentieth century was almost exclusively associated with Marxist-Leninist 
political theory. The Liberal approach to self-determination born in seventeenth 
century England and eighteenth century America, pre-dated the social democratic 
approach, and in many ways, can be described as its antithesis.  The liberal approach 
to self-determination was based on a limited form of politics, which required the pre-
existence in the territory of a cohesive, collective, and organised community, united in 
aptitude, political belief, and ideological outlook.  This meant that the community had 
to be comprised of a highly cultured and educated elite, which had some prior 
experience of self-government in a society whose economy could be described as 
capitalist.  Accordingly, the economy of such a society expanded through the 
acquisition of colonies in which it only recognised sovereign rights in lands that were 
cultivated and privatised in the Western tradition.  In essence its system of 
government amounted to an aristocratic oligarchy.  In contrast, the Marxist-Leninist 
approach to self-determination espoused an inclusive form of mass politics in which 
                                                            
82 See  Brendan  O’Leary,   “Analysing  Partition:  Definition,  Classification,   and  Explanation”,  Working  
Paper 27, 2006, produced as part of the project on Mapping frontiers: plotting pathways: routes to 
North-South cooperation in a divided island, Centre for International Borders Research, Institute for 
British-Irish Studies, at p. 2, available online at << 
http://www.qub.ac.uk/researchcentres/CentreforInternationalBordersResearch/Publications/WorkingPa
pers/MappingFrontiersworkingpapers/Filetoupload,175428,en.pdf>> 
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no fetters were to be placed   on   a   people’s   right   to independent national existence, 
which was to be granted immediately and unconditionally, irrespective and regardless 
for whether the peoples who were to assume power had acquired the attributes 
necessary to assume the burden of self-government.83  The economy of such a society 
was based on the abolition of private property and it was opposed to colonialism and 
imperial expansion.  In essence, its system of government was democratic dictatorship 
or the dictatorship of the proletariat in the sense that the oligarchy that assumed power 
claimed to do so in the name of the people, and set out to abolish the capitalist class 
and all remaining vestiges of inequality.  In this respect, what I term the non-aligned 
approach to self-determination in Part Three of this study is, in many ways, an 
offshoot of social-democratic and Marxist-Leninist thought that had already 
articulated a theory attacking imperialism and supporting self-determination for non-
European peoples up to and including the right to create a state. What the non-aligned 
approach stressed in conjunction with the Marxist-Leninist political theory was 
majority rule—which was specifically articulated in order to prevent the colonial 
power from vesting self-determination in minorities (think South Africa) because the 
imperial power considered the minority to have reached a stage of cultural, economic, 
and political development, which the majority had yet to reach.  I argue that these 
differing approaches to self-determination originated in the eighteenth century, 
principally in reaction to the very different American and French revolutions, and the 
reactions of the “liberals” and the “socialists” to the three partitions of Poland. I also 
explain how the American Revolution was inspired by the 1688 revolution in England, 
whereas the French Revolution took the 1649-1660 Commonwealth as a model, 
although it turned out to be a very different revolution that went through various 
mutations and stages (the constitutional revolution, the great terror, the Directory).  
And of course, the French Revolution—and especially the events associated with 
Robespierre’s  rise  and  fall, influenced the men behind the Russian Revolution.84 
                                                            
83  See G. Starushenko, The Principle of National Self-Determination in Soviet Foreign Policy 
(Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1962), pp. 50-51. 
84 See Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, supra n. 18.  See also, the strong critique of the 
Russian Revolution with specific references to the Terror in the French Revolution by Karl Kautsky, 
Terrorism and Communism:  A Contribution to the Natural History of Revolution (London: George 
Allen  &  Unwin   Ltd,   1920).      Kautsky’s   critique   infuriated   Lenin  who   called   him   a   “renegade”,   and  
especially upset Trotsky, who responded by writing a pamphlet of his own.  See Leon Trotsky, 
Terrorism and Communism: A Reply to Karl Kautsky (London: Verso, 2007, first published 1920).  
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 The first international lawyer to draw attention to these two major schools of 
thought on self-determination was Koskenniemi.85  This is how he summed them up: 
 
The self-determination which identifies the nation as the State could be called 
the classical, or Hobbesean, conception of self-determination.  It starts from 
the assumption that the authentic expression of human nature in primitive 
communities is something essentially negative—that unless it can be 
channelled into formally organised States, whatever natural bonds exist will 
not prevent a bellum omnium.  Nations, according to this conception, are 
artificial communities, collections of individuals who are linked principally by 
the existence of statal decision-procedure which makes it possible for them to 
participate in the conduct of their common affairs within the State.  For this 
liberal view, the presence or absence of those procedures and their proper 
functioning is the core of national self-determination.  Anything else is 
destructive, irrational passion. 
 The secessionist sense of self-determination builds upon a romantic or 
a rousseauesque approach.  It tried to look deeper into nationhood as 
something more basic, more fundamental than mere decision-processes.  For 
this view, the crucial question is less how popular will is exercised, more to 
what end it is exercised, whether it participates in the natural life-form 
appropriate for each nation as an authentic (and not artificial) community.  For 
it, the primitive is good, something that was tragically lost in the political 
struggles that organised themselves into the State and that must now be 
                                                            
85 The only other international lawyers in the West who have made the connection to the two schools of 
thought that I have come across is Joshua Castellino, although Koskenniemi evidently influenced him.  
See Joshua Castellino, International Law and Self-Determination:  The Interplay of the Politics of 
Territorial Possession with Formulations of Post-Colonial   ‘National’   Identity (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2000), pp. 9-10. See also, Brad R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 77-83. Much of this thesis was written before I came 
across  Koskenniemi’s  article,  but   it  was  a  delight   to  come  across   it,  even   in  retrospect,  as   it  supports 
one  of  my   central   arguments.     Whilst  Cassese  mentions  Lenin   and  Wilson’s   differing   approaches   to  
self-determination he failed to connect the historicity of their differing approaches which were in 
gestation long before the wars of the twentieth century.  See Antonio Cassese, Self-determination of 
peoples: A legal reappraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 14-23.  And yet, the 
two theories approach to self-determination in its specific historic context was always understood to 
exist by the Communists.  See Starushenko, The Principle of National Self-Determination, supra n. 83, 
pp. 13-14:    “There  are  two  theories  concerning  the  national  question,  one  for  each  of  the  class  camps  in  
the world today—the Marxist historic and economic theory expressive of the scientific views of the 
working  class,  and  the  idealistic,  psychological  theory  expressive  of  the  views  of  the  bourgeoisie”.   
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resuscitated so as to escape the legitimation crisis of the modern State and the 
malaise of (Western) civil society. 
The legal problem of the subject of the right of self-determination 
seems puzzling because neither of these opposing notions can fully overrule 
the other.86 
 
Whilst, legally, these opposing notions of self-determination could never fully 
overrule the other, they did clash, and when they did so, they produced schisms in the 
international system in the form of partition. This is because during the birth of the 
nation-state, which I argue corresponded to the birth of self-determination, a choice 
had to be made about the system of government that would prevail.  Then, as now, 
this choice has tended to be articulated in one of two ways: as aristocracy or 
democracy, capitalism or socialism, or the right or the left. Partition was the result of 
schisms or ruptures in these differing conceptions of how society should be oriented. 
Whilst Koskenniemi astutely identified the two principal theoretical approaches to 
self-determination, he did not trace their genealogies to explain how these differing 
theories actually affected state practice, which is what this study does.  And it is clear 
that even during the three partitions of Poland in the eighteenth century, there was a 
clash of ideas that were related to differing conceptions of self-determination, between 
what we would today call a liberal approach predicated on a limited and elitist form of 
politics, that preserved the rule of law, and the status quo, in opposition to an approach 
that was outwardly egalitarian and that sought to abolish existing inequalities within 
the state and alter the constitutional framework through armed struggle and revolution.   
In this connection, it is important to realise that men like Hobbes, Grotius, 
Locke, Wolff, Voltaire, Rousseau, Marx, and others, were not just theoreticians or 
“men  of  letters”  but actually played a direct role in domestic and international politics, 
and often suffered the consequences for doing so; thus, Locke, Wolff, Voltaire, and 
Rousseau had to flee persecution, and Grotius was even imprisoned.  Marx, of course, 
was in England as an exile or émigré.  In other words, these men sought to put their 
principles into practice whilst they were still alive, let alone influence events after 
their demise.  And   these  men’s differing political philosophies were reflected in the 
                                                            
86 Martti  Koskenniemi,  “National  Self-Determination  Today:  Problems  of  Legal  Theory  and  Practice”,  
43 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1994), p. 241 at pp. 249-250 (footnotes suppressed). 
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way they understood history and viewed modern civilization.  Those men who were 
more critical of modern society, became associated with the social democratic 
revolutionary school of thought, whereas those who thought that modernity was 
inevitable and benevolent tended to assail liberal imperialists and of course capital and 
the market.  For the latter, man needs to be restrained by laws and regulations since he 
is by nature prone to mischief, whereas for the former, man in nature is inherently 
good; it is modern society that has corrupted him, and that has made him fall from 
grace.87  In many respects, the men who espoused mass politics, tended to belong to 
the lower classes, and those from the nobility, the gentry, and the bourgeoisie, did all 
they could to prevent power from passing out of their hands.  Thus, Freud thought it 
entirely understandable   “that   the   attempt   to   establish   a   new,   communist   culture   in  
Russia should find psychological support in the persecution of the bourgeois”.88  
As Koskenniemi rightly identified, Rousseau is the ideological godfather of 
the social democratic revolutionary school of self-determination.89  In his Discourse 
on the Origins of Inequality (1754), which he wrote prior to his Social Contract (1762) 
Rousseau had argued that human society or modernity was the cause of inequality; 
and therefore society had to take responsibility for eradicating this evil, that is, the evil 
of inequality. This entailed a re-organization of society along patriotic lines as 
Rousseau had advised with regards to reforming the constitutions of Corsica and 
Poland. As Lucio Colletti explained in his brilliant analysis of Rousseau’s   political  
thought, his ideas were strikingly similar to those of Marx, and later of Lenin, and the 
entire Third World Communist bloc from Castro to Ho Chi Minh.90   For Rousseau, 
the social contract, rather than abolishing the state of competition and inequality, 
confirmed and reinforced it with the power of law.91  This is why the whole system 
had to be abolished and rebuilt.92  Thus, Colletti argued that Marx and Lenin added 
                                                            
87 On the differing approaches to the state of nature see Kautsky, Terrorism and Communism, supra n. 
84, pp. 121-127  (in  which  Kautsky  rejects  Rousseau’s  thesis  about the state of nature and so implicitly 
accepts the Hobbesian worldview; but he agrees with Rousseau and Marx that human development 
does not always lead to social improvement.)  See also, Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents 
(London: Penguin 2002, first published 1930), pp. 49-50 (critiquing the Communist view of the state of 
nature by explaining that aggression was not created by property; it prevailed in primitive times, when 
property was very scanty, and existed in the nursery where property existed  in  “its  original  anal  form”.) 
88 Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, ibid, p. 51. 
89 See also, Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy, supra n. 85, pp. 84-93. 
90 See Lucio Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin:  Studies in Ideology and Society (London: Monthly 
Review Press, 1972), pp. 143-193. 
91 Colletti, ibid, p. 165. 
92 Colletti, ibid, p. 184. 
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nothing to Rousseau, except for the analysis of the economic bases for withering away 
the state.93  Whether or not one agrees with Colletti is immaterial; the point is that the 
critique of modernity, of inequality, of aristocracy, and of the state, can all be found in 
the writings of Rousseau, which all preceded the writings of Marx and of Lenin. 
 This is important because my argument is that the idea of self-determination 
did not originate with Marx or Lenin, despite   the   fact   that   the   word   “self-
determination”  was first used by the London International Socialist Congress in 1896, 
and later by Lenin in 1917, but was born in seventeenth century during the 
Interregnum (1649-1660) when Charles I was executed (1649) and replaced by the 
Commonwealth that was run by Oliver Cromwell and the army. 94   This was a 
cataclysmic event that sent shockwaves throughout Europe, much in the way the 
execution of Louis XVI in 1793 did, and the execution of Nicholas II and his family in 
1918.  Thus, as I explain in Part One of this thesis, Puffendorf after expressly referring 
to the Interregnum, explained that it was possible for sovereignty to be vested in “the 
fatherland” rather than in the body of a king, queen, or prince, which was quite a 
radical proposition to make in his day, when transfers of sovereignty customarily took 
the forms of dynastic successions.  Of course, Hobbes and Grotius had said similar 
things, although Grotius backtracked in his later writings, a point that was not lost on 
Rousseau.  Later, after the Restoration, there was a second revolution (1688), this time, 
a parliamentary revolution, during which the concept of Parliamentary sovereignty 
emerged, which largely influenced the writings of Locke, which in turn influenced the 
work of Montesquieu and other Liberals. This provided the theoretical foundations for 
the American Revolution, which was profoundly different to the French Revolution. It 
goes without saying that the word “self-determination” was not used in this era.  
                                                            
93 Colletti, ibid, p. 185. 
94 J.L. Talmon makes a similar argument in The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, supra n. 4, in 
which he argues that totalitarian democracy (which he describes as a dictatorship resting on popular 
enthusiasm) was not an invention of the Marxists but came out of the French Revolution and was 
influenced by Rousseau and his political and theoretical disciples.  I agree with this view to the extent 
that I agree that the second phase of the French Revolution was a revolution of the Left.  But of course, 
Rousseau was himself influenced by the Commonwealth that was established in England under 
Cromwell. That revolution was his benchmark, and not the French Revolution, which of course he 
never lived to experience. Thus I argue that the idea of self-determination was born the moment that 
Charles I was executed in 1649, and along with it the myths associated with the divine right of Kings, 
including the idea that only Kings had a right to rule by way of dynastic succession.  Self-determination 
thus provided the right of a community to create a new political unit, the state, in place of the previous 
political system of government, which for most of European history had taken the form of a kingdom. 
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Instead, the form of government that sought to divest power from the King and 
disperse  it  more  widely  among  the  populace  was  referred  to  as  “popular  sovereignty”. 
A principal criterion of popular sovereignty was that government was only 
legitimate if it ruled with the consent of the people.  What  “the  people” that had to 
give its consent meant, prior to the reforms of the early twentieth century, was the 
consent of a legislative assembly comprised of white men of property.  Additionally, 
in seventeenth and eighteenth century England, these men had to be Protestants 
because Catholics were declared enemies, and were expressly barred from holding 
office or voting.  This was also the case in the Thirteen American Colonies where 
prior to the revolution the laws of England applied.95  Thus, the Anglo-American 
tradition that I referenced in the Introduction was born as an elite system of 
government in which a small cabal, akin to a court society, made the political 
decisions and who did not conceive of the whole population that was subject to their 
laws as belonging to the same body politic. Although the American revolutionaries 
had abolished monarchical rule, and re-established themselves as a Republic, they 
created the position of a President who acted as the executive in Britain, although s/he 
was also subject to Congressional oversight.  My point is that although the American 
revolutionaries created new political institutions, no attempt was made to change the 
structure of pre-revolutionary America until Reconstruction after the American Civil 
War, and even then it was not until the civil rights movement at the height of the Cold 
War that these rights were enforced.  Instead, a slave-owning creole elite ruled 
America in the eighteenth and nineteenth century and for a good part of the twentieth 
century; most of the population—African Americans, Native Americans, poor whites, 
indentured labourers, and women—remained legally and politically disenfranchised.  
Therefore, for most of its history, America was strikingly alike apartheid South Africa 
in the twentieth century. I suspect Britain would have looked the same had it had a 
significant slave population in the metropolis, something it avoided establishing by 
ensuring that the slave trade occurred far from its shores.  Britain also perfected a 
system of “transportation”  so that its “undesirables”,  that is, the poor, petty criminals, 
Irish rebels, Jews, Africans, prostitutes, and socialists, were sent to the colonies.96   
                                                            
95  See A. Berriedale Keith, Constitutional History of the First British Empire (Oxford: At the 
Clarendon Press, 1930), pp. 3-7. 
96 France had instituted a similar policy during the Monarchy.  For instance, Voltaire was famously 
banished from a number of leagues from the city of Paris.  I suspect that the institution of deportation is 
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The French Revolution, in contrast, was a more radical experiment.  In 1789, 
an attempt was made to convert an absolute monarchy into a constitutional monarchy, 
similar to the system that then prevailed in Britain.  Additionally, the different Estates 
of the Realm (the clergy, the aristocracy, and everyone else) were abolished and 
instead in its place was established the notion of the “active”  and  “passive”  citizen.  
The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen that proclaimed freedom and 
equality epitomised the process France was going through.  The notion of a 
constitutional monarchy in France inspired developments in Poland, which followed 
suit by drafting a constitution that would have provided a similar system of 
government for their King and the Polish nobility.  This was considered too much for 
the despots of Central and Eastern Europe who promptly divided up chunks of Poland 
between themselves, leaving only a small part intact. This was followed by a second 
even more radical phase to the French revolution, which peaked in the years 1793-4, 
after Louis XIV and his wife were beheaded, and when France was resurrected as a 
Republic under Robespierre. Under his rule, a new constitution was drafted that would 
have provided for universal suffrage for all adult males with no property qualifications 
had it entered into force.97  For Robespierre self-determination was equivalent to 
Rousseau’s   General  Will in that   it   was   associated   with   man’s   struggle for dignity, 
freedom, and equality.98  Thus, to Robespierre, the British system was “a  fraud  and  a  
plot  against  the  people”.99  This second, more radical, and more violent phase of the 
revolution, also inspired events in Poland, during which an attempt was made to 
abolish serfdom (in a country dominated by the nobility) resulting in the insurrection 
of 1794 that was crushed by the Russian army. Thus, Poland, which was militarily 
weaker than France, was partitioned for the third time, and wiped off the map.  
This is why the three partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795, are central 
to understanding how the principle of self-determination evolved in the nineteenth 
century, and are the missing link between the American and French Revolutions, and 
                                                                                                                                                                           
linked to Monarchy and to the notion of aristocracy.  The British penchant for deportation today that 
one occasionally hears in the gutter press, for instance, over the deportation of Abu Qatada is probably 
a  hang  up  from  a  very  old  British  practice.    If  Jordan  refuses  to  accept  Qatada  or  give  “assurances”  they  
will not torture him, perhaps Britain could send him to Saint Helena? As I explain in Part Two, one of 
the first acts that the American revolutionaries did after independence was to insist that Britain stop its 
practice  of  unceremoniously  “dumping”  undesirable  persons  in  what  had  been  the  Thirteen  Colonies.     
97 See Malcolm Crook, Elections in the French Revolution: An Apprenticeship in Democracy, 1789-
1799 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) p. 79, and p. 192. 
98 See Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, supra n. 4, pp. 90-94. 
99 Talmon, ibid, p. 92. 
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the articulation of that principle by Lenin and Wilson in 1917-1918.  And of course, 
Lenin and Wilson approached the principle of self-determination from very different 
philosophical vantage points.  For Lenin, self-determination was a revolutionary right 
that was to be granted to all oppressed nations unconditionally, which included the 
right to secession; namely, separate statehood.  For Wilson, self-determination 
amounted to self-government; namely, government by consent.  The partitions of 
Poland  breached  both  men’s  principles;;  in  the  case  of  Lenin,  because  it  was  subjected  
to an autocratic despotic regime that subjugated the Poles; and in the case of Wilson, 
because Poland was an integral part of the European family that had been partitioned 
in the eighteenth century three times without the consent of its Parliamentary 
institutions.  Moreover, Wilson had come to view the Poles (like the composer Chopin) 
as a cultured people, and was impressed by their struggle for freedom. As explained in 
Part Two, it was no coincidence that Poland was the only state mentioned  in  Wilson’s  
Fourteen Points speech that was to be established as a state after the First World War. 
And yet at the same time that Poland gained its freedom vast swathes of 
territory in Africa and Asia were re-colonized by the victors of the war and 
administrated in the form of A-, B-, and C- mandates, with each class being dependent 
on the stage of development that the men who sat on the League of Nations Council 
thought that the people of each territory had reached.  Prior to the war, as Lenin 
explained in his critique of capitalism and imperialism, vast swathes of Africa, Asia, 
and the Pacific were colonised, and partitioned by the great European powers, 
including by America.100  Unlike the Poles, the peoples of these territories were not 
viewed as cultured according to European standards and they lacked the parliamentary 
institutions that Wilson so admired.  And of course, since African Americans lacked 
political rights in America, it was hardly surprising that Africans in Africa were not 
perceived to be ready for self-government by the Americans and the Europeans.  
Instead political power was only transferred to European Africans even if they were a 
minority.  Thus, Britain granted political rights to the European settlers in Southern 
Africa after Westminster passed the Government of South Africa Act in 1909.  In 
other words, the foundations of separate development or what I like to call “separate 
                                                            
100 See V.I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (New York: International Publishers 
1939), pp. 76-87. 
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self-determination” as later manifested in the Bantustans, pre-dated the 1948 election 
victory of the national government that established the formal period of apartheid. 
In the colonies, the Anglo-American approach to self-determination was not 
based on any notion of there being equal rights or majority rule or on any notion or 
pretence of maintaining the integrity of the colonial unit that was arbitrarily drawn up 
during the scramble for the world’s   resources   in   the  high  age  of   imperialism  (1870-
1914).  Rather, that approach to self-determination focused on the identity of the 
subjects seeking self-determination and whether they had met the standards that were 
deemed necessary by the colonial power to participate in the social contract. One of 
the consequences of the theory of a social contract was that geography, whether it 
took   the   form  of   “natural   borders”   such   as   rivers,   lakes,   and  mountains,   or   even   an  
ocean, were irrelevant. 101   This is why Hobbes and Locke could describe the 
government of small families in the Americas as a society that was linked to the 
motherland irrespective of the vast quantities of water in the form of the Atlantic 
Ocean that straddled New England from the “Real England”.  The same logic applied 
to English sovereignty in Hanover after the Act of Settlement (1701) despite its 
location  in  Lower  Saxony.    Britain’s  purported  link  to  Ireland  was  also  unaffected  by  
geography despite the fact that the Irish Sea separated Ireland from Britain.  As A.J. 
Balfour argued when he was justifying the decision to partition that island in the 
Government of Ireland Act: “The  only  people who will grumble [about the partition] 
are those who imagine that this scheme deprives Ireland of a unity to which she had a 
historic claim. But these people ignore the fact that such unity as Ireland possesses is 
mainly the work of England, and that she has never in all the centuries, been a single, 
organized, independent state and that if she were not surrounded by water, no human 
being would ever think of forcing the loyal and Protestant North into the same 
political mould as the disloyal and Roman Catholic south [emphasis added]”.102  
In the Age of Imperialism a people who claimed to be entitled to self-
determination had   to   be   a   “nation”,   which proved to be a particularly problematic 
                                                            
101  Of the men associated with British liberalism, the only major theorist who did believe that 
geography played an important role in the formation of a collective identity was Edmund Burke.  See 
Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999) pp. 146-152. 
102  See Catherine B. Shannon, Arthur J. Balfour and Ireland 1874-1922 (Washington, D.C.: The 
Catholic University of America Press, 1988), p.  250  quoting  from  Balfour’s  memorandum  on  Ireland,  
25 Nov. 1919, Cabinet Records, CP 193, CAB 24/93. See also, Fraser, Partition in Ireland, India and 
Palestine, supra n. 32, p. 27. 
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notion, and perhaps intentionally so. 103   This is because the standards deemed 
necessary to be a nation, and therefore to be potential bearers of sovereignty, in order 
to participate in the social contract, were very similar to the standards that the Anglo-
Americans expected of their own subjects who participated in the social contract at 
home. Accordingly, the qualities the Anglo-Americans looked to before they would 
even contemplate conferring the right to self-government upon a non-European people 
included the qualities of nationhood they themselves valued highly.  The qualities that 
they valued were often inculcated in childhood, in the Church, in Sunday school, or in 
public school, and later refined at Oxbridge or at an Ivy League institution.  And of 
course, access to these institutions up until the education reforms in the twentieth 
century was restricted to the traditional elites, that is, wealthy white men of property. 
 As I explain in Part Two, European society at the height of the Enlightenment 
was not only run by an elite preoccupied with social hierarchy in which the majority 
of the population were disenfranchised and poor, but it was also a society that was 
intolerant of religious minorities, especially if those minorities were poor.  This is why 
the treaties that partitioned Poland only protected the religious rights of Christian 
minorities, but ignored the rights of Jews who were instead confined to the Pale.  
Similarly, the treaties concluded between the Russian and Ottoman Empires, only 
                                                            
103 In the social sciences there is an abundance of literature in the field of ethnicity and nationalism 
studies dominated by the debate between “primordialists”, “modernists”, and “ethnists”.    Primordialists 
like Hugh Seton-Watson trace the emergence of nations back to the Middle Ages and late antiquity.  
Modernists like Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, and Eric Hobsbawm argue that the nation is a 
modern phenomenon dating approximately back to the era of the French Revolution.  Ethnists like A.D. 
Smith argue that nations are modern inventions closely related to the pre-existence of ethnic sentiment 
and community.  These ways of understanding the nation, although very interesting, are not particularly 
useful to international lawyers, who in accordance with the strict positivist notion of international law, 
ought to by necessity focus on state practice and opinio juris i.e. what states do and why they do it, 
irrespective of whether what they do is right, wrong, good, bad, sensible, stupid, or completely 
irrational. This is because it is not the nation as an abstract entity as defined and understood by 
anthropologists and historians that matters legally, but what states think. It was rarely anthropology or 
science that determined what a nation was in the eyes of states, but geopolitics and prejudice. 
Politicians would pick and chose those theories (like social Darwinism) that purportedly supported their 
political ideologies, personal predilections, and prejudices, with often-disastrous consequences.  Prior 
to World War II states customarily referred to nations as the unit of self-determination.  However, and 
in the aftermath of the Nazi Holocaust and the UNESCO study criticising the concept of race, 
international  lawyers  have  instead  adopted  the  word  “peoples”  to  refer to the community that is entitled 
to self-determination.  This is encapsulated in common article one to the two human rights covenants of 
1966:  “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”.      The  word  
“nation”   has   been   dropped   in   favour   of   “people”   precisely   in   order   to   avoid   having   to   engage  with  
controversies over the precise meaning and origin of the nation that has so preoccupied the social 
scientists.  Moreover, because we cannot re-write history, the historian of international law cannot 
avoid using the language that was used by state actors in the past to describe the unit of self-
determination, even if this terminology was, and is, highly problematic, if not manifestly dangerous.  
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protected Christian minorities; Muslims were not protected.  The religious intolerance 
displayed towards non-Christians was also prevalent amongst many of the philosophes, 
even amongst those who espoused egalitarian values.  It was also prevalent amongst 
jurists like Hugo Grotius who wanted to convert the Jews to Christianity, because in 
his vision there was no place for non-Christians in Europe; instead he argued for their 
“return” to Palestine.104  These prejudices are worth emphasising because they had a 
major influence on the way in which nationalism developed at the height of 
imperialism in the metropolis and in the overseas colonies contributing to partition.  
 This is because by making distinctions between communities on the basis of 
their alleged innate religious differences, either by disenfranchising them, or by 
favouring one community to the detriment of the other, these communities were never 
able to vote or interact as citizens of a common state.  Instead, a gulf emerged between 
Catholics and Protestants in Ireland; Jews and non-Jews in Palestine; Muslims and 
non-Muslims in British India; Christians and Muslims in Cyprus, and Christians and 
non-Christians throughout Southern Africa.  In time, these religious differentiations 
were also manifested in terms of national affiliation.  Thus, the conflict in Ireland was 
one between Nationalists and Unionists; in Palestine between Zionists and Arabs; in 
India between the League and Congress; in Cyprus between Greek Cypriots and 
Turkish Cypriots; and in South Africa between Europeans and non-Europeans, which 
was manifested most graphically by the colour bar as a dispute between Whites and 
Blacks.  Additionally, in each of these cases, one of the communities was a minority.   
 Being a minority posed a problem in a political system that avowedly favoured 
majorities in the sense of a majority of those participating in the electorate.  And the 
Westminster model of government was such a system, which was reproduced in 
various forms in all British colonies that were granted a form of self-government (as 
opposed to Crown Colonies, were the Governor had his Council had authority, rather 
than the Legislative Assembly).  This is why the Anglo-American system of 
government deployed the law to segregate the populace so only a minority could vote 
e.g. white men of property.  This was, as I explained in the Introduction, developed in 
order to prevent majority rule or the tyranny of the majority of the lower classes.  In 
                                                            
104 This was also the view of John Locke.  In 1622, Grotius composed a treatise that was entitled The 
Truth of Christian Religion in which he made the case for converting those Jews (and Muslims) who 
lived in Europe to Christianity.   See  Nabil   I.  Matar,   “John  Locke   and   the   Jews”  44  The Journal of 
Ecclesiastical History (1993), p. 45 at p. 50 citing the 1680 English translation by Simon Patrick.   
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other words, in the parliamentary system of government, the majority never referred to 
the majority of the entire population of the state but only to the political classes, which 
were in fact a minority.  So only a majority of the minority, that is, the miniscule 
electorate that had been pre-determined by the ruling classes, could ever hope or 
aspire to influence government policy at the ballot box, by joining or forming a 
political party, or by standing as a candidate in an election for a political party.  This 
was the situation for many centuries in England and Wales and later in Scotland and 
Ireland.  It was also the case in America after the Revolution until the 1960s.  When 
this political system was transferred to the colonies, the result was the same: the 
minority was enfranchised or given preferential treatment over the majority.   
 This is why for many centuries in Ireland and America only Protestants could 
vote and hold public office even though they were only a minority of the total 
population, and why in Southern Africa only the Europeans could vote and hold 
public office even though they were a minority.  A similar situation prevailed in 
Palestine where Arabs were prevented from influencing government policy to prevent 
the establishment of a Jewish homeland and were disenfranchised despite forming the 
vast majority of the population.  The result was that only Jews participated in a 
governmental agency (the Jewish Agency) that was created by the League of Nations 
to provide for their welfare.105  In British India, Muslims were given preferential 
treatment over the Hindus, Christians, and the other communities and castes in British 
India, by voting in a separate electorate.  In Cyprus, Britain favoured the Turkish 
Cypriots by promoting them to important influential positions in the colonial 
government and by using Turks in the police force to crack down on the Communist 
                                                            
105 Britain had proposed to establish an Arab agency in Palestine, which was to occupy a position 
exactly analogous to that, accorded to the Jewish agency, under Article 4 of the Mandate.  See 
Palestine: Proposed Formation of an Arab Agency, Correspondence with the High Commissioner for 
Palestine, XXV Parliamentary Papers (1923), para. 7.  However, this offer was unanimously declined 
by the Arab leaders of the day on the grounds that they desired the establishment of a government that 
would recognise the majority status of the Arabs, who in 1917, when Britain occupied Palestine, 
formed 93 per cent of the population.  The leaders of the Palestinian Arab community contended that an 
Arab agency would not be representative of the Palestinian people because it included nominated 
British officials.  They argued that to participate in any council, no matter what its form, would indicate 
on their part an acceptance of the Mandate and the Constitution, which provided for the establishment 
of a Jewish national home in Palestine, which the Palestinian Arabs declined to accept.  Under the 
proposed Legislative Council the elected members would have no powers and so it could at any time be 
outvoted by the Government and by Jewish votes. See Mogannam   E.   Mogannam,   “Palestine  
Legislation  under   the  British”,  164  Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
(Nov. 1932), pp. 48-49; and also the views of Jamaal   Bey   Husseini,   “The   Proposed   Palestine  
Constitution”  164  Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (Nov. 1932), p. 24.  
41 
 
inspired EOKA insurgency. The British decision to partition each of the territories (or 
in the case of Cyprus to attempt to partition it) was a method of preventing majority 
rule for the whole of the population of the colonial unit.  Instead, a new majority 
would be established after the new boundary had been drawn through the territory 
leading to the creation of a new political unit, that is, a new subject of international 
law.   Hence it was hardly surprising that Irish, Indian, Palestinian, Greek, and South 
African nationalists were attracted to left-wing politics and political theories that 
espoused social democracy because these theories articulated a vision of society in 
which the majority ruled, in which only the majority had the right to form a state.  
 The consequences of this history and its importance to the subsequent 
development of international law, is that at the height of the Cold War struggle during 
decolonization, partition was outlawed by the United Nations.  Instead, as Professor 
Shaw correctly pointed out, when I quoted him earlier in this study, self-determination 
today (but perhaps not tomorrow) ensures “the distinct identity of the colony and its 
decolonization…on the basis of accepting the existence of a discreet territorial unit 
under international law”.  This is because self-determination does “not operate as a 
general rule as a means whereby each group within the territory had the right in 
international law to determine its own future up to and including separate 
statehood”.106  This   is  why  South  Africa’s  Bantustans  were  never  recognized  by  any  
other state apart from South Africa.  It also explains why the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus has never been recognised by any other state other than Turkey.  
This is because the contemporary law of self-determination is equated to majority rule, 
which is supposed to prevent the division of a self-determination unit from being 
recognised.   The issue for the future is whether this will remain the law in light of 
geopolitical change or whether the spread of liberal democratic systems of political 
thought and of government since 1989, will likely lead to new partitions elsewhere.  
 
A final word on the structure of this study 
 
Due to the ambitious scope of this study, I found it necessary to divide the core 
content into three parts, in chronological order, which I categorised under these 
                                                            
106 See  Shaw,  “Peoples,  Territorialism,  and  Boundaries”,  supra,  n.  53, p. 481. 
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headings: 1.The law of nations in the ancien régime.  2. European public law in the 
age of imperialism.  3. International law in the age of decolonisation.  The first and the 
third part of this study analyse specific partitions, whereas the second part focuses on 
the way in which jurists, the philosophes, and political theorists justified the 
colonisation of non-Europeans lands, and explains how they deliberately connived to 
cast aside non-Europeans from the body politic.  This was thought necessary in order 
to give some background to the ideas, which led to the partitions in the twentieth 
century.  As I explain national conflict did not suddenly emerge when Britain decided 
to withdraw from its colonies.  Rather these conflicts had evolved under British rule. 
Since the idea of partition in modern international relations began with the 
partition treaties that were negotiated in 1698 and 1700, this is the first instance of 
partition that I consider in this study. Prior to this I explain the old system of 
international relations, which was predicated on maintaining a balance of power 
between the Christian princes of Europe.  The analysis of the partition treaties are 
closely followed by, and contrasted with, the partitions of Poland in the eighteenth 
century.  The age of imperialism, which criss-crossed and paralleled these 
developments, reached its nadir in the late nineteenth century, when the seeds of 
partition were sown, although imperialism had began as early as 1492, and ended in 
the 1940s-60s during decolonization, when the better known partitions took place. 
In the headings I have   used   the   old   terminology   “law   of   nations” and 
“European  public   law”,   rather   than  “international   law”,  because   the   latter   term  only  
came into existence in the late eighteenth century when it was coined by Jeremy 
Bentham to refer to the relations amongst established states.107  To ease the flow of the 
text I have used both terms—the law of nations and the international law—
interchangeably, and I use the term international law in the title.  As the relationship 
between a people and its territory has undergone a fundamental transformation over 
the  past  500  years,  each  part  of  this  study  is  preceded  by  a  short  “scene  setter”,  which  
is designed to provide some perspective so that the evolution of self-determination in 
international law can be appreciated in its historical, political, and social context.   
 
                                                            
107 See  M.W.   Janis,   “Jeremy  Bentham   and   the   Fashioning   of   “International   Law”,   78  The American 
Journal of International Law (1984), p. 405. 
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Part One 
 
THE LAW OF NATIONS IN THE ANCIEN RÉGIME 
 
 
If there was a nation of gods, it would be governed democratically.  So perfect a 
government is unsuited to men.  
 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (1762), Wordsworth Edition 1998, p. 68. 
 
To establish an equality of duties between men, and to destroy those distinctions 
necessary in a well-ordered monarchy, would soon lead to disorder (the inevitable 
consequence of absolute equality).  The result would be the overthrow of civil society, 
the harmony of which is maintained only by the hierarchy of powers, authorities, pre-
eminences, and distinctions which keeps each man in his place... 
 
The Parlement of Paris (1776) remonstrating against an attempt to create a universal 
road tax in France.  Quoted in William Doyle, Aristocracy and Its Enemies in the Age 
of Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 43-44. 
 
You decided the Republic by a mere majority, you changed the whole history of the 
nation by a mere majority, and now you think the life of one man too great for a mere 
majority; you say such a vote could not be decisive enough to make blood flow.  
When I was on the frontier the blood flowed decisively enough. 
 
Georges Danton, 1793, on the vote to execute the King, quoted in Hilaire Belloc, 
Danton: A Study (London: James Nisbet & Co. Ltd., 1899), pp. 201-202. 
 
The very essence of democratic government consists in the absolute sovereignty of the 
majority; for there is nothing in democratic states that is capable of resisting it. 
 
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1835), Wordsworth 1998, p. 98. 
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Historians often refer to the period prior to the French Revolution of 1789 as the 
“ancien régime” i.e. “the old system”.  It is used here in connection to the law of 
nations, as it existed in Europe, prior to the political changes brought about by that 
revolution, which originated in the concept of Respublica Christiana.  These Christian 
origins did not, however, preclude relations with non-Christian powers such as the 
Ottoman Empire, which was recognised by the law of nations in a relationship of 
relative equality until the changes wrought by revolution and social Darwinism in the 
mid-nineteenth century.  Nonetheless,  Europe’s  Christian  identity  was  forged  through  
its   fear   of   “the   other”  when   “Suleyman   the  Magnificent”,   the   sultan   of   the  Muslim  
Ottoman Empire, reached the gates of Vienna in 1529.1  What characterized the law of 
nations during Protestant Reformation (1517-1648), when Luther attacked the 
authority of the Pope, was that it was predicated on a horizontal relationship much in 
the manner international law applies today, rather than in a vertical relationship with 
the Pope at the centre of the universe.2  The difference then, was that little or no 
account was given to the national identities of those who served  in  a  sovereign’s army, 
or administration, or who inhabited the territories placed under its sovereignty.   
The   Reformation   resulted   in   the   elimination   of   the   Church’s   control   over  
everyday life, and the substitution of a new form of control for the previous one.3  In 
attempting to assert a new form of control the Reformation contributed to a nascent 
form of nationhood expressed in the form of religious identity and difference.  Thus, 
King Henry VIII initiated the break from Rome in the 1530s to establish a Church of 
England, which directly challenged the authority of the Pope.  Then there was the 
Dutch Revolt against Spain (1555-1609), which half a century later was followed by 
the English Civil Wars (1641-1651), and the creation of a republic in Britain (1649-
1660), which led to the formation of an alliance between the Protestant Maritime 
Powers in opposition to the Catholic powers, France, Spain, and Portugal.  This was 
further buttressed by the Glorious Revolution of 1688, when William and Mary 
became the sovereigns of England in Parliament to ensure that it remained a Protestant 
country.  It was during the struggle between the Maritime Powers and the Catholic 
Kingdoms that many of the founding principles of international law were formed 
                                                 
1 Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis (London: 
Routledge 1992), p. 177. 
2 John Witte, JR. Law and Protestantism: The Legal Teachings of the Lutheran Reformation 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2002),  p.  2  quoting  Luther  (“I  shit  on  the  law  of   the  Pope,  
and  of  the  emperor,  and  on  the  law  of  the  jurists  as  well”). 
3 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (London: Routledge, 2002) p. 4. 
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during the contest for predominance over the trade routes to the Indies.4  It was also 
during this period that religion would contribute to the formation of national identity, 
which would have a profound impact on British colonial policy in the age of 
imperialism, as explored in Part Two, leading to partition, as explained in Part Three. 
Although it has been argued that “a  certain national sentiment”5 was beginning 
to weld together the populations of each kingdom as early as the Renaissance in Italy, 
European territory was still not associated in terms of national identity beyond an 
individual’s  chosen  faith.  Rather, an individual’s  identity  in  the  ancien  régime  tended  
to be accorded recognition only in terms of its relationship to the Christian religion in 
contradistinction to non-Christian religions.  Hence the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 
concluded between France, the Holy Roman Empire, and their respective allies, while 
confirming the rule of cuius regio, eius religio (“whose  realm,  his  religion”)  set  out  in  
the Religious Peace of Augsburg of 1555, only provided safeguards for the Christian 
minorities in Europe.6  Accordingly, Christian minorities could choose the religious 
denomination of their sovereign in order to practise their faiths, which pleased the 
Protestant princes who could be assured of their subject’s loyalty—which led to 
extensive transfers of populations within Germany.7  In other words, in the ancien 
régime a subject tended to be identified by the sovereign by his or her religion, and 
not just their residence,  since  an  individual’s  chosen  faith  affected  their allegiance. 
Accordingly, distinctions were made within Europe between specific Christian 
denominations whether these denominations were Catholic, Protestant, or Orthodox as 
epitomised by the treaties that partitioned Poland.8  And yet the rights of non-
Christians (e.g. Jews who were particularly numerous in Poland) were not recognised.  
Similarly those treaties the European powers concluded with the Sublime Porte 
                                                 
4 See Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum 
(New York: Telos Press, 2003, first published 1950), pp. 86-138; Wilhelm Grewe, The Epochs of 
International Law (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2000, first published 1984), pp. 137-162; and Antony 
Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), pp. 13-31. 
5 Watson, The Evolution of International Society, supra n. 1, p. 163. 
6 See Patrick Thornberry, International Law and the Rights of Minorities (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1991), p. 28. 
7 Watson, The Evolution of International Society, supra n. 1, p. 173. 
8 On the status of Christian minorities in Poland see Clause V of the Partition Treaty between Austria 
and  Poland  (1773)  which  safeguarded  the  rights  of  “the  Dissident  and  the  Non-united  Greeks”;;  Clause  
V of the Partition Treaty between Russia and Poland (1773) which safeguarded the rights of Roman 
Catholics; and clause VII of the Partition Treaty between Prussia and Poland (1773) which also 
safeguarded the rights of Roman Catholics.  See the Treaty between Austria-Hungary and Poland; 
Treaty between Poland and Prussia; and Treaty between Poland and Russia, all signed at Warsaw, 18 
September 1773, in Clive Parry (ed.) 45 The Consolidated Treaty Series (1772-1775), pp. 235-265.   
 
 
46 
preserved Christian religious liberties and rights of worship in Western Asia, but this 
was not reciprocated for Muslims who lived in the European continent.9  Non-
Christians such as Jews and Muslims were seen as an alien presence in Europe, as 
presumably were those persons who worshipped another deity.  Stereotypes of Jews 
and  Muslims  (“the  Turk”)  were  particularly  widespread  in  reformation  Europe, which 
Luther   invoked   in   his   writings   to   make   a   distinction   between   “insiders   and  
outsiders”.10  These stereotypes also affected the policies of the Catholic kingdoms 
that supported  the  Crusades  against  the  “infidels”  from  as  early  as  1095.    The  alleged  
“alien   identity”   of   Jews   and  Muslims   within   a   Christian   Europe   was   marked most 
graphically in Spain with the expulsions of the Jews and the Moors after the 
Reconquista in 1492, when King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella unified their Catholic 
Kingdom.11  It was also manifestly clear from the Inquisition, which Voltaire had 
famously mocked, that heretics were not considered to be a part of the body politic.12   
In addition to matters of religion, European identity was also forged through 
the education and learning that had been inspired by the Renaissance, which coincided 
with the Reformation, widely believed to have originated from Niccolò  Machiavelli’s  
(1469-1527) hometown of Florence.  As Johann Bluntschli (1808-1881), the Swiss 
jurist, observed, it was the Renaissance, which had ushered into most parts of Europe 
a new form of art, thought, and  intellectual  outlook  that  “broke through the bounds of 
medieval scholasticism and monastic theology”.13  From then on a trend had begun 
whereby a coterie of well-educated men would determine the conduct of foreign 
policy by appealing to human considerations as opposed to theocratic orthodoxy.14  
The essence of the Renaissance was humanism, in which God was no longer viewed 
as the measure of all things as the scholastics had tended to believe. Accordingly, 
scholars of the humanist variety tended to look to the ancient Greeks and Romans for 
inspiration   as   the   achievements  of  man   took  precedence   “through   the  diffusion  of   a  
                                                 
9 See e.g. The Treaty of Koutchouk-Kainardji (1774) which provided for ministers of the Imperial 
Court of Russia to make representations in favour of the Orthodox religion, mentioned in Thornberry, 
Rights of Minorities, supra n. 6, p. 33. 
10 Eve Darian-Smith, Religion, Race, Rights: Landmarks in the History of Anglo-American Law 
(Oxford: Hart, 2010), p. 41. 
11 See Josep R. Llobera, The Making of Totalitarian Thought (Oxford: Berg, 2003), pp. 17-26. 
12 See Voltaire, Candide (Penguin Popular Classics, 2007, first published 1759), which is still a good 
and  amusing  read  (if  not  “politically  incorrect”)  two  and  a  half  centuries  after  it  was  written.   
13 Johann Kaspar Bluntschli, The Theory of the State (New York: Libraries Press, 1971, first published 
1895), p. 48. 
14 Bluntschli, ibid, p. 48. 
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liberal   spirit   of   inquiry”.15  In making the ancient Greeks and Romans an object of 
study and inspiration, the humanists, whether wittingly or unwittingly, cast aside the 
knowledge that existed and was available to them from within contemporary and 
ancient non-European cultures, such as Arabic, Indian, Sino-Japanese, etc.  Indeed, 
when in 1723, Christian Wolff (1679-1754), then Professor of Mathematics and 
Natural Philosophy at the University of Halle, and a notable jurist, expressed 
admiration and emphasised the importance of the teachings of Confucius in a lecture 
there, he was ordered by the Prussian Royal Cabinet to leave within 48 hours “under  
pain   of   the   halter”.16  The intolerance displayed towards non-Christian and non-
European cultures indelibly affected the way European statesmen would relate to the 
rest of the world at the height of imperialism, as we shall come to see in Part Two. 
The   common   refrain   “By the Grace of God” that appeared in treaties and 
official correspondence between foreign courts gave expression to the belief that the 
monarch had a divine right to rule over his subjects and that in his person was an 
emanation of the state itself. 17  The doctrine of the divine right of kings provided that 
the monarch was subject to no earthy authority, deriving his right to rule directly from 
the will of God.  The king was thus not subject to the will of his people, the 
aristocracy, or any other estate of the realm, including the church. The doctrine 
implied that any attempt to depose the king or to restrict his powers ran contrary to the 
will of God and could constitute heresy—a theory that was closely connected to the 
idea of sovereignty devised by Jean Bodin (1530-1596), the French jurist and political 
philosopher. In his Six Books of Commonwealth published in 1576 he argued that the 
monarch possessed the right to impose law generally on all subjects regardless of their 
consent.18  James I of England/Scotland went a  stage  further  by  insisting  that  “Kings  
are not onely GODS Lieutenants vpon earth...but even by GOD himselfe they are called 
                                                 
15 Watson, The Evolution of International Society, supra n. 1, p. 153. 
16 For the story, see the introduction by Otfried Nippold in Christian Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo 
Scientifica Pertractatum (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934, first published in 1764), translated by Joseph 
H. Drake, at pp.  xvii – xviii. 
17 See e.g. the way Louis XIV is referred to in the Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and France, 
Concluded at Ryswick, September 10/20th, 1697, in Frances Gardener Davenport (ed.), European 
Treaties Bearing on the History of the United States and its Dependencies, Vol. II, 1650-1697 
(Washington,  D.C.  Carnegie   Institution  of  Washington,  1920),  p.  360.      (“Louis  par   la  grace  de  Dieu,  
roy  de  France  et  de  Navarre”). 
18 See the chapter on Jean Bodin (1530-96) in James Brown Scott, The State and the International 
Community (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), pp. 324-5. 
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Gods...Kings   exercise   a   manner   or   resemblance   of   Divine   power   on   earth”.19  By 
evoking   the   notion   of   a   “divine   right”   James   I   could   occupy   a   position   of   spiritual  
authority equivalent to the Pope to buttress his source of temporal authority.20 
One of the outcomes of this peculiar theory of divine right was that any breach 
of the law was analogous to a personal attack on the body of the sovereign.  Since the 
law represented the will of the sovereign, a breach of the law was a breach against 
him, as though he had been attacked personally, and thus the force of the law was the 
force of the sovereign, which was customarily and cruelly wrought on the body of the 
guilty.21  This partly explains why executions for treason were dealt with especially 
harshly and in public, amidst pomp and ceremony.  During the trials of the regicides 
in 1660, counsel for Kings Charles II took the theory of divine right to its absolute 
apotheosis when he argued  that  “the  King  can  do  no  wrong”  because  he  was  “above  
the  law”.    This  was  because  “the  King  is  immediate  from  God  and  has  no  superior  – 
he   is   our   sovereign   Lord,   and   sovereign   means   he   is   supreme”.22 This notion of 
supremacy and divine right was epitomised in England when the regicides were hung, 
drawn, and quartered at Charing Cross in 1660.  Even those regicides already 
deceased by this date such as Oliver Cromwell, had their bodies exhumed, and hanged 
in their shrouds at Tyburn, before their skulls were impaled at Westminster Hall. In 
France, the notion that the body of the King was  “sacred”  and  could  not  be  touched  
was epitomised by the infamous execution of Damiens the regicide in 1757.23  
It was during the English revolution and the trial of Charles I that the theory of 
a social contract was first spelled out in order to challenge the notion of divine right 
and to quell the abuses it inevitably caused, which would be picked up by 
contemporary writers such as Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), before being refined by 
later scholars, including John Locke (1632-1704), Samuel von Puffendorf (1632-
1694), Emmerich de Vattel (1714-1767), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778).  
These scholars challenged the view that a King could be divine and above the law.  
They argued that by virtue of his position the sovereign had entered into a bond or 
trust with his people. If he violated this trust then his people could remove him.  This 
                                                 
19 James  I,  “A  Speach  to  the  Lords  and  Commons  of  the  Parliament  at  White-Hall”  in  Charles  McIlwain  
(ed.), The Political Works of James I (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918), p. 307. 
20 Darian-Smith, Religion, Race, Rights, supra n. 10, p. 60. 
21 See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (London: Penguin 1991), pp. 
32-69, especially p. 47. 
22 See Geoffrey Robertson, The Tyrannicide Brief: The Story of the Man Who Sent Charles I to the 
Scaffold (London: Vintage, 2005), pp. 194-195.  See also the comment by Roberston in note 14, p. 407. 
23 For a description of this gruelling execution see Foucault, Discipline and Punish, supra n. 21, pp. 3-6. 
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was a theory that gave inspiration to revolts and revolutions from Corsica (1755), to 
the Thirteen American Colonies (1775-1783), Ireland (1782-1784), Belgium (1787-
1790), Holland (1783-1787), Poland (1791-1794), and France (1789-1799).  It must, 
however, be noted that the so-called Glorious Revolution, which took place in 
England in 1688, was an aristocratic revolution.  Power became vested in the 
aristocrats and the King-in-Parliament.  In contrast, the other revolutions were 
organised by the upper middle  classes  or  “the  Bourgeois”  to  use  Marxian  language.   In 
contrast to the American Revolution, during the French Revolution an attempt was 
made to alter social structure.  And unlike the English revolution in 1649-1658, which 
had likewise sought limited social change, the French Revolution was a success. 
Before the identification of a people with the nation-state, let alone before the 
establishment of the nation-state, a people were not  considered  “nationals”  since   the  
very idea of nationality laws, which provided the juridical link between the individual 
and the state did not exist. It was only after the establishment of the nation-state that 
an   individual’s  nationality  was  determined   in   relationship   to   that  state rather than in 
terms   of   one’s   loyalty   to   the   body   of   a   divine   and   munificent   sovereign.   This  
understanding of nationality was linked to nationhood, which in later years would 
come to be associated with the principle of national self-determination, rather than 
obedience to a sovereign. Being a national in a nation was a very different concept to 
being a subject in a monarchy or a citizen in a republic, in that both were much older 
concepts, which were  not  linked  to  an  individual’s  identity, however that identity was 
manifested, whether in terms of birth, language, or blood lineage.24  In Calvin’s  Case 
(1608), which was the leading authority on matters of citizenship in the seventeenth 
century, it was merely held that noblemen were subjects of the English King to whom 
they owed allegiance.25  In other words, there was no conception of belonging to, or 
being a part of, a larger body politic, which was independent of the sovereign-subject 
relationship. This was because during   the   Reformation   an   individual’s   identity 
depended on their place of birth as well as their status at birth, and whether or not they 
belonged   to   the  nobility.      In  England   an   individual’s   status  depended  upon  whether 
one was  a  “gentlemen”,  that  is,  a  peer  or  a  member  of  the  gentry,  or  whether  one  was 
                                                 
24 See Aristotle, The Politics, Book III (London: Penguin 1992), pp. 167-169. 
25 In Calvin’s  Case (1608), Lord Coke held that the subjects of Scotland born after King James VI 
became James I of England could hold land in England as well as in Scotland, because both Scots and 
Englishmen owed allegiance to the same king. See Calvin v Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B. 1608).   
 
 
50 
a commoner.26 The religious authority that one paid homage to by Church attendance 
was also taken into consideration. Thus, Catholics were assumed to owe allegiance to 
the Pope in Rome who was viewed by many Englishmen as a meddling foreigner, 
which is why Protestants tended to refer to them disparagingly  as  “papists”.  This was 
because many Englishmen associated the Papacy with arbitrary government and 
monarchical tyranny on the continent, and with societies that appeared to be 
composed of a few great lords and a mass of impoverished peasants, who lacked the 
freedoms they believed were the inheritance of Englishmen.27  Protestants, in contrast 
to Catholics, demanded a separation between the realm of the spirit, and the order of 
secular society.28  They therefore demanded the creation of a nationalised Church 
whose prayer book would be articulated in a language that they could understand. 
Prior to the French revolution and the emergence of nationalism, advisers, 
counsellors, diplomats, and professors, including those who wrote on what was then 
called the law of nations, were not bound to serve their country or nation because the 
concept   of   the   “nation”   as   a   cohesive,   homogenous,   and   loyal   unit   did   not   exist   as  
such.  Thus, the Prussian statesmen Friedrich von Gentz (1764-1832) could be 
employed in the service of Austria despite   his   “national”   origins, the international 
lawyer Vattel of Switzerland, could be employed in the service of Prussia, and the 
great writer Voltaire (1694-1778), served Frederick II of Prussia as his chamberlain 
for three years, even though he hailed from France.  Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) was 
for a time Ambassador of the Crown of Sweden at the French court, despite his Dutch 
roots, and Rousseau, who was from Geneva, spent a year employed as the secretary to 
the Comte de Montaigue, when he was the French Ambassador to the Republic of 
Venice, a century before modern Italy would be created.   With the sole exception of 
Rousseau; Gentz, Grotius, Locke, Vattel, and Voltaire, moved within aristocratic 
circles, and came from wealthy families, who were close to the ruling elite in their 
respective countries of origin, or else were in their employment.29  In the eighteenth 
century, a French monarch ruled Spain, a Hanoverian ruled Britain, and Francophiles 
ruled Prussia and Bavaria.  However, whilst the rule of this international aristocracy 
                                                 
26 See Brian Manning, Aristocrats, Plebeians, and Revolution in England 1640-1660 (London: Pluto 
Press, 1996), p. 6. 
27 Manning, Aristocrats, Plebeians, and Revolution, ibid, p. 15. 
28 See  Daniel   Philpott,   “The Religious Roots of Modern International Relations”, 52 World Politics 
(2000), pp. 206-245, at p. 223. 
29 Voltaire, for instance, was a very wealthy man, wealthy enough to lend substantial sums of money to 
royalty, at an appropriate high rate of interest, and to invest in the Compagnie des Indes.  See Ian 
Davidson, Voltaire in Exile: The Last Years, 1753-78 (New York: Grove Press, 2004), pp. 3-5. 
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brought like minded people together, it also created the illusion of an international 
feudal civilisation, which floated above the rural masses of people, who were deeply 
rooted to the soil, often illiterate, traditional, and living in isolation from one another. 
Prior to the rise of nationalism, borders were porous and indistinct, and 
sovereignties faded imperceptibly into one another.30  Territory was then viewed as 
little more than the personal appendage of the sovereign much in the way real estate is 
considered today, except that his heirs, who were not subject to taxation, could inherit 
it.  As opposed to territorial expansion overseas, within Europe, sovereigns expanded 
not only through conquest but also by  “sexual  politics”.31  Finding a suitor for the next 
in line was particularly important, as it was a guaranteed way of extending a 
sovereign’s  power  without  having  recourse  to  war.    And  it  did  not  matter  where  that  
territory might be.  Hence, the Emperor of Austria was also the King of Hungary, of 
Bohemia, of Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, Galicia, Lodomeria, Jerusalem, etc.32 And 
George I was King of Great Britain and Ireland, the Duke of Hanover, and 
Archtreasurer and Prince-elector of the Holy Roman Empire.  The fact that George I 
hardly spoke any English or that Hanover was located in central Germany and 
separated from Britain by parts of France, the Netherlands, and the English Channel, 
did not seem to make much difference to the legality of this personal union over 
which the King was the sovereign.33  This age of dynastic cosmopolitanism was also 
reflected in military matters in that most of the continental armies contained large 
numbers of foreign troops such as the Scots brigade in the Dutch army, and the Irish 
brigade of France.34  Accordingly, these soldiers could serve any sovereign that could 
afford to pay for their quarters and upkeep.  The cosmopolitan nature of the European 
ruling classes influenced and moderated the appeal to arms which was viewed as a 
contest between professional standing armies, during which the civilian population 
were to be as little affected as possible.35  The aristocratic and cosmopolitan approach 
to warfare and territorial expansion acted as a moderating factor and contributed to a 
system in which warfare was less devastating and destructive than it is today. 
                                                 
30 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities:  Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 2006), p. 19. 
31 Anderson, Imagined Communities, ibid, p. 20. 
32 See the example Anderson provides in Imagined Communities, ibid, p. 20. 
33 See John Clarke and Jasper Ridley, The Houses of Hanover and Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (London: 
Cassell  &  Co.  2000),  p.  6  (George  I  remained  German  and  made  no  great  effort  to  Anglicize  himself”). 
34 Michael Sheehan, The Balance of Power: History and Theory (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 98.  
35 Stephen C. Neff, War and the Law of Nations:  A General History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), p. 88. 
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Accordingly, in the ancien régime the very idea of sharply delineated and 
demarcated boundaries was largely a misnomer when notions like nationalism and 
sovereignty were underdeveloped in Europe or were considered alien by non-
European cultures.  There was also little need to draw sharply defined boundaries 
when mass migrations between Europeans—let alone between non-Europeans—could 
not take place because of poor standards of transportation.  The only use of 
demarcating boundaries prior to the rise of nationalism was to delineate the extent of a 
sovereign’s  authority  in order to distinguish it from the competition and to provide a 
geographic area for taxation.36  Before modern map-making skills came into use the 
extent  of  a  sovereign’s  authority  was  often  described  in  relation  to  geographic  features  
such as rivers, lakes, and mountains.  For instance, many a sovereign of France 
genuinely believed that   its   “natural   frontiers”   to its East, South, and West, 
corresponded to the Rhine, the Atlantic, and the Pyrenees, and Alps respectively.37  
Before nationalism, borders had a specific strategic nature to delineate buffer zones, 
and to act as compensation for territorial losses and acquisitions. It was only after the 
Congress of Vienna in 1815, when there was a threat from nationalist uprisings that 
boundaries were sharply delineated and demarcated on a large scale.38  As populations 
multiplied and coalesced, it became necessary for governments to define the extent of 
their sovereignty in order to preserve the character and identity of the state. 
 
                                                 
36 See e.g. Peter Sahlins, Unnaturally French: Foreign Citizens in the Old Regime and After (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 161. 
37 See  Peter  Sahlins,  “Natural  Frontiers  Revisited:  France’s  Boundaries  since  the  Seventeenth  Century”,  
95 The American History Review (1990), pp. 1423-1451. 
38 See Edward Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty: Showing the Various Political and Territorial 
Changes which have taken place since the General Peace of 1814, with numerous maps and notes 
(London : Butterworths, 1875-91). 
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II. The Three Partitions of Poland: The Birth of National Self-determination 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Reflecting back on events in the eighteenth century, the American jurist Henry 
Wheaton referred to the partitions of Poland as “the most flagrant violation of natural 
justice and international law” which had occurred “since Europe first emerged from 
barbarism”.39  This was a view with which William Hall concurred, calling the 
partition an  “immoral act of appropriation” whilst Thomas Lawrence thought it was 
“so full of evil” that it found “no warrant in international law”.40 In France, Henry 
Bonfils and Paul Fauchille held a similar view, calling the partitions “ce grande crime 
politique”.41  Robert Redslob also condemned the partitions of Poland and referred to 
them as a bloody assault on the rights of man and as an insult which had been 
characterized by a spirit of cynicism.42  As these views might indicate it would be 
difficult to find an international lawyer writing in the centuries following those 
partitions who held a favourable view of what happened.  And yet in the eighteenth 
century few had complained during the attempt to partition the Spanish Empire or 
when Poland was first partitioned.  What brought about this change in opinion? 
In order to have a better understanding of the historical context in which the 
partition treaties that purported to divide the Spanish Empire, and when Poland was 
partitioned three times over a period of thirty years (1772, 1793, and 1795), it is 
necessary to remind ourselves of the manner in which jurists wrote of the law of 
nations in the century of those partitions as well as in the centuries preceding those 
partitions.  Only in so doing can those partitions be placed in the context of the law as 
it was understood to apply then. The law of nations in the eighteenth century was 
predicated on maintaining a balance of power amongst a multitude of sovereigns on 
the European continent.  This explains why an earlier attempt at partition in the 
eighteenth century, which invoked the balance of power as being its principal 
justification, proved to be uncontroversial when contemporary jurists referred to it in 
                                                 
39 Henry Wheaton, History of the Law of Nations in Europe and America (New York: Gould, Banks & 
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40 William Edward Hall, A Treatise on International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), pp. 143-
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their writings.  Thus, when assessing the legality of the partitions of Poland most 
jurists writing in that era would have assessed it against this understanding of 
European law. In other words, their concern would have been whether the conflict that 
had been waged against Poland was just and if so whether acquiring sovereignty over 
parts of its territory was a genuine necessity to maintain the balance of power.  
Whilst international lawyers writing in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century also expressed their views on the balance of power, the way in which it was 
applied prior to the French Revolution differed in many fundamental respects from 
after 1789.  This is because at the heart of the debate was the matter of “popular 
sovereignty”, which, in various guises, would later be recognized as “national self-
determination”,  and which was no longer contested in the mid-nineteenth century to 
the extent that it had been a century earlier.  Generally, those who favoured partition 
to preserve the balance of power in the eighteenth century, tended to hail from the 
upper classes, and derided those who praised popular government, who in turn tended 
to hail from the middle classes. The latter despised the partitions of Poland and 
thought that the balance of power system needed reform because it provided a system 
that justified conquest.  The inklings of such a critique began to emerge as early as the 
English Revolution in 1649, but because of the subsequent Restoration in 1660, these 
views did not garner wide support until the mid eighteenth centuries, particularly after 
the Thirteen American Colonies succeeded in breaking their chains with Britain.  As 
the idea of conquest is in diametrical conflict with the idea of popular sovereignty, 
which by definition necessitates obtaining consent from the vanquished in order to 
obtain legal title to territory, conquest justified by reference to the balance of power, 
which required no such consent, acquired a sinister reputation.  Essentially the balance 
of power justified a system of warfare that recognised title acquired by conquest when 
peoples were treated no better than chattels, which was opposed to the very idea that 
man had  “natural  rights”, or a right to preserve the integrity of his territory.   
Prior to the Congress of Vienna in 1815, there was an absence of nationalism 
as a determining factor in foreign policy.43  With the exception of Portugal and the 
Dutch Republic, the Austrian, Prussian, Russian, and Spanish Empires were 
multinational.  In other words, they were large sprawling political entities whose 
boundaries encompassed peoples of varied ethnic, religious, and linguistic 
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backgrounds.  Thus, the decision for or against allying with any particular state in a 
balance of power arrangement was uninfluenced by nationalism.  Accordingly, any 
historical account of the emergence of nationhood in international law must take into 
account the fundamental change in the structure of international relations that was still 
associated with the balance of power and with a political system, which in many 
respects,  resembled  “a  kind  of  perpetual  stately  waltz”.44  This necessitates a historical 
inquiry that takes into account the structural transformation of international relations 
between 1713, when the balance of power found expression in the Treaty of Utrecht, 
during which the Spanish Empire was divided, when little account was taken of 
national aspirations, and the Congress of Vienna in 1815, that ended the Wars of the 
French Revolution in which ideas associated with nationhood were deliberately 
suppressed.  The Treaty of Utrecht ended a war of succession, that is, a war fought 
between dynasties, kings, queens, princes, and regents, whereas the peace negotiated 
at Vienna sought to end a war, which had been fought by a collectivity of monarchs 
against a country that claimed to represent the nation or the homeland (patrie).45   
My analysis in this chapter is limited primarily to the first era because it was 
only in the era of “genteel and pragmatic politics” associated with the eighteenth 
century that conquest, the balance of power, and territorial redistribution in the form 
of indemnities, went hand in hand.  It was also in this era that Poland was partitioned 
thrice although there was a distinction between the first, the second, and the third 
partitions of Poland.  The second and third partitions of Poland (1793 and 1795) 
differed from the first partition of Poland (1772) in that they were connected to the 
French Revolution (1789).  Accordingly, the first partition was justified on various 
grounds relating to balance of power machinations whilst the latter two were designed 
to suppress revolution.  Moreover, in contrast to the first partition of Poland the 
second and third partitions, which effectively wiped Poland off the European map for 
123 years, provoked an outcry in Poland and beyond.  Poland, it was argued, was a 
nation, and thus any attempt to divide it even if it was avowedly necessary to preserve 
the  balance  of  power,  was  manifestly  “contrary  to  the  law  of  nations”.    And yet at the 
time of the partitions there were voices of support from Edmund Burke and Frederick 
von Gentz who argued in favour of the partitions as a necessary evil to thwart the 
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genie of popular sovereignty in order to contain and to suppress revolution.  These 
gentlemen who were close to the aristocratic upper classes feared the prospect of 
popular sovereignty because they associated it with  “mob  rule”  i.e.  majority  rule.   
In order to understand what led to this dramatic transformation in legal and 
political opinion it is necessary to revisit the central justification advanced for the 
partitions; namely, that partition had been necessary to maintain the balance of power 
in opposition to the prospect of popular sovereignty.  Or to put it another way, 
partition sought to maintain the status quo, in opposition to majority rule.  What this 
really meant was preserving a system that was convenient to the ruling minority elite.  
Whilst most legal scholars take 1776 or 1789 as their starting point for the origins of 
self-determination, they do not differentiate them or place them in context. 1776 was a 
revolution in name only.  It was influenced by the 1688 revolution in England and it 
did not seek to tinker with social structure.  Thus, it maintained the system of 
representative government. 1789 was a different matter altogether.  That revolution 
was influenced by the 1649 revolution in England, when Charles I was beheaded.  The 
French Revolution sought to abolish feudalism, and to disperse political power more 
widely.  1688 and 1776 were constitutional revolutions and gave inspiration to British 
imperialists the world over, whereas 1649 and 1789 gave inspiration to socialism.46  
Representative government was the system promoted in all British colonial territories, 
including in Ireland, India, Palestine, and throughout Southern Africa. In contrast, 
socialism gave inspiration to the Marxists, who devised a system of political thought, 
which claimed to represent all people, to grant equality to all.   It was because of the 
tensions inherent in these two schools of thought that partition arose in the twentieth 
century.  Those who favoured partition looked to the history of representative 
government in England and America for inspiration, whilst those who opposed 
partition looked to the French Revolution, and to the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in 
Russia, as explained in Part Three. The partitions of Poland fit into this framework 
because they occurred in the twilight of the Enlightenment after the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen had been proclaimed in Paris.  The partitions of 
Poland were justified to suppress a revolution, which sought to vest political power in 
the body of the nation.  Thus the partitions of Poland and the subjugation of that 
country throughout the nineteenth century involved the continued suppression of a 
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nascent national movement, a violation of sovereignty, and of territorial integrity.  It is 
the connection between a people, its identity, and its territory, which is central to 
understanding how the partitions of Poland contribute to our understanding of self-
determination.  For a basic supposition of nearly all self-determination claims is that a 
people who inhabit a territorial unit which other states view as having a legitimate 
claim to it, are entitled to have the sovereignty and integrity of that territory respected.   
Poland was not merely an example of a   revolution   that   was   “nipped   in   the  
bud”   as   the revolutions in England, Corsica, and Ireland had been.  Rather, what 
happened in Poland was that a nation was completely subjugated. The partitioning 
power even had the audacity to attempt to wipe out its name from history.47  And yet 
Poland revolted, again and again.  Thus the partition of Poland not only contributed to 
our understanding of self-determination by attempting to thwart the notion of popular 
sovereignty.  The partitions of Poland also contributed to the notion that self-
determination was associated with “alien subjugation, domination and exploitation”, 
by providing an early example of such an instance, although this discourse was only 
incorporated into the corpus of international law in the twentieth century.  In this 
connection the partitions of Poland are central to understanding how the principle of 
self-determination developed in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century as 
they are the missing link between the American (1776) and French (1789) Revolutions 
and Lenin (1917) and Wilson’s   (1918) championing of the principle after the First 
World War, which had a major impact at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.  
 
 
2. The balance of power and title by conquest 
 
Although   the   term  “balance of power” has not receded from international discourse 
and is still used by political scientists today, the way in which it was originally 
conceived in the sixteenth century meant that it could only operate in a time when 
conquest was not prohibited.48  This is because the balance of power differed 
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substantially from the modern concept of collective security as encapsulated in 
Chapter VII UN Charter, in that it provided for exchanges of peoples and territories in 
the form of annexations, territorial indemnities, and land swaps, and was intimately 
linked to the notion of conquest, which is prohibited by contemporary international 
law.  At the end of the Middle Ages, however, when political and military power was 
associated   with   the   size   of   a   sovereign’s   population   and   territory, any inordinate 
increase in the population and territory of a particular sovereign was considered 
threatening.49  A combination would then be formed, to prevent the acquisition by that 
sovereign of even more population and territory to “redress the balance”.   
The preeminent example of this was the European coalition combined against 
France during the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), which broke out after 
France reneged on its agreement to the Partition Treaties (described below).  That war 
was concluded by the Treaty of Utrecht (1714), which explicitly made reference to the 
balance of power, although it was not, as some scholars have suggested, the first treaty 
to explicitly do so.50  At Utrecht the map of Europe was reconstituted and 
reconfigured as if it were some sort of giant jigsaw puzzle by reallocating populations 
and their territories between the ratifying parties without any consideration 
whatsoever being given to   the   “wishes of   the   people” who were for all intents and 
purposes   “invisible”.  Whilst Christian minorities were recognised in some of the 
treaties concluded in this era and were given rights of worship, and freedom to 
practice their religion, these were a far cry from modern civil and political rights.51  
And obviously these rights applied to Christians only.  Thus, the Treaty of Utrecht that 
ceded Gibraltar to Britain specifically excluded the Moors and Jews of protection.52 
In the eighteenth century, and earlier, interventions to preserve “the balance of 
power” were often referred to in official correspondence  and   treaties  as  “conserving 
the publik peace”, “preserving the publik quiet”, “maintaining the general tranquillity 
of Europe”, “preserving the peace of Christendom”, “maintaining the European 
                                                                                                                                            
“offshore   balancing”,   “buck-passing   strategy”   etc.      This   is   a   different   way   in   which   the   balance   of  
power was originally interpreted and invoked in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries.  
49 See Norman Hill, Claims to Territory in International Law and International Relations (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 36. 
50 The first to explicitly mention the balance of power are the Partition Treaties referenced below.   
51 See e.g. the Treaty of Oliva (1660), Austro-Ottoman Treaty (1615), and the Treaties of Koutchouk-
Kainardji (1774), which protected the rights of religious minorities.  See Thornberry, Rights of 
Minorities, supra n. 6, pp.  25-37. 
52 See Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (New York: The MacMillan Co., 
1954), p. 126. 
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equilibrium”, and “the balance of Europe”.53  All these phrases provided a common 
reference point which sovereigns could collectively invoke in order to justify military 
interventions as necessary to maintain what effectively amounted to the territorial 
status quo.  In this regard the balance of power is probably best described as a 
rudimentary form of collective security that provided a justification for the external 
intervention by military means by a sovereign or a group of sovereigns in the affairs 
of another sovereign to prevent it becoming all-powerful and a threat to the others.  
The terminology that was then employed to negatively describe a monarch that was 
actively   seeking   to   acquire   such   power   was   “universal   monarchy”.54  Thus wars 
waged in order to maintain the balance sought to prevent a monarch from aspiring to a 
position of omnipotence that would imperil the interests of other sovereigns.  In an 
age before the common man was perceived to have political rights, conquest was 
considered a sufficient basis to acquire legal title to territory, since the idea of self-
determination as a legal right, which would have prohibited this, did not yet exist.  
Accordingly, when sovereigns spoke of maintaining the balance of power they were 
thinking of maintaining a balance of power in relations between themselves only; not 
between themselves, and all of their subjects, irrespective of their statuses in society.  
The notion of acting pre-emptively to thwart the ambitions of a sovereign 
seeking universal empire was justified by reference to the balance of power, and found 
wide support in humanist scholarship in the sixteenth century.  This was in opposition 
to the scholastics who took a more restricted view of the right to embark on wars of 
conquest.55  The humanists (mostly Protestants from England, Holland, and Italy) had 
a tendency to invoke ancient Greek and Roman authors to expound their international 
legal theories, which included justifying pre-emptive strikes.  That the humanists took 
                                                 
53 These various terms were routinely used in the treaties that are discussed later in this chapter.  See 
e.g. the draft secret treaties concerning the Wars of the Spanish and Polish Successions, where in 
private instructions, King George II instructed James Earl Waldegrave, his Ambassador to France, to 
inform the King of France that should he refuse to consent to the terms of his peace plan then war 
between France and the maritime powers would become  inevitable.    (“…the Carrying on the War, on 
the side of Germany, or in the Empire, (especially considering the conquests, already made, in those 
Parts by France) must affect, to such a degree, the Balance of Power in Europe, that it is scarce to be 
expected, that the Maritime Powers (when the Emperor shall have agreed to the Terms proposed by 
them) can sit still, and see such extraordinary measure pursued, without any other Security for the 
Equilibre…”)      See  the  draft  secret  treaties  on  the  Spanish  and  Polish Succession SP 78/207, Paris, 12 
January 1735, available at The National Archives UK. 
54 See   Franz   Bosbach,   “The   European   Debate   on   Universal   Monarchy”,   in   David   Armitage   (ed.),  
Theories of Empire, 1450-1800 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 81-98. 
55 See the contrasting perspectives on war of the humanists and scholastics in the first two chapters of 
Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from 
Grotius to Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), at pp. 16-50 and pp. 51-77 respectively. 
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a more relaxed approach to armed conflict is perhaps not surprising when we 
remember that Englishmen like Sir Francis Drake (1540-1596) had acquired a certain 
reputation attacking Spanish ships laden with bullion from the Indies.  It was also not 
surprising in light of the Spanish Armada (1588) when England faced the prospect of 
being invaded by one of the largest assembled fleets in human history.  Accordingly, it 
made sense for the humanists to argue that Britain need not wait until the armada had 
landed before resorting to the use of force but could strike the Spanish ships on the 
open waters before they actually attacked British territory. The scholastics, by 
contrast, were mostly of Spanish or Italian origin, and trained as Catholic theologians 
(of the Dominican and Jesuit orders) who naturally looked to Rome for inspiration and 
to the Papacy for guidance.  As most of them were in the position of defending an 
empire one can perhaps understand why they did not champion pre-emptive strikes.  
It was the humanist tradition that would have the greatest impact on 
international legal scholarship, which arose out of the struggle between the English, 
the French, and the Dutch, against the Portuguese and Spanish monopolies in the Far 
East and in the Indies.  By formulating a view of the world associated with raison 
d’état, pre-emptive strikes, self-defence, and the balance of power, the humanists 
sought to provide parity in a community of competing, inter-dependent, and pluralistic 
states.  The humanist tradition provided a rational view of international politics, which 
rejected the idea that the Pope was the lord of the world, although many of the 
Protestants who formulated these views were very serious about their religion.  Thus 
the humanists tended to focus on the separate identity of Christian Europe as the 
equivalent of a Respublica.56 One of the consequences of making the Respublica 
Christiana the object of loyalty was that the loyalty of those who did not profess 
Christianity was questioned.  As Andrea Alciato (1492-1550) explained in his Opera, 
the Respublica Christiana excluded from citizenship “those  who  in  Asia,  Africa  and  
other provinces do not profess the faith of CHRIST...when war is declared against 
Turks and Saracens...those taken in war become the property of the captors.  But it is 
otherwise  among  Christians,  for  under  the  law  of  CHRIST  all  men  are  brothers”.57 
                                                 
56 Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace, ibid, p. 28. 
57 Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace, ibid, pp. 28-29 quoting Opera, I (Basle, 1571) col. 274. 
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The first expression of the idea of maintaining a balance was expounded in 
Storia  d’Italia58 written by Francesco Guicciardini (1483-1540),  Machiavelli’s  friend  
and Florentine colleague, which he used to justify the priority of state interest over 
private morality and religion.59 Guicciardini greatly influenced Alberico Gentili 
(1552-1608), an Italian Protestant, who fled Italy and sought refuge in England and 
who had a profound impact on humanist scholarship, on the balance of power, and the 
laws of war.  Gentili was appointed the Regius Professor of Civil Law at the 
University of Oxford from 1587-1605 and he frequently cited Guicciardini in his De 
Iure Belli Libri Tres.60  It was Gentili who first introduced the concept of pre-emptive 
strikes that underpinned the balance of power from his native Italy, where it was 
maintained  amongst  the  Princes  “under  the  constant  care  of  Lorenzo  de’  Medici”, to 
his students who it is believed included John Selden (1584-1654) and Thomas 
Hobbes.61  Gentili was also said to have influenced the Earl of Essex and Francis 
Bacon62 (1561-1626), a close friend of his, who played a leading role in the creation 
of British colonies, especially in Virginia, the Carolinas, and Newfoundland.  In his 
Considerations touching a War with Spain (1624) Bacon gave as one of the reasons 
justifying the quarrel that a just fear is a good cause for a just, preventative war.63  He 
referred  with  approval  to  the  “good days of Italy” in which Princes kept an eye on one 
another, and recalled the watchfulness of monarchs who would make them react to 
any taking of territory so as to “set the balance of Europe upright again”.64   
 Clearly,  Bacon  had  been  influenced  by  Gentili’s  ideas, which also provided the 
foundations for Grotius, Hobbes, and other scholars who sought to justify colonial 
expansion in order to open up the trade routes to the New World. In his writings 
Gentili described the state as an autonomous agent governed by an extremely thin set 
                                                 
58 See Francesco Guicciardini, The History of Italy, translated by Sidney Alexander (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1984, first published as Storia   d’Italia   by Presso Giorgio Angelieri in 
1540). 
59 See,   for  example,  Guicciardini’s  use  of   language   in  his  Dialogues in Alison Brown (ed. & trans.), 
Guicciardini:  Dialogue on the Government of Florence (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 
1994, first published 1527), p. 159. 
60 See Alberico Gentili, De Iure Belli Libri Tres, translated by John C. Rolfe (Oxford: At the Clarendon 
Press, 1933, translation of the edition of 1612). 
61 Gentili, De Iure Belli Libri Tres, ibid, p. 65 (referring to the Medici) and Tuck, The Rights of War, 
ibid, p. 17 (referring to the possibility that his students may have included Selden and Hobbes). 
62 See Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace, supra n. 55, p. 17. 
63 Bacon also cited Thucydides with approval in his Considerations that was drafted for King Charles in 
which he urged England to break its treaties and make war with Spain.  See Bacon Works, Spedding 
(London 1874), p. 474.  
64 Alfred Vagts and Detlev  F.  Vagts,   “The  Balance   of   Power   in   International  Law:  A  History  of   an  
Idea”,  73  The American Journal of International Law (1979), p. 555 at p. 559, note 15 referring to 2 
Works of Francis Bacon, B. Monatgu ed. 1859, p. 199, 205. 
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of moral requirements, which was in sharp contrast to the views of the scholastics like 
Francisco de Vitoria (1492-1546) and Luis de Molina (1535-1600) for whom wars in 
pursuit of glory, or pre-emptive strikes were utterly forbidden.65  Gentili’s  religion  and  
history of persecution undoubtedly affected his outlook.66  He strongly supported 
going to war pre-emptively to deter the pretensions of an ambitious sovereign before it 
was too late to stop him67 whereas Molina had been influenced by the Dominicans, the 
most  notable  critics  of  Spain’s  conquest  and  colonisation  of  the  New  World.68   
In De Iure Belli, Gentili who lived through the experience of the Spanish 
Armada’s  attempt   to   invade  Britain, argued that it was just for a sovereign to go to 
war based upon the mere fear that  it  might  be  attacked.    “[W]e ought not to wait for 
violence to be offered us, if it is safer to meet it half-way”  he  wrote.69  To elucidate, 
Gentili  paraphrased  “the excellent saying” attributed to Philo, that we should “kill a 
snake as soon as we see one, even though it has not injured us and will perhaps not 
harm us.  For thus we protect ourselves before it attacks us”.70  Suspicion was not 
enough however.  A just cause for apprehension was necessary before a sovereign 
could act pre-emptively, but it was not necessary to await an armed attack.  Whilst 
Gentitli tempered this conclusion   by   arguing   that   “the   lust for dominion is 
condemned”, which included wars made   for   the   sake   of   extending   one’s power, he 
was  nonetheless  of  the  view  that  “it is beyond doubt that lands and other possessions 
may be acquired under the title of war not less than by any other title whatsoever”.71  
Richard Zouche (1590-1661),   one   of   Gentili’s   successors   at   Oxford,   concurred,   in  
defending the right of Queen Elizabeth I to come to the aid of the Dutch against the 
Spaniards.72  In the days of Gentili and Zouche, the Spanish and Turkish Empires 
posed the greatest threat to the European order because they were “planning and 
                                                 
65 Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace, supra n. 55, pp. 51-52. 
66 Noel   Malcolm   takes   issue   with   Tuck’s   argument   that   Gentili’s   humanism   led   him   to   separate  
theology  from  politics.    In  his  study  of  Gentili,  Malcolm  concluded  that  his  “commitment  to  a  strongly  
Biblical protestantism remained  an  active  element  in  his  whole  pattern  of  thought”.    See  Noel  Malcolm,  
“Alberico  Gentili   and   the  Ottomans”,   in   Benedict   Kingsbury   and   Benjamin   Straumann,   The Roman 
Foundations of the Law of Nations:  Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), pp. 127-145, at p. 145.  
67 Tuck, The Rights of War, supra n. 55, p. 18. 
68 Tuck, The Rights of War, ibid, pp. 68-77. 
69 Gentili, De Iure Belli Libri Tres, supra n. 60, p. 61. 
70 Gentili, De Iure Belli Libri Tres, ibid, p. 61. 
71 Gentili, De Iure Belli Libri Tres, ibid, p. 304. 
72 See Richard Zouche, Iuris et Iudici Fecialis, sive, Iuris Inter Gentes, et Quaestionum de Eodem 
Explicatio (1650), Vol. II, translated by J.L. Brierly in The Classics of International Law by James 
Brown Scott (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1911), p. 114. 
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plotting universal dominion”.73   Thus, Gentili and Zouche were essentially 
advocating the forging of alliances, to deal with what was perceived to be a common 
threat to the European order, under the rubric of what  Bacon  had  called  the  “balance 
of Christendom”,74 which in later centuries would commonly come to be called the 
balance of power, to provide for the peace and stability of Europe.  In  Gentili’s  eyes  
Europe was a Christian commonwealth, which is why he was strongly opposed to the 
forging of alliances between Christian powers and infidels.75  In light of the threat 
posed  by  the  Turks  to  Europe,  Gentili  argued  that  “there  is  always  a  just cause for war 
against  the  Turks”.76 And as Zouche explained, it was an essential part of the law of 
nations that a cardinal consequence of a just war, which was fought to preserve the 
European equilibrium, was  that  “universal ownership over things and persons, that is 
to say, over territories and peoples, is acquired  by  surrender  and  by  victory”.77 
Similarly, like Gentili and Zouche, Grotius also justified title to territory 
obtained by conquest   and   even   went   so   far   as   to   claim   that   “to every man it is 
permitted to enslave himself to any one he pleases for private ownership”.78  Grotius, 
who argued that an individual in nature was morally identical to a state, and who had 
achieved international notoriety by publishing a treatise justifying the Dutch wars in 
the Indies, explained  that  “just as private property can be acquired by means of a war 
that  is  lawful  …  so by the same means public authority, or the right of governing, can 
be  acquired,  quite  independently  of  any  other  source”.79  In  Grotius’s  view  treating a 
single individual as private property could also apply to an entire population as well: 
“when a people is transferred this is not, strictly speaking, a transfer of the individuals 
but of the perpetual right of governing them in their totality as a people”. Despite 
Grotius’s   view  on   conquest   he did have something interesting to say about popular 
sovereignty, to which we turn to next, which got him into a spot of trouble at home. 
                                                 
73 Gentili, De Iure Belli Libri Tres, supra n. 60, p. 64. 
74 See James Spedding (ed.), The Letters and the Life of Francis Bacon, Vol. VII (London: Longmans, 
Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1874), p. 125, where Bacon refers to the importance of those parts of 
Germany   to   “the   balance   of   Christendom”   in   acting   as   “the   bulwark   of   Christendom   against   the  
approaches  of  the  Turk”. 
75 See  Malcolm,  “Alberico  Gentili  and   the  Ottomans”,   in  Kingsbury and Straumann, Alberico Gentili 
and the Justice of Empire, supra n. 66, pp. 138-145. 
76 Malcolm,  “Alberico  Gentili  and  the  Ottomans”,  ibid,  p.  127. 
77 Zouche, Iuris et Iudici Fecialis, supra n. 72, p. 41. 
78 Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres, (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1925, first 
published 1646, translated by Francis W. Kelsey), p. 103. 
79 Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres, ibid, p. 105. 
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Indeed, his subsequent volte-face provoked the anger of Rousseau a century later, 
when he singled out Grotius for specific disapproval in his most famous work.   
 
 
3. Representative government and the question of consent 
 
During the seventeenth century, some watershed moments in European history took 
place, which led to a fundamental restructure of international relations. This led some 
jurists and scholars to challenge the previous opinions expressed by scholars regarding 
the right of conquest by introducing the argument that consent was necessary to 
legitimise any acquisition of sovereignty.  Although this shift in opinion did not have 
an immediate impact on the general law of nations, these ideas did progressively over 
time, in line with state practice, have a major impact on the subsequent development 
of international law. This might explain why the partitions of Poland provoked an 
outcry, whereas previous partitions had provoked little discontent.  In this regard, 
before examining the partitions of Poland in detail, opinion regarding the right to 
acquire title by conquest, and especially the argument that consent was necessary to 
validate legal title ought to be explored first in the context of developments that took 
place in Europe in the seventeenth century.  This set the tone for the debate on Poland.   
One year after Westphalia (1648), England, which was not party to that treaty, 
and   did   not   partake   in   the  Thirty  Year’s  War, beyond stationing troops in the Low 
Countries, put King Charles I on trial and had him executed.  The trial was the first of 
its kind in European history.  Never before had a sovereign been tried as being 
beholden to the law, since it was always assumed that the sovereign was above the 
law. And Charles I was charged whilst he was still King as  being   “a   tyrant,   traitor,  
murderer   and   a   public   and   implacable   enemy   to   the   Commonwealth   of   England”.  
Charles I, among numerous other crimes and misdemeanours was charged with having 
damaged   “the   nation”.   And   John Cooke, the prosecutor, who was tasked with 
charging   him  with   these   high   crimes,   claimed   that   he  was   acting   “on   behalf   of   the  
people   of   England”.80  As Cooke argued in King Charles, His Case,81 which he 
                                                 
80 Robertson, Tyrannicide Brief, supra n. 22, pp. 148-9. 
81 John Cooke, King Charles His Case Or An Appeal to All Men concerning His Tryal at the High 
Court of Justice for the Most Part That Which Was Intended to Have Been at the Bar If the King Had 
Pleaded to the Charge and Himself upon a Fair Tryal. With an Additional Opinion the Death of King 
James the Lots of Rochel and of Ireland 7, 1649.  For the historical background to the case and this 
pamphlet see Robertson, Tyrannicide Brief, ibid, pp. 190-192. 
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published  a  week  after  the  King’s  execution,  and which contained the closing speech 
he had intended to deliver, had Charles entered a plea against the charges: 
 
By the fundamental law of this Kingdom, by the general Law of all Nations, 
and the unanimous consent of all rational men in the world...when any man is 
instructed with the sword for the protection and preservation of his people, if 
this man shall imploy it to their destruction, which was put into his hand for 
their safety, by the Law of that Land he becomes an enemy to that people, and 
deserves the most exemplary and severe punishment that can be invented: And 
this is the first necessary fundamental law of every Kingdom, which by 
intrinsical rules of Government must preserve itself: and this Law needed not 
be express, that if a King become Tyrant, he shall dye for it...82 
 
Just  after  2  o’clock  on  Tuesday,  30 January 1649, Charles I was publicly beheaded.83  
This momentous event not only amounted to a wholesale attack on the notion that 
kings were divine and above the law, and not only provided a precedent for later 
instances of regicide and revolution, but it also provided one of the first instances of 
the  “common  man”  overthrowing  a  tyrannical  regime.  Cooke’s  pamphlet, which was 
addressed  to  “all  rational  men”,  was  not  only  an  appeal  to  common  sense  and  reason;;  
it was also an appeal to the general public, i.e. to the wider nation, for most Puritans, 
including John Cooke, came from what we would today describe as poor working 
class families.  Significantly,  by  invoking  the  discourse  of  “the  nation”,  and requiring 
the  “consent  of  all  rational  men”,  the trial and execution of Charles I also contributed 
to the idea of nationhood and self-determination.84  Although Oliver Cromwell (1599-
1658) was from the poorer side of a well-to-do family and who accumulated 
substantial sums of money in his later years,85 he had to rely on the “middling  sort”86 
                                                 
82 John Cooke, King Charles His Case, ibid, pp. 22-23 (emphasis added). 
83 None of the officers charged with supervising the execution wanted to sign the order for the actual 
beheading, so they brought their dispute to Cromwell who signed it.  See Ian Gentles, Oliver Cromwell:  
God’s  Warrior  and  the  English  Revolution (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 82. 
84 One reason that might explain why the proceedings of trial have been overlooked in much 
international legal scholarship to date is because the proceedings of the trial are not easily accessible as 
Robertson explains in Tyrannicide Brief, supra n. 22, pp. 373-377.      For   instance,   the  King’s   trial   is  
totally  omitted  from  Phillipps’  State Trials, although it includes all the treason trials against the King as 
well as the trials of the regicides, including that of John Cooke.  See Samuel March Phillipps, State 
Trials; or a collection of the most interesting trials, prior to the revolution of 1688, reviewed and 
illustrated (London:  W.  Walker,  1826).    Evidently,  the  King’s  Trial  (1649)  was  not  considered  “a  most  
interesting trial”  even  though  it  took  place  before  the  revolution  of  1688. 
85 Despite the money that Cromwell made, he preserved a relatively modest style of life, and was not 
motivated by money.  See Gentles, Oliver  Cromwell:    God’s  Warrior, supra n. 83, pp. 135-143. 
86 The   “middling   sort”   has   been   described   by   Brian   Manning   as   “a   substantial   middle   rank   in   the  
population  between  the  wealthy  aristocrats  and  the  impoverished  masses”.    This  expression  refers  “not  
only to the bigger peasants and richer craftsmen but also to the general body of small producers in 
agriculture  and  industry  who  had  sufficient  resources  to  live  without  having  to  work  for  wages”.    See  
Manning, Aristocrats, Plebeians, and Revolution in England, supra n. 26, p. 4 and p. 10. 
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of people and lower ranking officers in his New Model Army to defeat the armies of 
Charles I in the Civil Wars.87  As  the  English  historian  Christopher  Hill  observed,  “the  
men who came to power in December 1648, and who were responsible for the 
execution of Charles I, were men well below the rank of the traditional rulers of 
England”.88  In  addition  to  promoting  “commoners”  to  the  upper  echelons  of  the army, 
Cromwell had forged an alliance with political and religious radicals in order to 
present a unified front against Charles.  However, Cromwell would cast aside these 
allies in  his  later,  more  “aristocratic” years, when they became a nuisance to him, and 
when he was considering whether or not to accept the Crown.89 For Cromwell had 
always been closer to the upper echelons of English propertied society. He strenuously 
opposed vesting political power in the lower classes, as the Levellers had desired.90 
Indeed he suspected   that  were  “the  people” to be sovereign they would reinstate the 
monarchy.91  Since the mass of the population was unsophisticated politically, and 
under the influence of their landlords and parsons, it was feared that giving them the 
vote would strengthen the conservatives.  As Milton, pointedly asked, what would the 
Commonwealth do if the mob demanded Charles II be restored to the kingdom?92  
Nonetheless,  whilst  Cromwell’s  Commonwealth  was  not   a   radical revolution 
by modern standards it was still a revolution.  Indeed, the creation of a 
Commonwealth in  England  in   the  aftermath  of  Charles  I’s  execution,  albeit one that 
was relatively short lived, is one of the earliest instances of a people in the modern age 
assuming political power and taking control of its political destiny.  As the Act 
declaring  England  to  be  a  Commonwealth  stipulated:    “the  authority  ...  that  the people 
of England, and of all the dominions and territories ... hereby constituted, made, 
established, and confirmed, to be a Commonwealth and Free State, and shall from 
henceforth be governed as a Commonwealth and Free State by the supreme authority 
of this nation, the representatives of the people in Parliament, and by such as they 
shall appoint and constitute as officers and ministers under them for the good of the 
                                                 
87 Here I am primarily relying   on   my   reading   of   Christopher   Hill’s,   God’s   Englishman:   Oliver  
Cromwell and the English Revolution (London: Penguin 1990). 
88 Hill, God’s  Englishman, ibid, p. 97. 
89 He did not accept the Crown in the end.  See Hill, God’s  Englishman, ibid, p. 165-191. 
90 Hill, God’s  Englishman, ibid, p. 139. 
91 Gentles, Oliver  Cromwell:    God’s  Warrior, supra n. 83, p. 58. 
92 Hill, God’s  Englishman, supra n. 87, p. 198-199. 
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people, and that without any King or House  of  Lords”.93  The Revolution established 
much greater unity within the British Isles that had hitherto existed, especially since it 
was also accompanied by the conquest of Ireland and Scotland. Ultimately, 
Cromwell’s   republican   regimes  of   the  1650s   established  a   strong  centralised   regime  
for naval, commercial, and colonial power, which was more profitable for the leadings 
sections of the  “middle  sort  of  people”  than  the  weak  central  government  and  strong  
local democracy that was advocated by the Levellers.94  Thus, the idea of self-
determination ultimately emerged in English political thought in order to replace the 
political void created by the removal of the previous sovereign, which in an age 
associated with dynastic absolutism, had tended to be vested in a hereditary monarch.   
One of the consequences of replacing a hereditary monarch with a government 
that based its authority through the representation of the people in Parliament was that 
the juridical connection between the King and his realm was severed.  Thus, the Act 
that abolished the Office of the King in 1649, declared  that  “all  the  people  of  England  
and Ireland, and the dominions and territories thereunto belonging, of what degree or 
condition soever, are discharged of all fealty, homage, and allegiance which is or shall 
be pretended to be due unto any of the issue and posterity of the said late King, or any 
claiming  under  him”.95  The  “fealty,   homage,   and  allegiance”  which  had  previously  
been   owed   the   King   was   now   transferred   to   “the   Commonwealth   of   England”.96  
Accordingly, the notion of representative government was inherently linked to the 
idea of consent because it was only by obtaining the consent of Parliament that an 
individual’s  right to rule became legitimate.  In later years, the idea of representative 
government became associated with the emergence of democracy because this was the 
only system of government, which could fairly claim to represent the people.   
This is why it is important to revisit the relationship between the sovereign and 
his subjects in the ancien régime to provide context to the issue of consent.  For if it is 
necessary to obtain consent from “the  nation”, rather than from the sovereign, then 
one must inquire as to what the nation that must consent to any change of sovereignty 
                                                 
93 “An  Act  Declaring  England   to  be  a  Commonwealth”,  19  May,  1649,   in  Samuel  Rawson  Gardiner  
(ed.), The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution 1625-1660 (Oxford: At the Clarendon 
Press, 1906), p. 388 (emphasis added). 
94 Manning, Aristocrats, Plebeians, and Revolution in England, supra n. 26, p. 138. 
95 “The  Act  Abolishing   the  Office   of   the  King”,   in Gardiner (ed.), Constitutional Documents of the 
Puritan Revolution, supra n. 93, p. 385. 
96 “Engagement   to   be  Taken   by  All  Men   of   the  Age   of  Eighteen”,   in  Gardiner   (ed.),  Constitutional 
Documents of the Puritan Revolution,   ibid,  p.  391.  (“I  do  declare  and promise, that I will be true and 
faithful  to  the  Commonwealth  of  England,  as  it  is  now  established,  without  a  King  or  House  of  Lords”). 
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amounts to.  In the ancien régime,   “the  nation”   tended   to   reflect   the   interests  of   the  
knights, esquires, and the propertied classes.  Prior to the eighteenth century 
representative governments were few and far between and  the  word  “democracy”  was  
associated  with  “mob  rule”  and  considered  a  dirty  word.     Hence  Hobbes  assimilated  
democracy  with  “anarchy”,   for want of government.97  It was only as more subjects 
entered the working force during the Industrial Revolution and were increasingly 
taxed, that they demanded more political rights, which gradually, and after much 
struggle, led to the broadening of the franchise as explained in Part Two, which 
contributed to a broadening of the political and social base of the nation, which 
contributed to the notion of self-determination.  This may also provide an explanation 
as to why Poland, which was partitioned thrice with little regard for its parliamentary 
institutions, provoked the greatest opposition in the US, Britain, and France, in the 
nineteenth century, where representative government was most developed. 
 
 
The Question of Consent 
 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries jurists began to increasingly write about 
“the  nation”, and  obtaining  “the  consent  of  the  people”,  to  validate  territorial  changes 
obtained by way of conquest, which had been almost absent in the language employed 
by jurists writing in earlier centuries.  Unlike in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 
when jurists had tended to display excessive deference to monarchical authority, 
including the right to wage war in order to maintain the balance of power, by the 
eighteenth century one can begin to detect a change in the discourse in the opposition 
that was expressed to obtain title to territory by means of conquest.  One can detect 
this change in discourse most clearly in the writings of the Calvinists on the issue of 
popular sovereignty, although it had first emerged within Catholic scholarship when 
scholastic theologians at the Sorbonne adapted the Roman law theory of corporations 
to defend a thesis of popular sovereignty within the Roman Catholic Church.98   
As early as 1517, Erasmus argued in his Adagiorum Chiliades,  “that  authority  
over men and beasts is not of the same order; that all power and authority over people 
                                                 
97 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan,  edited  and  with  an  introduction  by  J.C.A.  Gaskin,  (Oxford  World’s  
Classics, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008, first published 1651), p. 123 (in this edition), Chapter 
19, p. 95 (in original numbering), para. 2. 
98 See Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 245-
263. 
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rests  on   their  consent,   and   that   title  by  conquest   is  a   fallacy”.99  But who were “the  
people”   that  Erasmus  was   referring to from whom one needed to obtain consent in 
order to validate title obtained by conquest?  We can detect that Erasmus had a rather 
limited understanding of “peoplehood” in the sense of the people who would be 
vested with political authority from his other writings where he had complained that 
France  was  “infected  with  heretics,  with  Bohemian  schismatics,  with  Jews,  with  half-
Jewish  marranos”  as  well  as Turks, Europe’s archenemies.100 Of course, Erasmus was 
not alone in harbouring such prejudices.  For many of the great philosophers who 
articulated theories in favour of popular sovereignty as opposed to monarchical 
authority, and who advanced arguments against conquest between civilised European 
states, also had a very limited conception of which peoples within Europe held 
political rights, which will be addressed when we examine their views in Part Two. 
 As explained in the previous pages, Gentili, Grotius, and Zouche all justified 
wars of conquest expressing little concern over the question of consent, so long as the 
war was just, and so long as the territorial changes did not adversely affect the balance 
of power in Europe.  It was only after the English Civil Wars (1642-1651), after the 
trial and execution of Charles I (1649), and after the establishment and demise of 
Oliver  Cromwell’s  Commonwealth (1649-1660), that one can begin to detect a change 
in the scholarship, which first emerged most clearly in the writings of Hobbes, 
Puffendorf, Locke, Wolff, Rousseau, and Vattel.  Although there were some 
fundamental differences of opinion between these scholars, with the exception of 
Vattel, on specific issue of the necessity of obtaining consent in order to validate a 
lawful conquest, they were in surprising agreement.  Indeed as the eighteenth century 
progressed some of these writers such as Wolff, Puffendorf, and Rousseau, began to 
also express scepticism of those wars that were justified in order to maintain the 
balance of power.  However, Vattel did not go so far, and was willing to accept that in 
some instances conquest could be justified if it was genuinely necessary to maintain 
the balance of power.  As Richard Tuck explained, Vattel’s   views   on   pre-emptive 
strikes and sovereignty were closer to the views of Gentili, Grotius, Hobbes, and 
                                                 
99 Cited in Sarah Wambaugh, A Monograph on Plebiscites:  With a Collection of Official Documents 
(New York:  Oxford University Press, 1920), p. 3. 
100 Quoted in Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace, supra n. 55, p. 30.  Erasmus made these comment 
when he was appointed a counsellor to Prince Charles of Burgundy, in which he urged seeking peace 
with France. 
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Locke,101 rather than to Puffendorf or Wolff, which is rather surprising when we bear 
in  mind  Vattel’s  claim  that  he  had “resolved  to  facilitate  for  a  wider  circle  of  readers  a  
knowledge  of  the  brilliant  ideas”  contained  in  Wolff’s  Jus Gentium.102  Vattel’s views 
are rather intriguing because they stand out from what others writing in his generation 
had to say about the balance of power, and they differ radically from what they had to 
say about the issue of consent.   Perhaps it was because of this tension between his 
views on pre-emptive strikes, sovereignty, and consent that during the debates on 
Poland his views were cited by both those who opposed and supported the partitions.   
It is usually a good idea to begin tracing the roots of sovereignty and consent 
in the history of international relations with Hobbes because as Quentin Skinner has 
explained, it is with Hobbes that a new understanding of the state was articulated for 
the first time.103  In this connection it is worth recalling that Hobbes published his 
celebrated Leviathan (1651), which he wrote safely from the confines of Paris,104 a 
year before he returned to London (1652), from which he had fled (in 1640), during 
which time Cromwell had established himself as the Lord Protector of the 
Commonwealth of England, Scotland, Ireland, and the dominions, after the civil 
wars.105  In Leviathan, Hobbes, perhaps wanting to curry favour with the new regime, 
conveniently provided a justification for a Protectorate when   he   wrote:      “The  
sovereign of a commonwealth, be it an assembly, or one man, is not subject to the 
civil laws.  For having power to make, and repeal laws, he may when he pleaseth, free 
himself from that subjection, by repealing those laws that trouble him, and making of 
new”.106  This provided ample justification  for  Cromwell’s  institution of government, 
which   was   to   “reside   in   one   person,   and   the   people   assembled   in   Parliament”,107 
although Cromwell could only rule and pass legislation with the consent of his council 
                                                 
101 See Tuck, Rights of War and Peace, ibid, pp. 226-234. 
102 E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law: Applied to the Conduct and to 
the Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns, Volume 3, Translation of the Edition of 1758 by Charles G. 
Fenwick (Washington: Carnegie Institution, 1916), Preface, pp. 6a-7a. 
103 Quentin Skinner, “The State”, in Terence Ball, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson, Political 
Innovation and Conceptual Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 121. 
104 Gaskin (ed.), Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, supra n. 97, pp. xvi-xvii. 
105 On  Hobbe’s  exile  see  Richard  Tuck,  Hobbes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 24-31. 
106 Gaskin (ed.), Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, supra n. 97, p. 176 (in this edition), Chapter 26, p. 138 (in 
original numbering), para. 6. 
107 See   Article   I,   “The   Instrument   of   Government”   in   Gardiner,   Constitutional Documents of the 
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and Parliament.108  It is telling that the Instrument of Government, which established 
Cromwell as Lord Protector, used  the  word  “consent”  at  least  a  dozen  times.109   
In addition to articulating a secular theory of power that would reverberate 
down the ages, Hobbes argued that the people of Britain had an obligation to obey and 
submit themselves to the newly established Commonwealth, which had abolished the 
House of Lords, because according to the Act that Abolished the House of Lords, the 
Lords “is  useless  and  dangerous  to  the  people  of  England”.110 In other words, Hobbes 
argued that there was a duty to obey what in Royalist eyes amounted to a usurping 
power which  had  executed  the  King  “in  the  open  street”.111  Hobbes’s thesis was not 
unique, in this regard, as many other supporters of Cromwell, including John Milton 
in his Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (1649), had argued that the origins of lawful 
government lay in a decision by the people to consent to its establishment, thereby 
justifying the removal of tyrant and reasserting the  people’s  rights.  What was unique 
was that Hobbes was the first scholar to give expression to these arguments in a 
systematic manner.112 Thus it was no wonder he lost many of his royalist friends.  He 
was endorsing the same principles held by the men who had executed the King.113 
Skinner explains that it was in these circumstances that Hobbes wrote in 
Leviathan that any political power with the capacity to protect its citizens is a 
justifiable political authority, regardless of whether that authority was vested in a 
monarchy or a republic.114  “The  obligation  of  subjects  to  the  sovereign,  is  understood  
to last as long, and no longer, that the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect 
them”.115 Hobbes explained that it was only when this protection discontinued because 
the Commonwealth dissolved that the obligation of obedience to the sovereign came 
to an end.116  In other words, political authority was based on a compact between the 
sovereign and his subjects.  Hobbes argued that consent was necessary to validate 
conquest  since  “conquest  is  not  the  victory  itself;;  but  the  acquisition  by  victory,  of  a  
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right over the persons of men”.117  Thus it was clear that Hobbes was arguing that only 
through consent, whatever form this took, whether it was express or tacit, could a free 
subject acquiesce   to   live   under   another’s   sovereignty.118  He concluded by saying, 
“conquest   is   the   acquiring   of   the   right   of   sovereignty   by   victory.      Which   right,   is  
acquired, in the   people’s   submission,   by   which   they   contract   with   the   victor,  
promising  obedience,   for   life   and   liberty”.119  This was a theory of sovereignty and 
consent that differed substantially from what the Calvinists had been arguing in that 
rather than being based on scripture, it was based on the political nature of man.120   
Hobbes’s   theory   of consent was also striking in that it bore an uncanny 
resemblance to the argumentation employed by the Court which had adjudged that 
Charles   I   “as   tyrant,   traitor,  murderer   and   public   enemy   to   the   good   people   of this 
nation,   shall   be   put   to   death   by   the   severing   of   his   head   from   his   body”.121  As 
Geoffrey Robertson observed, the Court that sentenced Charles I to death had 
articulated  a  theory  of  sovereignty  that  predated  the  “social  contract”  philosophers  by  
several decades.122  In that case, both Judge Bradshawe and John Cooke, who was the 
prosecutor, argued that a contract and bargain had been made between the king and 
his people based on a trust that Charles I had violated.  In violating this trust, that is, 
the bond of protection he owed his subjects, Charles had released the bond of 
subjection that was due from his subjects.  Accordingly, Charles I had ceased to be 
sovereign and could be sentenced. According  to  Hobbes’s  biographers, Hobbes wrote 
Leviathan between 1648 and 1651, and published it three years after the trial had 
ended and been widely disseminated.123  Thus one can logically deduce that Hobbes’s 
theory of sovereignty was probably influenced by what was said in that trial.   
Puffendorf, who frequently referred to Hobbes in De Jure Naturae et Gentium 
Libri Octo,124 which was published in the same year as the English Revolution of 
1688, was also likely influenced by that trial.  Although Puffendorf’s  theory  differed  
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with Hobbes in the sense that he presupposed the existence of a double contract by 
which men agree to unite to regulate their safety and preservation by common 
consent, after which they transfer this power to the sovereign, he took what Hobbes 
wrote about conquest and consent, a stage further, by introducing the concept of 
legitimacy.125  Puffendorf argued “since men are by nature all equal, and so no one is 
subject   to   another’s   sovereignty,   it   follows   that   mere   force   and   seizure   are   not  
sufficient to constitute legitimate sovereignty over men, but that there is need of some 
other  additional   title”.126  In Puffendorf’s  opinion   this  “additional   title”  amounted   to  
the consent of the subjects in a situation where territory had been seized in a just 
war.127  Puffendorf  described  as  “arrant  nonsense”  the  argument  attributed to Hornius 
that sovereignty could only be vested in God and not in the people.128  Perhaps 
thinking of the despotic rule of Charles I in England, Puffendorf expressed his opinion 
that  “if  a  new  monarch,  after  altering  a  state  in  a  violent  manner,  abuses  and  mistreats  
its citizens, I should scarcely feel that the citizens are under any intrinsic obligation to 
him”.129  He considered the case, where in monarchical states already established, the 
monarch died without his successor being appointed, which in many respects was 
similar to the situation that prevailed in England during the Interregnum (1649-1660): 
 
It is an easy manner to understand what form should be assigned a state during 
an interregnum, if one considers the bonds which hold together a complete 
state.  That is, since the intrinsic completeness of a state and supreme 
sovereignty arise through the latter pact entered into between king and citizens, 
it follows that, with the passing of the proper subject of sovereignty, the 
kingdom slips back into an incomplete form, so that it holds together only by 
that original pact of states, whereby each individual is understood to have 
agreed with every other to the establishment of a single group.  Although no 
little firmness for the binding together of citizens during an interregnum is 
added to that pact by the thought of a common fatherland...130 
 
It  was  this  “common  fatherland”  that  held  the  state  together  in  times  of  crisis,  which  
“is   the   reason   why   a   state   that   falls   into   an   interregnum   still   holds   together   more  
firmly than an army which has lost its general, especially if the latter be composed of 
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mercenaries,   the   most   of   whom   ‘have   no   fatherland...’”.131  Puffendorf added, and 
again he may have been thinking  of  England,  that  “any  interregnum  has  regularly  the  
appearance and nature of a temporary democracy, in so far, at least, that for a time the 
administration of common affairs must be decided upon, and a new king crowned with 
the consent of all, unless   they  prefer   to   introduce  another   form  of  government”.      In 
other words, whilst agreeing that consent was necessary to validate any change of 
sovereignty, in addition to this, it was necessary, especially in a situation of an 
Interregnum, for there to be a sense of community, amongst those tasked with holding 
together the fatherland, until a new sovereign was appointed or elected.  Intriguingly, 
Puffendorf was prepared to acknowledge that monarchy was not the only form of 
government recognised by the law of  nations,   but   that   it  was  possible   “to   introduce  
another  form  of  government”,  which  is precisely what happened in England in 1649.  
In this connection it is well established that the trial of Charles I influenced the 
intellectual thought of Locke who was born in the same year as Puffendorf and who 
articulated a theory of consent which justified the replacement of one sovereign by 
another.  Logically, the theory of consent that Hobbes formulated in order to justify 
the  establishment  of  Cromwell’s  Commonwealth, and which Puffendorf argued was a 
prerequisite in order to constitute legitimate sovereignty over men, could also be 
applied to the replacement by the Commonwealth with another sovereign, even if that 
sovereign took the form of the King-in-Parliament.  And this is precisely what Locke 
accomplished in formulating his theory of consent during the revolution of 1688 when 
the Catholic King James II was removed from power during the Dutch invasion that 
made the Protestants William of Orange and his wife Mary the sovereigns of England 
in conjunction with Parliament.132  Locke, like Hobbes, had fled England for safety, 
when the accession of James II became inevitable, although unlike Hobbes he chose 
exile in the Protestant United Provinces, rather than in Catholic France.133  From the 
Netherlands he played a prominent, if distant role, in the intellectual debates that led 
to the flight of James II.134  Locke, whose father was a captain in the New Model 
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Army that fought with Fairfax on the side of Parliament135 in the civil wars against the 
armies of Charles I, played a role in the drafting of the English Bill of Rights 
(1689).136  Influenced by the Levellers, Locke argued that the divine right of kings 
was a myth, that kings were fallible human beings who received their authority from 
the free consent of their subjects; if the king abused their consent then he could be 
overthrown as attested by Charles   I’s   regicide  and   the   flight  of   James   II.137   In his 
Two Treatises of Government published a year after the revolution, Locke argued that 
there was a fiduciary relationship between the king and his people.138  If the monarch 
violated the trust, then it was only natural that the people could remove him.139   
In  this  connection  Locke  disapproved  of  Hobbes’s argument that the sovereign 
had absolute power.  Instead Locke argued that the supreme power was vested in the 
legislature, although this was only fiduciary, in the sense that the supreme power was 
still vested in the people, who could remove, or alter the legislature, when they found 
a legislative act contrary to the trust they had bestowed upon it.140  More specifically 
on the matter of conquest and consent, Locke argued that in an unjust war conquest 
could never give title to the conqueror because it lacked the consent of the conquered 
population.141  Regarding just wars, a conqueror only obtained power over those 
persons who concurred or consented to the unjust use of force against them.142  
Moreover, although the conqueror had an absolute right over the lives of those persons 
who fought against him in a just war, this did not extend to their possessions.143  The 
right of conquest, argued Locke, only extended to the lives of those who joined in the 
war, not to their estates, which could only be requisitioned to make reparations.144  
Locke also disapproved of title obtained by conquest compelled by duress, although, 
as explained in Part Two, Locke did make a distinction between rights of cultivated, 
and non-cultivated land,  in  the  Americas,  to  justify  the  latter’s  colonisation.145 
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 Locke’s   attack   on   the   divine   right   of   kings   and   his   argument   in   favour   of   a  
right of resistance provided the philosophical pretext for replacing one king by 
another.  Although it was professedly written in order to justify the 1688 revolution, 
the same principle could of course be applied elsewhere.  Indeed during the American, 
French, and Polish Revolutions, Locke’s  theory  was  refined  and  developed  further  so  
that a king could be replaced, not by another monarch, but by a government 
constituted by and for the people. This paved the way for the development of popular 
sovereignty and the eventual emergence of the idea of self-determination. Louis  XIV’s  
recognition of William as King of England in the Treaty of Ryswick (1697) fortified 
the Protestant succession there   and   introduced   “a new doctrine of legitimacy, 
contractual instead of prescriptive”.146  The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) provided further 
recognition of the Protestant succession by the Act of Settlement (1701), which 
applied to Scotland after the Acts of Union (1707) were ratified.  Thus, at the stroke of 
a quill, argued Martin Wright, “the English had imposed upon Europe a principle of 
national   sovereignty   against   Louis   XIV’s   doctrine   of   dynastic   legitimacy”.147 And 
indeed this new doctrine would come to haunt the French monarchy, when Louis XVI 
and his wife Marie Antoinette came face to face with the guillotine in 1793. 
 
 
The balance of power and the theory of popular sovereignty 
 
As the eighteenth century progressed, balance of power arrangements between 
competing sovereigns, in which there was a change of territorial sovereignty, faced 
criticism from those jurists sympathetic to the notion of popular sovereignty.  This 
was because such rearrangements assumed a feudal relationship between the 
sovereign and his subject.  Rather than the relationship being based on consent, which 
entailed the citizen being granted certain rights in exchange for agreeing to certain 
duties, the feudal system was based on obedience to a common sovereign.  This meant 
that the sovereign was supreme throughout his realm and upon a change of 
sovereignty the subject was required to swear an oath of allegiance, homage, or fealty 
to the new sovereign.  There was no notion that the population undergoing territorial 
change had any political rights independent of that relationship.  This would only take 
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place when the connection between the sovereign and his realm was severed during a 
revolution when sovereignty was “popular”,   in   that   it was vested in the people.  
Absent revolutions, traditional changes in territorial sovereignty were regulated by the 
laws of succession in which sovereignty could only be transferred in an arrangement 
that ensured the line of succession was vested in a sovereign of royal blood. 
In the eighteenth century, the balance of power (which was commonly referred 
to by Prussian writers in the native vernacular as das Gleichgewichte der Völcker, or 
“the equilibrium of peoples”) was intimately linked to the notion of a just war.148  
Puffendorf, for instance, in his De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo, divided wars 
into just and unjust ones and was one of the first scholars to explicitly mention the 
balance of power prior to it finding expression in the Treaty of Utrecht.  Puffendorf 
who  Tuck  explains  “lived  in  the  group  of  European  states  which  felt  themselves  most  
at risk from the kind of militarist and imperialist expansion in which the Dutch and 
English   writers   gloried”149 expressed   scepticism   that   an   “over-balance   of   power”  
amongst   one’s   neighbours   could   ever   amount   to   a   just   cause   of  war.150  Rather, he 
thought   it   “unpardonably   impudent”   as   it   gave   too   greater   leeway   for   the   strong to 
oppress the weak.  The fact that Puffendorf lived in a state that felt at risk from 
“militarist   and   imperialist   expansion”   may, as Tuck has suggested, explain why 
Puffendorf was more sceptical regarding the rights obtained by wars of conquest 
which were justified as being necessary to preserve the balance of power.   
However, there may also be another explanation, which may be related to 
Pufendorf’s   views   on   popular   sovereignty   and   the   matter   of   obtaining   consent   to  
validate a lawful conquest.  As explained previously, Puffendorf wrote about the 
concept of legitimacy alongside that of necessity to validate changes in territorial 
sovereignty during a just war.  In De Jure Naturae Puffendorf also devoted more 
space to the notion of democracy and the rights of the majority than any other jurist 
who was writing in his generation.151  One might therefore surmise that his critique of 
conquest, justified on the basis of preserving the balance of power, was also related to 
his views on popular sovereignty, in which consent was a key aspect of validating 
changes in territorial sovereignty.  As Puffendorf wrote:    “The rights which belong to 
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one person over another person, since they are  acquired  only  with  the  latter’s consent 
... may not be understood as acquired with a person, even though the one to whom 
they belonged may have fallen into the hands of enemies. Thus when a king has been 
captured by his foes, it is not supposed that his kingdom has also become theirs, nor 
does the capture of a husband or father give power immediately over the wife or 
children”.152  It seems there was a connection between those scholars who argued that 
consent was necessary to validate conquest, their views on popular sovereignty, and 
their caution towards territorial changes justified by reference to the balance of power. 
This might explain why Christian Wolff, another Prussian, who had acquired 
fame as a scientist and philosopher, as well as notoriety for praising Confucius, and 
who wrote on a wide range of issues including metaphysics, in addition to law, shared 
Puffendorf’s scepticisms.  Regarding the balance of power Wolff expressly rejected 
Gentili’s   view that a sovereign could go to war under the faintest pretext without 
being injured in some  way.  “[F]ear  alone  of  a  neighbour’s  power”, Wolff emphatically 
wrote, “is not a just cause of war”.153  Even the building of fortifications by an enemy 
on  one’s  territory  or  the  planning  for  war  in  peacetime  would  not, according to Wolff, 
trigger any imminent right to go to war.154  On the matter of acquiring sovereignty, 
Wolff made a sharp and clear distinction between just and unjust wars.  According to 
Wolff a sovereign who waged a just war could occupy the territory of the enemy, and 
any other property, in order to persuade the enemy to end the war.  Wolff  wrote:    “It is 
self-evident that the consent of each of the belligerents is needed to end the war”.155  
Accordingly, only if the vanquished consented to the seizure could sovereignty pass 
over it otherwise “the things which have been occupied or seized are in your hands 
without any reason”.156 However, if the war was waged for an unjust cause, then the 
sovereign was “bound by nature to return both captured property and persons”.157 
There was nothing original in the argument that conquest only conferred 
lawful title in a just war argued Vattel.158  Real property in lands, towns, and 
provinces became the property of the enemy who took possession of them in a just 
war although it was only by the treaty of peace or by the entire subjection and 
                                                 
152 Puffendorf, De Jure Naturae, ibid, p. 1312 (emphasis added). 
153 Wolff, Jus Gentium, supra n. 148, p. 329. 
154 Wolff, Jus Gentium, ibid, p. 329. 
155 Wolff, Jus Gentium, ibid, pp. 406-7 (emphasis added) 
156 Wolff, Jus Gentium, ibid, pp. 406-7. 
157 Wolff, Jus Gentium, ibid, pp. 458-459. 
158 Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law, supra n. 102, p. 307. 
 
 
79 
extinction of the state that the acquisition of the captured towns and provinces was 
completed and the ownership rendered permanent and absolute.159  Thus Vattel agreed 
with Puffendorf, and Wolff, that conquest gave title in a just war, although 
significantly he differed with these scholars in that he did not think consent was 
necessary to give title.  All that was necessary was to conclude a treaty of peace, in 
which the victor could coerce the vanquished to cede sovereignty since there was no 
prohibition in the eighteenth century on concluding treaties obtained by duress.  In this 
connection, it is astonishing that  nowhere  in  Vattel’s  chapter  on  “Acquisition  by  War,  
and   Conquest   in   Particular”   does   the   word   “consent”   appear.160  This is intriguing 
when we bear in mind  Vattel’s   claim   that   he  had endeavoured to bring to light the 
views of Wolff to a wider readership,   since   he   evidently   did   not   share   the  Baron’s  
views on the matter of obtaining consent in order to validate an act of conquest in a 
just war.  Vattel was evidently aware of the works of Locke and Puffendorf, although 
he chose not to mention them at all in his entire treatise.161  It would seem as though 
this was a conscious decision by Vattel to dissociate his work from theirs, and if so, it 
marked a significant departure.  Nonetheless, consent or no consent, Vattel was not a 
supporter of conquest, where peoples were subjected to the most terrible tyranny.162   
As Tuck explained, Vattel published Le Droit des Gens a year after Frederick 
II of Prussia had invaded Saxony and precipitated the Seven Years War—during 
which Vattel was appointed Privy Counsellor to the Elector of Saxony.163  It is likely 
that  Vattel’s  views  on  conquest  and  consent  were  related  to  his  experience of the wars 
being waged all around him.  “We   know   only   too   well   from   sad   and   frequent  
experience”,   wrote   Vattel,   “that   predominant   states rarely fail to trouble their 
neighbours, to oppress them, and even to subjugate them completely, when they have 
an  opportunity  of  doing  so  with  impunity”.164  “Must  we  await  the  danger?”  he  asked  
rhetorically.    “Must  we  let  the  storm  gather  strength  when  it  might  be  scattered  at  its  
rising?  Must we suffer a neighbouring state to grow in power and await quietly until 
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it is ready to enslave us?  Will it be time to defend ourselves when we are no longer 
able   to?”      On   the   one   hand   Vattel   agreed   with  Wolff   that, “the sovereign who by 
inheritance, by a free election, or by any other just and proper means, united new 
provinces or entire kingdoms to his states, is merely acting on his right, and wrongs no 
one”.165  On the other hand he disagreed   with   Wolff’s   cautious   references   to   the  
balance of power in that he thought a sovereign who   “gave evidence of injustice, 
greed, pride, ambition or a desire of domineering  over  its  neighbours”,  would become 
an object of suspicion, which the other sovereigns of Europe should guard against.166  
Accordingly, Vattel explained that “the surest means of preserving [the] balance of 
power would be to bring it about that no state should be much superior to the others, 
that all the states, or at least the larger part, should be about equal in strength”.167 
Intriguingly, Vattel’s   views   on   the   balance   of   power   marked   a   radical  
departure from the views expressed by his fellow Prussians, which may be explained 
by his experience of warfare.  Yet this would not account for the reason why Vattel 
played down the matter of consent and popular sovereignty.  And it was on such 
issues that Vattel was engaged in a bitter dispute with Rousseau in his feeble attempt 
to critique the latter’s  Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1754).168  Vattel’s  view  
of sovereignty was rather conservative, although it was an advance of the view that 
had been earlier expressed by Grotius in which he argued that sovereignty could never 
be vested in the people.169  In reaching this conclusion, Grotius had contradicted his 
earlier scholarship170 in advancing the argument that there was a general presumption 
against private wars and a right of rebellion under the law of nations171 unless it could 
be justified in certain limited instances.172 This abrupt volte-face had provoked the ire 
of Rousseau who noted disparagingly that Grotius’s  later views on sovereignty and the 
right of rebellion had been influenced by his newfound dependence on the French 
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monarch for his pension and diplomatic status.173 Indeed, it is striking that in The 
Social Contract (1762), Rousseau dedicated half a page to specifically single out 
Grotius and his translator Barbeyrac for criticism arguing that his concept of 
sovereignty was inconsistent, and reflected the vested interests he had to conciliate: 
 
Everyone can see, in chapters III and IV of the first book of Grotius, how that 
learned man and his translator Barbeyrac become entangled and embarrassed in 
their sophisms, for fear of saying too much or not saying enough according to 
their views, and so offending the interests that they had to conciliate.  Grotius, 
having taken refuge in France through discontent with his own country, and 
wishing to pay court to Louis XIII, to whom his book is dedicated, spares no 
pains to despoil the people of all their rights and, in the most artful manner, 
bestow them on kings.  This also would clearly have been the inclination of 
Barbeyrac, who dedicated his translation to the king of England, George I.  But 
unfortunately the expulsion of James II, which he calls an abdication, forced him 
to be reserved and to equivocate and evade, in order not to make William appear 
a usurper.  If these two writers had adopted true principles, all difficulties would 
have been removed, and they would have been always consistent; but they 
would have spoken the truth with regret, and would have paid court only to the 
people.  Truth, however, does not lead to fortune, and the people confer neither 
embassies, nor professorships, nor pensions.174 
Rousseau   was   referring   to   the   “Glorious Revolution of 1688”, when the British 
monarch James II, who was accused of bestowing favouritism on his Catholic 
subjects, was removed by a Dutch invasion in support of the Protestant elite, and 
replaced by William and Mary, who were made sovereign in his stead.  Rousseau 
castigated Grotius and Barbeyrac for what he perceived as their faulty analysis by 
concealing that what had happened was effectively a  “coup” by the aristocrats, rather 
than an “abdication”.      The   latter   explanation   was   essentially   an   excuse created by 
William’s  royalist  supporters  so as to maintain the fiction that the sovereign will had 
been unaffected and remained vested in the monarchy.  But if Grotius and Barbeyrac 
had been really honest, thought Rousseau, then they should have reached the 
conclusion that what took place was a continuation of the old order in a different 
guise, with political power being shared between the King and the aristocrats in 
Parliament.  1688 was emphatically not a “peoples” revolution, as it was during the 
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Interregnum from 1649-1660 when   the   “middle   sorts”   asserted   themselves.175 
Although the reforms they accomplished during the Interregnum would not be 
considered very radical or revolutionary by modern standards, they should not be 
downplayed.  For unlike the French and Russian revolutionaries, the English 
revolutionaries had no example to emulate.176  Nonetheless, what they did was still 
remarkable for the seventeenth century: a supposedly divine King was executed in the 
open street, the House of Lords was abolished, and seats were redistributed in the 
House of Commons in a way that followed the distribution of taxable wealth.  The 
latter measure was undertaken in the hope that the view of economically independent 
men would prevail over those men that were dependent on great lords and barons.177 
Vattel, like Grotius, was also close to the powers he served and was thus not 
prepared to concede that sovereignty could be continuously vested in the people and 
in them alone,   so   that   only  with   their   continued   consent   could   a  monarch’s   rule   be  
deemed legitimate—which   was   Rousseau’s   view.      Rather,   in   Vattel’s   opinion,  
“sovereignty is the public authority which commands in civil society and which 
regulates and directs what each member must do to attain the end of society”.178  
Vattel noted that often the sovereign authority took  steps  to  confide  sovereignty  “to a 
senate or to a single person.  This senate or that person then becomes the 
sovereign”.179 This was the situation  in  Vattel’s  day  in  the  United Kingdom where the 
King-in-Parliament was sovereign, and it remains the case today. But this view of 
sovereignty was sacrilegious to Rousseau for whom sovereignty could not be vested 
anywhere except for in the body of the people.  As he wrote in The Social Contract: 
“…sovereignty,   being   nothing   but   the   exercise   of   the   general   will,   can   never   be  
alienated”.180  The  sovereign  power  was  “a  collective  being”,  which  could  only  “be  
represented  by  itself  alone”.181  Although Vattel was of the opinion that “the right to 
alienate the State can never belong to the sovereign unless it is expressly given to him 
by the whole people”,182 Rousseau disagreed, since he thought that sovereignty was 
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both inalienable, and indivisible, which meant that it could never be alienated or 
divided.183  In Rousseau’s   view   those who ruled were merely agents of the general 
will—but they were not the sovereign.  This put him on a collision course with Vattel 
who saw the ruler as sovereign in his capacity as the   representative  of   the  people’s  
sovereignty.184  In other words, Vattel argued that the people transferred the 
competence to govern in favour of the juridical person of the state, albeit in a 
benevolent relationship between the king and the aristocrats, whereas Rousseau was of 
the opinion that the people continually hold this power, which was crystallized in a 
volonté générale (“general will”), which must be followed by the ruler or Parliament, 
which merely acted as an agent of the people.185 Thus, Rousseau argued that the ruler 
had to take into account the interests of the people at all times in governing the 
country because they commanded the general will which was at once both inalienable 
and indivisible. What this meant, explained Talmon, was that the general will could 
only be discerned if the whole people, and not just a part of it, were to make the 
effort.186 In effect the general will referred to the general will of the nation.187  The 
ramifications that this line of reasoning would have for the subsequent development of 
self-determination  were,  of  course,  beyond  Rousseau’s  mental horizons in 1762 (the 
year he published The Social Contract).  But it was not lost on the men of future 
revolutions.  For Rousseau had provided the philosophical basis for the theory that 
self-determination was nothing other than the right of the whole people to exercise 
sovereignty.188 Moreover, as Hannah Arendt observed,   “the   very   attraction   of  
Rousseau’s   theory for the men of the French Revolution was that he apparently had 
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found a highly ingenious means to put a multitude into the place of a single person; 
for  the  general  will  was  nothing  more  or  less  than  what  bound  the  many  into  one”.189 
This dispute between Vattel and Rousseau on the source of sovereignty was 
relevant to interventions justified to preserve the balance of power since those 
interventions took little account of the aspirations or interests of the peoples most 
affected by territorial change.  Since sovereignty, according to Rousseau, was vested, 
at least in principle, in the male population of the state alone, regardless of whether 
they were members of the aristocracy or not, he was of the opinion that any transfer of 
territory from one sovereign to another was illegitimate where it lacked the consent of 
the body of the people directly affected. How that consent was ascertained was left to 
the political institutions of each country to determine but it was better suited to the 
republican system of government.  Such a proposition, of course, directly conflicted 
with a balance of power arrangement between kings where  no  such  consent  by  “the  
people”  was  deemed  necessary.  On the contrary, once a king conquered territory and 
absorbed it into his kingdom the people situated there owed him allegiance 
irrespective   of   their   “national   sentiments”.      Indeed, Rousseau argued that any 
territorial change, which did not take into consideration the interests of the sovereign 
or  “the slave”,  (that  is, the  king’s  people prior to their attainment of sovereignty), was 
“contraire au droit naturel”.  As   he   explained:   “Mais   qu’on   puisse   à   son   gré   faire  
passer les peuples de maître en maitre, comme des troupeaux de bétail, sans consulter 
ni   leur   intérêt  ni   leur  avis,  c’est se moquer des gens de la  dire  sérieusement”.190  As 
Carl   Schmitt   understood,   Rousseau’s   use   of   the   word   “slave”   had   a   consequential  
meaning attached to the construction of the cohesive democratic state.  This was 
because for Rousseau the general will could only exist where the people are so 
homogenous (in their views, if not their customs) that there is essentially unanimity. 
Slavery signified that those who do not belong to the people did not participate in the 
compact and were therefore excluded from exercising sovereignty.191 This had serious 
consequences for the development of self-determination that I address in Part Two.  
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University Press, 1915), vol. 1, pp. 340-341. (“It  is  to  make  fools of people, to tell them seriously that 
one  can  at  one’s  pleasure  transfer  peoples  from  master  to  master,  like  herds  of  cattle,  without  consulting  
their  interests  or  their  wishes”). 
191 See Carl Schmitt, Preface to the Second Edition, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, (1926):  
On the Contradiction between Parliamentarism and Democracy, in Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of 
Parliamentary Democracy, translated by Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986), pp. 13-14.  
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4. The partition treaties and the first partition of Poland 
 
During the eighteenth century, a clear gulf had emerged between those jurists who 
expressed caution regarding the rights acquired through conquest and those who did 
not.  Paralleling this caution was a general distrust of those wars that were avowedly 
waged to preserve the balance of power.  Locke, Puffendorf, Wolff, and Rousseau, all 
emphasised the importance of obtaining consent to validate a transfer of territorial 
sovereignty in a just war, whereas for Gentili, Grotius (at least in De Jure Belli), and 
Vattel, this was immaterial so long as the war was just.  However, it was not until after 
Rousseau published The Social Contract that the notion of popular sovereignty gained 
both legitimacy and popularity, which might explain why the partition treaties that 
were negotiated in 1698 and 1700, and which sought to divide and apportion the 
Spanish Empire between England, France, and the United Provinces, without the 
consent of the Spanish king, aroused comparatively little opposition, when compared 
to the partitions of Poland that did.  Clearly, in the intervening century something had 
changed.  Through his writing and his astute understanding of the political scene, 
Rousseau had managed to tap in to an emerging national consciousness, which came 
into being through the seething discontent and frustration that the peasants and the 
bourgeoisie (the Third Estate) felt towards the corrupt and despotic rule of Louis 
XIV’s  Court, as well as the aristocracy, and the Church, who, unlike the great majority 
of Frenchmen, were exempt from most taxes, even though they controlled the  lion’s  
share of the kingdom’s resources, and owned the majority of its agricultural land.192  
The fact that France was in an acute financial crisis, and that hunger and starvation 
was spreading throughout the countryside could hardly have helped matters.193  
When a monarch had no obligation to consult the peoples of a territory 
undergoing a change of sovereignty to obtain their consent, conquest was a relatively 
uncontroversial matter.   Usually a process of consultation would only take place in 
matters of succession.  Although title to territory obtained by way of succession 
differs to title obtained by way of conquest, they are in many ways analogous since 
there is a transfer of sovereignty in both cases.  But even in instances of succession it 
                                                 
192 See   Gail   Bossenga,   “Society”,   in  William Doyle (ed.), Old Regime France 1648-1788 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 54-58.  Paradoxically, despite having to pay very little in the way 
of tax, the Church had the privilege of collecting the tithe from the peasantry, which was not likely to 
make them popular in a time of austerity. The peasants also had to pay their lords a number of taxes. 
193 See Simon Schama, Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution (London: Penguin 1989), pp. 
256-273. 
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was  not  “the  people”’,  in  the  modern  sense  of  the  term,  as  members  of  a  national  and  
political  community,  who  were  consulted.    Rather,  it  was  those  who  served  the  King’s  
Court, the jurists and theologians, and members of the royal family, whose opinions 
were most often sought, as well as the authority of the Pope in the case of Catholic 
kingdoms.  As Zouche, a descendent of old nobility, an academic, and an English 
judge,194 noted in his Exposition, Phillip II of Castille ejected King Antony from the 
Kingdom of Portugal on the basis that his election had been disapproved by the Pope, 
by   every   other   member   of   the   Royal   family,   and   that   “the   people   had   no   right   to  
choose  a  king  so   long  as  any  of   the  royal  blood  survived”.195  Whilst in France, the 
King would occasionally consult his ministers and advisers through the provincial 
estates and the Estates-General; there was no obligation upon him to do so.196  In any 
event, in those institutions, the clergy (the First Estate), and the aristocracy (the 
Second Estate) were consulted in separate chambers as separate orders or corporate 
bodies, in line with their privileges, which were extensive when compared with the 
remainder of the population (the Third Estate).197 This was the state of European 
political society in the eighteenth century when Poland would be partitioned thrice.198   
Although the attempted partition of the Spanish Empire at the turn of the 
seventeenth century was an attempted succession, the threat of conquest was inherent 
in the Partition Treaties.  In the event that the line of succession was not altered in a 
manner   conducive   to   preserving   the  maritime   power’s   conception   of   the   balance   of  
power, then they were prepared to alter the succession by armed force.  Whilst various 
pretexts were advanced to justify the first partition of Poland, including that it had 
been necessary to acquire Polish territory in order to preserve the balance of power in 
central and eastern Europe, this in effect masked what was to all intents and purposes 
an outright act of conquest.  The similarity between the Partition Treaties and the first 
partition of Poland is that in neither case was any serious attempt made to obtain the 
consent of “the people”.  In the case of the Partition Treaties the only person consulted 
                                                 
194 See Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations, supra n. 52, p. 165. 
195 Zouche, Iuris et Iudici Fecialis, supra n. 72, p. 132. 
196 Schama, Citizens, supra n. 193, pp. 235-236. 
197 See Bossenga in Doyle, Old Regime France, supra n. 192, p. 58.  
198 Unsurprisingly, many Frenchmen were aghast and exasperated when Louis XVI convened the 
Estates-General in 1788 exactly according to the forms of 1614 with its separate orders and chambers.  
Even in the early months of the French Revolution, some nobles still argued that a separate noble order 
was a necessary bulwark against the corruption of propertied money.   Whilst some nobles conceded 
that the Third Estate should have a representation at least equal to the other two estates combined, this 
would still have preserved the influence of the first two Estates, which was out of all proportion to their 
proportion of the population.  See Schama, Citizens, supra n. 193, pp. 249-250.  
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about altering the succession was the French King, whilst the Spanish King who was 
the sovereign of his Empire, was deliberately kept in the dark.  In the case of Poland, 
the members of Parliament were coerced to consent to partition under duress.  
 
 
The Partition Treaties199 
 
Ten years after the Glorious Revolution, Britain and Holland sought to prevent the 
outbreak of a European war by attempting to rearrange the succession of the Spanish 
Empire in a manner that would not threaten the balance of power by negotiating the 
partition treaties.  The idea behind the treaties was to redistribute Spanish territory in 
the event that Charles II, the Spanish Monarch, died before he could nominate an heir, 
since by default his population and territory would be vested in the King of France, 
Louis XIV, rendering him virtually omnipotent. Accordingly, it was thought that it 
would be wise to press upon the French King the importance of yielding the bulk of 
his inheritance and equitably redistributing it amongst the other powers for the sake of 
preserving the balance of Europe, since if he acquired too much territory by means of 
succession he might aspire to establish a universal monarchy.  This was an absolute 
anathema to the Maritime Powers, who would not hesitate to declare war against 
France  in  order  to  deter  the  Dauphin’s pretensions of becoming a universal monarch.   
In a word, the Maritime Powers wanted to safeguard the balance of power as it 
existed at the conclusion of the Treaty of Ryswick (1697) that had brought an end to 
the   last   major   European   war   (the   “Nine   Year’s   War”)   when   France   had   fought   a  
Grand Alliance comprised of England, Spain, the Holy Roman Empire and the United 
Provinces.  The treaties were negotiated in an era when it was accepted that for the 
sake of the balance of power, a prince could be compelled to renounce a lawful 
                                                 
199 See the French  King’s   Treaty  made  with   the  King   of   England,   relating   to   the   Settlement   of   the  
Succession of Spain on the Electoral Prince of Bavaria, on Condition that Naples, Sicily, Guipulcoa, & 
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General of the United Provinces, for Settling the Succession of the Crown of Spain, in case his Catholic 
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Relating to Peace and War, in Four Volumes, Vol. I, Second Edition, London, 1732, p. 386 (the First 
Partition Treaty) and p. 407 (the Second Partition Treaty). This collection can be accessed 
electronically at the British Library on their database Eighteenth Century Collections Online.  For 
literature on the partition treaties see Lord Macaulay, The History of England: From the Accession of 
James the Second, Volume III. (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, & Green, 1864), pp. 
264-270 and Andreas Osiander, The States System of Europe, 1640-1990:  Peacemaking and the 
Conditions of International Stability (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 90-99. 
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inheritance.  As François Fénelon (1651-1715), the tutor of the French princes, and the 
leading theorist of French absolutism, explained in his Examen de la conscience sur 
les devoirs de la royauté:  “A  particular  right  to  inheritance  or  donation  has  to  yield  to  
the law of nature protecting a multitude of states.  In other words, nothing can be 
lawful which destroys the balance of power and tips the scales in favour of a universal 
monarchy,  even   if   it   is  based  on   the  written   laws  of  a  particular  country”.200  There 
were two partition treaties because the first partition treaty had to be renegotiated after 
the King of Spain heard word of it on his deathbed.  He was not predisposed to having 
his Empire apportioned between his rivals without his consent.  When he was 
informed201 of the negotiations he appointed an heir who, as misfortune would have it, 
would subsequently die, which is why a second treaty had to be negotiated.   
The treaties could be described as a conflict-solving device in that they sought 
to anticipate and resolve a looming conflict before it transpired to preserve the balance 
of power by apportioning territory equitably between competing sovereigns. As the 
Spanish monarch was not being consulted about the distribution of territory that he 
had sovereignty over the treaties were initially negotiated with the French King in 
secret in Loo.  The point of both treaties was to avoid the prospect of a new European 
war, which was likely   if   the  Catholic  King’s   (that is, Charles II’s) vast territories in 
Europe,  the  Indies,  and  the  Americas,  were  vested  in  the  Dauphin  alone  (Louis  XIV’s  
heir).  Accordingly, the Protestant maritime powers persuaded the French King that it 
was in his interest to prevent a union that would upset the balance of power: 
 
III.  And whereas the two Kings and the States-General desire, above all things 
the preservation of the publik quiet, and the avoiding of a new war in Europe, 
by accommodating the disputes and differences that might arise on account of 
the said succession, or by reason of the umbrage from too many Dominions 
being united under one Prince; they have thought good to take before-hand the 
necessary measures for preventing the calamities which the said accident of 
the death of the Catholic King without issue might produce.202 
 
This was a forward-looking treaty.  It sought to prevent an event that had not yet 
occurred.  To this end the parties sought to redistribute the Spanish territories in such a 
manner that   the  European  balance  of  power  and  “the  general   tranquillity  of  Europe”  
                                                 
200 Quoted in Grewe, The Epochs, supra n. 4, p. 338 citing Oeuvres de Fénelon, Vol. 3, 1835, p. 361. 
201 Macaulay, The History of England, supra n. 200,  p.  270.    (“Quiros,  the  Spanish  Ambassador  at the 
Hague, followed the trail [of the partition negotiations] with such skill and perseverance that he 
discovered, if not the whole truth, yet enough to furnish materials for a dispatch which produced much 
irritation  and  alarm  at  Madrid”.) 
202 The First Treaty of Partition, supra n. 200, p. 388. 
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would not be disturbed.203  Britain and the Netherlands feared that should the Catholic 
King,  Charles   II   of  Spain,   die   “without   issue”  his   vast   territories   in  Europe   and   the  
Americas would by means of succession be vested in the Dauphin, rendering Louis 
XIV,  the  “Sun  King”,  all-powerful.  Accordingly, to avoid this prospect, Britain and 
the States-General sought to pre-empt the outbreak of a new war by entering into an 
agreement with Louis XIV which reads today as though it were an estate in a personal 
will being administered by sovereign states writ large.  It had dawned upon Louis XIV 
that if he did not agree to the partition scheme then his opponents would declare war 
against him and  that  as  a  consequence  “his  life’s  work  would  be  at  stake”.204   
Exhausted by war, with peace having only been established the previous year 
in   1697,   which   had   settled   the   Nine   Year’s  War,   France   was   required   to   agree   to  
renounce  all  its  “rights  and  pretensions  to  the  said  Crown  of  Spain”. 205  As a form of 
territorial compensation, France was to be awarded the Kingdoms of Naples and 
Sicily, and the adjacent islands Sancto Stephano, Porto Hercole, Orbitello, Telemone, 
Porto-longon, Piombina, situated on the coast of Tuscany, and the province of 
Guipulcoa, including the towns of Fontarabia, St. Sebastian, and the port of Passage. 
As regards the Province of Guipulcoa, Navarre, Alava and Biscay, it was to be 
“shared   between   France   and   Spain   in   such a manner, as that there shall remain as 
much of the said passages and mountains to France on her side, as there shall remain 
to  Spain  on  hers”.206  At a time when territory and population were associated with 
political and military power, sovereigns kept a constant check on the territorial 
acquisitions of their competitors in case they were in a position to augment their 
political power, which would affect the balance amongst the rest.  Had Charles II, 
appointed Louis XIV as his heir, noted Vattel in Le Droit des Gens,  “it  would  have  
meant, according to all the rules of human foresight, nothing less than delivering all 
Europe  into  servitude,  or  at  least  putting  it  in  a  most  precarious  condition”.207    
This explains why it was thought necessary to reorganise the map of Europe as 
a preventative measure and why Britain and the Netherlands sought to persuade 
France to agree that the remainder of the Spanish Empire would be assigned to the 
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206 Art. IV, ibid. 
207 Vattel, The Law of Nations, supra n. 102, p. 249. 
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eldest son of the Elector of Bavaria rather than to the Dauphin.208  In exchange, the 
Elector  was  required  to  “renounce  …  as  soon  as  he  shall  come  of  age,  all  rights  and  
pretensions to the portion assigned to the Dauphin, and to that which is to be assigned 
to  the  Archduke  Charles  by  the  following  Articles”.    The  Dutchy  of  Milan  was to be 
given to Archduke Charles of Austria209 and in exchange he was also required to 
“renounce,   at   the   time   of   the   decease   of   his   Catholic   Majesty,   and   the   Archduke  
Charles, as soon as he shall come of age, all other rights and pretensions to the Crown 
of   Spain,   and   to   the   other   kingdoms,   islands,   states,   countrys   and   places  …  which  
compose  the  shares  and  portions  …  assigned  to  the  Dauphin,  and  the  Electoral  Prince  
of   Bavaria”.210  As   Vattel   explained,   “the   right   of   self-preservation”   would   have  
justified the actions of England and Holland in preventing Louis XIV from making 
“such  a  formidable  addition  to  his  power”  had  he  not  agreed  to the partition treaties.211   
It was for this reason that Article VIII of the treaty stipulated that “His 
Imperial Majesty, the  King   of   the   Romans,   and   the   said   Elector”,   were   “invited   to  
approve”  of  the  arrangement.  Should the Prince and Archduke have refused to abide 
by the agreement, then they were to be presented with a fait accompli, which was to 
take the form of partition.212  The parties had no compunction about resorting to force 
to put partition into effect.  Charles II, the Spanish monarch, was resolutely opposed 
to the treaty because it sought to dismember his Empire without consulting him.  He 
responded by naming the Electoral Prince of Bavaria, as his sole heir to the whole of 
the Spanish Empire, and not just those parts that Britain, France, and the Netherlands, 
had unilaterally decided to divide and redistribute by the first partition treaty.  
However, when Elector suddenly died, and when it became apparent that Charles II 
was dying, a Second Treaty of Partition was negotiated.213  As with the First Treaty of 
Partition, the aim of the Second Treaty of Partition was, in the words of the preamble, 
“to   prevent,   by   taking   timely measures, those events which may raise new wars in 
Europe”,   but   ultimately   the   maritime   powers failed in their attempt to prevent the 
outbreak of war because on 16 November 1700, in direct contravention of the treaty, 
Louis XIV publicly announced that his second grandson, Philip, the Duke of Anjou, 
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91 
was  to  succeed  Charles  II  of  Spain  as   the  ruler  of  all   the  latter’s  dominions.214   Six 
months later, Britain, the Holy Roman Emperor, and the Netherlands, declared war 
against France, and thus began the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714).   
It may seem paradoxical that partition was invoked by the great powers in the 
name of the “balance of power”, and the “general tranquillity of Europe” as a method 
to avoid conflict, since the parties were quite prepared to go to war in order to 
maintain the equilibrium.  Indeed, the threat of war as a deterrent was always inherent 
in the partition treaties.  Secrecy was also a necessity due to the fact that the parties to 
the Partition Treaties sought to dispense with, and redistribute, territories over which 
they had no sovereignty.215   This was an era when territory was viewed as the private 
property of the monarch, when conquest was considered lawful, and when the great 
powers saw through territorial compensations a means of preserving the peace and 
redistributing political power.  It is clear from the text of the treaties that there was no 
conception of there being a wider body politic.  If the succession did not proceed 
according to plan, then in order to put into effect the partition conquest was the means 
they would forcibly invoke to secure an exchange of sovereignty, without obtaining 
the consent of either the French or Spanish King or the peoples directly affected. 
 
The First Partition of Poland216 
 
Seventy-three years after the negotiations for a second partition treaty collapsed 
Poland would be partitioned for the first time.  Officially, Poland was known  as  “the 
Commonwealth of the Two Nations, the Polish and Lithuanian”.  It was a personal, 
dynastic union between   the   “Crown” of the Polish Realm, and the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania that had existed since 1386.  In 1569 the Commonwealth was converted into 
a constitutional union, in which the two provinces of the Crown and Lithuania enjoyed 
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a common parliament.217  By the eighteenth century, Poland had acquired a reputation 
for being unstable due to its peculiar constitution, and especially the liberum veto that 
allowed any noble to veto legislation on any ground, which led to anarchy.218  Poland 
was also prone to foreign plots and was always dominated by its larger neighbour to 
the east.   Geographically, the Commonwealth spanned the territorial sphere between 
two emerging powers—Prussia and Russia—who would repeatedly clash in Poland. 
The first partition was undertaken “In the Name of the Most Holy and Indivisible 
Trinity”   and   was subsequently approved of by several further treaties, that were 
concluded, initially, between the partitionists and Poland, and finally with the 
disappearance of the Polish state in 1795, only between themselves.219  The first three 
treaties legitimised a fait accompli.  This was because by 1773, when the treaties were 
ratified, the first partition had already been put in place the year before by recourse to 
armed force.220  The partition was not complete, however, as the borders still had to be 
“settle[d] definitely and with greater exactitude” by the commissaries especially 
appointed to determine the exact limits of their respective acquisitions.221   
In essence, each of the partition   treaties   sought   to   legitimise   Poland’s  
dismemberment by obtaining “approval” from the Sejm (the Polish Parliament) for the 
transfer of sovereignty over the territories to each of the partitioning powers, which is 
consistent with the views expressed by Puffendorf that title by conquest was only an 
inchoate title.  Nonetheless, according to historians this consent had been obtained by 
duress and therefore it could be questioned whether the Polish nation had really 
consented to its dismemberment.  Indeed it would seem that the theory of consent 
which had first been raised during the trial of Charles I by Bradshawe and Cooke and 
advanced by Hobbes, Puffendorf, Locke, Wolff, and Rousseau was being completely 
disregarded in Poland.  Hence Senator Solytk resigned his office in protest.  “I would 
rather sit in a dungeon and cut off my hand than sign the sentence passed on my 
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fatherland” he wrote to Staeckelberg. “A Pole who permits the partition of his country 
would be sinning against God.  And we senators ...   would   become   perjurers”.  
Tadeusz Retjan (1746-80), envoy of Nowogródek, went even further in his protest.  
Having begged the members in vain to reject the partition, he rent his clothes and 
threw himself on to the floor of the chamber: “On the blood of Christ, I adjure you, do 
not play the part of Judas; kill me, stamp on me, but do not kill the fatherland”.222  
These statements of protest at the partition, although they were dismissed by the 
partitioning powers, provide an indication that the Polish nation existed, which was in 
the process of being despoiled in a non-consensual arrangement.  As historians have 
been at pains to point out, the confederated Sejm, which met to ratify the partition 
treaties, had been “sweetened by foreign money, and surrounded by foreign troops”.223  
Prussia took 36,000 square kilometres with 580,000 inhabitants; Austria 83,000 
square kilometres with 2,650,000 inhabitants; and Russia 92,000 square kilometres 
with 1,300,000 inhabitants.  As a result of the first partition Poland lost approximately 
30 per cent of its territory, and one third of its population.224  The partition was no 
consensual arrangement; if the Poles did not cooperate, Prussia and Russia threatened 
to seize further territories. Consequently, the Sejm had little choice but to ratify the 
three partition treaties, although perhaps significantly no vote was taken.   
In an age when there was no prohibition on concluding a treaty which had 
been procured through the threat or use of force, and when peoples were treated little 
better than chattels, the partitioning powers were able to coerce the Poles to agree to 
the following identical provision, common to all three treaties: 
 
His Majesty the King of Poland and the Orders and Estates of the Kingdom of 
Poland and of the Grand-Duchy of Lithuania hereby cede to His Majesty the 
King of Prussia, [Her Majesty Empress of Hungary and Bohemia, and Her 
Majesty the Empress of all the Russias], [their] Heirs and Successors, all of the 
aforesaid Territories, will full propriety, sovereignty and independence, and 
with all towns, fortresses and villages, all havens, harbours and rivers, and all 
vassals, subjects and inhabitants, whom they hereby release at the same time 
from their bonds of homage, and from the oaths of allegiance they have sworn 
to His Majesty and to the Crown of Poland, with all civil, political and spiritual 
rights and generally with all that attends the sovereignty of these countries; and 
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hereby vow never to stake, under any pretext, any claim to the Provinces ceded 
by virtue of this Treaty.225  
 
As this provision indicates, the partition treaties were akin to treaties of cession in a 
time  when  the   law  of  nations  placed  few  fetters  on  a  state’s  discretion  to  go  to  war.  
Moreover, there was no notion that the Polish people had any political rights other 
than the bonds of homage and the oaths of allegiance they had sworn to the King of 
Poland.  As with the Partition Treaties, there was no conception of there being a wider 
body politic in Poland that was independent of the sovereign-subject relationship.  
Instead, as this provision made clear, the connection between the sovereign and his 
realm was being transferred to another sovereign.  In this sense the partition was 
similar to the situation of an enforced succession but instead of sovereignty being 
transferred to a royal of Polish blood it was being transferred to the royals of Austrian, 
Prussian, and Russian blood.  It would appear that this provision was precisely the 
reverse of what the republicans had accomplished in England in 1649, when they had 
abolished the Office of the King, which had discharged all the bonds of fealty, 
homage, and allegiance that the people of England had formerly owed their king. 
 
 
 
The international reaction 
 
The international   reaction   to   the   first   partition   was   ambivalent.      “The   partitioning  
powers”,   wrote   Sharon Korman,   “had   rightly   calculated   that   Europe   would   remain  
unmoved   by   the   disappearance   of   Poland   from   the   political   stage”.226  She quoted 
Acton  who  observed:    “By  a  series  of  treaties  it  had  condoned  the  seizure  of  Silesia.    It  
was   too   late   to   complain   of   the   dismemberment   of   Poland”.227  In a private and 
confidential dispatch to Lord Stormont, the British diplomatic representative in 
Vienna, Lord Suffolk, described   as   “extraordinary”   and   without   elaboration   the  
“acquisition   of   territory   and   resources”   by   “the   aggrandizement”   of   the   three  
partitioning   powers   “obtained   by   a   division   of   a   country   carved   out   and   settled”.228  
George III drew up a memorandum on the partition in which he emphasized the 
subversion of the balance of power and the damage done to the commercial interests 
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of Britain, the United Provinces, and France.229  Lord Rochford described the partition 
as  “arbitrary  and  tyrannical”  in  a  private  memorandum  for  the  use  of  Lord  Sandwich  
at the Admiralty.230  However, reaction in Parliament was muted.  In a characteristic 
letter   “to   a   Prussian   gentleman”   Burke   mocked:      “Poland   was   but   a   breakfast”.231   
Voltaire concurred, writing as soon as he heard news of the partition to his friend and 
close confidant King Frederick, that  it  was  assuredly  “a  truly  kingly  cake”.232 
 In contrast to the reaction in Europe, the reaction to the first partition of Poland 
in the Thirteen Colonies was very different.  Indeed there is much circumstantial 
evidence to suggest that the American Declaration of Independence (1776) was issued 
prematurely in order to deal with the perceived threat that the founding fathers feared 
of a plot to partition North America by the colonial powers as they had just condoned 
in Europe.233  The Americans did not believe that their colonial status would protect 
them from partition, which they thought a distinct possibility in the aftermath of the 
French annexation of Corsica, and the partition of Poland.234  The following opinion 
contained in a letter by Richard Henry Lee, the US Senator for Virginia, who played 
an indispensable role in the issuance of that Declaration, to Patrick Henry, the 
Governor of Virginia, expressed these fears with the utmost clarity:  “A slight attention 
to the late proceedings of many European Courts”, he wrote, “will sufficiently evince 
the spirit of partition, and the assumed right of disposing of Men & Countries like live 
stock on a farm, that distinguishes  this  corrupt  age….Corsica,  &  Poland  indisputably 
prove this”.235  In the words of Tom Paine (1737-1809): “There was reason to believe 
that Britain would endeavour to make a European matter of [the question of American 
independence], and, rather than loose the whole [of North America], would 
dismember it, like Poland, and dispose of her several claims to the highest bidder”.236   
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5. The second and third partitions of Poland 
 
In order to have a proper understanding of the second and third partitions of Poland 
we need to be aware of international developments in France, the rest of Europe, and 
overseas, particularly in America.  For there was a twenty-one year gap between the 
first and second partitions of Poland, and only a two year gap between the second and 
third partitions.  This is because the two partitions of 1792 and 1795 were connected, 
and directly influenced by events in France, whereas the first partition in 1772 
amounted to a brazen act of conquest, whereby the theories of consent and popular 
sovereignty advanced by Hobbes, Puffendorf, Locke, Wolff, and Rousseau were set 
aside.  It was only during the American War of Independence in 1776, and the French 
Revolution in 1789, that their theories regarding consent and sovereignty were put to 
the test.  Unlike the English revolution in 1649, the American independence struggle 
and French Revolution were successful, and their consequences long lasting. 
Accordingly, it is necessary to revisit the changes brought about by these 
revolutions as they dramatically affected events in Poland.  This is because it marked 
the moment when the idea of popular sovereignty—the precursor to national self-
determination—first emerged in full fashion enshrined in the revolutionary 
constitutions which posited that sovereignty was collectively and exclusively vested in 
the nation.  In the words of the Déclaration  des  Droits  de  l’Homme  et  du  Citoyen de 
1789:    “The source of all sovereignty is located in essence in the nation; no body, no 
individual can exercise authority which does not emanate from it expressly”.237  The 
theory of popular sovereignty was different from every other theory of government 
which had hitherto existed:  “It is a theory according to which those who exercise 
power, and those over whom it is exercised, are one and the same”.238 And this is 
precisely what the French revolutionaries did.  As soon as they seized power they 
amended the French Constitution and inserted a section entitled “Popular 
Sovereignty”.  Article 7 of that Constitution provided that “[t]he sovereign people 
comprises all French citizens”.239  Two years later this provision was amended under 
the new heading “Constitution”.  Article 1 provided:  “The French Republic is one and 
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indivisible”. Article 2 provided: “The totality of French citizens is the sovereign”.240 
Popular sovereignty meant that all French citizens were sovereign, not just the bishops 
and aristocrats, i.e. not just those who comprised the First and Second Estates. 
It was the prospect of   popular   sovereignty   or   “mob   rule”   that   provoked   the  
aristocrats to turn a blind eye to the partitions of Poland.  In particular, men like Burke 
and Gentz, who were both in the pay of aristocrats, and therefore beholden to their 
paymasters, supported the partition, not out of any hatred towards the Poles or the 
Polish nation, but because they feared that the idea of popular sovereignty would 
spread.241  And they had good reason to fear the contagion. As Paine recognised in the 
introduction to Rights of Man (1792), which he had dedicated to his friend the 
Marquise de Lafayette: “As  revolutions  have  begun  ...  it  is  natural  to  expect  that  other  
revolutions  will   follow”.242   Paine drew a link between events on both sides of the 
Atlantic noting that a by-product of those revolutions was opposition to the notion of 
conquest, which had  “dispossessed  man  of  his  rights”.243  The revolutionaries not only 
opposed monarchical rule, they also opposed the ideas, which sustained such rule, 
including divine right, conquest, and the balance of power.  By justifying the 
partitions of Poland the aristocrats were sending a clear message that they would not 
tolerate these new ideas.  They preferred monarchies with their hereditary lineages, 
ecclesiastical hierarchies, and rigid class systems, where everyone knew his place. 
 
 
The emergence of patriotism and popular sovereignty in Poland 
 
After the first partition, the fear of further violations of Polish sovereignty by Austria, 
Prussia, and Russia, contributed to the formation of Polish patriotism and a need for 
self-preservation.244   Rousseau, in his Considérations sur le gouvernement de la 
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Pologne (hereafter “Considérations”),245 published posthumously, had advised the 
Poles   to  “spare no efforts” to gain the support of the Ottoman Sultan in a defensive 
alliance aimed at safeguarding their mutual territorial integrity,246 which is what 
subsequently transpired.247  Rousseau was one of the first philosophes to recognize the 
close correlation between resistance to “alien occupation”   and   the   emergence of 
patriotism.  “You  will   never   be   free   as   long   as   a   single  Russian   soldier   remains   in  
Poland”   Rousseau   boomed   in   his   advice   to   the   Poles.248  In his Considérations,249 
which was translated into Polish in 1789, (The Social Contract having been translated 
into Polish in 1778)250 Rousseau advocated political reform in Poland that had a direct 
impact on the politics of that country culminating in the Constitution of 3 May 1791.   
In the words of that Constitution,   it   was   desired,   “to take advantage of the 
season in which Europe finds itself and of this dying moment that has restored us to 
ourselves, free of the ignominious dictates of foreign coercion, holding dearer than 
life, than personal happiness the political existence, external independence and 
internal liberty of the people whose destiny is entrusted to our hands”.251  The Poles 
had clearly heeded   Rousseau’s   advice   and   had   amended   their   Constitution, which 
enshrined  Roman  Catholicism  as  “the  dominant  national  religion”,  whilst  assuring  the  
Polish nobility and peasantry that their interests would not be adversely affected.252  
The Constitution further proclaimed the principle of popular sovereignty when it 
affirmed   that:   “All authority in human society takes its origin in the will of the 
people”.253  As a leading Polish historian explained, “it  was  [Rousseau’s]  ideological  
achievement to turn Polish republican thought from passivity to action”’.254   
Writing two decades before the French Revolution, Rousseau saw education 
and politics as intertwined and his advice to the Poles sought to preserve the natural 
political energies of the Polish people and preserve the identity of the Polish nation in 
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Europe.      Rousseau’s   radical political philosophy is best illustrated in the following 
extract in which he critiqued the old system of diplomacy based on the balance of 
power, and encouraged the Poles to seek out their freedom independently: 
 
…   you   will   always   be in danger of losing your freedom as long as Russia 
interferes in your affairs.  But if you succeed in forcing her to deal with you as 
one power with another, and no longer as protector and protectorate, then 
profit by the exhaustion into which the Turkish war will have thrown her to 
accomplish  your  task  before  she  is  able  to  disturb  it  …  [But]  do  not  waste  your  
energies in vain negotiations; do not bankrupt yourselves on ambassadors and 
ministers to foreign courts; and do not account alliances and treaties as things 
of any moment.  All this is useless to the Christian powers, who recognise no 
other bonds than self-interest.  When they find it advantageous to fulfil their 
obligations, they will fulfil them; when they find it advantageous to break 
them, they will  do  so;;  such  promises  might  as  well  not  be  made  at  all  …  it  is  
almost never reasons of state that guides them; it is the momentary interest of a 
minister,   of   a   mistress,   of   a   favourite   …  What   assurance   can   you   have   in  
dealing with people who have no fixed system, and who are led only by 
chance impulses?  Nothing could be more frivolous than the political science 
of courts.  Since it has no certain principles, no certain conclusions can be 
drawn from them; and all this fine theorising about the interest of princes is a 
child’s  game  which makes sensible men laugh.255 
 
A year after the French Revolution had broken out in 1789, a Polish-Ottoman Treaty 
was concluded,  which  provided   in   its   first  article   that   its  principal  purpose  was  “the  
mutual right of sovereignty, the removal of any kind of meddling or interference by 
the foreigners, and the right of sovereignty and independence  of  the  Polish  republic”.  
In the event of conflict both parties agreed to furnish either side with financial aid, 
munitions, and troops. An amendment to that treaty then made an intriguing 
observation:  “It is known by experience from a series of consecutive acts how great 
was the damage inflicted on the European balance, which should be observed, and 
how great was the harm that was instantly caused to the high state and to the Polish 
Republic by the immoderate rise of the Russians, entirely originating from setting 
their feet on and extending their hands to grasp some lands of the high state and the 
Polish   Republic”.256  Accordingly, to redress the balance and to deal with the 
immoderate rise of the Russians his most exalted Sultanate and the Polish Republic 
were to coordinate their movements and inform each other of their preparations for 
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military movements against the Russian Empire.  Thus, Rousseau’s  advice  was  taken  
very seriously by the Poles (as well as by the Turks) and put into practical action.   
It is no coincidence that the writings of Rousseau, as well as Diderot, 
Machiavelli, and Voltaire, were banned by the very same powers that had partitioned 
Poland.257  This is because it was clearly evident that the writers of the Enlightenment 
were idolized by the Poles, and not just by the American and French revolutionaries. 
Indeed, there was a direct link between the philosophers of the Enlightenment and the 
peoples who fought in revolutions of the late eighteenth century particularly between 
France, the Thirteen United States, and Poland.  For instance, the Polish patriot 
Tadeusz Kosciusko (1746-1817) valued   Rousseau’s   views   over   those   of   the   other  
philosophes,258 founded West Point,259 was a close friend of Thomas Jefferson (1743-
1826), and fought alongside him in the American War of Independence.260  He was 
also granted honorary French citizenship261 and sought support in France just after the 
outbreak of the revolution where a bust of Rousseau with a copy of his Social 
Contract was installed in the Assembly Hall in October 1790.262 After a special 
service in the Convention on 14 September 1794, a copy of The Social Contract was 
carried to the Pantheon on a velvet cushion along with a statute of its author that was 
pulled in a cart carried by twelve horses on the orders of the Thermidorians.263 The 
bodies of Rousseau and Voltaire, once intellectual arch-rivals, were “posthumously 
resurrected” and placed in the Pantheon, where today they lay opposite one another.  
Those who were alive during the revolutionary era such as Jeremy Bentham, Thomas 
Paine, and William Wilberforce, were granted honorary French citizenship.264  Not 
only was Maximilien Robespierre a disciple of Rousseau, but after his execution in 
1794,   the   Girondists   interned   Rousseau’s   corpse   from   its   original   resting   place   in  
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Ermenonville to the Pantheon in Paris amid much fanfare.  The Social Contract, 
which prior to the French Revolution went through only one edition, was republished 
thirteen times between 1792 and 1795,  and  one  of   those  editions  “was appropriately 
issued in pocket Bible size for the use of the soldiers defending la patrie”.265  General 
George Washington had also ordered that the writings of Tom Paine be read out aloud 
to his troops to inspire them in their battles with the British.266  There was thus clearly 
an intellectual kinship between the American, French, and Polish revolutionaries that 
would have been seen as extremely subversive by the aristocrats many of whom felt 
they had little choice but to flee for their lives to the safety of England and Prussia.267 
 
 
The Schism: the impact of the French Revolution 
 
One of the most vocal critics of the French Revolution was the brilliant British 
parliamentarian Edmund Burke (1729-1797). Burke was born to an Irish Catholic 
family in the Blackwater Valley, Co. Cork when the Penal Laws were still in full 
force, which is why he had to covert to Anglicanism and conceal his Catholicism in 
his later years.268  Burke’s  vehement opposition to the French Revolution may seem 
paradoxical, because he was an Irishman at heart where revolution and revolt against 
British rule had been commonplace.  I say paradoxical because Irish nationalism as it 
evolved over the centuries against British rule was also anti-aristocracy. And yet 
Burke, who struggled for most of his life for recognition from his British peers, was 
adamantly against the French Revolution that had impressed so many Irish (and some 
British) radicals, including many in his party The Whigs.  Burke’s  rhetorical  crusade  
against the French Revolution as encapsulated in his most famous pamphlet 
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Reflections on the Revolution in France,269 is all the more intriguing since he shared 
that  revolution’s  ideological critique of imperialism, which he had condemned during 
the trial of Warren Hastings.270  However, Burke’s  critique  of  British  imperialism was 
not based on the social contract theories of Hobbes and Locke.  Nor did Burke think 
much of Rousseau’s philosophy either. Burke thought that a   people’s   attachment   to  
territory, instead of being based on the social contract, was something intrinsic, 
natural, and organic—one might almost say, emotional.      For   Burke,   a   people’s  
homeland was a collective personal and political identity that was based on a shared 
sense of belonging, and not on social contract theories, which Burke noted Britain had 
invoked to divest the Irish, the Indians, and the Native Americans, of political 
authority over their homelands, in favour of the Anglo-Saxons who displaced them.271  
For Burke, a territory or homeland anchored both individual and collective identity, 
not just from the narrow instrumentality of rule or control, but in the psychologically 
deeper sense in which identity draws on entrenched feelings and memories.272  Burke 
opposed British imperialism because it sought to alter the pre-existing social 
structures and patterns of human behaviour that existed in India before the British 
arrived.  In this sense, what the British colonists were doing in India was analogous to 
what the French revolutionaries were doing to France:  they both sought to unsettle the 
existing customs, honour, laws, ranks, rights, usages, and social habits.273  For Burke, 
social order was a requisite for individual liberty, which the British were destroying 
through company rule in India, and which the French revolutionaries were destroying 
in France.274  In both cases, a class of individuals who were dislocated, young, restive, 
and rootless, were afflicting upon the societies they touched a similar contagion.275  
For Burke the French Revolution was dangerous because its architects sought 
to alter the natural course of human development.  The anti-Catholic aspects of the 
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French Revolution obviously did not endear him to its principles, especially when his 
fellow Whigs analogised it to the anti-Catholic and anti-Irish English Revolutions of 
1649-1660 and 1688.  But his dislike of the French Revolution was more than 
personal, for Burke disliked its abstract principles that sought to seduce people into 
believing that what  he  called  “absolute speculative liberty” could be achieved merely 
by writing beautiful prose on a piece of paper, in a society without order, and without 
security.  But above all Burke feared the violence of the mob, which Rousseau had 
galvanized with his attacks on inequality and his talk of an indivisible and inalienable 
general will.  In a vitriolic onslaught on Rousseau, Burke attacked the men in the 
French National Assembly for trying to see who could best imitate “the   vain”  
Rousseau whose   heart   “was   incapable  of   harbouring  one   spark  of   common  parental  
affection”.276  Ultimately, for Burke, the French Revolution went contrary to his 
vision of nature, where human gradations were natural.  It was in this context that 
Burke referred to the natural aristocracy, which in his view provided the dynamic 
element in society.  It was the dynamism provided by the aristocracy through their 
philanthropy, the promotion of the arts and sciences, and through their administration 
of law and justice, as well as through trade, education, and good breeding that 
provided the stability that was necessary in any civil society.  Man had to be taught 
these qualities from birth, as they did not come to man naturally or by osmosis.277  In 
Burke’s view, the men of the French Revolution sought to undo the natural order of 
things by vesting political authority in angry men from humble origins who came to 
power not by virtue (as they claimed) but at the violent hands of the Parisian mob. 
One of the men that provoked Burke’s   wrath was Maximillien Robespierre 
(1758-1794), a shy young lawyer who would be thrust into the forefront of French 
politics, and whose name is forever associated with the Terror.278  Born to humble 
origins in the French town of Aras, Robespierre won a scholarship to study at Louis-
Le-Grand, the elite Collège in Paris (next to the Academy of France) on the Rue St 
Jacques.  It has been suggested that the young Robespierre first read Rousseau during 
his time at the Louis-Le-Grand, which provided him with ideological inspiration for 
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the remainder of his life.279  In this respect, Robespierre would certainly have 
identified with Rousseau whose personal life was not too dissimilar to his own:  both 
men lost their mothers prematurely from complications following childbirth, and spent 
their lonely childhoods reading sentimental novels, and philosophical tracts.280 These 
similarities may have explained the rumour that Robespierre slept with a copy of The 
Social Contract under his pillow.281  For Robespierre was passionately opposed to any 
attempt by the French deputies to divide or alienate the general will, which comprised 
the totality of the French nation.  This would have accounted for the passionate 
opposition that Robespierre expressed in the National Assembly against a law that 
sought to divide the French nation into active and passive citizens, and in the process 
exclude 39 per cent of the male population—the poor, vulnerable, and disadvantaged 
whom Robespierre was destined to help.  Robespierre argued that the legislation, 
which was eventually passed in 1790, contravened the provisions on equality that had 
already been articulated in the Declaration on the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789. 
If Robespierre had got his way then, he would not only have prevented the passage of 
such legislation, but he would also have extended the suffrage so that it also included, 
in addition to poor males; actors, Jews, and West Indians living under colonial rule.282  
Indeed, once he was able to, Robespierre successfully argued for a new law abolishing 
the distinction between active and passive citizens in favour of a universal male 
franchise, which would have become the most democratic constitution of its time.283 
Although Robespierre was no atheist, he was suspicious of the Catholic clergy, 
who he thought were behind all counter-revolutionary plots, which undoubtedly 
contributed to his sense of paranoia.  Burke thought likewise.  But obviously Burke 
hoped the Catholic clergy would succeed in suppressing the revolution, whereas 
Robespierre sought to harness the power of religion to his revolutionary cause, by 
creating an alternative religious ideology that was independent of the clergy.284 As 
Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859), the son of a French aristocrat,285 explained in his 
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popular history of the French Revolution, it was opposition to the Catholic Church in 
France that unified the revolutionaries, not because they were ardent atheists, but 
because the Church to which their   fury   was   directed   was   comprised   of   “landed 
proprietors,   lords   of   manors,   tithe   owners”.286  The Church had a leading part in 
secular affairs and “it occupied the most powerful, most privileged position in the old 
order that  was  now   to  be   swept  away”.     The  Church’s  vast  estates  certainly  did not 
endear the clergy to Robespierre or his friend Saint-Just who recognised that the 
wealth of the nation was to be found in the main in the hands of the enemies of the 
revolution.  This was perhaps why it was under Robespierre that a series of decrees 
were issued which included a forced loan of a milliard francs on the rich, as well as a 
demand for fixed prices for corn and flour in a public market, in what amounted to an 
abolition of the corn trade. All bakers were turned into state employees, and a 
maximum price was fixed on commodities and wages. A further law put an end to 
freedom of trade and secrecy of commerce in all commodities except luxury 
articles.287  It was thought that  certain  commodities  like  food  concerned  the  people’s  
right to preserve their existence; freedom of trade in these commodities would have a 
detrimental impact on the health of the nation, whereas the hoarding of luxury goods 
would not affect their livelihoods or means of survival. This is why Robespierre 
argued that private property was not a natural right, but was a social convention.288  
When we consider what the Robespierrists were trying to accomplish, and the 
means in which they deployed to that end (such as Saint-Just’s   injunction   to   raze   to  
the ground the houses of speculators, and to redistribute 5000 pairs of shoes and 
15000 shirts from the rich in Strasbourg for war widows and orphans), we can perhaps 
understand why men like Burke were worried.289  The execution of Marie Antoinette, 
who Burke had personally met, and the fact that the proportion of nobles guillotined 
rose from 6 per cent to 20 per cent during the Terror could hardly have caused him to 
have second thoughts.290  Indeed the French abolition of feudalism and of nobility 
occurred whilst Burke, who spent much of his public career as the pensioner or 
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placemen of wealth English peers, was writing his Reflections.291  As Tom Paine 
noted, there was no fundamental difference between the British social elite and the 
French nobility; both claimed to be descended from the Normans.292  Nor would Paine 
have endeared himself to Burke and the other counter-revolutionaries, when he 
proclaimed:    “It  is  not  difficult  to  perceive,  from  the  enlightened  state  of  mankind,  that  
hereditary Governments are verging to their decline, and that Revolutions on the 
broad basis of national sovereignty, and Government by representation, are making 
their way in Europe, it would be an act of wisdom to anticipate their approach, and 
produce Revolutions by reason and accommodation, rather than commit them to the 
issue   of   convulsions”.293  As Hobsbawm perceptively   observed,   “every genuine 
revolution  tends  to  be  ecumenical”.294  Thus men like Burke feared that the ideology 
of the French Revolution could not be contained, which would have a profound 
impact on events in Poland.  For when faced with the prospect of popular sovereignty, 
the abolition of feudalism, and the removal of inherited privilege gaining currency, the 
successive partitions of Poland were seen as the lesser of two evils.295  That those who 
divided Poland were absolute monarchies was significant since they would have of 
necessity opposed the principle of popular sovereignty, which if put into practice in 
their own countries, would have divested them of their patronage and power. Whilst 
Burke had accepted that the first partition of Poland in 1772 was  “the first very great 
breach in the modern political system of Europe”, he was likewise prepared to 
overlook the second and third partitions of Poland, because he perceived the French 
Revolution to be a source of greater danger—far more dangerous than the American 
Revolution had been.296  For, as Gentz had noted, unlike the French Revolution, the 
American struggle for independence did not affect the European balance of power.297   
Nor did the American revolutionaries seek to abolish serfdom or confiscate the 
properties of the aristocrats since America did not have any aristocrats in the 
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European sense.298  Hence it was hardly surprising that Paine’s  Common Sense,299 
which he wrote in defence of the American revolution, and which repeatedly railed 
against the “evils”   of monarchy and hereditary rule,300 was promptly described by 
Gentz, as “a pamphlet just as contemptible, almost throughout just as remote from 
sound human sense, as all others, by which, in later times, he has made himself a 
name”.301 In contrast to the situation in North America, Gentz forcefully argued that 
the French revolutionaries had no legal pretext “to suspend the constitution, dethrone 
the King, or to assume to themselves, in the name of the people, the power of calling a 
National Convention to proclaim the republic, with fewer formalities, than a man 
would use to change his dress”.302  Since Gentz feared that popular sovereignty might 
prove contagious, he was prepared to overlook the destruction of Poland.  As he 
argued Poland was partitioned in an arrangement sanctified by treaties and enshrined 
in public law, which in his opinion, was consistent with the balance of power.   
 Thus, at the heart of the arguments over the partitions of Poland was the 
dispute over where sovereignty lay.  Accordingly, a transformation occurred around 
the time of the French Revolution and in the following decades, from absolute 
sovereignty associated with wars of conquest and the balance of power, to the 
sovereignty of the people associated with popular sovereignty, and wars  of  “national  
liberation”, as legitimised through the French revolutionary device of the plebiscite.  
As the nineteenth century progressed the consent of the people who inhabited a 
particular territorial sphere was repeatedly raised as a necessity to legitimise a claim to 
territory in international discourse, dispute settlement, and great power negotiation. It 
was this opposition to conquest that led to the emergence of the plebiscite and consent 
became necessary to legitimise conquest. This reached its height between 1848 and 
1870 when plebiscites were convened under international supervision in Moldavia and 
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Wallachia.303  The fact that plebiscites were being organised throughout western 
Europe in nearly all the territories that fell to revolutionary rule from the Batavian 
Republic to the Helvetic Republic was significant.  The principle was never applied to 
Eastern Europe, and no plebiscites were organised prior to the partitions of Poland or 
to justify its ex-post-facto dismemberment.  For Austria, Prussia, and Russia were still 
playing by the old rules of diplomacy.  Conquest was sufficient to confer title.  
 
 
The partition treaties of 1792 and 1795 in context 
 
The second and third partitions of Poland were also accomplished by way of treaty, 
but only Prussia and Russia took part in the second partition, since Austria was 
distracted by its war with the France, which had begun a year earlier in 1792.  With 
the third partition in 1795, Austria was brought back into the fold, and it signed a 
single treaty with Prussia and Russia that collectively provided for the “total partition” 
of the Polish state.  As the three partitioning powers explained, they had been 
“convinced by experience of the absolute inability of the Republic of Poland to 
provide itself either with a firm and rigorous government or to live peacefully under 
the law while preserving any form of independence, in their wisdom and love of peace 
and the happiness of their subjects have decided on the unavoidable necessity of 
resorting   to   …   a   total   partition   of   this   republic   between   the   three   neighbouring  
powers”.304  In contrast to the second partition, the third had come about as a direct 
result of a republican revolution within Poland that had been directly influenced by 
events in America and France.   Since the Sejm had been abolished, it could hardly be 
called to ratify the treaty.305  On 3 January 1795, Coblenz, Osterman, Bezborodko, and 
Markov met in St Petersburg and signed   two  declarations   that  had  “the force, value 
and obligation” of “the most formal and most solemn treaty” and which provided for 
the third and final partition of Poland.306  Thus, it was arguably through an act of 
international law that Poland was eliminated from Europe.  A secret article concluded 
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two years after the 1795 partition stipulated that it had been necessary “d’abolir  tout  
ce  qui  peut  rappeler  le  souvenir  de  l’existence  du  Royuame  de  Pologne”.307 
 In this connection it was no coincidence that the second partition of Poland 
coincided with the decision by Britain to join the European coalition against France.  
This resulted in Britain siding with the kingdoms of Austria and Prussia which had 
both participated in the first partition of Poland.  One of the consequences of this 
realignment was that Russia, once she had concluded peace with Sweden and Turkey, 
was in a position to turn her attention west to events in Poland where a new 
constitution had been proclaimed doing away with the liberum veto.  With Austria, 
England, and France at war, Russia had a free hand in Poland as did Prussia after it 
withdrew from the war with France.  Conveniently, both Prussia and Russia cited the 
fear that French revolutionary ideas might spread to Poland as the pretext for partition.  
“For Catherine II, ‘the mob of Warsaw’ had ‘outdone all the follies of the Parisian 
National Assembly’.  The new Polish order was insupportable: a potential military 
threat to Russia and a centre for social revolution, infected with the pernicious maxims 
of the French”.308  And as soon as Austrian Hapsburgs were distracted by the French 
revolutionaries who declared war on Austria in 1792, Prussia and Russia pounced on 
Poland.309  As  one  scholar   remarked,  “Russia and Prussia could never have found a 
situation more extraordinarily favourable than that of 1793 for perpetrating a great act 
of international rapine without hindrance from the other Powers”.310   
Thus, Austria was left out of the second partition, which left one-third of the 
realm independent with the remainder of Poland being partitioned between Prussia 
and Russia.311  France had long been a staunch ally of Poland but the distractions of 
the French revolution upset the balance of power and provided the perfect opportunity 
for Prussia and Russia to expand into Poland.312 Therefore, by joining the coalition, 
the British Government was seen by many as being largely indifferent to the fate of 
Poland, although the decision to adopt a position of strict neutrality in the affair did 
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cause a ruckus in Parliament.313  Fox argued that Britain should not join in the 
coalition against France because this would involve becoming parties with Austria, 
Prussia, and Russia, who he thought had disgraced themselves by partitioning Poland, 
an  act  which  “had violated all the rights of nations, all the principles of justice and of 
honour”.314  Indeed, Fox thought that the partition of Poland was “a greater and more 
contemptuous violation of the law of nations” than the French revolution had been 
guilty of.315  He explained that it was only after Prussia had been foiled by the French 
revolutionary armies that the   King   of   Prussia   turned   on   “defenceless Poland” to 
indemnify himself for his losses.  Fox and the New Whigs were appalled at the British 
Government for its Janus-faced foreign policy when it claimed that it needed to go to 
war against France to preserve the European balance of power whilst ignoring events 
which affected central Europe.  Charles Grey agreed with Fox and argued that the 
balance of Europe was as much endangered by the aggression against Poland as by the 
aggrandizement of France.316   He drew a parallel between the Polish attempt to 
established a constitutional monarchy and the political system of Britain, and 
complained that “His Majesty’s  ministers,  with  apparent  indifference  and  unconcern,  
have seen her become the victim of the most unprovoked and unprincipled invasion; 
her territory overrun, her free constitution subverted, her national independence 
annihilated, and the general principles of the security of nations wounded through her 
side”.317  The parallel that   Grey   drew   between   Poland’s   attempt   at   constitutional  
reform and the British political system was particularly significant.  Many British MPs 
would have readily self-identified with Poland because it was a Christian country, 
because it was in Europe, and also  because   it   shared   the   “same  values”,   i.e.  Poland  
had a similar political system to Britain after it had attempted to establish a 
constitutional monarchy in 1791.  Despite a sentimental attraction to the Polish cause 
amongst the revolutionaries in France, the First Committee of Public Safety under 
Georges Danton (1759-1794) abandoned   the   “system of cosmopolitanism idealism, 
armed propaganda, and universal revolution, by which the Girondists had so aroused 
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the fears of sovereigns and the hopes of peoples, and instead [fell] back on a policy 
based exclusively upon the practical needs and material interests of France”.318 
 The French Revolution and the constitutional revolution that took place in 
Poland were inadvertently viewed as being linked, and provided the perfect ruse for 
the   latter’s territorial dismemberment.319  Indeed, both Prussia and Russia justified 
their intervention to put down the Polish “revolution” of 3 May 1791, which they 
avowedly considered akin to some kind of Jacobin conspiracy.  For instance, the 
preamble to the Polish-Prussian  treaty  expressly  referred  to  “the illegal revolution of 3 
May 1791, the disturbances that have unceasingly torn at its fabric since that fateful 
time”.320  The treaty squarely placed the blame for the Prussian intervention and 
subsequent partition of Poland on the Polish people for “having forced His Majesty 
the King of Prussia and Her Majesty the Empress of all the Russias to form an entente 
and seek consultation with neighbouring powers on the means of safeguarding their 
own states from the imminent danger”.321  The preamble to the Polish-Russian treaty 
likewise referred to “the revolution which took place on 3 May 1791 in an arbitrary 
and violent manner, within its former government, and which continued to foment and 
spread to the point that despite all efforts that Her Majesty the Empress of all the 
Russias has taken to calm and stifle it, a manifest danger has resulted for the peace 
and safety of the bordering states”.322  It was little consolation to the Poles that there 
was no truth to this since, as soon as Russia acquired its share of Polish territory, it 
banned French newspapers from being distributed and imposed tight censorship.  
Newly accredited French diplomats were expelled and a systematic search for 
“Jacobins” was undertaken.323  “None were found”, notes Jerzy Lukowski, “but the 
notion   that   the   Commonwealth   was   riddled   with   the   ‘philosophical   spirit’   was   one  
which Catherine and the Targowica [Polish notables opposed to constitutional reform 
and loyal to Russia] found convenient to entertain and hard to shake off”.324 
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 One can imagine that if the Polish Revolution of 3 May 1791, a constitutional 
revolution, which would have kept the Polish monarchy and nobility intact, was 
considered enough of a pretext for its second partition by Prussia and Russia, then the 
Polish Republican Revolution in 1794, which sought to abolish the monarchy 
altogether, would have been viewed as even more abhorrent.  Indeed Kosciuszko had 
travelled to Paris in January 1793 to plead the Polish case, “in which he promised to 
abolish serfdom, episcopacy, aristocracy, the monarchy, to extend the szlachta’s rights 
and liberties to the rest of the populace, and to deploy the rebuilt Polish army against 
all three partitioning powers”.325  Whether or not these demands were realistic, 
Kosciuszko’s  Act  of   Insurrection  of  24  March  1794   is  all the more remarkable than 
the Constitution of 3 May 1791, which was adopted by the Sejm, because it was a 
fusion of Polish peasant religious imagery with the popular revolutionary language of 
the day.  Kosciuszko stood  before  Krakow’s  city  square  and  swore  before  “God and 
the   innocent   Passion   of   His   Son  …   not   to   use   the   power   entrusted   to   him   for   any  
personal  oppression,  but  only  …  for  the  defence  of  the  integrity  of the boundaries, the 
regaining of the independence of the nation and the founding of universal freedom”.326  
Kosciuszko held back from adopting liberté, égalité, fraternité as the uprising’s  motto  
and instead proclaimed “Liberty, Integrity, and Independence” as the supreme aims of 
the insurrection.327  If the insurrection was a success and Polish freedom was regained, 
the Act provided that “the nation assembled by its representatives” would “decide its 
future prosperity”.328  By combining the “struggle” for the “independence” and 
“freedom” of the Polish “nation” in defence of its territorial “integrity”, to “decide its 
future”, Kosciuszko was inadvertently prescribing and prefiguring national self-
determination as it would come to be known over a century later.  Six weeks after his 
speech in Krakow, Kosciuszko abolished serfdom in Poland in the hope of creating a 
mass uprising that further antagonised the szlachta (the privileged class in Poland) as 
well as agrarian Russia in his Proclamation of Połaniec  dated  7  May  1794.329 
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 Whilst the first partition of Poland left a body politic that still contained the 
elements essential to continued national life, the second partition marked the death 
sentence for the Polish state.330  The third partition effectively   sealed   the   republic’s  
fate.  In this connection the signatories to the third partition treaty did not even go 
through the trouble to provide a pretext for the destruction of Poland by mentioning 
Kosciuszko’s  revolt.    Instead  it  was  concluded  merely  so that the partitioning powers 
could   “more fully understand one another” with a view to defining “more precisely 
the borders that are to separate the respective states of the three Powers neighbouring 
Poland, following the total partition of the latter”.331  As with the other treaties, it was 
concluded “in the name of the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity”, which as one 
scholar noted, was an expression that was always used by the powers when they were 
on the point of committing a peculiarly immoral agreement.332  The principal 
beneficiary of the third partition, in terms of territory gained, was Russia with over 
46,330 square miles, with an additional 1,200,000 new subjects.  This was almost half 
as much of the combined shares of territory that Austria and Prussia acquired. Austria 
obtained 18,147 square miles of territory, and Prussia 18,533 square miles.  Austria 
secured 1,500,000 new subjects and Prussia acquired around a million new subjects.333   
 
 
The international reaction to the second and third partitions 
 
The partitions of Poland occurred in a tumultuous phase of European politics when it 
had become apparent to the great powers that the balance of power could no longer 
safeguard the security of Europe.  This did not, however, mean that the balance of 
power was not invoked as a justification for the second and third partitions of Poland.  
It was, but it was contested.  For instance, statesmen like Charles James Fox who 
supported the principles of the French Revolution opposed the partitions of Poland, 
whereas Burke who opposed that revolution supported the partition of Poland.  When 
we bear in mind that those statesmen   and   scholars   who   critiqued   “the rapine of 
Poland” tended to support the French Revolution, and those who supported the 
partitions of Poland tended to vigorously oppose it, we can deduce that the dispute 
                                                 
330 Lord, The Second Partition of Poland, supra n. 310, p. 484.  
331 See the preamble to the Treaty between Austria, Prussia and Russia for the Partition of Poland 1795, 
in Parry, supra n. 219. 
332 See James Brown Scott, “Poland”, 11 The American Journal of International Law (1917), p. 140. 
333 These statistics are all provided in Lukowski, The Partitions of Poland , supra n. 216, p. 177. 
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was essentially over the admissibility of the principle of popular sovereignty.  The 
French and the Polish revolutionaries were asserting that sovereignty was vested 
continuously in the people whereas for the aristocrats this was a fiction and a threat.   
Compared to the first partition of Poland, where the great powers were largely 
indifferent   as   to   that   nation’s   fate,   the   second   and   third   partitions   were   viewed   as 
being more problematic.  As Burke had noted with his characteristic use of colourful 
language, the great powers had viewed the first partition of Poland in 1772, with “as 
total an indifference and unconcern, as we could read an account of the extermination 
of one horde of Tartars by another, in the days of Genghis Khan or Tamerlane”.334  In 
contrast, the second and third partitions were viewed a little differently because they 
were tied up with events in revolutionary France in which the principle of popular 
sovereignty had been proclaimed challenging the legal, political, and social fabric of 
Europe.  Burke’s   position   on   Poland   and   on   the   revolution   in   France   had   a   great  
influence over Gentz, who shared his views and who translated many of his works 
from the English into the German.335  Gentz had, like Burke, expressed some very 
strong opinions on the state of Europe and the challenge posed to the balance of power 
by the partitions of Poland prior to taking up his appointment as official secretary to 
the Congress of Vienna in 1815.336  In his Fragments Upon the Balance of Power in 
Europe that was published in 1806, Gentz argued that the shock given to the European 
political system by the first partition of Poland in 1772 made it all too plain that the 
balance of power could be invoked for the annihilation of a weaker state that it was 
avowedly supposed to protect.337  In other words interventions justified by reference 
to the balance of power could both justify preserving the peace as well as the 
territorial aggrandizement by an unscrupulous power.    Gentz  observed  that  this  “abuse  
of   form”   allowed   revolutionary   France   to   exploit   the   balance   of   power   for   its  
territorial ambitions conquering and annexing territories throughout the European 
continent and then having the gall to justify its crude exploits by referring to the 
                                                 
334 See   “The Annual Register for the Year 1772:  The History of Europe, Chap. I” in The Annual 
Register, or a View of the History, Politics, and Literature, for the Year 1772 (London: Printed for J. 
Dodsley, in Pall-Mall, 1773), p. 2. 
335 As noted in Osiander, The States System of Europe, supra n. 199, p. 174. 
336 Frederick Gentz, On the State of Europe before and after the French Revolution: Being an answer to 
L’Etat   de   la   France   à   la   Fin   de   l’An   VIII. Translated from the German by John Charles Herries 
(London: J. Hatchard, 1802), p. 83. 
337 See The Chevalier Fred. Gentz, Fragments Upon the Balance of Power in Europe, translated from 
the German (London: Printed for M. Peltier, 18, Warwick-Street, Golden-Square, 1806). 
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partitions of Poland.338  Sir Robert Phillimore, writing several decades later, concurred 
with this view, recalling   that:   “The   aggressions   of   Revolutionary   France   …   were  
repeatedly justified by reference to the rapine committed by Russia, Austria, and 
Prussia, upon Poland”.339  But what upset Gentz in particular was the French 
Revolution.  He would probably not have raised such a fuss if the second and third 
partitions   of   Poland   had   not   been   linked   to   events   in   France   where   “a horde of 
jabbering sophists”  were  striving to undermine every existing constitution.340  It was 
for this reason that Gentz would justify the partitions of Poland as a lawful measure.341   
Nine years later Gentz would participate as one of the key players in the 
Congress of  Vienna  where  Poland’s  fate  was  sealed  for  113  years.    But  even  at  Vienna  
there was support for the Polish cause amongst the French negotiators.    As 
Talleyrand warned Metternich, France did not consider the dismemberment of Poland 
as being consistent with  the  “principles of political equilibrium”, which would lead to 
“tranquillity of all”.342  He scolded Metternich, who was blinded by his obsession to 
preserve the Austro-Hungarian Empire at all costs, by arguing that in order to 
acknowledge the partition of Poland as legitimate, one would have to recognise:  
 
that peoples have no rights distinct from those of their sovereigns, and can be 
likened  to  a  small  farmer’s  cattle;;  that  sovereignty  is  lost  and  acquired  by  the  
sole fact of conquest; that the nations of Europe are not united among 
themselves by moral ties other than those which unite them to the South Sea 
islanders, that they live among themselves subject only to the mere law of 
nature, and that what is called the public law of Europe does not exist….343   
 
The American and French revolutions had changed the political dynamic.  For the 
negotiators to fail to recognise this by dismembering Poland as if there had been no 
revolution verged on the absurd.  Whilst it was legitimate to preserve the balance of 
power, one needed to take in to account the rise of a new national consciousness.  In a 
                                                 
338 Gentz, Fragments Upon the Balance of Power, ibid, p. 75. 
339 Robert Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law (Philadelphia: T. &. J. Johnson, 1854), p. 
327.   
340 Gentz, Fragments Upon the Balance of Power, supra n. 337, p. 77-78. 
341  Gentz, Fragments, ibid, pp. 80-81. 
342 See Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, letter to Metternich, in Moorhead Wright (ed.), Theory and 
Practice of the Balance of Power 1486-1914 (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 1975), pp. 98-104, at p. 
100. 
343 Ibid, p. 102. 
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word,   a  man’s   cottage  was  his   kingdom.     And   it  was  no   longer   appropriate   to   treat  
men like cattle.  But this was anathema to the negotiators who instead felt compelled 
to reconstruct the European balance of power at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 in 
opposition to this new movement for national liberation.  The despoilers of Poland 
reminded Castlereagh, the British Foreign Secretary, who at one point in the 
negotiations had come out in favour of recreating the Polish Kingdom, that he had 
supported the suppression of an anti-British rising and the annexation of Ireland in 
1801, which had only been granted self-government in 1782.  As Andres Osiander 
observed, the three east European great powers could consider themselves quite safe 
from any British complaints over their treatment of the Poles, as long as, in order to 
answer  such  complaints,  it  was  enough  to  mention  the  word  “Ireland”.344 
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
Throughout the nineteenth century the Poles were to follow the advice given to them 
by Rousseau in his Considérations:  If you cannot be devoured, then you must make 
sure that you will not be digested.  In 1794, 1806, 1830, 1846, and 1863 the Poles 
repeatedly rose up in insurrection forcing the great powers to confront the Polish 
question.345  In the process, the great powers were obliged to recognise the legitimacy 
of  the  Polish  people’s  claims  to  national self-determination.  Le Marquis de Noailles 
spoke for many, when in reaction to the 1863 Polish revolt, he asserted: 
 
The Poles require not a revolution, but a restoration, having on their side 
justice, patriotism ...On the part of Russia, we see tyranny, violation of the 
right of nations, and violation of the laws of war.  Russian soldiers murder the 
wounded after battle, pillage alike the cottage and the mansion, and massacre 
inoffensive persons, while the Government issues the most incendiary 
proclamations, persecutes the priests, and having thwarted the generous 
intentions of the nobles as to emancipation, tries to exasperate the peasants 
against the landowners by a promise of the land...346 
 
                                                 
344 See Osiander, The States System of Europe, supra n. 199, p. 180. 
345 See   Piotr   S.  Wandycz,   “The Polish Question” in Manfred F. Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman, and 
Elisabeth Glaser, (eds.) The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006, first published 1998), p. 313. 
346 Le Marquis de Noailles, What is Poland? A Question of Geography, History, and Public Law, 
Abridged   from   ‘La   Pologne   et   Ses   Frontières’   (London: Effingham Wilson, Royal Exchange, 1863, 
translated by Edward Johnstone), pp. 18-19. 
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To   nineteenth   century   historians   the   partition   of   Poland   became   an   “act   of  
brigandage”,   a   notorious   example   of   international immorality.  Influenced by the 
liberalism associated with that age, those who supported the Polish cause pressed 
history   to   prove   that   Europe   had   to   erase   its   “bad   conscience”   and   bring   Poland,   a  
Christian and civilised nation, back into the European family.347  Thus, the struggle of 
the   Poles  with   the   Russian   Empire   became   a   platform,   and   a   rallying   cry,   for   “the  
forces  of  progress”,  in  opposition  to  “the  Asiatic  despotism”  of  the  Russian  Tsar:      
 
To partition Poland was to mutilate Europe, as, beyond Germany, all is now 
subject to the Asiatic despotism of the Czar; and it must be repeated, that, for 
the interest of Europe, for the interest of the civilised world, in obedience to 
the call of Justice, and in conformity with the Law of Nations, our only course 
is to repudiate and to declare null and void the infamous partition, and to aid 
and support the Poles in restoring to perfect independence, and with her full 
rights, and to her former extent, the Ancient Kingdom of Poland.348 
 
Many French aristocrats like the Marquis de Noailles could self-identify with Poland 
because it was a European Christian country that had its sovereignty violated by a 
“less   civilised”   and   “barbarous”   country   on   the   periphery   of   Europe.    And the 
Americans could self-identify with Poland for the same reason.  Thus, in an exchange 
of letters with John Quincy Adams (1767-1848), Jefferson wrote:    “A wound indeed 
was inflicted on the character of honor in the eighteenth century by the partition of 
Poland.  But this was an atrocity of a barbarous government chiefly, in conjunction 
with a smaller one still scrambling to become great, while one only of those already 
great, and having character to lose, descended to the baseness of an accomplice in a 
crime”.349  This was a sentiment with which the former President did not disagree, 
writing that there is “no difference of opinion or feeling between us, concerning the 
partition of Poland”. Nonetheless, whilst the founding fathers of the American 
Constitution were horrified by what happened to Poland, they were still ideologically 
closer to Great Britain, and to France, in national sentiment, ideology, and outlook.  
This was because the American understanding of self-determination was also based on 
a social contract, which only encompassed a people who appeared alike, were God-
                                                 
347 See the list of histories cited in Louis L. Gerson, Woodrow Wilson and the Rebirth of Poland, 1914-
1920: A Study in the Influence on American Policy of Minority Groups of Foreign Origin (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1953), p. 4, note 15. 
348 Le Marquis de Noailles, What is Poland?, supra n. 346, p. 80. 
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fearing, were wealthy, and who thought in a similar way.  Inevitably, this only 
encompassed a small minority of people, since as explained in Part Two, most people 
in America in the eighteenth century were women, poor whites, natives, and slaves.  
The Marxists, by contrast, looked at the partition of Poland in a different light, 
and came to radically different conclusions on what it meant, and how the nationality 
problem was to be resolved.350  “With all its shortcomings”, explained Karl Marx 
(1818-1883), this constitution [referring the 1791 Polish Constitution] appeared 
against the background of Russo-Prusso-Austrian barbarity as the only work of 
freedom which Central Europe has ever produced of its own accord.  Moreover, it was 
created by a privileged class, the gentry.  The history of the world knows no other 
example of such generosity by the gentry”.351  For Marx and Engels, the Polish 
struggle against the Austrians, Prussians, and Russians, was a class struggle; the 
peasants, the gentry, and the privileged classes had all united in order to oppose the 
forces of conservatism and Monarchy. This is why Marx supported the secession of 
Poland from Russia.352 Indeed, a recent study of Marx argued that along with Engels 
his support for the Polish cause “was one of the greatest political passions of his 
life”.353  Marx and Engels support for Poland, like their opposition to Russia, was for 
much of their generation, a litmus test demarcating the democratic and revolutionary 
character of the socialist cause from its conservative opponents.  This might explain 
why Poland was the only country explicitly mentioned in The Communist Manifesto 
(1848) whose authors believed and hoped that its revolution would be of an agrarian 
character.354  Hence, the whole European Left, from nationalists like Mazzini and 
Michelet to English Chartists, were deeply stirred up by the Manifesto of the Polish 
Revolutionary Government of 22 February 1846.355  As Marx and Engels explained: 
 
Poland  …  is   the  only  European  people   that  has   fought  and   is   fighting  as   the  
cosmopolitan soldier of the revolution.  Poland shed its blood during the 
American War of Independence; its legions fought under the banner of the first 
French Republic; by its revolution of 1830 it prevented the invasion of France 
                                                 
350 See G. Starushenko, The Principle of National Self-Determination in Soviet Foreign Policy 
(Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1962), p. 55.  
351 Quoted in Davies, God’s  Playground, supra n. 216, p. 403. 
352 See Starushenko, The Principle of National Self-Determination, supra n. 350, p. 55. 
353 Kevin B. Anderson, Marx at the Margins:  On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Non-Western Societies 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010), p. 56. 
354 As noted by E.H. Carr in The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923, Volume One (London: Macmillan & 
Co, 1960), p. 414. 
355 Andrzej Walicki, Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism: The Case of Poland (Notre Dame, Indiana, 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1994, first published by Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 362. 
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that had been decided by the partitioners of Poland; in 1846 in Cracow it was 
the first in Europe to plant the banner of social revolution; in 1848 it played an 
outstanding part in the revolutionary struggle in Hungary, Germany, and Italy; 
finally, in 1871 it supplied the Paris Commune with its best generals and most 
heroic soldiers.356 
 
As an expert on Polish history explained, for Marks and Engels Poland was an 
Eastern-European counterpart to France.  They thought that Poland had to perform the 
same revolutionary task for the East as France had performed for the West, and 
therefore, that the revolutionary movements in the West had their natural ally in the 
Polish national movement.  They saw Poland as the main bulwark of civilization 
among the Slavs and the main carrier of revolutionary ideas east of the Elbe; very 
often they spoke of Polish “sacrifices” to the cause of revolution in the West, 
especially of the services rendered by the Poles to different revolutions in France.357  
In the aftermath of the First World War, when the balance of power was realigned, 
and when Lenin and the Bolsheviks seized power, one of their first acts was to grant 
Poland immediate independence.  This suited the policy of Wilson, the US president 
who had been lobbied by Polish Americans to resurrect Poland, which explains why it 
is the only country mentioned in his famous fourteen point’s speech.358  Thus, Poland 
became an independent state in 1918, at the moment when the League of Nations 
established mandates over the former German and Ottoman colonies, and turned a 
blind eye to the continued colonisation of territories in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific, 
with the exception of Ethiopia, a Christian country, Liberia, which had been 
established as a free state as a refuge for liberated American slaves, and South Africa 
where the European, civilised, Christian minority, ruled over the majority. In order to 
understand how this could happen, we must next turn to the age of imperialism. 
                                                 
356 Quoted in Anderson, Marx at the Margins, supra n. 353, p. 76.  
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120 
Part Two 
 
EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW IN THE AGE OF IMPERIALISM 
 
 
The opinion thus entertained and acted upon in England was naturally impressed upon 
the colonies they founded on this side of the Atlantic.  And, accordingly, a negro of 
the African race was regarded by them as an article of property, and held, and bought 
and sold as such, in every one of the thirteen colonies which united in the Declaration 
of Independence, and afterwards formed the Constitution of the United States. 
 
Dred Scott v. John F.A. Sandford in Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the 
Supreme Court of the United States, December Term, 1856, ed. Benjamin C. Howard, 
Vol. XIX (Washington DC: William Morrison & Co. 1857), p. 393 at p. 408. 
 
Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided 
the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. 
 
J.S. Mill, On Liberty (London: 1859) reprinted in John Gray (ed.) John Stuart Mill: 
On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 14-15.  
 
Does the British Empire rest on universal and equal voting rights for all of its 
inhabitants?  It could not survive for a week on this foundation; with their terrible 
majority, the coloureds would dominate the whites.  In spite of that the British Empire 
is a democracy.  The same applies to France and the other powers. 
 
Carl Schmitt, Preface to the Second Edition (1926):  On the Contradiction between 
Parliamentarism and Democracy, in Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary 
Democracy, translated by Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986), p. 10. 
 
Apartheid is not, at root, a colour policy; it is the policy of a total nationalism and the 
colour bar is far from being the most sinister of its manifestations ... The sting of the 
colour bar is nationalism, and the strength of nationalism is democracy. 
 
Lord Percy of Newcastle, The Heresy of Democracy: A Study in the History of 
Government (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1954), pp. 236-237. 
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In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt described the period of Imperialism 
as  spanning  “[t]he  three  decades  from  1884  to  1914”  during  the  scramble  for  Africa  
when   there   was   “stagnant   quiet   in   Europe”   before   the outbreak of the First World 
War.1  She was responding to an argument first advanced by Hobson and later refined 
by Lenin who noted that imperialism coincided with a specific historical period 
associated with economic development and high finance.2  For Hobson, 1870 marked 
the  year  that  indicated  “the  beginning  of  a  conscious  policy  of  imperialism”,  although  
“the   movement   did   not   attain   its   full   impetus   until   the   middle   of   the   eighties”. 3  
Similarly, Lenin, reflecting on Hobson’s  thesis a decade later, thought that it was the 
15-20 years after the Spanish-American War (1898), and the Anglo-Boer War (1899-
1902)  that  the  term  “imperialism”  began to be used in the political literature to define 
“the  present  era”.4   In contrast, Antony Anghie in his study of Imperialism focused on 
the years, which spanned from 1870 to 2003, although curiously his first chapter 
examined the writings of the fifteenth century Spanish jurist Francisco de Vitoria.5   
In retrospect, the thirty years that Arendt, Hobson, and Lenin alluded to, would 
more accurately be described as “the   high   period of   imperialism”. As Hobson 
observed these years could be distinguished from previous eras, by the fact that native 
lands were not colonised for the purpose of settling white men or their families; that 
the lands occupied were densely populated   by   the   “lower   races”;;   and that the 
occupation of these new territories was undertaken by, and in the presence of, a small 
minority of white men, including traders and industrial organisers, who exercised 
political and economic power over what they termed the “inferior”  races.6  However, 
if one accepts that colonialism is inextricably linked to imperialism, and if one is of 
the view that colonialism is not solely about settling white peoples in distant lands, 
then one could plausibly argue as Anghie did in his study of Imperialism, and Vitoria, 
                                                            
1 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 
1979, first published in 1951), p. 123.  
2 J.A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1902).  VI Lenin, Imperialism: 
The Highest Stage of Capitalism (London: Pluto Press, 1996, first published 1917). 
3 Hobson, Imperialism, ibid, p. 19. 
4 Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, supra n. 2, p. 9. 
5  Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 13-31.  I say curiously because there is a three hundred year 
gap between Anghie’s   first   chapter, which focuses exclusively on Vitoria, and his second chapter, 
which jumps to what international lawyers wrote about sovereignty in the nineteenth century.  
6 Hobson, Imperialism, supra n. 2, p. 27 (emphasis added, for reasons that become clearer later). 
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that imperialism began with the conquest of the New World in the fifteenth century.7  
As Edward Said  noted,  “colonialism  is  almost  always  a  consequence  of  imperialism”.8  
Ultimately the rules that the great powers invoked to preserve the balance of power 
during the colonisation of the New World were also invoked to colonise other places.   
Indeed colonialism was an integral part of the policies adopted by Britain, 
France, and the other powers during the Age of Imperialism. This often involved the 
transfer of European populations into non-European territory, where the new arrivals 
lived as permanent settlers while maintaining political allegiance to their countries of 
origin.9  In contrast to the British method of indirect rule in which autonomy was 
granted to colonial legislatures, in France there was colonial representation in the 
metropolitan parliament.10  Thus no distinctions were made between French settlers 
and colonial subjects in terms of representation in the French parliament, which was 
not the case in the British colonies with the sole exception of Ireland where 
assimilation failed.  And one reason why assimilation in Ireland failed was because 
after the Act of Union between Great Britain and Ireland in 1801, the Irish MPs 
returned to Parliament in Westminster remained Protestant until the restrictions on 
Catholic representation were repealed in 1829.  Even so, most Irish MPs remained 
highly unrepresentative of Irish society as they were drawn overwhelmingly from the 
landed aristocracy.11  This was also, of course, the case on the mainland where the 
patrician families dominated British politics.12  In this connection one should not 
forget that prior to the 1911 reforms, the House of Lords was a more important and 
                                                            
7 Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, supra n. 5, p. 9.  Similarly, 
many of the historical events that Arendt went on to analyze in the subsequent pages related to issues 
such as the rise of the nation-state, the political emancipation of the bourgeoisie, race-thinking before 
racism, and race and bureaucracy, which related to ideas and practices that were in gestation long 
before 1870 or 1884.  See Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, supra n. 1, pp. 123-221. 
8 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (London: Chatto & Windus, 1993), p. 8. 
9 Hobson, Imperialism, supra n. 2, p. 6. 
10 Contrast the way the British Overseas Territories are governed with their own legislatures to the 
overseas  departments  (“department  d’outre  mere”)  in  France.  See  Title  XII  on  Territorial  Communities  
in articles 72-3, 73, and 74 of the French constitution available at <http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/index.asp>>.  For instance, Article 72-3  provides:      “La  République   reconnaît,   au   sein  du  
peuple français, les populations d'outre-mer,  dans  un  idéal  commun  de  liberté,  d'égalité  et  de  fraternité”. 
11 “Westminster,   Irish   representation   at”   in   The Oxford Companion to Irish History, which can  be 
accessed at <<http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O245-WestminsterIrishrprsnttnt.html>> 
12 See David Cannadine, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy (New York: Vintage, 1999), 
pp.  206-234 (examining how the ruling English families dominated the British cabinet in the imperial 
age).  See  also,  Appendix  B,  “Patrician  Members  of  British  Cabinets,  1880-1980”,  at  pp.  711-712.  
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constitutionally powerful institution than the House of Commons.13  In other words, 
inequality was a principal feature of British imperialism both at home and abroad. 
As Arendt observed, it   was   not   by   chance   that   there  was   “stagnant   quiet   in  
Europe”   during the scramble for Africa, since there the balance of power was 
maintained, whilst Africa was effectively a free-for-all.  This is because one of the 
original purposes behind the idea of maintaining the balance of power in Europe was 
to prevent conflict between the European powers during their discovery of the New 
World.  Thus, after 1492, the Pope divided the earth into lines in which he drew a 
distinction between Christian and non-Christian territories.  The former was 
considered  “vacant  land”  or  “terra  nullius”  and  open  to  colonisation,  whilst  the  latter  
was considered occupied and therefore unavailable for colonisation.14  In order to 
avoid conflict between the Catholic kingdoms of Portugal and Spain an agreement 
was reached and concluded two years later in the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) 
whereby  a  line  was  drawn  from  the  Arctic  to  the  Antarctic  poles  separating  Portugal’s  
possessions in the Cape Verde Islands and on the western coast of Africa from Spain’s  
possessions in the Indies.15  The aim of this treaty, as well as with subsequent treaties 
of this kind, was to avoid the outbreak of a general war in Europe.  For instance, as 
late as 1559, France and Spain would reach an agreement at the Peace of Cateau-
Cambrésis in France, whereby armed conflicts in the New World were allowed to 
continue on the understanding that they were not to disturb the peace of Europe.16  
With the aim of preventing the emergence of a hegemonic power on the 
European continent, the balance of power was supposed to provide for the peace of 
Europe, whilst enabling a state of war to continue overseas.17 With the expansion of 
                                                            
13 After the 1911 reforms the Lords could only delay public Bills for two parliamentary sessions.  After 
1949 reforms the Lords could only delay reforms for one parliamentary session.  See Ian Loveland, 
Constitutional Law: A Critical Introduction (London: Butterworths, 1996), pp. 196-197. 
14 See The Bull Inter Caetera (Alexander VI.) May 3, 1493 in Frances Gardiner Davenport (ed.), 
European Treaties bearing on the History of the United States and its Dependencies, Vol. I 
(Washington DC: Carnegie Institute of Washington 1917), pp. 56-63. 
15 See Treaty between Spain and Portugal concluded at Tordesillas, June 7, 1494 in Davenport (ed.), 
European Treaties bearing on the History of the United States, ibid, p. 84. 
16 Hedley  Bull,  “The Revolt Against the West”, in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.) The Expansion 
of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 227. 
17 Neither the papal arbitration nor the Treaty of Tordesillas was intended to be binding on the other 
great maritime powers, and both were in fact repudiated.  Cabot’s  voyage   to  North  America   in  1497  
was  England’s  immediate  reply  to  the  partition.    France, Holland, and Denmark rejected it as well.  In 
1580, the English government countered with the principle of effective occupation as a determinate of 
sovereignty.  See Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1994, first published in 1944), pp. 3-4. 
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colonialism and great power contests overseas it would continue to apply but only in 
relations between great powers when it came to acquiring and colonising non-
European territory.18  In other words, it was an all-white affair.  The same rules that 
applied between European sovereigns did not equally apply between European 
sovereigns and non-European sovereigns.  This was because non-European territory 
did not have the same quality as European territory because it was uncultivated.  
Accordingly,   “vacant   spaces”   could   be   colonized   by   those   who   could   use   them  
productively. In the high period of imperialism, the balance of power was once again 
invoked to secure the peace of Europe to provide some semblance of order between 
the great European powers during their colonisation of Africa.   In this respect, one 
can draw a parallel between the Treaty of Tordesillas, the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis 
and the 1884-5 Berlin (West Africa) Conference during which the colonial powers 
sought to fix approximate borders in Africa in advance of occupying them in order to 
reduce the potential for conflict so as to secure a balance of power between them.19 
It was often the case that the settlers who colonised the New World attempted 
to recreate the world they knew from home. Hence, Amsterdam became New 
Amsterdam; England became New England; York become New York, etc. In 
Bermuda, which is Britain’s  oldest  colony,  and  which  remains  an  “overseas  territory”  
today, the island was divided into parishes with very English names like Devonshire, 
Hamilton, Paget, and Southampton.  It was as though the indigenous population in the 
US or the Africans brought across the Atlantic as slaves did not exist in the sense of 
forming political societies.  This would explain why the natives in America, Canada, 
and Australia, and the descendents of slaves and  “free  men”  in America, and Bermuda, 
were not granted   political   rights   equal   to   that   of  whites,   even   after   “emancipation”.    
Rather, segregation became a hallmark of policy in the US and Bermuda until the 
second half of the twentieth century.20   It was assumed by most Europeans that only 
those societies which had collectively coalesced to form a nation in the European 
mould had the capacity to reason and to be bearers of sovereignty.  Consequently, 
                                                            
18 See Schmitt’s examination of the Amity Lines, which separated the sphere where European Public 
Law applied, and the “New  World”  where it did not apply.  See Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth 
in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum (New York: Telos Press, 2003), pp. 92-99. 
19 See   Jörg   Fisch,   “Africa   as   terra nullius:   The   Berlin   Conference   and   International   Law”,   in   Stig  
Förster, Wolfgang J. Mommsen, and Ronald Robinson (eds.), Bismarck, Europe, and Africa:  The 
Berlin Africa Conference 1884-1885 and the Onset of Partition (The German Historical Institute, 
London, published in Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 348-349 and pp. 353-354. 
20 Universal suffrage was not implemented in Bermuda until 1968.  
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only they had a right to have their political independence and territorial integrity 
respected.  This is why the partitions of Poland provoked uproar in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries whereas the partition of Africa hardly provoked a murmur of 
discontent within European society at the time of its conquest and colonisation.21   
In the imperial age, as Martti Koskenniemi observed:   “Europeans   still   acted  
from a position of superiority towards others: capitulation regimes, consular 
jurisdiction, and brutal colonial wars had become banal aspects of the international 
everyday”.22  Accordingly, one would be hard pressed to find an international lawyer 
writing in the high period of imperialism who recognised that native political society 
was entitled to equal civil and political rights on par with Europeans.23   This is 
especially when we remember that such rights did not exist within the societies they 
belonged to.  Thus, in the United Kingdom most   Britons   “generally   conceived   of  
themselves   as   belonging   to   an   unequal   society”.      And   it   was   in   the   light   of   this  
inequality   that   they   “contemplated and tried to comprehend the distant realms and 
diverse   society   of   their   empire”.24  In trying to comprehend these differences some 
British statesmen like A.J. Balfour (1848-1930) espoused eugenics.25  Thus, Balfour, 
who knew Darwin from his days at Cambridge,  and  was  familiar  “with  much  of   the  
contemporary   intellectual   agonizing  over   risen  apes  and   fallen  angels”,   espoused  all  
the peculiar racial theories that were common in his day.26  He explicitly rejected the 
idea   that   “all   men   are   created   equal” as enshrined in the American Declaration of 
Independence (1776) as an eighteenth century anachronism as did many other men of 
his time.  In his view, only Europeans were created equal. Even in France, which had 
avowedly abolished the privileges of the ancien régime, Victor Hugo would still 
lament that those who favoured the abolition of the death penalty, favoured abolishing 
it only for the upper classes and the deputies who might become ministers:  They had a 
                                                            
21 This is not to suggest there was not opposition from the Africans at the time of colonization and 
partition or that opposition was vociferously expressed in later years. 
22 See   the   second   chapter   (“Sovereignty:   a   gift   of   civilization:   international   lawyers and imperialism 
1870-1914) in Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International 
Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 98. 
23 See Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, supra n. 5, pp. 52-65. 
24 See David Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire (London: Allen Lane, 
2001), p. 4.   
25 Balfour was an honorary vice president of the British Eugenics Education Society.    
26  See Jason Tomes, Balfour and Foreign Policy: The International Thought of a Conservative 
Statesman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 22. 
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right   to   life,   but   not   “the   deprived   children   of a cruel mother society whom the 
workhouse  takes  at  twelve,  the  penal  colony  at  eighteen,  [and]  the  scaffold  at  forty”.27   
These inherent inequalities might explain why jurists like James Lorimer 
(1818-1890), the son of the factor of the earl of Kinnoull, that is, a Scottish aristocrat, 
was steadfastly opposed to granting equal civil and political rights to non-Europeans 
let   alone   to   the   “uneducated   urchins”   within   Victorian   Britain.   Instead   Lorimer  
favoured   a   weighted   voting   system   that   took   into   account   a   man’s   social   status.28  
Bearing in mind  Lorimer’s  opposition  to  extending  universal  manhood  suffrage  in  his  
own country, it was not surprising that he opposed it in the colonies.  In an article 
Lorimer wrote for The North British Review reviewing J.S. Mill’s  Considerations on 
Representative Government29 in 1861, the Scotsman had occasion to expand upon his 
opposition to universal suffrage.30  At that time the case for extending the franchise in 
Britain was gaining currency, and in many parts of the country tenants were turning 
against their landlords.31  This provided Lorimer a cause for consternation.32   For 
Lorimer a numerical democracy spelt disaster especially if the vote was universal and 
equal  because  then  government  would  be  comprised  of  “the  lowest  class”.33  Instead 
Lorimer thought that equality  was  relative,  not  absolute.    In  a  word,  “all  men  are  not  
and   never   can   be   equal”.34 This was why he favoured complex voting systems in 
which individuals would have votes linked to various qualifications.  This might 
explain why after the franchise was widened at the domestic level in the United 
Kingdom, bills introducing compulsory education were passed by Parliament.35  This 
was because, according to Mill, only the literate, those who could perform the 
                                                            
27 See the preface Victor Hugo wrote to the 1832 edition of The Last Day of a Condemned Man 
(Richmond: Oneworld Classics, 2009, first published 1829, translated by Christopher Moncrieff), p. 9.  
28 See James Lorimer, Political Progress Not Necessarily Democratic:  Or Relative Equality the True 
Foundation of Liberty (London: Williams and Norgate, 1857).  
29 This is reprinted in John Gray (ed.) John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), p. 203. 
30 See The North British Review, No. LXX, November 1861, pp. 534-563. 
31 See Cannadine, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy, supra n. 12, p. 36. 
32 The North British Review, supra n. 30, pp. 538-539. 
33 The North British Review, ibid, p. 551. 
34 He  added,  “the  doctrine  of  absolute  equality  is  a  French  and  American  [doctrine],  but  it  was  never  an  
English  doctrine”.    See  The North British Review, ibid, pp. 562-563. 
35 It was not until the passage of The Elementary Education Acts of 1870 and 1880 that it became 
compulsory for children aged between 5 and 10 to attend school in England and Wales. 
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common operations of arithmetic, who had some knowledge of geography, politics, 
and history, and who paid their taxes, should be accorded the right to vote.36 
In the high period of imperialism international lawyers were virtually universal 
in viewing non-European societies as being backward.  Accordingly, consent was not 
viewed as a necessary prerequisite to acquire legal title to the lands and resources of 
non-European societies because they were considered as being little better than 
“savages”  or  “brutes”  who  were   in  a  perpetual  state  of  “non-age”.  These  descriptive  
labels, which were employed almost exclusively by international lawyers to describe 
non-European  societies  in  a  “lower  stage  of  civilisation”,  were strikingly similar to the 
qualities—insanity, imbecility, non-age—that Lorimer claimed would rule out an 
entire class of people from the franchise in Britain.  It was feared that if the franchise 
were extended to cover these categories of peoples it would have a detrimental impact 
on the safety and wellbeing of other members of society.37  Effectively native society 
was being compared to those categories of peoples who were not accorded the right to 
vote in Britain. Accordingly, they had to be taught to acquire the attributes that those 
who ruled the British Empire believed were necessary to maintain their political 
independence.  Absent European tutelage, most Europeans thought that the natives in 
their colonies could not claim to be bearers of sovereignty because it was assumed that 
if they attained independence prematurely they would become a threat to themselves 
and a source of insecurity to their neighbours.   Thus Lorimer was drawing a parallel 
between the deeply divided society that he was familiar with at home, and the alien 
societies of the British Empire that he tried to comprehend from distant shores.38    
This might also explain why John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), who worked for 
many years at the East India Company, was also explicit in espousing  the  right  of  “a  
higher  culture”  to  rule  over  “a  lower  one”.    As  Mill  explained:  “subjection  to  a  foreign  
government...notwithstanding its inevitable evils, is often of the greatest advantage to 
a people, carrying them rapidly through several stages of progress, and clearing away 
obstacles to improvement which might have lasted indefinitely if the subject 
                                                            
36 See  “Considerations  on  Representative  Government”,  first  published  in  1851,  in  John Gray (ed.) John 
Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, supra n. 29, p. 203 at pp. 330-331. 
37 See Lorimer in The North British Review, supra n. 30, p. 552. 
38 Lorimer never travelled to the Orient although as a young man he had intended to pursue a career in 
India.  See  John  W.  Cairns,  “Lorimer,  James  (1818-1890)”,  Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, 2004, online edition. << http://www.oxforddnb.com/>>  
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population  had  been  left  unassisted  to  its  native  tendencies  and  changes”.39  This was 
a theory of economic, political, and social development that bore all the attributes of 
imperialism, and which would later be expressed and codified in the form of mandates 
and trusteeships.  In a similar vein, Mill would also advocate support for minority rule 
in those British colonies comprised of plural societies if the minority was of a higher 
civilisation  than  the  majority.  This  would  be  the  case  where,  for  instance,  “a  small  but  
leading portion of the population, from difference of race, more civilized origin, are 
markedly superior in civilization and general character  than  the  remainder”.    In  such  a  
situation,   “government   by   the   representatives   of   the  mass   would   stand   a   chance   of  
depriving them of much of the benefit they might derive from the greater civilization 
of  superior  ranks”.     Thus,  Mill  advocated  installing  sovereign  authority  “in  the  chief  
ruler  of  the  dominant  class”.     It  was  assumed  that  “[h]e  alone  has  by  his  position  an  
interest in raising and improving the mass, of whom he is not jealous, as a 
counterpoise  to  his  associates,  of  whom  he  is”.40  It was in this theory of development 
and in according authority to a minority, which ensured that power remained in the 
hands of the few, rather than in the many, in which the seeds of partition were sown. 
                                                            
39 See  J.S.  Mill,  “Considerations  on  Representative  Government”  in  Mill,  On Liberty and Other Essays, 
supra n. 29, p. 264. 
40 See  J.S.  Mill,  “Considerations  on  Representative  Government”  in  Mill,  On Liberty and Other Essays, 
ibid, p. 265. 
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III. Colonialism, Liberalism, Nationalism: Minority Rule and Self-Government 
 
 
1. Introduction 
At the end of the First World War, President Woodrow Wilson championed the 
principle of self-determination, which he articulated in opposition to the conflicts and 
territorial arrangements, which in days gone by had been justified as being necessary 
to preserve the balance of power.  This was given immemorial expression in a speech 
to a joint session of Congress, when Wilson cautioned that, “…peoples  and  provinces  
are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere 
chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited of the 
balance  of  power”.41  Instead, “every   territorial   settlement   involved   in   this  war  must  
be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations   concerned”.42   Given 
that Wilson uttered these words in reply to the addresses he received from the 
governments of the Austro-Hungarian and German Empires, one can surmise that he 
was thinking of Europeans rather than Africans and Asians, whose territories had been 
partitioned   and   plundered.      In   Wilson’s   eyes   and   in   the   eyes   of   many   of   his  
contemporaries the inhabitants of these continents did not form separate nationalities 
entitled to national self-determination.     Rather,   they   formed   the   “subject   races”   that  
were destined to be tutored by the victors of the First World War until they were 
deemed to have reached a stage of development when they could attain independence 
at an unspecified future date in the League of Nations mandate arrangements.43 
 When Wilson gave this address to Congress he was speaking after he had 
articulated his Fourteen Points.44  Poland was explicitly mentioned in those points:  
“An   independent   Polish   state   should   be   erected ... whose political and economic 
independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international 
covenant”.45  The Poland that had been partitioned thrice in the eighteenth century and 
                                                            
41 See  “Reply  to  the  Addresses  of  the  Imperial  German  Chancellor,  and  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Austro-
Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Address Delivered at a Joint Session of the Two Houses of 
Congress,   February   11,   1918”,   in   James   Brown   Scott   (ed.),   President   Wilson’s   Foreign   Policy:  
Messages, Addresses, Papers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1918), pp. 364-373 at p. 371. 
42 Scott (ed.), President  Wilson’s  Foreign Policy, ibid (emphasis added), p. 372. 
43 This is why Wilson only spoke of nationalities when he reflected on the European situation.  See 
Scott (ed.), President  Wilson’s  Foreign  Policy,  ibid (emphasis added), p. 372. 
44 See  “Address  on  the  Condition  of  Peace  Delivered  at  a  Joint  Session  of  the  Two  Houses  of  Congress,  
January  8,  1918”,  in  Scott  (ed.),  President  Wilson’s  Foreign  Policy,  ibid, pp. 354-363. 
45 Scott (ed.), President  Wilson’s  Foreign  Policy,  ibid, p. 362. 
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that had revolted several times in the nineteenth century had been a Christian kingdom 
and thus its soil had a different  “quality”  to  that  of  Africa  and  Asia.    At  the  moment  
that Poland was  “resurrected”,  the  former  Ottoman provinces in the Middle East were 
parcelled out between the victors as though it amounted to a vast empty space in a 
similar manner to the way Africa had been partitioned in the late nineteenth century. 
This was because when Wilson thought of nations and national self-determination he 
thought of Europeans whose religion was Christian and whose skin tone was white—
just like the Poles.  He did not think that dark skinned people were entitled to the same 
civil and political rights as Europeans.  This might explain why in A History of the 
American People (1902) Wilson made it clear he was steadfastly opposed to extending 
the  franchise  to  “the  negro”  in the south and expressed alarming admiration for the Ku 
Klux  Klan,  whom  he  glowingly  described  as  that  “Invisible  Empire  of  the  South”.46 
Wilson’s   racism   might   also   explain   why   he   recoiled   in   horror   when   the  
Japanese delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 proposed to enshrine the 
principle  that  “the  equality  of  nations”  is  “a  basic  principle  of  the  League  of  Nations”,  
in  which  “all   alien  nationals”   should  be  ensured  “equal  and   just   treatment”  and   that  
“no   distinction   either   in   law   or   fact”   could   be made   “on   account   of   their   race   or  
nationality”. 47   Ignoring a majority vote at the session where the provision was 
approved, Wilson ensured that the draft never made it into the final text of the League 
Covenant, to the consternation of the French legal expert.48   Lord Balfour, supporting 
the minority, concurred   with   Wilson’s   opposition   to   the   equality   provision, and 
promptly informed Colonel   House,  Wilson’s   chief   foreign   policy   adviser, that “the 
proposition taken from the [American] Declaration of Independence, that all men are 
created  equal  …  was  an  eighteenth  century  proposition  which  he  did  not  believe  was  
true  …  it  was  true  in  a  certain  sense  that  all  men  of  a  particular  nation  were  created  
equal, but not that a man in Central Africa was created equal to a European”.49  As 
argued in the following pages, the system devised by the League of Nations was 
                                                            
46 Woodrow Wilson, A History of the American People, Vol. V, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1903), 
pp. 58-64 at p. 60. 
47 The text is reproduced in The Colonial Problem: A Report by a Study Group of Members of the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 59. 
48 For the full story, see Paul Gordon Lauren, Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of 
Racial Discrimination (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 82-107 at pp. 99-100 (describing the vote).  
The vote was eleven out of 17 in favour of the proposal on racial equality.  Those in favour were Japan 
(2), France (2), Italy (2), China, Brazil, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. 
49 Lauren, Power and Prejudice, ibid, p. 91. 
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constructed to deny equality to those territories populated by non-European peoples, 
unless that is, part of the territory was governed by a European minority, in which 
case the idea of partition would be promoted to preserve their way of life.50 
Wilson’s   support   for   self-determination was prompted in reaction to the 
Bolshevik  Revolution  in  1917  and  V.I.  Lenin’s  (1870-1924) forceful promotion of the 
idea in his speeches and writings.  In contrast to Wilson, the Communists did not seek 
to restrict its application to the so-called   “civilised”   peoples   of   Poland   nor   even   to  
those nations that sought to secede from the Russian Empire.  This is not to suggest 
that Lenin and Stalin were unaffected by the racial assumptions of their day.51  They 
were, and they thought the Poles, as Europeans were more   “civilised”   than   non-
Europeans.52 The distinction was that they did not think that differences in economic, 
social,   or   political   development   should   stand   in   the   way   of   a   nation’s   claim   to  
independence.53  Thus, in addition to being opposed to tutelage “from above”, the 
Communists supported the right of secession, and regional autonomy for minorities.54  
In a word, Wilson’s   liberal   understanding   of   self-determination was much more 
conservative than   Lenin’s.      His liberal conception of democracy could not 
accommodate minorities in the polity, which is why African Americans were 
subjected to segregation.  In  Wilson’s  view, only a community, which had acquired 
the attributes to govern themselves independently, were entitled to have its demand 
for self-determination recognised. As explained in Part Three, it was the Communist / 
                                                            
50 The starkest examples of these are highlighted in Part Three. 
51 I am not suggesting that Marx, Lenin, or Stalin were racist.  But the discourse that was used by Lenin 
and Stalin, and even Marx, in his writings prior to the 1857 Indian Mutiny, did make cultural 
assumptions about foreign peoples, such  as   the  “Asiatics”,  which was the norm in their day. As Jani 
observed:   “Marx’s   critique   of   British   colonialism   and   the   defense   of   Indian   resistance   in   the   post-
Revolt articles is so powerful that some Marxists have mistakenly drawn a straight line from these 
articles   to   Lenin’s   “national   self-determination”   theses   of   the   1910s   to   the   general   Left   support   for  
decolonization   after   World   War   II”.      Jani   later   added,   “Lenin   and   later   Marxists   thus   provided   a  
stronger theoretical footing to the economic and political conclusions on colonialism developed 
unevenly by Marx”.    See  Pranav  Jani,  “Karl  Marx,  Eurocentrism,  and  the  1857  Revolt  in  British  India”,  
in Crystal Bartolovich and Neil Lazarus (eds.), Marxism, Modernity, and Postcolonial Studies 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 81-97, at pp. 92-93 and at pp. 95-96.  
52 See, for instance, the language used by Stalin towards   the   Tartars   (“their   schools   controlled   by  
omnipotent  Mullahs,  and  their  culture  permeated  by  the  religious  spirit”)  in Marxism and the National 
and Colonial Question (University of the Press of the Pacific Honolulu, Hawaii, 2003, reprinted from 
the 1935 edition). 
53 This would explain why, in addition to his support for the Indian struggle against Britain, which he 
articulated after the 1857 mutiny, Marx was also an early supporter of the Irish and Polish movements 
for self-determination. See  August  Nimtz,  “The  Eurocentric  Marx  and  Engels  and  other  related  myths”,  
in Bartolovich and Lazarns (eds.), Marxism, Modernity, and Postcolonial Studies, ibid, pp. 65-80. 
54 I say more about this in Part Three.  See Alfred Cobban, The Nation State and National Self-
Determination (London: Collins, 1969), p. 194. 
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non-aligned understanding of self-determination that briefly won the day during 
decolonization.      With   the   emergence   of   the   “Third   World”   during   the   Cold   War, 
equality became a principle of paramount importance, whereas in the eyes of the 
Western powers non-Europeans   needed   tutelage   because   they  were   “not   yet   able   to  
stand by themselves  under  the  strenuous  conditions  of  the  modern  world”.55 
The ideology that underpinned the Western liberal understanding of self-
determination was representative government.  But this form of government, despite 
its name, was never truly representative.  Rather, representative government grew out 
of the Protestant-Catholic divide and the Reformation in Europe first finding 
expression in Britain, whose parliament was almost universally lauded by the scholars 
of the Enlightenment, before finding expression elsewhere, most notably in the United 
States.  Yet nineteenth century Britain was comprised of a society that was wrought 
with class conflict and divided by religion.  The aristocracy, which had ruled Britain 
since the Norman Conquest, opposed any reform of the franchise since they were 
aware that paralleling these efforts was the emergence of socialism through which the 
working classes demanded a fair distribution of property and reform of Britain’s 
antiquated land laws.56  Thus, the principle of self-determination appeared on the 
international stage at a moment of momentous upheaval with unrest between landlords 
and tenants sweeping throughout Europe, which climaxed in Russia with the 1917 
Bolshevik Revolution, which wiped away the old aristocratic order there.57  Although 
after the end of the First World War, Britain extended its franchise, the men who ruled 
the Empire were not keen on extending these rights to its colonial subjects.  The 
British government only reluctantly conceded self-governing status to its colonies, 
declaring in 1917 that its aim in India was the gradual development of self-governing 
institutions under the aegis of the Crown.  Even so, this did not prevent Britain from 
                                                            
55 See Art. 22, League of Nations Covenant. 
56 According to an 1861 study on land ownership, approximately one-quarter of the land of England and 
Wales was owned by just 710 individuals, and nearly three-quarters of the entire British Isles was in the 
hands of less than five thousand people.  See Cannadine, The Decline and Fall of the British 
Aristocracy, supra n. 12, p. 55. See also, the statistics that Cannadine provides for land held in estates of 
1000+ acres in 1880 at p. 9.  According to the figures provided by Cannadine, based on a contemporary 
study, approx. 93 per cent of the total land area in Scotland was held in the form of Estates of 1000+ 
acres. The figure for England was 56 per cent, for Wales 61 per cent, and for Ireland 78 per cent. 
57 As  Balfour   intimated  when   he  was   Foreign   Secretary   in   1918:   “Russia   is in a condition of septic 
dissolution”,   Hungary,   Austria,   and   even   Germany   were   also   suffering   from   the   same   Bolshevik  
infection,   and   there  were   some  “who   feared   that  we   shall  not  wholly   escape”.     See  Kenneth Young, 
Arthur James Balfour: The happy life of the Politician, Prime Minister, Statesman and Philosopher- 
1848– 1930 (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1963), p. 405. 
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replicating its class system in the Princely states in India and in the Gulf before 
adapting it to the international system in the form of A-, B-, and C-class mandates.58   
In this connection it was not by accident that many of the British statesmen 
who called for the creation of a League of Nations, who formulated imperial policy, 
and who administered the various colonies, tended to hail from the upper classes.  
Most of them were already nobles, earls, peers, dukes, and lords before they entered 
government or were appointed to govern distant colonies.59  Many were related to 
royalty, like the Cecils, who produced several Prime Ministers, including Lord 
Balfour, who features prominently in the following pages, and whose uncle Lord 
Salisbury, was thrice Prime Minister.  Salisbury’s   cabinets   remained   so   full   of   his  
relatives that Lord Rosebery felt compelled to  congratulate  him  on  being  the  “head  of  
a family with the most remarkable genius for administration that has ever been 
known”.60  British imperial families like the Cecils and Salisburys who made their 
money from land and from India had vested interests in opposing socialism and 
preserving empire.  Whilst they were powerless to prevent these changes emerging at 
home after the 1911 reforms, they were still able to thwart them overseas where the 
aristocracy still dominated the Foreign Service until after the Second World War.61  
Thus they opposed granting India independence and succeeded in thwarting several 
attempts to concede Home Rule to Ireland.  Undoubtedly their Victorian education 
and austere religious upbringing inculcated in them a particular imperial outlook that 
affected the formulation of imperial policy.  As explained in Part Three, this imperial 
outlook would contribute to the partitions of Ireland, Palestine, and India.  Hence it is 
necessary to revisit their approach to nationalism and self-government for the so-
called  “subject races”  as it proved to be pivotal to later instances of partition. 
In the remainder of this chapter, the manner in which colonialism, liberalism, 
and nationalism came together at the height of British imperialism and contributed to 
                                                            
58 See Cannadine, Ornamentalism, supra n. 24, pp. 41-57 (on India) pp. 71-82 (on the mandates).  I 
think  it  is  striking  the  word  “class”  is  actually  used to describe peoples in the  “lower”  human  chain  of  
evolution—something that I  don’t  think  many  international lawyers have picked up on.  
59 See Appendix C, in Cannadine, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy, supra n. 12, p. 712. 
60 Cannadine, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy, ibid, p. 206. 
61 Before the First World War recruitment to the Foreign Office was restricted to the highest social 
classes.  No one could sit the exam for the diplomatic service without a certificate from the Secretary of 
State saying that the candidate was known to him personally, or had been recommended by someone 
whose judgement he trusted.  Entry to the diplomatic service was also restricted to those with an 
income (independent of that earned whilst working for the Foreign Service) to the tune of at least £400 
a year.  See Cannadine, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy, ibid, p. 281. 
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the partitions of Ireland, India, Palestine, and the attempts to partition Southern Africa, 
is explored.  Colonialism was the method that encouraged the planting of settlements 
in   overseas   territories   for   “low   class   undesirables”   to   populate   in   order   to   alleviate  
overcrowding in the metropolis.  Liberalism, although it was associated with 
individual rights, freedom of opinion, religion, and trade, as well as opposition to 
monarchical power, was at the same time intolerant of cultures, which lacked these 
traditions.  So cultures that championed group identity over individual identity, that 
were paternalistic, that were superstitious, which did not believe in monotheism, that 
were poor and illiterate, and that proved to be resistant to political invasion, 
missionary evangelism, and economic penetration, were viewed as backward and 
illiberal by British standards—especially if they were not capable of providing 
security for persons and property, in terms identical to what Westerners could expect 
in their own countries.62  Accordingly, such communities were not entitled to the range 
of benefits accorded to those cultures and peoples who were more disposed to liberal 
values.  Nationalism whilst often touted as a cohesive and collective force was also a 
force for division and exclusion.  The British experience of nationalism and the 
struggle between Catholics and Protestants greatly affected its approach to the 
question of nationality, which in turn was also influenced by class prejudice.  This 
explains why in the colonies British statesmen deemed the lower classes incapable of 
self-government, even if they formed a numerical majority of the population, in favour 
of vesting political power in the higher classes, even if they were in a minority. 
 
 
2. Creating  the  colony:  excluding  the  “uncivilised” 
 
Writing in his Essays sometime in the sixteenth century, Sir Francis Bacon (1561-
1626) lamented  that  the  peoples  sent  to  populate  the  colonies,  or  “the  plantations”  as  
he liked to call them, tended to emanate from the lower classes.  He thought this most 
unfortunate since they would cause all sorts of mischief to the colony:   
 
It is a shameful and unblessed thing to take the scum of the people, and wicked 
condemned men, to be the people with whom you plant; and not only so, but it 
spoileth the plantation; for they will ever live like rogues, and not fall to work, 
                                                            
62 Accordingly, they could expect to be incorporated into the territory of a Western state.  See Anthony 
Carty, Philosophy of International Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), p. 85. 
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but be lazy, and do mischief, and spend victuals, and be quickly weary, and 
then certify over to their country to the discredit of the plantation.63   
 
Rather  than  convicts  and  criminals,  Bacon  thought  that  instead  “the  people  wherewith  
you plant ought to be gardeners, ploughmen, labourers, smiths, carpenters, joiners, 
fishermen, fowlers, with some few apothecaries, surgeons, cooks, and bakers”.64  Alas, 
Bacon’s  advice  was  not  heeded,  and  the  editor  of  Bacon’s  Essays that was assembled 
and published two-and-a-half  centuries  after  Bacon’s  death, likewise lamented that the 
English government, by establishing penal colonies in various part of the world, such 
as in Australia, had in so doing, “begun  an  impudent  nation”.65  As the editor observed, 
whilst  the  land  was  certainly  planted,  it  was  “planted  with  the  worst  of  weeds”.66 
One of the great ironies of   history   is   that   it   was   “the   worst   of   weeds”   that 
during the height of British imperialism in the late nineteenth century would be 
accorded the right of self-government in the colonies to lord over the natives who 
were cast out of civil society.67  Thus in the emerging nations within the colonies, 
Africans, Jews, Indians, Irish, “Orientals”, and anyone who basically did not acquire 
the cultural attributes associated with the Anglo-Saxon Protestant settler communities 
that established themselves in the colonies were excluded or driven out of political 
society.68  In other words, they were not considered to form a part of the nation, which 
being based on a social contract meant that it was restricted to the upper classes, in 
                                                            
63  See   Francis   Bacon,   “Essay   XXXIII.   Of   Plantations”   in   Richard   Whately   (ed.),   Bacon’s   Essays 
(London: John W. Parker and Son, West Strand, 1860), p. 374. 
64 Francis  Bacon,  “Essay  XXXIII  Of  Plantations”,  ibid,  p.  374. 
65 Quoting the  language  of  Shakespeare,  see  “Annotations”,  in  Whately  (ed.),  Bacon’s  Essays, ibid, p. 
378. 
66 The British practice of “transporting”  people  to  distant  colonies  began  during  Elizabethan  times,  and  
was given fresh impetus during the Civil Wars when Oliver Cromwell ordered his defeated enemies to 
be shipped   to   North   America.      James   II   sent   the   survivors   of   Monmouth’s   Rebellion of 1685 to 
Virginia, where they worked alongside the existing black slave population.  A law of 1718 permitted 
convicted thieves and vagabonds to be transported to North America.  It was not until the 1783 Treaty 
of Paris, which brought the American War of Independence to an end, that transportation would no 
longer be permitted in North America.  Instead, Britain sent undesirables to Australia, Penang in 
Malaya, Singapore, and the Seychelles.  In 1787, 400 impoverished “free”  blacks from London and 
sixty white prostitutes were sent on the British warship, the HMS Nautilus to Sierre Leone. See Richard 
Gott, Britain’s  Empire:  Resistance,  Repression,  and  Revolt (London: Verso, 2011), pp. 81-94.   
67 For a Marxist perspective, see V.G. Kiernan, The Lords of Human Kind: Black Man, Yellow Man, 
and White Man in an Age of Empire (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).  
68 Jack  P.  Greene,  “Empire  and  Liberty”  in  Jack  P.  Greene  (ed.)  Exclusionary Empire: English Liberty 
Overseas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 1-24, at p. 22. 
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other words, to white men of property.69  This development is crucial to understanding 
the ideology and imperial outlook that would influence those statesmen who were 
responsible for proposing partition during decolonization, explored in Part Three.  It 
also explains why non-Europeans  could  never  be  accorded  equality  in  Wilson’s  eyes  
and were therefore not entitled to self-determination in the way Europeans were. 
 
 
The native in English colonial society  
 
British society in the colonies mirrored British society in metropolitan Britain, where 
the lower classes were excluded from participating in the social contract. 70  
Accordingly, when it came to recreating British society in the colonies, the lower 
classes they encountered there were also excluded from the body politic, and from 
participating in the social contract.71   This is why the colonial legislatures in the 
Thirteen American Colonies reproduced the very undemocratic (by modern standards) 
British House of Commons in which “the colonists who were privileged sought to 
exclude those who were not”.    Accordingly,  “there were exclusions on grounds of race, 
religion and property as well as of sex and colour”.72  In other words, the natives and 
the lower classes were not treated as equals, for it was assumed that non-European 
cultures could not exercise rational choice, and so were not to be granted self-
government until they had acquired the attributes of civilisation.73  In the British 
context   the   term   “civilised”   was   used   almost   exclusively   to   describe   upper class 
English speaking settlers who were accorded full participation in the political affairs 
of the colony in contrast to   the   “uncivilised” i.e. the natives and slaves, as well as 
Jews, the Irish, and Orientals, who although treated better than natives and slaves, 
                                                            
69 “The  settlers  extended  to  the  colonies  the  same rights to security of property and civic participation 
that appertained to the empowered, high-status,   and   independent   property   holders   in  England”.      See  
Greene, “Empire  and  Liberty”,  ibid,  pp. 5-7.  
70 See Greene, “Empire  and  Liberty”   in  Exclusionary Empire, ibid, p. 5. See also, Frederick Madden 
and David Fieldhouse (eds.), The Classical Period of the First British Empire, 1689-1783: The 
Foundations of A Colonial System of Government (London: Greenwood Press, 1985).  
71  In those colonies that were not earmarked for large-scale European settlement, the system of 
government that was devised was autocratic Crown Colony Government where power lay with the 
Governor and his council and not with a legislature.  See Frederick Madden and David Fieldhouse 
(eds.), Imperial Reconstruction, 1763-1840: The Evolution of Alternative Forms of Government 
(London: Greenwood, 1987), p. 507, and p. 670. 
72 See Madden and Fieldhouse, The Classical Period of the First British Empire, supra n. 70, p. 343. 
73 In this regard, the French with their mission civilisatrice were not that different to the British.  In fact, 
the French went further than the British  in  trying  to  mould  “little  Frenchmen”  out  of  the  natives.    See 
Martin   Deming   Lewis,   “One   Hundred   Million   Frenchmen:   The   ‘Assimilation’   Theory   in   French  
Colonial  Policy”,  4  Comparative Studies in Society and History (1962), pp. 129-153. 
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were not accorded these rights immediately, and would have to struggle to attain them.  
These inequalities went to the heart of British imperial policy in its colonies.  Anyone 
who did not conform to the dominant class, creed, and colour associated with English 
high society, would be distinguished and ostracised from the rest of society. Thus, Sir 
Ivor Jennings (1903-1965), reflecting on the history of British colonial policy in 
Ceylon, admitted that “a  person  in  a  colony  who  speaks  the  language  of  the  English,  
but who has been treated by them as an inferior because of the colour of his skin or the 
immaturity  of  his  social  and  political  background,  probably  will  not  like  the  British”.74   
The Spaniards were the first to make these differentiations, distinctions, and 
exclusions when they encountered the native societies, which they had difficulty 
accepting were “fully  human”, at the first point of contact, in their discovery of the 
“New World”.75  Essentially, the Spaniards viewed the Indians as “barbarians”   and  
“savages”, terms that were used to describe individuals or societies  that  “stand  outside  
of   the  borders  of   the  societies  or  states   that   refer   to   them  by   these   terms”.76  For the 
Spaniards, the status of peoples as human beings was linked to Christianity. 77  
Essentially, savages were believed to share with barbarians an inability to understand 
the benevolence and humanity inculcated by the Christian religion. 78   But the 
Spaniards were not the only people to view natives in this way. In fact, as explained in 
Part One, with the noticeable and sole exception of Edmund Burke, later jurists and 
scholars like Alberico Gentili, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, William Blackstone, 
Emmerich de Vattel, and John Westlake also expressed similar opinions, even more 
forcefully. 79   Thus, Gentili quoted the Book of Genesis to reach the categorical 
conclusion that God did not create the world to be empty, and “therefore the seizure of 
vacant places is regarded as a law of nature”.80  Similarly,   in  his  description  of  “the  
natural  conditions  of  mankind”  in  Leviathan (1651), Hobbes drew a sharp distinction 
between   those   places   in   the   world   that   had   government   from   those   that   had   “no  
                                                            
74 Sir Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government (Cambridge: At the Universality Press, 1956), 
pp. 12-13. 
75 See Paul Keal, European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: The Moral Backwardness 
of International Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 56-74.  On Vitoria, see 
also Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law, supra n. 5, pp. 13-31. 
76 Keal, European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ibid, p. 67. 
77 Keal, European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ibid, p. 69. 
78 Keal, European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ibid, p. 72. 
79 Keal provides an excellent summation of these scholar’s  various  views   in European Conquest and 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ibid, particularly chapters two and three from pp. 74-112. 
80 See Alberico Gentili, De Iure Belli Libri Tres, translated by John C. Rolfe (Oxford: At the Clarendon 
Press, 1933, translation of the edition of 1612), Book I, p. 80. 
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government   at   all”.      And   it   is   significant   that in making this distinction Hobbes 
mentioned   “the   savage   people   in   many   places   of   America”   as   being   devoid   of  
government  where  the  social  contract  was  inapplicable  in  contrast  to  “the  government  
of  small  families”  where  it  was  applicable.81  For Hobbes only the European pilgrims 
and settlers who had arduously voyaged to America from Europe were in a position to 
establish a government of small families, which by implication excluded “the savage 
people of America”. Of course, Hobbes made no anthropological study of Native 
American forms of government.  He simply made an assumption based on incomplete 
evidence.  But the point is that he made this distinction.  And he was not the first, nor 
the last to do so.  It was implicit in the historical development of liberal imperialism.   
Hobbes’s   assumption   that   Native Americans were incapable of self-
government was a view of native society that Locke was in complete concord with.  In 
fact, Locke went further than Hobbes in divesting the natives from ownership over 
their ancestral lands and in excluding them from ever being in a position to form a part 
of the body politic of the government of small families in the Americas.  And Locke 
had vested interests in making these assumptions and arguments.  He helped to draw 
up the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina in 1670, which provided the foundation 
for a government of slave-owners run by wealthy land barons; he was an investor in 
the Royal Africa Company, and in the Bahamas islands, and a landgrave of Carolina.82  
Locke was active in supporting the Atlantic slave trade.83  He was secretary to the 
English Council for Trade and Foreign Plantations (1673-4); and towards the end of 
his life he was also the secretary to its successor the Board of Trade (1696-1700).84  
Berriedale Keith explained that when Locke was Secretary to the Council for Trade 
and Foreign Plantations, its work was conscientiously done, meetings were frequent, 
complaints and memorials from the colonies were sedulously examined, instructions 
given to Governors were carefully prepared, and colonial legislation scrutinized.85  As 
Barbara  Arneil  noted,  Locke  was  “involved  in  the  most  minute  details  of  colonial  life”  
                                                            
81 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan,   edited   and   with   an   introduction   by   J.C.A.   Gaskin,   (Oxford  World’s  
Classics, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008, first published 1651), p. 85 (in this edition), Chapter 
13, p. 63 (in original numbering), para. 11. 
82 Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from 
Grotius to Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 167. 
83 See  James  Farr,  “Locke,  Natural  Law,  and  New  World  Slavery”,  36  Political Theory (2008), p. 495. 
84  David   Armitage,   “John   Locke,   Carolina,   and   the   “Two   Treatises   of   Government”,   32   Political 
Theory (2004), p. 603. 
85 See A. Berriedale Keith, Constitutional History of the First British Empire (Oxford: At the Clarendon 
Press, 1930), p. 60. 
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in the Carolinas.     She  added,  “[t]he  amount  of  paperwork   involved   in  administering  
Carolina,  and  therefore  which  passed  through  Locke’s  hands,  was  staggering”.86   By 
all indications Locke was a very wealthy man for his time, with investments in the silk 
trade in addition to the slave trade.  He invested heavily in the first issue of stock of 
the Bank of England, just a few years after he wrote his Second Treatise.87 
As mentioned in Part One, Locke had argued against the theory that conquest 
could be a source of legal title to territory because it lacked consent from the nation 
that had been conquered.   A conqueror only obtained sovereignty over those persons 
who concurred or consented to the conquest.  Whilst the conqueror had an absolute 
right over the lives of those persons who fought against him in a just war, this did not 
extend to their possessions.88  Now of course in the Americas, Locke, like Hobbes, did 
not recognise native political society (those   “savage   people   of  America”) as having 
political authority in the  manner  Europeans  did.     In  Locke’s  eyes  only  the  European  
settlers had the requisite characteristics that enabled them to fully participate in 
colonial society.89  This is because consent required the person that was giving their 
consent to reason.90  Those who did not have the capacity to reason were deemed not 
have the necessary prerequisites for expressing consent.91  Accordingly, they could be 
excluded from the political constituency or be governed without their consent.92 Due 
to what Locke had argued on the matter of conquest and consent, he could hardly have 
invoked the doctrine of conquest to dispossess the natives of their lands in the 
Americas, as he had already disavowed of this possibility in his Second Treatise when 
challenging imperial rule in Europe.  Accordingly, in order to remain ideologically 
consistent and to continue his support for European colonisation (as opposed to 
conquest) in the Americas, Locke amended his theory on property rights in the Second 
                                                            
86 Barbara Arneil, John Locke and America: The Defence of English Colonialism (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1996), p. 118.  This  is  why  the  phrase  attributed  to  Seeley  that  Britain  acquired  its  Empire  “in  a  
fit  of  absence  of  mind”  is  arrant  nonsense—for Englishmen like Locke carefully constructed it.   
87  See Howard Zinn, A   People’s   History   of   the   United   States   1492–Present (London: Pearson 
Education, 2003), p. 73. 
88 C.B. Macpherson (ed.) John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 
1980, originally published 1690), pp. 91-93 at §175 through §179. 
89 These characteristics were outlined most clearly in Locke’s  Thoughts Concerning Education (1693).  
90 Macpherson (ed.) John Locke, Second Treatise, supra n. 88, pp. 32-33, at §57-59. 
91 Accordingly,  “somebody  else  must  guide  him,  who   is  presumed   to  know  how  far   the   law  allows  a  
liberty”.    See  Macpherson  (ed.) John Locke, Second Treatise, ibid, p. 33, at §59. 
92 See Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal 
Thought (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 59. 
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Treatise to divest the natives with rights of ownership over their ancestral lands.93  
Locke accomplished this by arguing that the English Crown was not acquiring 
sovereignty over the Americas by virtue of conquest but was instead extending its 
authority and legal jurisdiction over certain territories, which were being acquired 
from the natives who were not entitled to their lands, because they did not cultivate 
them.94  Thus Locke was not arguing for extending sovereignty over natives with all 
the problems that this entailed, such as having to consider whether to grant them civil 
and political rights.  Instead he argued that government only followed the ownership 
of land, that is, private ownership of property in the Western tradition.95  In  Locke’s  
view territory with no distinguishing markers, with nothing to set it apart, and with 
nothing enclosed, was effectively ownerless.  Picking apples and acorns, hunting deer, 
and fishing were not actions sufficient in his mind to form a political society that 
would afford such territory protection from those who could put it to better use.96  This 
meant that land could be appropriated if the settlers brought it into cultivation and put 
to some positive use. Accordingly the writ of the English Crown extended to those 
areas cultivated by English settlers over which it had jurisdiction.97  It followed that 
the chiefs and tribes in America could not claim jurisdiction over land that was barren, 
went uncultivated, and/or was unproductive, even if it had a special spiritual 
significance. Until the native applied his industry and reason to the land, the English 
settlers believed that they had the right to appropriate it because each colonist had a 
natural right through his labour to such land.98  In theory, those Native Americans who 
cultivated their lands, were also entitled to them, although this was the seldom-
observed in actual practice.  As  Arneil  admitted:     “It   is  beyond scholarly doubt that 
John Locke’s  Two Treatises were used in the early years of the history of the United 
States  to  justify  Americans  taking  over  land  claimed  by  the  aboriginal  peoples”.99   
Locke’s  Two Treatises provides a clear example of a theory that affected state 
practice and evolution of international law.  Thus, in his influential Commentaries, 
Blackstone accepted that those peoples at a “lower” stage of civilisation, like the 
                                                            
93 Armitage,  “John  Locke,  Carolina,  and  the  “Two  Treatises  of  Government”,  supra  n.  84, pp. 618-9. 
94 Arneil, John Locke and America, supra n 86, p. 166. 
95 See Keal, European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra n. 75, p. 75-80. 
96 Mehta, Liberalism and Empire, supra n. 92, p. 126. 
97 Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace, supra n. 82, p. 176. 
98 Arneil, John Locke and America, supra n. 86, p. 166. 
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Native Americans, were to be subjected to the property laws   of   the   “higher”   stage,  
which had implications in all British colonies.100  Similarly, Vattel, taking his cue from 
Bacon, Gentili, Hobbes, and Locke, agreed that in order to alleviate overcrowding in 
Europe, uncultivated land could be expropriated from the natives in the colonies: 
 
...when the Nations of Europe, which are too confined at home, come upon 
lands which the savages have no special need of and are making no present 
and continuous use of, they may lawfully take possession of them and 
establish colonies in them. We have already said that the earth belongs to all 
mankind as a means of sustaining life. But if each Nation had desired from the 
beginning to appropriate to itself an extent of territory great enough for it to 
live merely by hunting, fishing, and gathering wild fruits, the earth would not 
suffice for a tenth part of the people who now inhabit it. Hence we are not 
departing from the intentions of nature when we restrict the savages within 
narrower bounds. However, we cannot but admire the moderation of the 
English Puritans who were the first to settle in New England.101 
 
To give a sense of perspective to Vattel’s views on the acquisition of Native American 
land and the effect it had on their communities in New England, we need look no 
further than Marx, who reminds us: “In 1703 those sober exponents of Protestantism, 
the Puritans of New England, by decrees of their assembly set a premium of £40 on 
every Indian scalp and every captured redskin; in 1720, a premium of £100 was set on 
every scalp; in 1744, after Massachusetts Bay had proclaimed a certain tribe as rebels, 
the following prices were laid down:  for a male scalp of 12 years and upwards, £100 
in new currency, for a male prisoner £105, for women and children prisoners £50, for 
the  scalps  of  women  and  children  £50”.102  Like Locke, Vattel justified the taking of 
land “belonging to no one” on the basis that it went uncultivated.  Accordingly, the 
settler that  “took  possession  of  a  territory  which  belongs  to  no  one”  was  “considered  
as acquiring sovereignty over it as well as ownership”.  Thus,   it   followed   that   if   “a  
number of free families, scattered over an independent country, come together to form 
a Nation or State, they acquire as a body sovereignty over the entire territory they 
inhabit”. 103  Of all the international jurists, it was Vattel who was   “instrumental   in  
                                                            
100 See Keal, European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra n. 75, p. 75-76 quoting 
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crafting a doctrine that differentiated between effective occupation on the one hand 
and  indigenous  nomads’  claims  on  the  other,  pushing  territories  inhabited by ‘roaming’  
peoples rather than farming settlers into the realm of res nullius”.104   
When John Westlake (1828-1913) expressed a similar view to Vattel over a 
century later, the language he employed differed slightly from   Vattel’s   but the 
distinction he was making between European and non-Europeans was the same.  In 
those  parts  of  the  world  that  lacked  any  government  “the  first  necessity”  of  civilisation 
was “to establish government”.105  Writing in an age associated with empire and social 
Darwinism, skin colour and race were emphasised instead of the Christian religion 
and the government of small families:  “The inflow of the white race cannot be 
stopped where there is land to cultivate, ore to be mined, commerce to be developed, 
sport to enjoy, curiosity to be satisfied.  If any fanatical admirer of savage life argued 
that the whites ought to be kept out, he would only be driven to the same conclusion 
by another route, for a government on the spot would be necessary to keep them out.  
Accordingly international law has to treat such natives as uncivilised”.106 
 
 
Peoples deemed  intrinsically  “uncivilised” 
 
As Antony Anghie aptly observed, the distinction between communities that were 
considered civilized and uncivilized, was not concerned with sovereignty, but with 
society.  At the height of European imperialism the constellation of ideas associated 
with society enabled the jurist to link a legal status to a cultural distinction. 107  
Accordingly, when it came to the matter of contemplating whether or not to grant self-
government to a colonial community there were certain immutable characteristics, 
which meant that their unsuitability for government was always inherent.108 These 
societies therefore needed tutelage from the colonial power before they were deemed 
ready to assume the burden of self-government.  These categories all related in one 
                                                            
104 Lauren   Benton   and   Benjamin   Straumann,   “Acquiring   Empire   by   Law:   From  Roman  Doctrine   to  
Early  Modern  European  Practice”,  28  Law and History Review (2010), p. 1 at p. 26. 
105 Westlake made a distinction between the Asiatic empires where there was government from those 
places   that   lacked   government.   In   the   former   “the   law   of   our   own   international   society   has   to   take  
account   of   it”.      See   John Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1894), p. 142. 
106 Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law, ibid, pp. 142-143. 
107 Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law, supra n. 5, p. 59. 
108 As Carty observed, the discourse of civilization is one of modernization.  Accordingly, societies that 
opposed modernization were coerced i.e. taught to be modern. See Carty, Philosophy, supra n. 62, p. 
85. 
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way or another to a community’s class, colour, and creed, which were connected to 
the questions of loyalty and trust, the capacity of that community in question to enter 
into reciprocal relations with Britain, as well as to assist the British Empire with its 
safety and security, its civilising mission, and its imperial project.  It was assumed that 
a community who differed substantially from the characteristics associated with 
English high society, i.e. upper class, white, Protestant, could be a potential threat—
especially if they were criminals or from the lower classes; and so it was considered 
safer to cast them out of the body politic.109  If a certain category of people was 
deemed incapable of self-government in the metropole, then it usually followed that 
they were also deemed incapable of self-government in the colony.  This is why 
Britain encouraged the emigration of Irish, Jews, paupers, and Africans to the 
colonies.110 This was also a policy, which would be replicated by the United States of 
America,  Britain’s  most important colonial possession after independence in 1776.111  
In short, those peoples pushed to the peripheries within English society, would 
also be pushed to the peripheries of those English societies in the colonies. Thus, in 
the  US  Supreme  Court’s  infamous  decision  in  Dred Scott (1856), in which it was held 
that an African American could never become a citizen of the US, the colonial 
policies  of  “the  English  Government  and  the  English  people” were favourably cited.112  
In  the  words  of  the  US  Supreme  Court:    “The opinion thus entertained and acted upon 
in England was naturally impressed upon the colonies they founded on this side of the 
Atlantic.  And, accordingly, a Negro of the African race was regarded by them as an 
article of property, and held, and bought and sold as such, in every one of the thirteen 
colonies which united in the Declaration of Independence, and afterwards formed the 
                                                            
109 Offences for which the punishment was deportation or transportation to the colonies included the 
stealing of cloth, burning stacks of corn, killing cattle, corrupt legal practices, and in later years trade 
union activity. Proposals made in England in 1664 would have banished to the colonies all vagrants, 
rogues, idlers, petty thieves, gipsies, and loose persons frequenting unlicensed brothels.  Poaching 
rabbits  on  a  gentlemen’s  estate, picking a pocket for more than a shilling, or stealing horse or sheep 
were punishable by death.  See Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, supra n. 17, pp. 11-12. 
110 See Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, ibid, pp. 11-16. 
111 Paradoxically, this British policy was actually a cause of grievance.  Benjamin Franklin opposed this 
“dumping   upon   the  New  World   of   the   outcasts   of   the  Old”   as   the  most   cruel   insult   offered   by   one  
nation to another, and asked, if England was justified in sending her convicts to America, whether 
America was justified in sending to England its rattlesnakes. See Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, 
ibid, p. 12. And yet, America would deport thousands of Africans to Liberia in the nineteenth century. 
112 Dred Scott v. John F.A. Sandford in Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Supreme Court of 
the United States, December Term, 1856, ed. Benjamin C. Howard, Vol. XIX (Washington DC: 
William Morrison & Co. 1857), p. 393 at pp. 407-408.  
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Constitution of the United States”.113  Thus at first the position in the US was that 
Africans were not a part of the body politic. Moreover, after the Civil War when they 
were begrudgingly accepted as citizens, they were still treated far less than equals.  
Instead, African Americans were encouraged to immigrate to Haiti and Liberia. 
 In addition to those peoples hailing from Africa who were stigmatised on 
grounds of their skin colour, and their dehumanization during the trans-Atlantic slave 
trade, other peoples who were deemed intrinsically “uncivilised”  in  the  age  of  British 
imperialism included almost anyone who was not accepted as a gentleman in English 
high society.  Thus, the Irish, who although European, and Christian, and in some 
cases hailing from the upper classes, were generally considered suspect and a potential 
threat if they were Catholic, as the vast majority of Irishmen were, which became 
especially evident at the time of Cromwell’s Protectorate.114  Similarly, most Jews, 
although mainly European, were not Christian, and their fortunes would ebb and flow 
depending   upon   who   wielded   political   power.      Thus,   Cromwell’s   puritanical  
supporters tended to favour  the  Jews  as  “the  chosen  people”,  which might explain why 
he permitted Jews to return to England in 1656, whereas high Anglicans and Catholics 
tended to malign the Jews for not accepting Christ as the true messiah.115  Since the 
Crusades, Muslims and Turks have been depicted as a danger to the security of 
Europe with the Balkans proving a battle zone to protect the Gates of Vienna.116 
 The point of mentioning these prejudices is not to denigrate European culture, 
history, or society, nor to shock the uninitiated.  Rather the point is to explain how 
these prejudices informed the gradations and categorisations of different peoples in 
the Age of Imperialism, which influenced the  racial  classifications  found  in  Cuvier’s  
Le Règne animal (1817),  Gobineau’s  Essai  sur  l’inégalité  des  races  humaines  (1853), 
and  Robert  Knox’s  The Races of Man (1850).  To these ideas were added theories of 
                                                            
113 Dred Scott v. Sandford, ibid, p. 408. 
114 Many  of  Cromwell’s  Irish  prisoners  were  sent  to  the  West  Indies.    According to Williams so many 
Irish were deported to Montserrat that it effectively became an Irish colony.  He  added:  “The  Irish  …  
were poor servants.  They hated the English, were always ready to aid England’s   enemies,   and   in   a  
revolt   in   the   Leeward   Islands   in   1689   we   can   already   see   the   burning   indignation   which…gave 
Washington some of his best soldiers.  See Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, supra n. 17, p. 13. 
115 On   Puritan   support   for   returning   the   Jews   to   Palestine   see   the   chapter   entitled   “On   the   Edge   of  
Prophecy:  Puritan  England  and  the  Hope  of  Israel”,  in  Barbara W. Tuchman, Bible and Sword: How the 
British Came to Palestine (London: Macmillan 1982, first published 1956), pp. 121-146. 
116 The hatred displayed towards Turks and Muslims can be detected most clearly in the writings of 
Gentili and was related to his fear and mistrust of the Ottoman Empire, which at the time he was 
writing was at war with the Hapsburgs.  See Noel Malcolm,  “Alberico  Gentili  and   the  Ottomans”,   in  
Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann (eds.), The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations:  
Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 127-145. 
  
145 
evolution, which  seemed  to  accentuate  the  “scientific”  validity  of  the  division  of  races  
into advanced and backward, or European-Aryan, and Oriental-African, which also 
had an impact on the racialised scientific lexicon of positive international law.117  As 
Anghie acknowledged, “anthropology,   science,   economics   and   philology,   while  
purporting in various ways to expand impartial knowledge, participated crucially in 
the colonial project”.118  Indeed these so-called “scientific”   ideas   and warped social 
Darwinian theories had a major impact on the policies employed by imperial 
statesmen to govern the distant and diverse societies of their Empire.  In doing so they 
imprinted upon the rest of the world the prejudices that existed within their own 
societies.  This also affected their approach to the question of self-government.  
Rather than treating all their colonial subjects equally, when it came to self-
government, some peoples were evidently treated more equally than others.  
 
 
The Semite in the European imagination 
 
Today   the   term   “Semite”   is   often   used   exclusively   to   describe   Jews   as   in   the 
expression “anti-Semitism”.  However, this was not always so, and in nineteenth 
century Europe, Muslims and Jews were pilloried together as Semites.  Thus, James 
Lorimer, the Scottish jurist, lumped Jews and Muslims together as Semites in his 
Institutes and complained that according to their understanding of   religion:      “Man  
becomes  a  mere  listener  to  external  commands  which  all  must  obey”,  which  implied  
that unlike the Protestants, Jews and Muslims were not capable of acting rationality or 
engaging in reciprocity, and therefore no consent was needed from them to take their 
lands and properties.119  Another of the consequences of this line of reasoning was that 
the Semites were not capable of fully participating in European society because they 
lacked a nationalised authority that was necessary in any civilised society governed by 
the rule of law.  Thus Lorimer thought that   the   Turks   as   “a   race”   were   totally 
incapable of the political development or of enacting constitutional government.120  
In  Lorimer’s  eyes the Jews in England were not real Englishmen on account of 
their “alien  character”. On   the  same  page  where  he  referred   to   the  “modern  Jew”  as  
                                                            
117 Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, supra n. 5, p. 66. 
118 Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, ibid, p. 66. 
119 James Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations: A Treatise of the Jural Relations of Separate 
Political Communities (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1883), p. 118. 
120 Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations, ibid, p. 123. 
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being  of  an  “alien  character” in his Institutes,  he  invoked  the  name  of  “Mr.  Darwin”  
and   then   concluded   that   “the   un-speculative character of   the   Semitic   race   …   is  
traceable in their forms of speech [which] warns us that ethical development from the 
human   side,   in   their   case,   can   come   but   very   slowly”.121   Sounding eerily like the 
anti-Semites in Germany, he  added:  “The  sympathies of modern Jews do not extend 
beyond the nationality to which they have become attached by birth or residence; and 
their   loyalty   even   to   it   is   subordinate   to   the   wider   allegiance   of   race”.  Lorimer 
continued  by  attacking  “the  imperialistic  foreign  policy”  of  Lord  Beaconsfield (that is, 
Benjamin Disraeli) claiming  it  to  be  “directly  at  variance  with  the  idea  of  reciprocity”. 
He could not help   but   exclaim   that   it   was   “a   curious   indication   of   this   Semitic  
peculiarity, too, that Lord Beaconsfield and his disciples always spoke of rhetoric, in 
circumstances  in  which  Europeans  are  accustomed  to  speak  of  logic”.122 
Essentially Lorimer was questioning the identity and loyalty of the Semitic 
race.  Jews and Muslims have often been described as an alien presence in  Europe,  “a  
nation  within   a  nation”  because  of their refusal to assimilate, preferring to maintain 
their traditions.123  As Martti Koskenniemi explained in his comprehensive history of 
international   law,   Lorimer’s   views   on   Aryans   and   Semites   would   not   have   been 
considered out of place amongst many members of the Institut de droit international, 
who shared them. 124   Jews were far more numerous than Muslims in eighteenth-
century Europe, which is why the Jews were a target of acute prejudice in the 
nineteenth century, with the vast majority inhabiting an area in Eastern Europe known 
as the Pale of Settlement, which was established by the Russian tsars in Poland and 
Eastern Europe.125  The presence of Jews proved to be a major source of discomfort to 
                                                            
121 Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations, ibid, pp. 120-121. 
122 Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations, ibid, pp. 121-122. 
123 Thus anti-Semitism arose as a popular movement in the twentieth century because its instigators 
sought to make everyone the same.   See Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of 
Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 139. 
124 Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, supra n. 22, p. 104.  And these views remained 
prevalent amongst some international lawyers well into the twentieth century.  See Raphael Gross, Carl 
Schmitt   and   the   Jews:  The  “Jewish Question”,   the  Holocaust,   and  German  Legal  Theory (Madison: 
The University of Wisconsin Press, 2007). 
125 It was in the Pale where the vast majority of Jews, the so-called Ostjuden, lived.  According to Vital, 
in 1880 world Jewry numbered between 7.5 and 8 millions; of these the overwhelming majority (88.4 
per cent) were in Europe, with the vast majority (75 per cent) inhabiting Eastern Europe.   And within 
Eastern Europe, 4 million Jews (that is 70 per cent) lived in Russian occupied Poland.   And within the 
Russian Empire, the vast majority of Jews lives in the Pale.  For instance, in 1897, 4.9 million Jews 
lived in the Pale, out of a total of 5.1 million Jews who lived in the Russian Empire.   Although Jews 
were not the only inhabitants of the Pale, they formed very high proportion of the total population.   See 
David Vital, The Origins of Zionism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 30-31. 
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the Christian majority during the formation of the nation-state with many scholars 
expressing differing opinions on whether to grant them civil and political rights.126  
They were uncomfortable with granting these rights to a society whose cultural 
traditions differed from those of the Christian majority, whether this was manifested 
in terms of custom, dress, language, religious holidays, outlook on life, etc. In short, 
they wanted the Jews to integrate, to effectively become “good  Christians”.   
Ultimately, the opinions that Lorimer, and many others like him expressed 
were about identity, trying to fit in, belong to, and be accepted by, a nation, which was 
defined by religion.  And as indicated by the Inquisition, Judaism and Islam were 
perceived to pose a problem in a time when national identity tended to be expressed in 
the form of religion.  Accordingly, in  order   to   “tolerate”   the   Jews, John Locke and 
Hugo Grotius favoured converting English and Dutch Jews to Christianity.  Thus, in 
1622 Grotius composed a treatise that was entitled The Truth of Christian Religion in 
which he made the case for converting those Jews (and Muslims) who lived in Europe 
to Christianity.127   If, however, they refused to become Christians, then Locke and 
Grotius favoured “restoring”   the Jews to the Holy Land, i.e. Palestine.  Both Locke 
and  Grotius  were  by   today’s  standards  religious  men.  Stories   from  the  Bible   littered  
Grotius’s   writings   on   the   law   of   nations   and   informed   Locke’s   philosophy.   Their  
conception of nationhood was in many ways informed by their own knowledge of 
history and in their reading and understanding of the ancient Israelites in the Bible.  
Similarly,   religious   prejudice   also   informed  Voltaire’s  writings   even   if   he   is  
considered a doyen of rationalism and the Enlightenment. Whilst Voltaire is often 
considered  a  champion  of  “free  speech”,  it has been suggested that he was not in fact 
such an advocate128,   and   he   often   mocked   the   status   of   women   and   wrote   of   “the  
                                                            
126 See e.g. Bruno  Bauer,   “The   Jewish  Problem   (1843),”   in  Paul  Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz 
(eds.), The Jew in the Modern World: A Documentary History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
pp. 321-324.  See also, Marx’s  reaction  to  Bruno  Bauer  “On  the  Jewish  Question”  in  Karl  Marx,  Early 
Writings (London: Penguin (1992), pp. 211-241. 
127 See  Nabil  I.  Matar,  “John  Locke and  the  Jews”  44  The Journal of Ecclesiastical History (1993), p. 
45 at p. 50 citing the 1680 English translation by Simon Patrick. 
128 At least not in the way people commonly think, see Brian Klug Offence: The Jewish Case (New 
York: Seagull Books, 2009), pp. 34-39   (explaining   the   misattribution   of   the   famous   saying   “I  
disapprove  of  what  you   say,  but   I  will  defend   to   the  death  your   right   to   say   it”,  which is commonly 
attributed to Voltaire, but which he never actually uttered.)  See also, Elizabeth Knowles, What They 
Didn’t  Say:  A  Book  of  Misquotations  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 55. 
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Mohamedans”   and   the   Jews   in   a   highly   discriminatory  manner.129  Take   Voltaire’s  
entry  for  “tolerance”  in  his  Philosophical Dictionary (1764) in which he writes of the 
Jews  in  this  manner:    “It  is  with  regret  that  I  discuss  the  Jews:  this  nation  is,  in  many  
respects, the most detestable to have ever sullied the   earth”.130  Note how Voltaire 
spoke  of  the  Jews  as  a  “nation”  which  is  important  since  this  would  be  taken  up  by  the  
Zionist movement to establish a Jewish nation outside Europe in the twentieth century 
contributing to the partition of Palestine. What Voltaire wrote about the Jews was not 
so different to what the nineteenth century anti-Semites would write a century later.131   
Even  Voltaire’s  archrival  Rousseau  depicted  the  Jews  of  the  Old  Testament  as  
intolerant to the point of justifying the destruction of their neighbours and confiscation 
of   their   territory,   and   he   saw   in   their   “fanaticism”   the   seeds   of   subsequent  wars   of  
religion.132  In his Considérations sur le gouvernement de la Pologne, Rousseau wrote 
of the Jews in Poland as  a  “nation”  of  “wretched  fugitives, without arts, arms, talents, 
virtues or courage, who were wandering as a horde of strangers over the face of the 
earth  without   a   single   inch  of   ground   to   call   their   own”.133  “Moses”,   he   continued,  
“had  the  audacity  to  create  a  body  politic,  a  free  people”,  from  what  he  described  as  a  
“wandering   and   servile   horde”.     He then added, ominously:   “To prevent his people 
from melting away among foreign peoples, [Moses] gave them customs and usages 
incompatible with those of other nations; he overburdened them with peculiar rites 
and ceremonies; he inconvenienced them in a thousand ways in order to keep them 
constantly on the alert and to make them forever strangers among other men”.134 
Intriguingly, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) authored anti-Jewish writings as 
well.135  Paradoxically in light of recent history, Kant referred to the Jews of the 
                                                            
129 One   can   sense   this   from   reading   Voltaire’s   most   famous   work   Candide as well as in his other 
writings. For further reading on Voltaire’s   anti-Semitism, see Arthur Hertzberg, The French 
Enlightenment and the Jews (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968). 
130 Quoted in Klug Offence: The Jewish Case, supra n. 128, p. 50.  For the original see Voltaire, 
Dictionnaire Philosophique (1764) M. XX. pp. 517-18.  
131 To  Voltaire,  Judaism  signified  “primitivism,  legalism,  and  blind  reverence  for  tradition”.    See  Adam  
Sutcliffe, Judaism and The Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 232. 
132 Ronald Schechter, Obstinate Hebrews: Representations of Jews in France, 1715-1815 (Berkley: 
University of California Press, 2003), p. 54. 
133  Jean-Jacques   Rousseau,   “Considerations   on   the   Government   of   Poland   and   on   its   Proposed  
Reformation”  (Completed  but  not  published  April  1772),  translated  and  edited  by  Frederick  Watkins  in  
Rousseau: Political Writings (New York: Nelson, 1953), p. 163. 
134 Rousseau,  “Considerations  on  the  Government  of  Poland”,  ibid,  pp.  163-164. 
135 Léon  Poliakov,  “Racism  from  the  Enlightenment  to  the  Age  of  Imperialism”,  in  Robert  Ross  (ed.),  
Racism and Colonialism (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers for the Leiden University Press, 
1982), p. 55 at pp. 58-59. 
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eighteenth  century  as  “Palestinians”.    In  one  of  his  works  he  wrote:  “The  Palestinians  
living amongst us are, since their exile, because of their usurious spirit not 
unjustifiably renowned for their deceitfulness, so far as the great majority is 
concerned”. 136   Notwithstanding the emancipation of the Jews in the nineteenth 
century,  the  coupling  of  the  Jews  as  a  “nation”  comprised  of  “Palestinians”  by  Kant  is  
an outstanding example of an anti-Semitic idea that would be picked up by later 
generations of scholars and statesmen from Disraeli to Balfour to encourage Jewish 
emigration  from  Christian  Europe  to  their  “true”  homeland,  namely,  Palestine.137  This 
is important to bear in mind because as non-Christians neither Jews nor Muslims were 
considered by Enlightenment scholars or the literati to be fully European in the sense 
that they were entitled to equal civil and political rights on par with the Christian 
majority, which is why a homeland was often sought for them outside Europe.138 
In addition to anti-Semitism, the way in which the Europeans viewed Jews in 
the centuries preceding Zionism also contributed to the manner in which those who 
ruled Britain warmed to Zionism in the late nineteenth century.  This coincided with a 
massive influx of Jewish immigrants into Britain fleeing Russian and Romanian 
persecution. 139   As explained in Part Three, the British Government favoured 
establishing a national home for European Jews in its Balfour Declaration, which was 
read out in Parliament in November 1917, and which necessitated a population 
transfer i.e. deportation.  The idea of encouraging Jewish emigration to Palestine was 
accepted and encouraged by other European states in the inter-war years even though 
the vast majority of the population in Palestine was of Arab descent and opposed to 
Zionism.  In time this policy would also lead to various proposals to partition 
Palestine to establish a national home for the Jews and a national home for the Arabs.   
 
 
Catholicism and the question of allegiance 
 
                                                            
136 Poliakov,  “Racism  from  the  Enlightenment”, ibid, p. 58 citing CF. Vermischte Schriften, ed. F. Cross 
(Leipzig, 1921), pp. 389-90 (emphasis in original).  
137 Although the Jews were, at the last hour, granted legal equality by the revolutionary government of 
the  French  Republic,  Schechter  suspects  that  it  amounted  to  little  more  than  an  publicity  stunt  “since  it  
resulted in the enfranchisement of a negligible portion  of   the  population”.     See  Schechter,  Obstinate 
Hebrews, supra n. 132, pp. 156-157. 
138 For the impact of social Darwinism on debates on Jewish nationhood and the link to Theodor Herzl 
and Zionism see Shlomo Sands, The Invention of the Jewish People (London: Verso, 2009), pp. 77-83.  
139 See Victor Kattan, From Coexistence to Conquest: International Law and the Origins of the Arab-
Israeli Conflict 1891-1949 (London: Pluto Books, 2009), pp. 8-37. 
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Although the Irish were not ever considered alien in the way Jews and Muslims were, 
those Irish of Catholic origin would nonetheless be excluded from British society after 
the Reformation when Britain established its own Church.  After England had severed 
its ties to Rome, anyone who continued to maintain that link was considered a traitor 
and a threat.  Thus, in one of his earliest works, Gentili, who was a passionate 
Protestant, set out to prove in great detail that the Pope was the Antichrist predicted in 
the Book of Revelation.140  Because of their allegiance to the Papacy, the Irish were 
effectively seen as the “enemy  within”  never  to  be  trusted  in  positions  of  power. Thus 
in 1689, the Protestant Parliament in Ireland enacted the Penal Laws restricting the 
activities of the Catholic Church, depriving Catholics of property, and political rights, 
and excluding Catholics from the Irish Parliament.  Although the religious aspects of 
the Penal Laws were apparently lightly enforced, the authorities in Ireland rigidly 
imposed their political and property clauses that coerced most of the Catholic 
aristocracy and gentry to either leave the country or convert to Anglicanism (such as 
Edmund Burke) in order to protect their property and retain their social status.141 
 To understand the hatred and contempt that the English felt towards the Irish 
in the centuries that have passed since the conquest of Ireland, consider the following 
extract from the English historian Christopher Hill’s biography of Oliver Cromwell: 
 
The hatred and contempt which propertied Englishmen felt for the Irish is 
something which we may deplore but should not conceal.  Even the poet 
Spencer, who knew Ireland well, the philosopher Bacon and the poet Milton, 
who believed passionately in liberty and human dignity, all shared the view 
that the Irish were culturally so inferior that their subordination was natural 
and necessary.  Religious hostility reinforced cultural contempt … A great 
number of civilized Englishmen of the propertied class in the seventeenth 
century spoke of Irishmen in tones not far removed from those which Nazis 
used about Slavs, or white South Africans use about the original inhabitants of 
their country.  In each case the contempt rationalized a desire to exploit.142 
 
As with popular prejudices against the Jewish minority, prejudices against the 
Irish also filtered into legal and political circles.  Thus Thomas Macaulay (1800-1859) 
in his History of England popularized an interpretation of Irish history based upon the 
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Celtic love of violence and anarchy.  His book was so popular that its second and third 
volumes sold 26,500 copies in the first ten weeks. 143  Macaulay, a historian and 
reformer, was one of the first scholars to propose the idea of having two parliaments 
in Ireland as a solution to the Irish Question, which would presumably have 
necessitated or precipitated a partition. 144   When Benjamin Disraeli (1804-1881) 
sought to attract the attention of the Irish Tories, he articulated their sentiment towards 
Ireland in a series of articles published in The Times in 1836.   Disraeli charged that 
the   Irish   “hate   our   free   and   fertile   isle.      They hate our order, our civilisation, our 
enterprising industry, our sustained courage, our decorous liberty, our pure religion.  
This wild, reckless, indolent, uncertain, and superstitious race has no sympathy with 
the  English  character”.    He  went  on  to  describe  Irish  history  as  “an  unbroken  circle  of  
bigotry  and  blood”  before  asking  parenthetically,  “shall  the  delegates  of  these  tribes,  
under  the  direction  of  the  Roman  priesthood,  ride  roughshod  over  our  country…?”.145   
This view of the Irish as being deceitful and treacherous was also one shared 
by Lorimer who   explained   that   “one of the strongest of the many insuperable 
objections to granting a separate international position to Ireland is, that her 
ecclesiastical ties to Rome would render it unsafe for England to recognise her as a 
reciprocating political community”.  He  added:    “The nationalisation of Churches was 
the most precious fruit of the Reformation when seen from an ethical or political point 
of view, but it was a fruit which unhappy Ireland failed to reap”.146  Lorimer assumed 
that  the  Irishman’s  allegiance  was  to  Rome,  not  Westminster,  and  that,  moreover,  they  
had  repudiated  the  very  “Reformation”, which was seen as an important milestone in 
English national history, but which was a tragedy for the Catholics.  Similarly during 
the Home Rule debates Prime Minister Salisbury believed that Home Rule meant 
Rome Rule and that “the superstitious priest” would dominate a self-governing Ireland. 
The Ulster Protestants would not tolerate   “the subjection of their prosperity, their 
religion, their industry, their lives to the absolute mastery of their ancient and 
unchanging enemies”. He feared that a Home Rule Ireland would be a permanent 
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threat to national security.  Sounding like Locke from the seventeenth century, he 
feared that Ireland would  become  “a haven for the enemies of the Empire as in the 
days of the Wars of the Roses, the Reformation and the Jacobite threat”. 147   
Salisbury likened the   Irish   question   to   “an evil dream”, and thought Ireland 
was inhabited   “by men of different races and antagonistic traditions”. He explained 
that:      “Representative government answers admirably as long as those who are 
represented desire much the same thing, and have interests tolerably analogous, but it 
is put under intolerable strain when it rests upon a community divided into two 
sections, one of which is bitterly hostile to the other and desirous of opposing it on all 
occasions”.148 During  the  Home  Rule  debates  one  of  Salisbury’s  critics  noted: 
 
When Lord Salisbury talked of the minority in Ireland as being that portion of 
the country which contained all that was progressive and enlightened, he 
meant that that was Ulster...According to Lord Salisbury Ulster contains all the 
light, all that is progressive, all that is not priest-ridden in Ireland...He divides 
Ireland into two parts, and the division is not geographical; it is religious. They 
are divisions into Catholic Ireland and Protestant Ireland, and to the first of 
these divisions he attributes want of enlightenment, and the absence of all the 
elements of progress and civilisation; to the second he attributes all the civic 
virtues. The first of these divisions he denounces as the traditional enemies of 
England; for the second he claims the exclusive possession of that much 
desired and much misunderstood quality of loyalty.149 
 
On Ireland, the views of Lord Salisbury influenced his nephew and political 
protégé Lord Balfour, and for that matter most of the Cecils.  To Conservatives like 
Salisbury and Balfour,   who   belonged   to   one   of   Britain’s   oldest,   wealthiest,   and  
politically influential aristocratic families (“Hotel   Cecil”)  with large landed estates, 
the nationalist rhetoric of the Irish expressed deep-rooted antagonisms that existed 
between landlord and tenant.  To confront the Irish land problem Salisbury appointed 
his nephew Balfour to be Chief Secretary to Ireland.  A few days after his appointment, 
Balfour provocatively announced that   he   would   be   “as   relentless   as   Cromwell   in  
enforcing obedience to the law”. 150  He appointed Edward Carson (1854-1935) to 
become a part of his legal staff before calling in the army to aid the police in enforcing 
evictions and battering down the barricaded cottages in an effort to end the uprising.  
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Thus it was in Ireland where Balfour  acquired   the  nickname  “bloody  Balfour”. And 
one of his solutions to resolve the land dispute was state-assisted emigration.151 
Excluding Catholics from the British body politic, and maintaining these 
restrictions in Ireland where the overwhelming majority of the population was 
Catholic had major repercussions for the way in which nationalism developed there, 
which contributed to the partition in the twentieth century, as explained in Part Three.  
After the Reformation religion was bound up with politics and the question of loyalty 
and from this time the division of the two future political communities on religious 
grounds in the island of Ireland would contribute to the policy of partition.  In addition 
to the religious antagonism there was also the question of class.  Because the Catholic 
population had been disadvantaged in the era of the Penal Laws, they were poorer 
than the landed aristocracy, and the gentry, that is, the capitalist class who favoured 
maintaining the Union, and who were mostly the descendants of Protestant settlers.  
During the Home Rule debates, Balfour repeatedly sided with his fellow aristocrats in 
opposing Home Rule because it would “put the more prosperous and less backward 
part of the population under the control of the less prosperous and more backward part 
of the population   …   the   result   would   be   … that the prosperous, advancing, and 
progressive minority might have their interests seriously imperilled by the action of 
those who, as a matter of fact, are less prosperous and more backward”.152 
 
The inferiority of Oriental culture and society 
 
Such racial prejudices and stereotypes that afflicted European attitudes towards Jews 
and the Irish also had an impact on European  attitudes   towards  “the Orient”, which 
invariably included the peoples of North Africa and the Middle East, but also, South 
Asia, China, and Japan.  But it was above all the Turk and his religion that proved to 
be a particular target of European prejudice because of his proximity to Europe and 
because of the historical enmity that existed between Christians and “Mohammedans”, 
which began with the Crusades, and was followed with the fall of Constantinople.153  
Hence Gentili, thinking of the Turks, argued that alliances with infidels were always 
wrong because they were infidels.  And in making this argument he cited various 
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Biblical passages, including the statements in the Pentateuch about driving out the 
nations of unbelievers from Canaan.154  But of course, not everyone agreed with 
Gentili. Christian nations such as Poland did forge alliances with Turkey, and the 
latter proved to be pivotal to the European balance of power during its wars against 
the Hapsburgs, which provided a distraction that allowed for the spread of 
Protestantism in northern Europe.155  When the Ottoman Empire was a great power, it 
was admired and feared, which is why many scholars, including Grotius, called for the 
creation  of  a  general  league  of  Christian  states  and  a  crusade  against  “the  Turk”.156 
It was only when the Ottoman Empire began to crumble that its image in the 
eyes of Europeans sharply deteriorated.  Whilst Turkey was welcomed and invited to 
take part in various European congresses (e.g. Carlowitz 1699, Paris 1856, the Hague 
1899), it was always perceived to be a cultural threat.157 This perceived threat became 
particularly strained in an age associated with nationalism and European imperialism.  
Although jurists less frequently quoted biblical passages in the nineteenth century, one 
can nonetheless detect that the old religious animosity had not completely waned. 
Rather than invoking biblical verses and their language of eternal damnation, the 
civilising nature of Christianity was instead cited with the discourse of “science  and  
progress”.  Thus, Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens (1845-1909), who made his career 
serving the Russian Empire, thought that   Islam   represented   “the   epitome   of  
backwardness and fanaticism, of hostility to scientific progress, and intercourse 
between   states”. 158   Like his contemporary Westlake, Martens made distinctions 
between  “civilized  peoples”  like  the  Persians,  Chinese,  and  Japanese,  and  those  “non-
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civilized or semi-barbarous  peoples”  in  Eastern  Turkestan  and  Afghanistan  that  were  
“nomadic,   semi-savage   peoples   living   on   theft   and   pillage”. In his opinion, 
international law could not extend to such peoples since they could not be held 
responsible for their behaviour as they were unable to understand simple juridical 
ideas which formed the basis for international relations between European peoples.159 
Instead of being designated infidels in the imperial age, non-Europeans from 
the East were referred to as “Oriental”, which as Edward Said observed, involved an 
evaluative judgment.160  In the case of the peoples inhabiting the Ottoman Empire, it 
signified an implicit program of action:  “Since the Oriental was a member of a 
subject race, he had to be subjected”.161  European ideas about the biological bases of 
racial inequality ineluctably led them to conclude that the peoples of the Orient were 
naturally backward and degenerate.  In addition to theories of Social Darwinism, the 
Evangelicalism and Utilitarianism of influential figures like Charles Grant (1746-1823) 
and James Mill (1773-1836) affected their perceptions of the peoples of the Orient, 
particularly in their cases, of British India.  Grant was the author of an enormously 
influential policy paper that made the case for an aggressively Anglicizing and 
Christianizing stance toward India and its culture, in opposition to the prevailing 
policy of respect for Indian laws, religion, and custom that had been set in motion by 
Warren Hastings.162  In On Liberty and Representative Government J.S. Mill wrote 
that his views could not be applied to British India because the Indians were 
civilizationally, if not, racially, inferior.163   Grant in his Reflections described the 
“Hindoos” as “a people void of public spirit, honour, attachment; and in society, base, 
dishonest, and faithless”. 164   Moreover, because of the fundamental cultural and 
religious differences within Indian society, and the lack of homogeneity, it was argued 
by some that   representative   government   was   not   suitable   in   India:      “The religious 
distinctions of India are very different to those with which we are familiar in this 
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country. There they cut far deeper than here into the social fabric, and divide far more 
fundamentally man from man, family from family,  and  even  village  from  village”.165 
When Macaulay expressed his opinion on Indian education policy in his 
Minute on Indian Education (1835), he could not help but exclaim in a stridently 
Oriental  manner  that  “a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole 
native literature of India and Arabia”. 166   Macaulay’s   view   that   Oriental   culture  
whether expressed in the form of art, literature, or even music, was by its nature 
inferior to whatever was produced and originated within Europe, was something that 
would be expressed by those persons tasked with writing up the Royal Commission 
Report on the Partition of Palestine in 1937, chaired by Lord Peel, as explained in Part 
Three.  Instead Macaulay implored the natives to study Milton, Locke, and Newton, 
before calling on the British government  to  form  an  elite  class:  “Indian in blood and 
colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect”.167  As India 
marched towards independence, this British policy had, over time, the effect of 
creating an elite class of British Indians in the manner Macaulay had prescribed in 
which a national conflict would emerge between upper caste Hindus and Muslims, 
whilst the interests and opinions of the masses were ignored.168 As Nehru recollected: 
 
...the British treated India as a kind of enormous country-house.  They were 
the gentry owning the house and occupying the desirable parts of it, while the 
Indians were   consigned   to   the   servants’ hall and pantry and kitchen.  As in 
every proper country-house there was a fixed hierarchy in those lower 
regions—butler, housekeeper, cook, valet, maid, footman, etc.—and strict 
precedence was observed among them.  But between the upper and lower 
regions of the house there was, socially and politically, an impassable 
barrier ...We developed the mentality of a good country-house servant.169   
 
As Bhikhu Parekh explains, the British in India, following the logic of the language of 
civilization, justified their rule in educational terms and used pedagogical and tutorial 
metaphors with great regularity.  The Indians were effectively treated as though they 
were their pupils, and as if India was a big public school—like Eton writ large.  
Britain introduced a new language and taught its pupils how to speak to each other 
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and their rulers in a “civilized”   tongue.     They   introduced Indians to the writings of 
Hume, Locke, Berkeley, Bentham, J.S. Mill and Spencer—exactly as Macaulay had 
prescribed in his Minute on Education.  And Britain set up schools, colleges, and 
universities in India, to train Indians to  “think”  and  develop  “good  character”.170 
 
 
Slavery and the origins of apartheid 
 
Like Jews, the Irish, Indians, and Orientals, the so-called  “men  of  colour”  were  also  
the target of widespread prejudices. These prejudices had their origins in the sixteenth 
century, and earlier, when Europeans first encountered the African in Africa, which 
created long-standing prejudices concerning the African’s  physical,  mental,  and  moral  
nature.171  In 1685, Louis  XIV  issued  a  decree  known  as  “Le  Code  Noir” that created 
a strict separation between whites and non-whites   in  France’s  colonies.172 Nearly all 
aspects of daily life were affected by the Code:  prescriptions against assembly, 
alcohol use, flight, and interracial sexual relations.  They also stipulated that slaves 
had to be baptized in the Roman Catholic Church and forbade Jews from residing in 
the colonies and sought their eviction.173  For centuries, Africans were mythologised 
by Europeans as brutish, evil, satanic, and concupiscent.174  And it was with this 
pervading view of the African, and because the white man considered him physically 
“suited”  for  slavery,175 that he was sold into bondage, especially in the US where 69 
per cent of the signers of the American Declaration of Independence had held colonial 
office under English rule, many of whom also happened to be slave owners.176 
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This included Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826), the man who wrote most of that 
Declaration.  In his writings he repeatedly insisted that black slaves were a threat to 
the character of the US, and that after emancipation they should be “colonized  to  such  
place as the circumstances of the time should render most proper, sending them out 
with arms, implements of household, and of the handicraft arts, feeds, pairs of useful 
domestic   animals”.177  Jefferson owned some 175 slaves, and he took few steps to 
liberate any of them at any time in his comparatively long life.178  And in not freeing 
his slaves, Jefferson was breaking a promise to his Polish compatriot Tadeusz 
Kosciuszko to free them. 179   For   Jefferson’s   conception   of   American   nationhood  
excluded the African.180  Thus in Dred Scott the Supreme Court interpreted the words 
that Jefferson   had   penned   to   the  Declaration   of   Independence   to   the   effect   that   “all  
men  are  created  equal”,  to  deny  that  he  had  ever  intended  to  include  enslaved  Africans.    
“[I]t  is  all  too  clear  for  dispute”,  the  Court  categorically confirmed,  “that  the  enslaved  
African race were not intended to be included, and formed no part of the people who 
framed  and  adopted  this  declaration”.181  This was because for more than a century, the 
African   “had   been   regarded   as   beings   of   an   inferior   order,   and   altogether   unfit   to  
associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, 
that  they  had  no  rights  which  the  white  man  was  bound  to  respect”.182  As the Supreme 
Court explained, this view was one shared by the Founding Fathers: 
 
...the men who framed this declaration were great men—high in literary 
acquirements—high in their sense of honor, and incapable of asserting 
principles inconsistent with those on which they were acting.  They perfectly 
understood the meaning of the language they used, and how it would be 
understood by others; and they knew that it would not in any part of the 
civilized world be supposed to embrace the negro race, which, by common 
consent, had been excluded from civilized Governments and the family of 
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nations, and doomed to slavery.  They spoke and acted according to the then 
established doctrines and principles, and in the ordinary language of the day, 
and no one misunderstood them.  The unhappy black race were separated from 
the white by the indelible marks, and laws long before established, and were 
never thought of or spoken of except as property, and when the claims of the 
owner or the profit of the trader were supposed to need protection.183 
 
It ought to be remembered that although Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865) authored the 
Emancipation Proclamation (1863), and was genuinely committed to granting 
Africans their natural rights to life, liberty, and happiness, he opposed the rights of 
blacks to vote, become citizens, serve on juries, hold office, or marry whites. 184  
Lincoln did not believe that Africans were political or social equals to whites.  As he 
admitted:      “I   am   in   favour   of   the   race   to   which   I   belong   having   the   superior  
position”. 185   Lincoln only opposed slavery because it was inconsistent with the 
principles of the war fought against Britain in 1776, and the theory of government by 
consent.186  But the theory of consent had nothing to do with equality.  Although 
disagreeing with the opinion expressed by the Supreme Court in Dred Scott, Lincoln 
nonetheless told an 1857 Republican  rally:    “I  think  the  authors  of  [the  Declaration  of  
Independence] intended to include all men, but they did not intend to declare all men 
equal in all respects.  They did not mean to say all we equal in color, size, intellect, 
moral development, or social  capacity”.187  It was only after the  Union’s  victory  in  the  
Civil War that a new approach to American self-determination was established in 
which the new social compact was premised on there being equal  citizenship.  This 
history may partly explain why America refused to support the maintenance of the 
British Empire and its old fashioned form of imperialism after World War II.188     
Lincoln, like Jefferson, was, prior to the Civil War, a proponent of various 
colonization schemes to send free black men and slaves to Liberia, Haiti, and 
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Panama.189  Indeed some slaves, after their owners were compensated, were sent to 
Liberia and Haiti.190  Although Lincoln thought that the white population in America 
would grow faster than the black, others supported colonisation because they feared 
that emancipation would result in the black population outgrowing the white.  Indeed 
this is what happened in some of the Southern states whose white population dwindled 
prior to the Civil War.191  This might explain why only a month before issuing the 
Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln had asked for a constitutional amendment 
authorising Congress to appropriate funds for colonization, along with funds to 
compensate owners of slaves who gained their freedom as a result of the war.192  By 
sending  the  “uncivilised”  and  the  “undesirables”  to  the  colonies,   these  US  statesmen  
were mimicking British colonial policy, in which its undesirables were sent to the 
Americas and Australasia.  The policy had come full circle.  Between its founding in 
1816 and 1860, the American Society for Colonizing Free People of Color in the 
United States had transported some 11,000 persons to Africa, the majority slaves 
manumitted by their owners for the express purpose of removal to Liberia.193   
Inequality based on race was at the heart of colonial policy throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  In places of white settlement racism against 
blacks was particularly acute.  These old prejudices provided the context for the 
extraordinary ease with which Europeans came to accept the enslavement of African 
negroes  as  a  “natural”  function  of  their  black  skin.194  And these views were prevalent 
in the twentieth century.  Thus Frantz Fanon (1925-1961), writing during the Algerian 
struggle for independence, summed up a view that was still common then in the West:  
“Black  Africa   is   looked   on   as   a   region   that   is   inert,   brutal,   uncivilised—in a word, 
savage”.195   He   complained   of   “the   drivelling   paternalism   with   regard   to   blacks”  
which   was   a   “loathsome   idea   derived   from  Western   culture   that   the   black   man   is  
impervious   to   logic”.196  It was therefore no coincidence that when the white man 
came into contact with non-Europeans of a different skin colour in large numbers in 
                                                            
189  See John Milton Cooper Jr and Thomas J. Knock (ed.), Jefferson, Lincoln and Wilson: The 
American Dilemma of Race and Democracy (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2010), pp. 
107-123. 
190 Cooper and Knock, The American Dilemma of Race and Democracy, ibid, pp. 112-119. 
191 Cooper and Knock, The American Dilemma of Race and Democracy, ibid, pp. 118-119. 
192 Cooper and Knock, The American Dilemma of Race and Democracy, ibid, p. 118. 
193 Cooper and Knock, The American Dilemma of Race and Democracy, ibid, p. 112. 
194 Stepan, The Idea of Race in Science, supra n. 171, p. 8. 
195 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (London: Penguin, 2001), p. 130. 
196 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, ibid, p. 130. 
  
161 
southern Africa, a legal system was created that would entrench his legal and political 
position. Outright racism against Africans had a long history in Western academia, 
which fuelled the ideology of those who established apartheid that would mutilate 
southern Africa, contributing to its attempted partition in the twentieth century. 
These sweeping generalisations had a major impact on the attitudes of those 
who were vested with responsibility for colonial policy at the height of British 
imperialism, which affected the differentiations they made between their colonial 
subjects, and the manner in which certain colonies would be divided during 
decolonization as explained in Part Three. The prejudices that the English speaking 
settlers developed in categorising peoples in terms of their alleged innate differences 
on the grounds of class, colour, and creed, was a reflection of the way in which 
English nationalism had developed within the British Isles. This in turn had an impact 
on nationality legislation and the development of nationhood overseas.   In order to 
appreciate how these differences came into being and how they affected later 
instances of partition the genesis of nationality in the Empire ought to first be 
considered.  This is best appreciated by contrasting the development of nationhood 
and nationality in Britain and France, the chief colonial rivals, in the imperial age. 
 
 
3.  The evolution of nationhood:  British and French approaches 
 
The way in which the notion of nationhood developed in the United Kingdom after it 
was formally established in the Act of Union in 1707, differed somewhat from the 
French concept of nationhood.   The significance of these differences as regards 
colonial policy becomes clearer when one takes a closer look at how the nation was 
forged in England and France.  This is because how these nations defined their body 
politics influenced the way in which they defined the body politics in their colonies.  
In order to appreciate how the concept of the nation was understood differently in 
England and in France during their respective periods of revolutionary turmoil, it is 
necessary to revisit, albeit briefly, the laws passed that prescribed their respective 
political bases, whether in the form of citizenship, nationality, or immigration laws.  
The reason for revisiting these laws is because the way in which the English and 
French determined and defined their nationals provides a reference point for 
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comparison, since it is only by understanding these differences, that we can appreciate 
why partition was a phenomenon common to British, but not to French, colonies.   
A brief comparison with France is also useful because of its geographical and 
political proximity to England, its close historical association, and because the greatest 
empires in colonial history were English and French. In Britain, the revolution 
ultimately failed and the old order was restored during the Restoration in 1660.197  
Whilst  the  1688  revolution  made  the  King’s  exercise  of  power  subject  to  the  consent  
of Parliament this did not greatly affect the social structure of British society.  In 
contrast in France, the revolution, despite several setbacks, ultimately succeeded.  It 
was during the French Revolution that the concept of nationality, as a distinct idea, 
was codified in legislation, which provided a model for other nations to follow.198  
This was not the case in the United Kingdom where nationality laws developed very 
differently.  The reason for this is that unlike in France, Britain had, and still has, no 
written constitution clarifying the rights and duties of its citizens.  In Britain the idea 
of nationality developed haphazardly, and was closely connected to immigration 
law.199 The French Revolution was partly to blame for this state of affairs, since it was 
in reaction to the revolutionary wars, that hierarchy, privilege, and patriotism, in the 
form of the British class system, and Anglicanism, became further entrenched.200  
It has to be remembered that one of the major differences between the British 
and French experiences of revolution was that the constitutional settlement negotiated 
during the Interregnum deliberately kept the class system intact.  This was not the case 
in France, where the aristocracy fled en masse to Austria and Germany, after their 
manors, castles, and abbeys, had been burned to the ground during the peasant 
uprising.  To appease the peasants, the revolutionaries abolished the privileges of the 
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aristocracy.201  In Britain, in contrast, Cromwell, whilst he abolished feudalism, and 
the House of Lords, did not interfere with the social structure of British society.  The 
Parliamentarians who briefly took control of the state during the Interregnum were not 
concerned with rights for the masses of the people.  Instead, sovereign power in the 
state shifted to the House of Commons.  After the Restoration when Charles II was 
invited back to Parliament, he and the monarchs who succeeded him were called  “our  
sovereign  lord”.     The  sovereign  king-in-Parliament would become an oligarchy, and 
within the small group of aristocratic families who dominated the Lords (now re-
established) and the Commons, the king was leader of one faction among many.202 
Another major difference between the English and French experiences of 
revolution was the way in which they dealt with the problem of religion. In England, 
religion was the major issue during the Interregnum as the Puritan revolutionaries 
sought to make England a more religiously tolerant and equal society, but the 
Monarchy, and the forces of conservatism they were up against, succeeded in 
thwarting their reforms during the Restoration in 1660.  Charles II and his supporters 
ensured that the aristocratic Anglican system was reinstated once they regained power, 
which included reinstating the upper chamber, with its Lords and Bishops, although 
the Bishops were never again to assume their former position when they controlled 
Parliament.203  In France, in contrast, the revolutionaries were mostly atheists, and 
hailed from the bourgeoisie.  A surprisingly large number of them were lawyers fed 
up with the abuses and corruption of the Monarchy, the aristocracy, and the clergy.204 
The French revolutionaries sought to create a more equal society, with no role for 
Monarchy and a lesser role for religion.  The French revolutionaries therefore had to 
create an entirely new nation, with laws defining the rights and duties of the citizen.   
Prior to the Civil War and the Restoration in Britain, naturalisation was the 
primary legal technique employed to distinguish foreigners from those who were born 
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and bred in Britain.205  The assumption underlying the concept of naturalisation was 
that a subject was more likely to be loyal to his king if he was born and bred within 
the kingdom.  The law would accord that person the greatest protection.  If, however, 
an alien born in territory belonging to the king’s   enemy   entered Great Britain by 
chance that person could be slain as the law gave him no protection.  Thus becoming a 
subject of the English king was defined in relationship to his enemies. In other words, 
it all came down to loyalty. The king  needed  to  be  assured  of  his  kingdom’s  security  
and self-preservation. 206   In the colonies naturalisation laws would be used to 
distinguish European settlers from others, as well as through efforts to restrict the 
franchise so only those who were considered loyal to the Empire could exercise it. It 
was only after the Act of Union in 1707 that one could first speak of a distinctive 
British concept of nationality. 207  This developed through immigration policy, which 
aimed at encouraging the settlement of people in Britain to benefit the economy.  
In contrast to post-revolutionary France, religion and class played a crucial 
component in the concept of British nationhood as reflected in its nationality and 
immigration laws. Accordingly, Britain encouraged the emigration of paupers and 
convicts (the  “lower  classes”) to the colonies, whilst encouraging wealthy Protestant 
artisans, including Huguenot refugees from France, and during  Cromwell’s  days   the  
immigration of Dutch Jewish merchants, to settle in England and Ireland.  Those who 
were sent by Britain to the colonies included thousands of poor Irish men, women, and 
children, whom Cromwell sent to plantations in the West Indies and in Virginia, 
where they were exposed naked in the cattle market to be selected and purchased by 
the agents of planters as though tantamount to slaves.208  Within Britain and Ireland, 
religious tests were imposed on aliens seeking naturalisation. The Old Catholic 
aristocracy in Ireland was deliberately replaced by a new class, which wanted more 
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autonomy. The result was that Irish nationalism in the eighteenth century became 
Protestant and upper class, although this was reversed in the following century.   
The legislation, which naturalised foreign-born Protestants who had settled in 
England and Ireland, was appropriately entitled the Foreign Protestants Naturalisation 
Act (1708).  This Act allowed any alien to become naturalised on taking the oaths and 
communion and declaring, before a court, support for the Protestant succession.209  
Thus the enjoyment of full political rights rested on conformity to Anglicanism.  This 
would explain why there was public outcry when the government considered an Act 
enabling the naturalization of foreign-born Jews.210  The English, the Welsh, and the 
Scots common investment in Protestantism allowed them to be fused together, despite 
their cultural and linguistic differences.  It was also Protestantism that helped to make 
Britain’s  wars  against  France  significant  in  the  process  of  state  formation.    The  image  
of a persistently powerful   and   threatening   French   Empire   “became   the   haunting  
embodiment of that Catholic Other which Britons had been taught to fear since the 
Reformation  in  the  sixteenth  century”.211   Prior to the Union, the nationality laws of 
England applied to the colonies, which did not have their own separate nationality.212  
The result was that the same class and religious distinctions applied there, with the 
exception of the American colonies, where differences in Christian worship were 
tolerated, and where instead difference was expressed in the form of racial appearance. 
In the United Kingdom it was only after the union with Ireland that the 
exclusion of Catholics became untenable, which led to the Catholic Relief Act in 1829.  
This step dislocated the identification of the Anglican Church with the British nation, 
but ended up reinforcing the popular perception that the United Kingdom was a 
Christian country.213  In any event, the passage of the Catholic Emancipation Act had 
little impact on the prevailing Protestant worldview in which many Britons viewed 
themselves as a distinct and chosen people, a view that they continued to hold well 
into the twentieth century.214  Indeed this Protestant worldview had direct impact on 
the attempt to create an imperial citizenship to encompass the English-speaking 
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peoples in the Dominions of white settlement.215  This Protestant worldview would 
also have a direct impact on the decision to partition Ireland between nationalists and 
unionists (in reality, between Protestants and Catholics) and also explains British 
support for Zionism in Palestine, which contributed to various schemes to partition it. 
In contrast to the manner in which religion influenced nationality and 
citizenship legislation in Britain, in France, Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès (1748-1836), 
described   as   “the theoretical architect of the French Revolution of 1789”, 216 
deliberately avoided race and religion.  Instead, Sieyès sought to create a secularized 
concept of citizenship that only discriminated on grounds of class, in that it made a 
distinction between “active” and “passive” citizens, which would find expression in 
the first French revolutionary Constitution. 217  To be an active citizen, an individual 
had to have been born in France or to have French parents, be at least 25 years old, 
domiciled in France, not be in a condition of servitude, and to pay the property taxes.   
Women, whilst not explicitly excluded from citizenship in the language of the law 
noted Peter Sahlins, were nonetheless in fact treated “like children, the very poor, and 
others in a position of dependence, only capable of enjoying the quality of being 
French (qualité de français)”.218  This concept of citizenship was thus similar to the 
Anglo-American citizen, but only to the extent that there was a property qualification. 
In France, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789) 
proclaimed  the  principle  “men  are  born  free  and  remain  equal  in  rights”.    Unlike  in  the  
Thirteen American Colonies, and in other British colonial territories, the French 
revolutionaries sought to apply their principle of equality equally through assimilation, 
which was introduced in France and in its colonies.  In France, equality meant that 
everyone should be treated by legislation as if they were identical.  This meant, for 
instance, that only the French language could be used to the exclusion of all others.219  
The eradication of local patois not only affected revolutionary France, however.  
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Local dialects in the colonies were also targeted. There, in the words of the principal 
textbook that was written to explain the law of colonisation to law students in France, 
assimilation  aimed  to  inculcate  the  native  “with  our  ideas  and  customs”,  in  the  hope  of  
making    “them  into  Frenchmen”.    This meant  that  the  native  was  “educated”,  “granted  
the  right  of  suffrage”,  as  well  as  “dressed  in  the  European  mode”,  and  that  French  law  
was  “substituted   for   their  customs”.     However   if   the  natives   refused   to  assimilate   to  
the French way of life, then they were  to  be  “exterminated  or  pushed  back”.220   
This French understanding of nationhood sought to encompass all those 
individuals who found themselves under French sovereignty.  So long as they 
assimilated to the French way of life, they were to be treated equally, at least on paper.  
One of the consequences of this approach to nationhood was that the notion of 
belonging to the French nation was all encompassing.  It was not predicated on 
establishing internal divisions, as the British colonial model was, whether these 
distinctions  were   based   an   individual’s   class,   colour, or creed.  This might explain 
why France did not partition its colonies during decolonisation, in contrast to Britain, 
which did, because in the British colonies these distinctions tended to extenuate 
difference.  And these differences in turn affected the evolution of nationhood. 
 
 
4.  The colonial franchise: to avoid a numerous democracy 
 
Another way in which the state could define its national community, in addition to 
defining it through the instruments of immigration and nationality legislation, was by 
restricting membership in political society.  This was done through limiting who could 
exercise the vote by manipulating the franchise qualifications.221  There were many 
ways in which this could be accomplished:  it could either be blatantly discriminatory 
i.e. so as to directly preclude non-Europeans on the basis of their class, creed, or 
colour; or, as proved to be more common, by imposing a high property qualification.  
Locke resorted to both qualifications when he helped draft The Fundamental 
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Constitutions of Carolina in 1669.222  To Locke, the notion of equality only applied to 
Lords Proprietors, and their heirs and successors, it applied to no one else. This might 
explain why the preamble to the Fundamental Constitutions, which Locke is believed 
to have written, ensured that “the government of this province may be made most 
agreeable to the monarchy under which we live and of which this province is a part; 
and   that   we   may   avoid   erecting   a   numerous   democracy”. 223  Why did one of the 
founding fathers of liberalism desire to avoid erecting a numerous democracy? 
 In order to answer this important question, it is necessary to contextualise the 
Constitutions, and briefly consider the demographic, political, and social situation in 
the Carolinas when Locke helped draft it.  In his extensive and scrupulously 
documented study on the Negroes in Colonial South Carolina, Peter Wood explained 
that  “black  slaves  were  present  in  South  Carolina  colony from the year of its founding, 
and  by   the   second  generation   they  constituted  a  majority   of   the  population”.224  The 
reason for this was that well over 40 per cent of the slaves reaching the British 
mainland colonies between 1700 and 1775 arrived in South Carolina.  The first 
Africans came to the Carolinas in 1526 as members of a sizeable Spanish expedition 
from the West Indies. 225  Those who settled in the Carolinas from Barbados and 
Bermuda also brought slaves with them.226  In addition, the settlers came into contact 
with the nineteen Native American tribes indigenous to the southern Carolinas.  
Around the area of the Carolinas some 60,000 Creek, Cherokee, Choctaw, and 
Chickasaw Indians roamed—who frequently clashed with the settlers.  In other words, 
the land was not as empty as Locke wished it to be.  There were at least as many, if 
not more, natives and slaves, than whites, in the Carolinas when he helped write the 
Constitutions.227  Thus, in 1737, Samuel Dyssli, a Swiss newcomer, commented that 
“Carolina  looks  more  like  a  negro  country  than  a  country  settled  by  white  people”.228  
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In order to offset this population imbalance, Locke and his fellow proprietors 
sought to encourage settlers to colonise the Carolinas from New England, New Jersey, 
New York, and Virginia,229 as well as French Huguenots and Scottish dissenters from 
Europe.230  The colonists in the Carolinas sought to divide the slaves and natives so 
they would not be able to combine numbers to overthrow the minority ruling 
aristocracy.  One of the proprietors admitted that  their  policy  was  “to  make  Indians  &  
negroes a checque upon each other lest by their Vastly Superior Numbers we should 
be   crushed...”231  The Constitutions provided that the hereditary nobility, as well as 
being members of parliament, were to rule over the colony, which was divided by 
counties, as the land was apportioned in England. 232  And naturally, this English 
aristocracy were also the biggest landowners.  Just to be a register in a colony, the 
Constitutions specified that one had to own a minimum of 50 acres of freehold in the 
colony.233  The natives and slaves were to be encouraged to become good Christians,234 
although the Constitutions affirmed the absolute powers of life and death of the 
slaveholders over their slaves.235  The  conditions   in  Locke’s  Carolinas  prompted  one 
scholar to describe it as having yielded “the  most  rigorous  deprivation  of  freedom  to  
exist  in  institutionalized  form  anywhere  in  the  English  continental  colonies”.236  
 
 
The concept of majoritarianism 
 
The decision to avoid erecting a numerous democracy in the Constitutions of the 
Carolinas was deliberate.  Locke did not want political authority to be vested in slaves, 
natives, and the lower classes.  This was because in any democratic system, Locke 
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outnumbered the free white men in 1703.  They would continue to outnumber the white settlers for 
many years, even after independence in 1776. 
228 Wood, Black Majority, ibid, p. 132. 
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understood that political power was nominally vested in the majority of those persons 
who formed the political assembly, and were elected by a majority vote.  As Locke 
admitted in his chapter on the beginning of political societies in the Second Treatise:  
“when  any  number  of  men  have  so  consented  to  make  one  community  or  government,  
they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the 
majority have  a  right  to  act  and  conclude  the  rest”.    Thus  Locke’s  understanding  of  the  
nature of government in a civil society was based on the principle that the opinion of 
the majority had to prevail.  The founding father of liberalism clearly associated the 
source of political and legislative authority as being vested in the fact that the minority 
had to submit to the opinion of the majority:    “...every  man,  by  consenting  with  others  
to make one body politic under one government, put himself under an obligation, to 
every one of that society, to submit to the determination of the majority”.237   
Locke wrote at  length  on  “majoritarianism”   in the Second Treatise because it 
is central to the source of legislative authority in Western political society.238  When 
Locke was pontificating upon the state of nature it was evident that he was thinking 
primarily of the Americas, hence he referenced Mexico, Peru, and Florida.239  And in 
his conception of society, Locke was only thinking of freemen. This did not mean that 
legislative power emanated from a majority of the community in which every 
individual was given an equal vote.  This was only the case in what Locke called  “a  
perfect   democracy”. 240   Such   a   democracy   in   Aristotle’s   view   was   based   on  
“numerical  equality,  not  equality  based  on  merit”.    One  of  the  results  of  this  was  that  
“in  democracies the poor have more sovereign power than the rich; for they are more 
numerous,  and  the  decisions  of  the  majority  are  sovereign”.241 Political authority thus 
hinged on the notion that authority in such a society was vested in the majority, albeit 
the manner in which this majority was determined could be rather restrictive if it was 
based on factors other than population statistics, such as loyalty, merit, or wealth. The 
problem was that any system, which vested power exclusively in the majority, was 
likely to lead to a tyranny of the minority, which is why Locke wanted to avoid 
establishing a democracy in the Carolinas until the settlers became the majority. 
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This understanding that democracy implied majority rule was not restricted to 
Aristotle or Locke.  Many natural lawyers writing before and after Locke (and since) 
have understood that political authority in a democracy is vested in the majority, 
although the natural lawyers did not mean a universal majority.  Thus, Gentili wrote: 
“...as  the  rule  of  a  state  and  the  making  of  its  laws  are  in  the  hands  of  a  majority  of  its  
citizens, just so is the rule of the world in the hands of the aggregation of the greater 
part   of   the   world”.242  In the words of Grotius:   “...it   is   manifestly   unfair   that   the  
majority should be ruled by the minority. Therefore, naturally, the majority has the 
same  right  as  the  entire  body...Thucydides  says:  ‘Whatever  the  majority  votes  has  full  
power’”.243  Puffendorf  approved:  “...each  citizen in agreeing to a democratic form of 
government is understood to have subordinated his will to the will of the 
majority...”244 He  added:  “in  popular  assemblies,  the  will  of  the  majority  prevails.  For  
it is a moral affection of all large bodies that the consent of the larger part of those 
who  gather  in  the  council  should  be  taken  as  the  will  of  all...”245 Also in accord with 
this  view  was  Wolff,  who  wrote:  “...in  a  democracy  or  a  popular  state  treaties  can  be  
made only by the people, but since in this form of state that is to be considered the 
will  of  the  whole  people  which  shall  have  seemed  good  to  the  majority...”246 
The problem was that any form of government that purported to represent the 
“majority”,   hinged   upon   the   community   in   question   “agreeing   to   unite into one 
political   society”. 247   But what if such a society was lacking? Or what if the 
community   in   question   refused   to   unite   into   “one   political   society”?      Who   would  
make the decisions?  Who was to abide by the decisions?  What if there was a 
competition to attain the rights accorded the majority, when nationalism or class 
divided societies?  To this, the natural law jurists provided no answers, as they were 
writing in an age before such conflicts had a major impact on international relations.  
Thus, the only answer Vattel could provide when he asked himself what was to be 
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done when the nation was divided, was to say:    “In  the  ordinary  affairs  of  the  State  the  
opinion of the majority must pass unquestioned as that of the whole people; otherwise 
it would be  impossible  for  the  society  to  pass  any  measures  at  all”.248  As monarchy 
was the predominant form of government in the eighteenth century, perhaps many 
jurists did not concern themselves with trying to answer what must have seemed a 
rather abstract question. This would only change when Europeans had to confront the 
class and religious divisions within their own societies in times of revolution, and 
when they came to confront the major cultural, economic, linguistic, political, and 
social differences with the alien communities they encountered overseas. 
 
 
The  state  of  the  franchise  in  Locke’s  day 
 
When Locke was drafting his Constitutions he was attempting to reproduce a political 
system in the Carolinas that he was familiar with from England.  It was not by chance 
that the colony was named the Carolinas, in memory of King Charles I.      In  Locke’s  
day, the concept of a “political  community” was restricted in England to “40  shilling  
freeholders”  i.e.  those  persons  who  owned  land  to  the  value of at least 40 shillings.249 
The purpose of restricting the franchise to this limit, according to the 1430 statute, was 
to   keep   out   “as   outrageous   and   numerous   people   of   small   substance  who   pretend   a  
voice   as   to   such   election   with   the   most   worthy   knights   and   esquires”.250  A 1445 
decree further stipulated that those who aspired to hold political office were limited to 
“notable  knights,   esquires,  or  gentlemen  able   to  be  knights  and  not  of   the  degree  of  
yeomen  or  under”,251  In other words, the franchise was restricted to the nobility and 
the gentry.  The franchise remained restricted to this minority for 400 years from 1429 
until 1832 when it was modified by the Representation of the People Act.    
This extremely restrictive conception of representation might explain why five 
years before Hobbes published Leviathan,  the  Levellers  and  their  “agitator”  friends  in  
Cromwell’s   New   Model   Army   drafted   An agreement of the people, which they 
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presented   to   the   army’s  General   Council   in   Putney  Church   on   28  October   1647.252  
This agreement, among other things, called for electoral redistribution of 
parliamentary  seats  “according  to  the  number  of  inhabitants”,  which  when  appreciated  
in historical context is striking, because it made no distinctions between the different 
socio-economic classes within seventeenth-century Britain.253  Thus, it was considered 
a very radical document and was   attacked   as   a   call   for   “universal   manhood 
suffrage”.254  As explained in Part One, Cromwell was opposed to vesting power in 
the lower classes (although not promoting them in the army) as he thought they would 
instinctively vote to reinstate the King.  In his first speech to Parliament, Cromwell 
had equated poor men with bad men, and said that if a commonwealth must suffer, it 
was better that it should suffer from the rich than from the poor.255  Cromwell was not 
the only politician to be genuinely opposed to “majority  rule”.    For  “the tyranny of the 
majority”, has haunted international politics ever since the word democracy was 
invented.    In  Cromwell’s  case  he  was right to fear that extending the franchise might 
lead to monarchy, since most of the gentry were instinctive monarchists, and indeed 
after his  death,  the  monarchy  was  reinstated  through  a  “democratic”  process.256 
Instead the Lord Protector and his Parliament restricted the franchise, and 
those who could hold office, to those persons who were considered loyal to the 
Commonwealth.  Accordingly, anyone who had consorted in the war against 
Parliament on the side of Charles I during the civil wars, was excluded. 257  
Additionally,  all  those  who  had  “advised,  assisted,  or  abetted  the  rebellion  in  Ireland”  
were   excluded,   as   naturally,   were   “all   such   who   do or shall profess the Roman 
Catholic  religion”.258  Catholics had been a suspect community in England ever since 
the reign of Elizabeth I, but it was the discovery of the Gunpowder Plot on 5 
November 1605 by Lord Robert Cecil* (1563-1612), which   “provided   the English 
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monarchy with an excuse to roll back advances made in institutionalising electoral 
representation  in  parliament”.259 Also  excluded  from  the  franchise  were  “immoral  and  
irreligious  persons,  profaners  of  Lord’s  Day,  profane  swearers  and  cursers,  drunkards, 
and common haunters of taverns and ale-houses”.260  This meant that voters were 
confined to English  and  Scottish  settlers  and  most  of  the  MPs  elected  to  Cromwell’s  
Parliament were army officers.261  It must be remembered that Locke was profoundly 
anti-Catholic.  He feared that had James II returned to England, the English nation 
would have been divided and that Englishmen  would   face   the  “ruin  of   [their]  estate  
and family, the impoverishment of their children, the rape of their wives, and the 
prospect  of  becoming  a  popish  convert  and  a  miserable  French  peasant”.262   
This was the political context and the state of the franchise that Locke was 
familiar with when he sought to avoid erecting a numerous democracy in the 
Carolinas and when he was theorising on the function and nature of government in his 
Second Treatise.  Thus, it would be safe to assume, that when Locke wrote of the will 
of the majority, he was not referring to a numerical or a universal majority, in which 
the franchise was open to all communities, whatever their class, colour, or creed.  
Thus even though blacks were a majority in the Carolinas, soon after Locke had 
drafted his Constitutions, they were denied the franchise because they were not free 
men.  Similarly, Native Americans were denied the franchise although they were free 
because they were not European.  But what would happen after emancipation? 
 
 
The franchise in America and the Jim Crow laws 
  
In “the Land of the Free”, to where many Christians had fled in order to escape 
religious persecution in Europe, the laws made racial rather than religious distinctions 
when limiting the franchise in  which  a  man’s social status was also taken into account 
through a property qualification.  Thus a few years before the American colonies 
attempted to assert their independence from Britain, a suffrage law was passed in 
Georgia in 1761, which empowered   “every   free  white  man   and   no   other”  who  was  
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over 24 years of age, who owned 50 acres of land, and who had been resident in the 
province for six months, to vote in local elections.  Whilst this provision made no 
mention of religion, its effect was to preclude free black men, slaves, and resident 
Indians, as well as poor white people, from the franchise.263  This was because whilst 
the Fathers of the American Constitution believed in representative and republican 
government, they feared the populace as they feared original sin.  One of their 
fundamental purposes in shaping the form of the federal government was to break the 
force of majority rule at its source in elections and in the operation of government.264   
After   the   US   Civil   War,   the   Supreme   Court’s   decision   in   Dred Scott was 
voided through the adoption of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments, 
which provided for the abolition of slavery, citizens rights, and voting rights, 
respectively.  However, these changes made little difference in practice.265  Take the 
case of South Carolina*, where Locke had sought to avoid erecting a numerous 
democracy.266  It was not for a further 197 years, until after a devastating Civil War, 
that Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the Reconstruction Acts of 
1867 and 1868, which widened the franchise to give voting rights to all resident males 
twenty-one years of age or older.267  In South Carolina as throughout much of the 
Southern States there was resistance to this new policy.  Accordingly, a South 
Carolina Law passed in 1865 defined “persons  of  colour”,  as  anyone  having  less  than  
seven-eighths of Caucasian blood, and who were emphatically  “not entitled to social 
or  political  equality  with  white  persons”.268  Throughout the period of Reconstruction 
(1865-1877), white South Carolinians, and many other Southerners, would resort to all 
kinds of chicanery, including intimidation, threats, and acts of violence, which often 
took the form of lynching, in order to deter and restrict blacks from participating in 
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political society, and in the political process.269  It was not by chance that the Ku Klux 
Klan was founded in 1865 during Reconstruction in order to regain white power. 
As a result of the Civil War amendments and the Civil Rights Acts, the 
number of blacks registered eligible to vote in South Carolina dramatically increased 
so that they outnumbered white voters by 116,969 to 86,900.270  Predictably, this mass 
enfranchisement caused consternation amongst the whites, many of whom had 
previously owned slaves, and still had blacks as servants.  They were not enamoured 
to being ruled by their former slaves, even if they formed a majority of the electorate.  
Thus they devised various schemes to abrogate the fifteenth amendment, schemes 
which would last some seventy-five years.  These schemes included literacy tests and 
requesting documents showing proof of land ownership; a poll tax, and criminalising 
non payment of the tax; restricting the right to vote to a single precinct so as to 
disenfranchise black farm labourers, who often moved with the crops and seasons; 
redrawing precinct boundary lines so that some blacks had to travel all day to vote; 
and enacting what become known as the “Eight  Box  Law”.    This  law  required voters 
to deposit the ballot for each office in separate ballot boxes, and if a voter put his 
ballot in the wrong box, his vote did not count.  The US Attorney General for South 
Carolina estimated that this law eliminated 83 per cent of black ballots. 271  The result 
of all these obstacles was that by 1896, only 5,500 blacks were registered voters.272   
Similar legislation followed throughout the South to prevent blacks from 
voting, and from fully participating in political society.  These laws collectively 
became known as “the Jim Crow laws”, which enshrined the principle of racial 
segregation.  And this segregation was upheld by various decisions of the US Supreme 
Court, the most famous of which included Plessy v Ferguson (1896), which upheld 
segregated carriages on the railway, and the case of Berea College (1906), which 
upheld segregated education. 273  As legal historians have observed these laws and 
Supreme Court decisions did not emerge out of a vacuum but reflected prevailing 
white opinion in the early twentieth century.      “As   Republicans   and   Progressives  
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rallied behind imperialist adventures abroad that brought eight million non-whites 
under   force   of   American   arms”,   explained   Benno   Schmidt,   “they   took   up  
characteristic   Southern   attitudes   towards   black   people”. 274   Similarly, Michael 
Klarman noted that proponents of acquiring Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, 
after the Spanish-American   War   of   1898,   “rejected   the   notion   of   extending   full  
citizenship rights to persons thus incorporated into the United States—a position that 
the  Supreme  Court  conveniently  accommodated  in  the  early  twentieth  century”.275 
 
 
5. The Anglo-American Approach to Self-Determination 
 
The Anglo-American approach to self-determination developed during the height of 
imperialism, and posited that the entity claiming self-determination had to have 
acquired the attributes of a nation as a prerequisite.  As explained in Part Three, this 
approach to self-determination was not that different to the Marxist approach in that 
both approaches were concerned with identifying the people who could exercise this 
right.  The difference was that the conception of the nation in Marxist theory 
encompassed all economic, political, and social classes, to include even those peoples 
who  were  viewed  as  economically,  politically,  and  socially  “backward”,  whereas the 
Anglo-American approach tended to restrict its conception of the nation to those who 
it viewed as having acquired the necessary attributes to maintain that independence, 
without threatening the balance of power.  The Marxist approach in contrast required 
revolution and immediate independence for all oppressed nationalities regardless of 
what impact this may have on the balance of power, whereas the Anglo-American 
approach was based on a hierarchy, which bore a striking resemblance to the 
evolutionist theories of social Darwinism. The Anglo-American approach to self-
determination was an elite movement, in contrast to the Marxian mass movement. 
The   “Anglo”   in   the   Anglo-American approach to self-determination was 
preoccupied with class, and tended to vest political power in minority community if 
the minority was better able to govern than the majority in   line   with   J.S.   Mill’s  
theories on representative government. This envisaged a civilized, cohesive 
community, committed to the Protestant work ethic and well versed in both the 
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machinery and theory of government.  This approach put the Anglo-Americans at 
diametrical loggerheads with the Marxist approach to self-determination that was 
avowedly based on creating a classless society.  The   “American”   in   the   Anglo-
American approach to self-determination tended not to emphasize class as much as 
economic development which it tended to assume was a quality associated with the 
white race, and in particular with the Protestant religion.  The Anglo-American 
approach to self-determination was ultimately influenced by the historical 
development of representative government in England and in the Thirteen Colonies, 
and later in the Thirteen United States, and was connected to the notion of self-
government, which they then projected onto the non-European world in the high 
period of imperialism regardless for whether those communities desired this.   
I have chosen to focus on the personalities and politics of Woodrow Wilson 
and A. J. Balfour because they were the two main actors representing the US and 
Britain respectively during the negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 to 
create the League of Nations.  It was there that the principle of self-determination was 
modified and reformulated so that it could apply to those communities in “a lower 
stage  of  civilisation”  in the form of A-, B-, and C-class mandates.  The USSR did not 
participate in the drafting of the League Covenant due to the October Revolution, and 
it did not become a member of the League until 1934.  Its approach to the question of 
self-determination would not have an impact on international law and relations until 
after 1945.  In order to delve deeper into the Anglo-American notion of self-
determination it is necessary to have regard to the way in which Wilson and Balfour 
understood the historical development of nationhood within their own societies.    
 
 
Woodrow Wilson and “the self” in self-determination 
 
Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924), a white Southerner who was born on the eve of the 
Civil War, raised during that war, and during Reconstruction, was an early exponent 
of American imperialism.  The son of a Presbyterian minister, Wilson grew up 
surrounded by blacks, although his family were not allowed to own slaves because of 
religious custom.  Instead they had servants.  Much  of  Wilson’s  youth  was  spent   in  
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August, Georgia, and in Columbia, South Carolina.276  His childhood experiences in 
the latter state are important because prior to the Jim Crow laws, and the legislative 
chicanery employed to disenfranchise blacks, South Carolina had the largest number 
of black officeholders elected following the Constitutional amendments enforced after 
the Civil War. Since political power in South Carolina had shifted to the black 
majority, many whites, some of whom Wilson and his family may have been on 
friendly terms with, would have lost their former political positions in the state. In A 
History of the American People (1903), which Wilson published when he was 
President of Princeton University (1902-1910), prior to running for the Presidency for 
the Democratic Party, he explained that in reaction to Reconstruction: 
 
The white men of the South were aroused by the mere instinct of self-
preservation to rid themselves, by fair means or foul, of the intolerable burden 
of governments sustained by the votes of ignorant negroes...There was no 
place of open action or of constitutional agitation, under the terms of 
reconstruction, for the men who were the real leaders of the southern 
communities.  Its restrictions shut white men of the old order out from the 
suffrage even.  They could act only by private combination, by private means, 
as a force outside the government ... They took the law into their own hands, 
and began to attempt by intimidation what they were not allowed to attempt by 
the ballot box or by any ordered course of public action.277 
 
Evidently,   “the   real   leaders   of   the   southern   communities”  were   the  whites  who  had  
been disenfranchised during Reconstruction as a result of the amendments to the 
Constitution.      The   blacks   being   “ignorant”   in   Wilson’s   eyes   were   an   intolerable  
burden on the government and therefore by implication they should not have been 
given the franchise.  In  Wilson’s  opinion  the whites had no other means of recourse 
except to take the law into their own hands and to act as vigilantes in order to 
safeguard their interests and position in society; in short, to maintain white power. 
                                                            
276 Much of my information on Wilson is taken from the three articles on Wilson, which appear in the 
collection edited by Cooper and Knock, Race and Democracy, supra n. 189, pp. 145-208. In reading 
these articles I sensed that some of the authors hesitated   to   describe   Wilson   as   a   “racist”.    
Astonishingly,  not  one  of  the  scholars  citied  in  this  collection  mentioned  Wilson’s  views  on  race  in  A 
History of the American People, which I shall quote here. This is a major oversight. He expressed 
views, which I have no doubt were they expressed today would be deemed racist, and would probably 
have also been considered offensive to African Americans at the turn of the twentieth century.   
277 Wilson, A History of the American People, Vol. V, supra n. 46, pp. 58-59 
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In the light of Wilson’s   views   on   the   Ku   Klux   Klan278 and his critique of 
enfranchising blacks it is not surprising that he was very critical of Reconstruction, 
describing   it   as   “nothing   more   than   a host of husky children untimely put out of 
school”. 279   Wilson criticised the naivety of those Northerners who had travelled 
southwards to assist, educate, and improve the position and status of the blacks in the 
South so they could govern.  He singled out the teachers and chastised them for 
working   with   “the   negroes”, which in his opinion was “a   cause   of   mischief”.     He 
accused   the   lessons   these   teachers   taught   “to   be   lessons   of   self-assertion against 
whites: they seemed too often to train their pupils to be aggressive Republican 
politicians and mischief-makers between races”. 280   Wilson was opposed to black 
tutelage.  The blacks were supposed to be passive: till the fields, work in the factories, 
and serve the white man, but do no more.  Thus, when Wilson was President of 
Princeton University, all blacks who applied to the college were coerced into 
withdrawing from consideration.  By 1900, seven of the eight Ivy League schools had 
admitted African Americans as students; the sole exception was Princeton.281 
It was no accident that Wilson was a Democrat.  Half of his cabinet hailed 
from the South. 282   During   Wilson’s   tenure   as   President   (1913-1921) segregation 
became entrenched in government departments, including in lavatories, waiting rooms, 
and restaurants.  Collectors of internal revenue and postmasters were allowed to fire 
black employees outright, or otherwise reduce their ranks and salaries.283  Moreover, 
as Manning Marable noted: “Between 1909 and 1915 an average of seventy African 
Americans were lynched across   the   South   each   year;;   Wilson’s   response   was   cold  
silence”.284  It is often overlooked by international lawyers who champion Wilson as 
being the great father of self-determination and anti-colonialism that it was during 
Wilson’s   tenure as President that some of the worst race riots in American history 
took place in the cities of Chicago and Washington DC in the same year as he 
                                                            
278 Wilson expressed admiration for the Ku Klux Klan, which as he tells us, was named after the 
Kuklos,   the  “Circle”.        He   then  wrote  a  passage,  accompanied  by  a  picture  of   two  Klansmen  sheeted  
like ghosts with white conical hats, that reads as though Wilson was himself a Klansman.  One of the 
Klansman in the picture is armed with a pistol, and the other is armed with a shotgun.  See Wilson, A 
History of the American People, Vol. V, ibid, pp. 59-60, the picture appears at p. 61. 
279 Quoted in the contribution by Manning Marable, in Cooper and Knock, Race and Democracy, supra 
n. 189, p. 163. 
280 Wilson, A History of the American People, Vol. V, supra n. 46, p. 63. 
281 See Marable, in Cooper and Knock, Race and Democracy, supra n. 189, p. 169. 
282 Cooper, in Cooper and Knock, Race and Democracy, ibid, p. 151. 
283 Marable, in Cooper and Knock, Race and Democracy, ibid, p. 171. 
284 Marable, in Cooper and Knock, Race and Democracy, ibid, p. 177. 
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attended the Paris Peace Conference (1919).  These riots  took  the  form  of  “white  mob  
aggression   against   newly   arrived   blacks”.285  And one of the reasons why Wilson 
prevaricated about entering the war was because he feared the possible consequences 
of a depletion of white manpower in the struggle with “the yellow races”.286  
As explained in the Introduction, when Wilson spoke of self-determination he 
was thinking of Europeans rather than Africans and Asians who in his eyes did not 
form separate nationalities entitled to self-determination.  For Wilson’s  understanding  
of self-determination was informed by his understanding of American history.  Since 
Wilson was opposed to granting blacks the suffrage in the US, he could hardly be 
expected to extend the franchise to Africa  and  other  “backward”  parts  of   the  world.    
So when Wilson spoke of the balance of power, the right of people to choose the 
sovereignty under which they live, or when he pontificated on the equality of rights,  
the affections or convictions of mankind, and when he wrote his History of the 
American People he was thinking primarily of the rights of Caucasian, Christian men. 
Thus whenever he spoke of nations and communities these nouns were qualified by 
the  adjectives  “modern”  and  “enlightened”, as  in  “modern nations”  and  “enlightened 
communities”, which were expressly chosen to qualify what he was preaching.287  And 
Wilson’s   understanding   of   American   history   informed him that it was the social 
contract and consent, not social equality that formed the bedrock of civilised society. 
Thus,  “the  self”  in  Wilson’s  conception of “self-determination” only applied to 
those  advanced  communities,  which  in  Wilson’s  day,  were  predominantly  Caucasian  
and Christian, and which had already or were in the process of forming a cohesive, 
collective, and organised community, united in aptitude, political belief, and 
ideological outlook.  This meant that the community had to be comprised of a highly 
cultured and educated elite, which had some prior experience of self-government.  In 
the age of imperialism, the qualities that men like Wilson looked to before they would 
even contemplate conferring the right to self-government upon a non-European people 
included the qualities they themselves valued highly.  The qualities men like Wilson 
valued were often inculcated in childhood, in the Church, in Sunday school, or in 
public school, and later refined at Oxbridge or at an Ivy League institution.  These 
                                                            
285 Cooper, in Cooper and Knock, Race and Democracy, ibid, pp. 157-158. 
286 Cooper, in Cooper and Knock, Race and Democracy, ibid, pp. 156-157. 
287 See the contribution by Erez Manela in Cooper and Knock, Race and Democracy, ibid, pp.184-208, 
at p. 190. 
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qualities included the ability to maintain a certain degree of camaraderie with  one’s  
colleagues (“to  be  one  of   the   lads”), being  “a  good  sport”,  and being good at sport, 
particularly manly outdoor sport, as well as being honest, obedient, and loyal within 
the community were highly valued, whilst all the while trying to maintaining   one’s  
integrity, individuality, and industry.288  And it was thought that some communities 
due to their inherent and inbred attributes could never acquire these qualities, which is 
why  they  had  to  be  segregated  to  prevent  the  corruption  of  the  “white  races”. 
Erez Manela tells us that when Wilson gave speeches, he often like to remind 
his audiences that the Anglo-American form of government emerged out of a 
historically contingent and specific set of political circumstances.  Accordingly, it was 
not a system that suited everybody.   This is why, he thought, the US should instruct 
“less  civilised”  peoples  “in  order  and  self-control in the midst of  change”  and  in  the  
“habit  of  law  and  obedience”.    The  ultimate  goal  was  to  lift  the  colonized  to  the  level  
of the colonizer so   they   could   become   “equal   members   of   the   family   of   nations”,  
although he was of the opinion that this process could take as many as three or four 
generations, and necessitated conceptual flexibility and sensitivity to cultural 
difference.289  In  many  respects,  Wilson’s view of development and self-determination 
did not tolerate cultural or racial difference.  Instead he sought to recreate non-
European societies as a mirror image and replica of Western societies.  The “backward  
races” had to acquire certain qualities before democracy could work.  They had to be 
made fit for democracy otherwise chaos would ensue.  This is why tutelage was 
deemed paramount.  Liberty could not coexist in a society without order.  Thus, it was 
probably not by chance that in the light of Wilson’s personal prejudices and 
predilections his favourite political philosopher was none other than Edmund Burke.290   
 
 
A question of class:  The British approach to self-determination 
 
                                                            
288 Some of these qualities were proscribed by Cecil Rhodes in his will regarding the provision of 
scholarships at Oxbridge for American students and for those from the Dominions of White settlement. 
(“literary  and  scholastic  attainments  …  fondness  of  and  success  in  manly  outdoor  sports  such  as  cricket,  
football, and the like   …qualities   of   manhood,   truth,   courage,   devotion   to   duty,   sympathy   for   the  
protection   of   the   weak,   kindliness,   unselfishness,   and   fellowship   etc.”.      See   “The   Last   Will   and  
Testament   of   Cecil   John   Rhodes”   in   Barbara   Harlow   and   Mia   Carter   (eds.),   Archives of Empire. 
Volume II: The Scramble for Africa (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), p. 538 at p. 554. 
289 Manela in Cooper and Knock, The American Dilemma of Race and Democracy, supra n. 189, p. 197. 
290 Manela in Cooper and Knock, The American Dilemma of Race and Democracy, ibid, p. 196. 
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Since the US approach to self-government grew out of its historical relationship with 
the British Empire, one might assume that their approach to self-determination was 
the same.  Whilst there were similarities, there was a major difference, which can be 
summed up in one word: class.  In contrast to race, which was the principal 
distinguishing criterion employed by Americans in American society, in Britain, the 
approach to self-government was all about preserving aristocracy.291  At the turn of the 
twentieth century, the aristocratic way of life in Britain was waning.292 Radicals like 
Joseph Chamberlain (1836-1914) and David Lloyd George (1863-1945) were 
attacking the stark inequalities within British society regarding the distribution of 
wealth, and demanded major reforms in the spheres of voting rights, labour rights, the 
provision of state education, fairer wages, and a better system of taxation, which 
would target the rich, and their landed estates. The radicals despised the patrician 
families, like the Hotel Cecil (see p. 152) who had ruled Britain since Elizabethan 
times and other aristocrats who had traced their heritage back to the Norman Conquest. 
 One of the members of Hotel Cecil who was determined to protect the 
financial and material interests of his class and ensure that the radicals did not get 
their way entirely was Arthur Balfour (1848-1930).293  As Chief Secretary for Ireland 
(1887-1891), Prime Minister (1902-1905), First Lord of the Admiralty (1915-16), 
Foreign Secretary (1916-1919), and Lord President of the Council of the League of 
Nations (1919-1921), as well as holding a score of other prominent positions in 
government, Balfour dominated parliamentary politics for a quarter of a century. 
Balfour had a profound influence on the course of events in South Africa as a result of 
his role as leader of the opposition (1906-1911) during the debates on South Africa in 
1909-10, which coincided   with   his   attempt   to   thwart   Lloyd   George’s   legislative  
proposals passed by the House of Commons, which led to a constitutional crisis 
between 1909-1911 over the powers of the House of Lords.294  Balfour was also 
instrumental in encouraging Jewish colonisation to Palestine after 1917, which 
                                                            
291 This is not to suggest that race was not a factor in British imperialism.  It was.  But Britain never had 
a  domestic  “race  problem”  because  there  were  so  few  ethnic  minorities  in  the  country  at  the  turn  of  the  
twentieth century. Instead Britain tended to classify and distinguish its subjects by their class. 
292 Cannadine provides the best account in The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy, supra n. 12. 
293 For biographical information I am relying primarily on the two books published on his life by 
Cambridge  University  Press.  Zebel’s  Balfour: a Political Biography (1973), supra n. 150, and Tomes, 
Balfour and Foreign Policy (1997), supra n. 26, which have both been cited earlier in this text. 
294 On the constitutional crisis see Roy Jenkins, Mr   Balfour’s Poodle: an account of the struggle 
between the House of Lords and the government of Mr. Asquith (London: Collins, 1968). 
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eventually led to various partition proposals, and was the key player in the 1919-1921 
negotiations that led to the Government of Ireland Act, which partitioned Ireland.295   
 By fortune of birth Balfour belonged to the Cecils, a large landowning 
oligarchy who had virtually monopolized power in Britain until the Reform Act of 
1832, and who continued to enjoy, with the nouveau riche, and the bourgeoisie, 
political, economic, and social pre-eminence until the First World War.296  As David 
Cannadine has explained until 1905, every British cabinet, whether Conservative or 
Liberal, was dominated by the traditional territorial classes, with brief exceptions of 
the Liberal ministries of 1892-5.297  When most businessmen were busy making their 
fortunes, those with patrician roots were gaining valuable experience through a family 
connection in the service of a senior political figure.  As scholars have pointed out 
Balfour’s   uncle  was Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, the Third Marquess of Salisbury, who 
was thrice Prime Minister (June 1885 - January 1886; 1886–1892; and 1895-1902), 
four times Foreign Secretary, (1878-1880; 1885-1886; 1887-1892; and 1895-1900), 
twice Secretary of State for India (1866-1867 and 1874-1878), and three times leader 
of the opposition (1881-1885; January 1886-July 1886; and 1892-1895).  After the 
premature death of Balfour’s   father,   Lord   Salisbury,   his  maternal   uncle,   assumed   a  
greater role in his life and assured his nephew’s  rapid ascendancy into parliamentary 
politics by making Balfour his Parliamentary Private Secretary in 1878, where he 
participated in the Congress of Berlin, and by later appointing him to be the Chief 
Secretary to Ireland.298  Salisbury, who ruled Britain at the height of imperialism, was 
an incorrigible opponent of democracy, and was adamantly opposed to “any  bestowal  
on  any  class  of  a  voting  power  disproportionate  to  their  stake  in  the  country”.299 
                                                            
295 See Catherine Shannon, Arthur J. Balfour and Ireland 1874-1922 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 1988).  See also, T.J. Fraser, Partition in Ireland, India and Palestine: 
Theory and Practice (London: MacMillan, 1984), who makes the connection between Balfour and 
partition on the passage of the Government of Ireland Bill at p. 27, p. 29, pp. 32-33, and p. 42  although 
he  does  trace  Balfour’s  steadfast  advocacy  for  partition  before  the  1919-1921 debates as Shannon does. 
296 Zebel, Balfour: a Political Biography, supra n. 150, p. 1. 
297 Cannadine, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy, supra n. 12, p. 207. 
298 Taylor, Lord Salisbury, supra n. 147, p. 115; Zebel, Balfour: a Political Biography, supra n. 150, pp. 
45-59; Tomes, Balfour and Foreign Policy, supra n. 24, p. 11.  The sheer scale of nepotism in British 
parliamentary life in the era of the Cecils should not be underestimated.  It was so dire that it even 
prompted some disgruntled Tory back-benchers  to  snipe  that  “all  honours,  emoluments  and  places  are  
reserved  for  the  friends  and  relatives  of  the  favourite  few”. See Cannadine, The Decline and Fall of the 
British Aristocracy,   supra   n.   12,   p.   211   (on  Balfour),   p.   213   (on  Tory   sniping).   In   Salisbury’s   1885  
cabinet 14 out of 15 ministers had patrician roots (Appendix B, p. 711.) 
299 Cannadine, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy, ibid, p. 223.  
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 In order to appreciate Balfour’s  outlook  on  life,  it  is  important  to  note  that  he 
was a deeply religious man, and had been raised a strict Evangelical by his mother 
who brought up her children in both the Anglican Church of England and the 
Presbyterian Church of Scotland. 300   Like most aristocrats, the Balfours went to 
Oxbridge. In 1869, Balfour matriculated from Cambridge University where he knew 
Charles Darwin (1809-1882),301 and when he came of legal age he acquired control of 
a £4,000,000 fortune, invested in landed property and other equity.302  Most of this 
money had been made by his father in India.303  One  of  Balfour’s  brothers  became  an  
authority on genetics and was appointed to the newly created chair of Animal 
Morphology at Cambridge University.304  Like his brother, Balfour maintained an 
interest in science, particularly eugenics, and religion.  The bulk of his non-political 
publications concerned the conflict between science and religion in which he sought to 
prove that advancement of science could be compatible with deep religious belief.  In 
his view ethics, aesthetics, and science, were more intelligible when framed in a 
theological setting, and criticised those scholars who relied on science alone.305  
Although Balfour did not find pure social Darwinism attractive he did espouse 
its  theories  when  it  came  to  the  “lower  races”.306  He held particularly strong views on 
race, and opposed miscegenation.  In 1913, the same year in which he advanced his 
two-nation theory for Ireland, he became honorary vice president of the British 
Eugenics Education Society.307  In his Henry Sidgewick Memorial Lecture which he 
had delivered at Newnham, an all-girls college at Cambridge University five years 
earlier,  Balfour  had  explained  that  “any attempt to provide widely differing races with 
an identical environment, political, religious, what you will, can never make them 
alike.  They have been different and unequal since history began; different and 
unequal they are destined to remain through future periods of comparable duration”.308  
                                                            
300 Zebel, Balfour: a Political Biography, supra n. 150, p. 3. 
301 Tomes, Balfour and Foreign Policy, supra n. 26, p. 22. 
302 Zebel, Balfour: a Political Biography, supra n. 150, p. 10. 
303 Zebel, Balfour: a Political Biography, ibid, p. 1. 
304 Zebel, Balfour: a Political Biography, ibid, pp. 3-4. 
305 For  a  detailed  analysis  of  his  views  see  L.S.  Jacyna,  “Science  and  Social  Order   in   the  Thought  of  
A.J.  Balfour”,  71  Isis (1980), pp. 11-34.   See also, Tomes, Balfour and Foreign Policy, supra n. 26, pp. 
22-23; and Zebel, Balfour: a Political Biography, supra n. 150, p. 22. 
306 See Tomes, Balfour and Foreign Policy, ibid, pp. 27-34. 
307 Jacyna,  “Science and Social Order in the Thought of A.J. Balfour”, supra n. 305, p. 31. 
308 See Tomes, Balfour and Foreign Policy, supra n. 26, p. 29, quoting Balfour lecture which was 
entitled  “Decadence”, pp.  46-7. The New York Times reported  the  lecture,  noting  that  Balfour’s  essay  
“is clearly not optimistic”.      See   “Mr. A. J. Balfour on Decadence: Discusses Tragedy of the 
  
186 
Balfour sought to create an Anglo-Saxon commonwealth of white nations.  He 
proclaimed “that our pride in the race to which we belong is a pride which includes 
every English-speaking   community   in   the  world”, such as Britain, the US, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand,  which  were   united   in   an   “Anglo-Saxon   patriotism”.309  
For Balfour racial and cultural differences gave rise to different social and political 
systems, which had to be kept separate and intact.  This was even the case where the 
white Anglo-Saxon community was numerically a minority in a particular territory.  
In   Balfour’s   mind   a multicultural and multiracial society was completely 
inconceivable—it was an anathema.  Equality could only exist between equals.  Non-
whites, even if they formed a majority in a particular geography, were simply not 
equal.  The races had to be kept strictly apart.  The “whole point of eugenics” Balfour 
emphasised in a speech he gave to the First Eugenics Congress in 1913, was that “we 
reject the standard of mere numbers.  We do not say survival is everything; we 
deliberately say that the feeble-minded man, even if he survives, is not so good as the 
professional man”.310  And of course the same reasoning based on the science of 
Eugenics and social Darwinism provided a convenient cover to support the social 
inequality   that   Balfour’s   Conservatism   was   trying   to   defend   in   opposition   to   the  
socialism advanced by his adversaries like Chamberlain and Lloyd George.   It 
followed that the greatest social value attached to those of highest social rank and the 
least to those of the lowest.  Government policy therefore had to be orientated 
accordingly, rather than trying to sustain the latter group by despoiling the former.311  
Eugenics provided a convenient argument to denounce socialism and revolution. 
As leader of the opposition in 1907-8, Balfour used the upper chamber where 
there were 479 Unionists compared to only 88 Liberals to   thwart   the   government’s  
legislative proposals.  As Sydney Zebel explained, Balfour thought it both practicable 
and justifiable   to   employ   the  House   of   Lords   to  weaken   or   set   aside   the   Cabinet’s  
“dangerous”   legislative   proposals until the revolutionary tide inspired by the 1905 
October Revolution in Russia had subsided. 312   Balfour likened socialism to a 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Degeneration of Civilizations, and Asks Whether Modern Nations Will Escape”, The New York Times, 
9 May, 1908.  
309 Tomes, Balfour and Foreign Policy, ibid, p. 36. 
310 Jacyna,  “Science and Social Order in the Thought of A.J. Balfour”,  supra  n.  305, pp. 31-32 quoting 
Reports of the Proceedings of the First Eugenics Congress (London: Eugenics Education Society, 
1913), Vol. II, pp. 7-11 at p. 9. 
311 Jacyna,  “Science and Social Order in the Thought of A.J. Balfour”, ibid, p. 32. 
312 Zebel, Balfour: a Political Biography, supra n. 150, p. 151. 
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“continental  disease”,  and saw nothing wrong when the Lords struck down a Plural 
Voting Bill, which aimed to eliminate multiple votes for owners of property in 
different constituencies.  The government reacted by denouncing the anti-democratic 
posture adopted by Balfour and the House of Lords, which was encapsulated by the 
famous  phrase  attributed  to  Lloyd  George:  “The  House  of  Lords  has  long  ceased  to  be  
the  watchdog  of   the  Constitution.      It  has  become  Mr.  Balfour’s  poodle.      It  barks  for  
him.  It fetches and carries for him.  It bites  anybody  that  he  sets  it  on  to”.313  Balfour’s  
political philosophy, as David Nicholls observed, resulted from his belief that 
aristocracy provided the dynamic element in society; whilst democracy was 
essentially regulative. The many could never produce new ideas and they did not have 
the ability to run the country.  This could only be accomplished by the few.314 
Balfour’s  views  on  race,  religion,  and  class,  were  informed  by  his  own  life,  his 
experience of British parliamentary democracy, and by his views of  Britain’s  role  in  
world affairs.  Accordingly, he carried these views with him as leader of the 
opposition and later as Foreign Secretary.  Balfour was firmly of the view that 
representative government was only suited for European peoples who had common 
traditions, a common outlook on life, and who coalesced in a community.  
Accordingly, Balfour attacked the Morley-Minto Bill on India in 1909, which sought 
to incrementally increase the involvement of Indians in the governance of India.  
Balfour repeated his   view   that   representative   government  was   only   suitable   “where 
you are dealing with a population in the main homogeneous, in the main equal in 
every substantial and essential sense, in a community where the minority is prepared 
to accept the decisions of the majority, where they are all alike in the traditions in 
which they are brought up, in their general outlook upon the world, and in the broad 
view of national aspirations”.315  He later expressed his opinion that this was found 
wanting in India. He told the   Lords:   “you   cannot regard India as a homogeneous 
community, that you cannot simply count heads, and that you cannot regard them as a 
community in any sense, however remote, comparable to, say, the inhabitants of these 
                                                            
313 Zebel, Balfour: a Political Biography, ibid, p. 152. 
314 See  David  Nicholls,  “Few  Are  Chosen:  Some  Reflections  on   the  Politics  of  A.J.  Balfour”,  30  The 
Review of Politics (1968), pp. 33-42 at p. 34. 
315 Indian Councils Bill [Lords.], HC Deb 01 April 1909 vol 3 cc496-601, col. 553 (Mr Balfour). 
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islands, or the United States of America, or our self-governing Colonies, or those 
countries on the Continent which have adopted representative institutions”.316 
In the light of his views on representative government it was hardly surprising 
that during the debates on the Government of South Africa Bill in 1909, Balfour 
strongly argued against enfranchising the coloured population* of South Africa even 
though they formed the vast majority of the inhabitants.317  The Act created the Union 
of South Africa from the British Colonies of the Cape of Good Hope, Natal, Orange 
River Colony, and the Transvaal Colony. 318   This entailed uniting the Dutch and 
English speaking provinces together under one Parliament.  As an “unquestioning 
believer  in  white  supremacy”, Balfour supported amalgamating the English and Dutch 
races in South Africa (this is what British imperialists meant by  “the  unification”  of  
South Africa), but he was convinced that that any extension of the suffrage to the 
coloured races and the Africans would be disastrous not only because they formed the 
overwhelming majority of the population of South Africa but  because  of  their  “alleged  
innate  intellectual  and  moral  inferiority”.319  Balfour told the Lords that the Maoris in 
New Zealand were numerically insignificant; Native Americans were gradually dying 
out; and the Australian Aborigines were  “clearly predestined to early extinction”.  In 
the Dominions of White Settlement, the race problem was no longer acute.  However, 
this was not the case with   the   “black   races”   in   America   and   the former slaves 
transported there.  Coming from a tradition of thought he shared with Jefferson, 
Lincoln, and Wilson, Balfour observed that after the Americans abolished slavery 
“they were face to face with the immutable principles of their Constitution, which laid 
down, in true eighteenth-century language, that all men were equal”.  But Balfour told 
Parliament that he manifestly did not believe that all men were created equal: 
 
                                                            
316 Indian Councils Bill [Lords]. HC Deb 26 April 1909 vol 4 cc32-107, at col. 54. 
* The  expression  “coloured”  referred  both  to  the  African  and  Asian  population  in  Southern  Africa. 
317 For a good summary of the debates in both Houses of Parliament and the Colonial Secretary’s  
Conference see L.M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa 1902-1910 (Oxford: At the Clarendon 
Press, 1960), pp. 398-432.  
318  The Act also made provisions for admitting Rhodesia as a fifth province of the Union, but 
Rhodesians rejected this option in a referendum held in 1922, in which only Europeans were allowed to 
participate.  There were 34,000 Europeans in Rhodesia in 1922, and they voted 8,774 to 5,989 to 
remain separate. See Ralph Zacklin, The United Nations and Rhodesia: A Study in International Law 
(New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 12.  Zacklin does not give figures for the population of the black African 
majority who were not given the right to vote to determine the destiny of their territory, but presumably 
it was much higher than the white population.  See Jericho Nkala, The United Nations, International 
Law, and the Rhodesian Independence Crisis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 3. 
319 Zebel, Balfour: a Political Biography, supra n. 150, p. 154. 
  
189 
...to suppose that the races of Africa are in any sense the equals of men of 
European descent, so far as government, as society, as the higher interests of 
civilisation are concerned, is really, I think, an absurdity which every man who 
seriously looks at this most difficult problem must put out of his mind if he is 
to solve the problem at all.  If the races were equal the matter would be simple. 
Give them all the same rights, put them on precise political equality, but if you 
think, as I am forced to think, that this is an inequality, not necessarily 
affecting every individual, but really affecting the two races, I will not say for 
historic reasons—they go far back beyond the dawn of history, into the very 
arcana of nature, in which these different races were gradually differentiated—
if anyone believes that difference is fundamental, you cannot give them equal 
rights without threatening the whole fabric of your civilisation.320 
 
Accordingly, the coloured races in South Africa could not be accorded political 
equality with the white population because by doing this the whole fabric of the white 
man’s   civilisation   there  would   be   threatened.     As   explained in Part Three, this was 
precisely the same argument employed in 1948 by the National Government to deny 
political representation to blacks, and to keep the races strictly separated. In other 
words the architects of apartheid in South Africa was arguably the British Government, 
and not the Government of South Africa, because it was the British Government that 
first enacted legislation to disenfranchise the voting rights of the vast majority of the 
people of South Africa.321 Whether the South African Government would have done so 
in any event, is more than likely, but the British role should not be overlooked or 
simply dismissed.322 Nor is it adequate or historically accurate to blame the Boers for 
                                                            
320 South Africa Bill [Lords]. HC Deb 16 August 1909 vol 9 cc951-1058 at cols. 1000-1002. 
321 One of Britain’s first legal initiatives was to introduce a law in the Cape in 1809 requiring native 
blacks to carry passes if  they  wished  to  enter  “white”  areas  of  the  colony.  In addition, the  Cape’s  1853  
constitutional arrangements enacted when Britain was still the colonial power only granted the 
franchise to adult male British subjects who either earned an income of at least £50 per year or who 
occupied property with an annual rental value of £25 or more.  Although the law said nothing of colour, 
these restrictions would have effectively precluded most non-White, non-British men from the vote.  
When the law was amended in 1887 when Cecil Rhodes was Governor of the Cape the property 
qualification was increased to £75 per year and a literacy test was added.  These reforms would have 
removed the right to vote from some poor whites and coloureds.  In addition, communal property was 
excluded from consideration that would have only affected the African community.  The 1894 Glen 
Grey Act introduced native reserves and those who lived in them were specifically denied the right to 
vote.  In 1903, when Milner was Governor of the Transval and the Orange River Colony, the 
Municipalities Election Ordinance was passed which extended the right to vote to all white adult British 
subjects in the Transvaal.  All non-whites were excluded.  Although  the  Cape  had  a  nominally  “colour  
blind”   franchise   immediately   prior   to   the   Union,   in   practice   whites,   Indians,   coloureds,   and   natives 
enjoyed different access to the franchise since the whites occupied a disproportionately large 
percentage of the Cape’s  land  and  filled  a  disproportionately  large  percentage  of  the  Cape’s  better  paid  
jobs.  See Ian Loveland, By Due Process of Law? Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote in South 
Africa 1855-1960 (Oxford: Hart, 1999), p. 9, pp. 19-20, pp. 36-37, pp. 70-71, and p. 115. 
322 According to Keegan, in the 1870s Britain was toying with the idea of creating a larger white 
confederation under imperial auspices, combing all the white-ruled states of the subcontinent, including 
the Boer republics.  See Timothy Keegan, Colonial South Africa and the Origins of the Racial Order 
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South African racism.323  Even Professor Thompson, the Anglophile Professor of the 
University of Cape Town, admitted that Britain was not bound by Treaty of 
Vereeniging (which ended the second Anglo-Boer War) to exclude Coloured and 
Indian men from the franchise in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony.324  Rather, it 
chose to do this.   Accordingly, the old colonial voting laws in Natal, which excluded 
Africans, Coloureds, and Indians, and those which loaded the vote with income and 
property qualifications were agreed to by the British Parliament, which knew what the 
consequences would be.325  Furthermore, it was during the years that Britain ruled 
supreme in South Africa after the conquest of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State 
in 1902, and before it progressively devolved power to South Africa, first informally 
to Jan Smuts, and formally during the creation of the Union in 1910, that the seeds of 
segregation between Africans and Europeans in separate territorial spaces were 
sown. 326   This began through the creation of the South Africa Native Affairs 
Commission (SANAC) of 1903-5 headed by the Sir Geoffrey Langden, who one 
scholar described as a “reactionary   High   Tory, who had served as Resident 
Commissioner in Basutoland before his appointment by Milner to run Native Affairs 
in the Transvaal where his chief task was to secure labour for the mines”.327  As Ian 
Loveland explained, the SANAC explicitly approved the principle of territorial 
segregation along racial lines.  Specific areas of the country were set aside for the 
exclusive occupation of the native black population.  Blacks would not, however, be 
able to own this land.  Instead it was held in trust on their behalf by the colonial 
government where the natives would be assisted in developing their own forms of 
government to manage their internal affairs within their respective territories.328  The 
                                                                                                                                                                           
(London: Leicester University Press, 1996), p. 293.  This is intriguing because, as described in Part 
Three, Britain attempted to establish a confederation of minority white settler regimes throughout 
Southern and central Africa in the 1960s, although it was thwarted by the USSR and non-aligned states.  
323 In 1901 some 7000 native blacks were uprooted from their Cape Town homes and forcibly relocated 
in a camp built on the site of an old sewerage works at Uitvlugt.  See Loveland, By Due Process of 
Law? supra n. 321, p. 67.  This does not appear to be all that different to the apartheid government’s  
decision to forcefully relocate 60,000 Africans over a number of years from  Cape  Town’s  District  Six  
in the 1970s in order to relocate them to the Cape Flats Township complex 25 kilometres away.  
324 See Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, supra n. 317, p. 401, note 10. 
325 Bernard Makhosezwe Magubane, The Making of a Racist State: British Imperialism and the Union 
of South Africa 1875-1910 (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1996), p. 281. 
326 See  Martin  Legassick,  “British  Hegemony  and  the  Origins  of  Segregation  in  South  Africa,  1901-12”  
in William Beinart and Saul Dubow (eds.), Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth-Century South 
Africa (London: Routledge 1995), p. 43. 
327 Legassick,  “British  Hegemony  and  the  Origins  of  Segregation  in  South  Africa”,  ibid,  p.  48. 
328 Loveland, By Due Process of Law?, supra n. 321, p. 66. 
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idea underpinning the formation and function of the SANAC was strikingly similar to 
the South African government’s decision in 1954 to create Bantu Homelands, when 
the Tomlinson Commission recommended such a policy (as described in Part Three).   
The British approach to self-determination was similar to the American 
approach in the sense that they corresponded in the belief that non-Europeans were 
inherently not suited to representative government.  This was because, as one 
Anglophile member of the Transvaal Parliament explained, “the  negro   races occupy 
the lowest position in the evolutionary chain”.329  Many Southerners in the US would 
have shared this view of African-Americans.  Nor did the Anglo-Americans think that 
representative government could evolve amongst non-Europeans absent guidance.  In 
transferring power to South Africa, Britain preferred to divest the coloured races from 
the body politic, so that they could evolve in their own way without the whites 
interfering in their lives. Because of the sheer imbalance in numbers this was the only 
way to preserve the European way of life.  Where the British approach to self-
determination differed from the American approach was in the principle of aristocracy.  
Men like Balfour, Lorimer, and Salisbury believed it was better for the masses to be 
guided by an oligarchy who by their enlightenment, experience, and their superior 
knowledge, were best placed to rule.  The result was that Britain preferred to establish 
minority governments in the colonies where the native populations outnumbered the 
Europeans.  For an elite had ruled Britain for almost a thousand years even though 
they amounted in overall terms to a minority.  As explained in Part Three, the clamour 
for majority rule never came from Britain or from America.  It came from the call to 
liberate the toiling masses as encapsulated in the Soviet revolutionary approach to 
national self-determination after it had become fused during decolonization with the 
anti-colonial approach, which was encapsulated by the non-aligned movement. 
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
Whilst it is a cliché to repeat that civilisation was the key term used to distinguish 
certain types of political societies from others it is important to realise that what 
underlay the term civilisation was a set of assumptions about how those political 
societies belonging to the Western liberal tradition saw themselves in the world.  This 
                                                            
329 See George M. Fredrickson, White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American and South African 
History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 196. 
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is important because it affected the way they viewed the development of political 
society in the colonies placed under their control.  One of the consequences of this 
worldview was that only societies with a similar economic, cultural, and political 
system i.e. a mirror image to themselves, could possibly be deemed civilised. Self-
identification between the colonizer and the colonial subject played a major role in the 
development of self-determination especially in British colonies, whether this self-
identification was manifested in terms of class, colour, or creed.  This would explain 
why, for instance, Burke and Gentz could identify with the Americans during their 
War of Independence in 1776, as explained in Part One, when they succeeded in 
breaking their chains to Britain, but recoiled when it was attempted elsewhere.   
Accordingly, it was virtually impossible for any society to be classified as 
civilised  and  deemed  “fit  for  independence”,  which  was  not  Christian;;  which  was  not  
of a similar class to the British aristocracy i.e. well-bred, well-spoken, and wealthy; 
and that was racially different to Europeans i.e. not Caucasian.  In this connection it is 
important to stress that being considered civilised did not mean that one was 
considered an equal, a negation which applied to individuals, groups, and nations.  
Thus, the Ottoman Empire was left in the periphery of European politics even though 
it was admitted into the Concert of Europe in the nineteenth century.330  And Japan 
although it was considered a great power after it defeated Russia in 1904-5 was never 
really considered an equal which is why Wilson strenuously opposed its espousal of 
equality. 331   Nor was Siam (Thailand), Arabia, the Hejaz, China, or Ethiopia 
considered equals even though they had all been recognised as states or admitted into 
the League of Nations.332  Ultimately, equality would have to be fought for by the gun 
and the ballot box which is why the rest of the world would have to wait until 
                                                            
330 Turkey, still waiting to become a member of the EU, was only admitted to the European Concert 
when it was the Ottoman Empire at the Congress of Paris in 1856—but it was an unequal relationship. 
In 1878, Turkey would find its European possessions being partitioned by the great powers at the 
Congress of Berlin.  See Art. VII of the Treaty of the Congress of Paris, 30 March 1856, in M. Edouard 
Gourdon, Histoire du Congrès de Paris (Paris: Librairie Nouvelle, 1857),   p.   10   (“…déclarent   la  
Sublime  Porte  admise  à  participer   aux  avantages  du  droit  public  et  du  concert  Européens”.)     For   the  
English translation, see Edward Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. II (London: Butterworths, 
1875), p. 1250.  For the history  of  Turkey’s  attempt  to  enter  the  European  Concert,  see  Fikret  Adanir,  
“Turkey’s  entry  into  the  Concert  of  Europe”,  13  European Review (2005), p. 395.   
331 Gong  argues  that  Japan  had  already  attained  a  recognised  “civilised”  status  by  the  European  states in 
the decade prior to that conflict.  See Gerrit W. Gong, The  Standard  of  ‘Civilization’  in  International  
Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 195-200. 
332 This might explain why the nominal independence of the Hejaz was so short lived and why no one 
came  to  Ethiopia’s  rescue  when  Mussolini  annexed  it  in  the  Second  Italo-Ethiopian War (1935-6). 
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decolonization  when  they  were  “granted”  independence  from  their  colonial  masters  or  
when they liberated themselves in wars of national liberation by resort to armed force.   
Of course, these European prejudices did not remain static or stuck in the 
nineteenth century.  They remained in the ascendency until well into the twentieth 
century and had a major impact on the development of international law, which in turn 
had a major impact on the development of self-determination.  In the colonial context 
a community claiming self-determination had to be viewed as having the qualities of 
nationhood before its claim would be recognised. In other words, they had to have the 
capacity for good government in the form of an organised collectivity that was united 
in aptitude, political belief, and ideological outlook.  This necessitated a pre-existing 
community that was comprised of a highly literate, culturally assimilated, and racially 
homogenous society that was aligned to the Western tradition.  This tradition assumed 
that there was a separation between the church and the state, which meant a form of 
rationalised Christianity of the post-reformation Protestant variety.  The problem of 
course was that outside the dominions of white settlement, few such societies could 
ever exist that could achieve these lofty self-serving goals.  This conception of the 
nation caused particular problems in those fault lines where the white settler came 
across the native particularly where the former was not strong enough to exert itself by 
exterminating or cleansing the land of the natives i.e. as in Australia, Canada, and the 
US.333  The problem became particularly acute in Ireland, British India, Palestine, and 
in Southern Africa because of the sheer size of the native communities, which 
disturbed the natural evolution of self-government, which being based on the 
Westminster model, necessitated a form of government in which the majority ruled. 
For in a plural society which majority was to rule and over which territorial 
unit?  Was it the native or the settler?  Was it the Catholic or the Protestant, the 
Muslim or Hindu, the Jew or Arab? And what was a nation anyway? The difficulties 
in answering these questions is that they could not be resolved—absent partition—if 
                                                            
333 This would explain why the statistics for the indigenous populations of Australia (1 per cent), 
Canada (1.5 per cent), New Zealand (9 per cent), and the US (0.5 per cent) are so low compared to 
Ireland (which prior to the partition in 1921 had a population that was over 85 per cent Catholic), South 
Africa (over 80 per cent during apartheid), India (over 99 per cent), and Palestine (20 per cent in Israel 
proper today, 45-50 per cent if the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are included, although it was over 93 
per cent Arab in 1917 when the Balfour Declaration was issued and over 67 per cent Arab when the UN 
recommended  partitioning  Palestine  in  1947  ).    See  Andrew  Kenny,  “Right  of  Passage”,  The Spectator, 
30 September 1989, pp. 9-11 at pp. 9-10.  I would like to thank  Professor  Robert  Wintemute  at  King’s  
College for drawing my attention to this article where the indigenous statistics for Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, the US, and South Africa appear, and for sending me a PDF copy by email. 
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the prevailing system of government was to be representative or democratic.  This is 
why nationality conflicts did not present much of a problem to the dictator, the prince, 
or the tribe, which did not need to legitimise their systems of government by having 
regular recourse to the plebiscite.  However, if the system of government was to be 
democratic then absent the defining characteristics of representative government, it 
was practically impossible to establish a state, which would remain in state of peace, 
since there would be a constant struggle for political power.  It was partly for this 
reason that the colonial power always favoured the rights and interests of the 
European races in those colonies settled by Europeans.   For it was assumed that the 
Europeans in the dominions of white settlement were a highly literate, culturally 
assimilated, and racially homogenous community. And of course in the colonial 
context it was the colonial power that defined the national community and 
differentiated   it   according   to   assumed   “national   characteristics”.      In   the   British  
colonial context, these differences tended to be defined according to religious 
differences, since this is how Britain differentiated its own subjects.  Thus the colonial 
census often categorised peoples according to religion i.e. Christian, Muslim, Jew, 
Hindu or in colonial India by their “scheduled caste”.  Then there was “the Other”.334 
                                                            
334 This nominally referred to communities that did not fit into the other categories. 
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Part Three  
 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE AGE OF DECOLONIZATION 
 
 
In capitalist society, we have a democracy that is curtailed, wretched, false: a 
democracy only for the rich, for the minority. The dictatorship of the proletariat, the 
period of transition to Communism, will, for the first time, produce a democracy for 
the people, for the majority, side by side with the necessary suppression of the 
minority constituted by the exploiters. Communism alone is capable of giving a really 
complete democracy, and the fuller it is the more quickly will it become unnecessary. 
 
V.I. Lenin, The State and Revolution (New York: Vanguard Press, 1926), p. 194. 
 
It had come to be accepted that the pigs, who were manifestly cleverer than the other 
animals, should decide all questions of farm policy, though their decisions had to be 
ratified by a majority vote. This arrangement would have worked well enough if it had 
not been for the disputes between Snowball and Napoleon.  
 
George Orwell, Animal Farm: A Fairytale (1945) Penguin Classics, 1989, p. 31. 
 
THE PRIME MINISTER said that he would face difficult elections in the near future 
in England since he did not know what the Left would do.... 
THE PRESIDENT said that in 1940 there had been eighteen political parties in France 
and that within one week he had had to deal with three different prime ministers in 
France.  He said that when he had seen de Gaulle last summer he had asked him how 
this had happened in French political life, and de Gaulle replied that it was based on a 
series of combinations and compromises, but he intended to change all that. 
THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that Marshal Stalin had a much easier political 
task since he only had one party to deal with. 
MARSHAL STALIN replied that experience had shown one party was of great 
convenience to a leader of a state. 
 
Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin in conversation at the tripartite dinner meeting, 10 
February, 1945, Vorontsov Villa, The Conference at Yalta, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955) p. 923. 
 
Although it took some time for the Marxists to come to grips with the question, they 
can no doubt lay claim to being on the whole the oldest established and most 
consistent of opponents of colonialism and advocates of national self-determination. 
 
Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization (1964), 
Published by the Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University, p. 7. 
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The defining characteristic of international relations in the twentieth century was the 
triumph of national self-determination, although it would lose its “national label” as 
time progressed.  What initially began as an idea, emanating from the revolutions of 
the eighteenth century, was proclaimed a principle at the end of the First World War, 
before it acquired its status as a customary rule of international law, during 
decolonization, and was finally proclaimed a peremptory norm.1  This story of 
progress, however, is insufficient, for it masks the violent ideological struggles that 
took place during decolonization between two competing visions of what self-
determination entailed:  The Anglo-American versus the Soviet / Non-Aligned 
approach.  The first approach was associated with a liberal conception of nationhood 
which required a colonial people to develop the necessary characteristics before they 
would be granted the right to establish representative government in a manner that 
would not threaten international peace and security.  The second approach, in contrast, 
was ambivalent regarding the question of representative government, although it was 
universal in application, and was to be granted to all peoples colonised by Europeans 
immediately, and unconditionally, by all necessary means, including armed struggle.   
If we want to understand how partition became associated with the age of 
decolonization, then in addition to the Cold War rivalry, and the divergent views that 
were expressed on self-determination, the manner it was applied to certain peoples 
and territories ought to be considered.  This is because the way in which nationalism 
developed in territory placed under colonial control played a major factor when the 
colonial power came to relinquishing control over the territory.  Nor is it a 
coincidence that most territories partitioned during decolonization were British 
colonies.  As noted in Part Two, those who ruled the British Empire had a distinctive 
approach to the nationality question in its colonies and the application of self-
determination that was formed on the basis of a superior hierarchical structure 
informed by the Anglo-Saxon class system and the Westminster model of 
government.  Imperial government in Britain was very much character driven by men 
from aristocratic families who belonged to the ruling minority elite.2  Thus, they were 
                                                 
1 See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 26 January 
1971, ICJ Reports (1971), p. 31, para. 53; East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), judgment, ICJ Reports 
1995, p. 90 at p. 102, para. 29; and  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136 at p. 199, at paras. 155-156. 
2 See Carroll Quigley, The Anglo-American Establishment: From Rhodes to Cliveden (New York: 
Books  in  Focus,  1981,  first  written  1949)  especially  Chapter  2,  ‘The  Cecil  Bloc’,  pp.  15-32. 
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not averse to entrenching minority rule elsewhere where they thought it necessary to 
preserve British economic interests and the integrity of the Empire.  This is especially 
if the minority in the territory in question were either European or were foreign but of 
a class that was “English  in  taste,  in  opinions,  in  morals,  and  in  intellect”.3 
As noted in Part One, this contrasted starkly with the Marxist-Leninist 
approach to self-determination, which was inspired by the resistance of the Poles to 
the partitions of Poland.  This resistance had given inspiration to Marx and Engels 
contributing to the language of self-determination.4  As Joseph Stalin (1878-1953) 
recalled, in the language reminiscent of his day, “... Marx was in favour of the 
separation of Russian Poland; and he was right, for it was then a question of 
emancipating a higher culture from a lower culture that was destroying it”.5  Poland 
also contributed to the international policy of the Bolshevik party when it seized 
power.  As Stalin explained, the Kerensky government that attained power in the 
February Revolution of 1917 wanted to continue the war “in order to subjugate new 
lands, new colonies, and new nationalities”.6  In contrast, the Bolsheviks who seized 
power in the October Revolution of the same year, proclaimed “self-determination for 
the toiling masses of the oppressed nations” such as Finland.7  The Bolsheviks wanted 
self-determination to apply to all colonies irrespective of their location which initially 
included its own colonies in Europe such as Finland, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland, as 
well as the Western colonies of Egypt, India, and Ireland, whereas for Wilson and the 
imperialists their mind was focused almost exclusively on the nationalities of Europe.8  
Class, argued Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1870-1924), would become the politically 
dominant social identity only when national identity was given proper respect.9  This 
meant that nations should have the right not only of autonomy, but also of secession.10 
The principle of popular sovereignty and government by consent, originated in 
Western political philosophy, as an outcome of the formation of the nation-state 
                                                 
3 To coin a phrase from Macaulay, see “Thomas Babington Macaulay on Education for India” in Philip 
D. Curtin (ed.), Imperialism (London: MacMillan 1972), p. 178 at p.190. 
4 See Kevin B. Anderson, Marx at the Margins:  On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Non-Western Societies 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010). 
5 Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question (University of the Press of the Pacific 
Honolulu, Hawaii, 2003, reprinted from the 1935 edition), p. 21. 
6 Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, ibid, p. 69. 
7 Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, ibid, p. 71. 
8 See Derek Heater, National Self-Determination: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy (London: 
MacMillan, 1994), pp. 36-37. 
9 See Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin (eds.), A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in 
the Age of Lenin and Stalin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 68. 
10 Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, supra n. 5, p. 51. 
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during the revolutions in England, America, France, and Poland as explained in Part 
One.  However, the concept of the nation in Western political thought was not a 
universal community, and was initially restricted to Europeans, to those who 
professed the Christian faith, and to the upper classes.11  As explained in Part Two, 
those peoples who did not fit into European society in the colonies were shunned, 
placed in a position of subordination, or deported to the colonies.  In sharp contrast the 
Marxist-Leninist approach to the concept of the nation sought to abolish all 
distinctions and forms of privilege.  In the words of the All-Russian Congress of 
Soviets:   “...where capitalist democracy prevails and where the state rests on private 
property, the very basis of the state fosters national enmity, conflicts, and struggle”.    
In contrast, in the realm of the Soviets, power was built not on capital, but on labour, 
not on private property, but on collective property, not on the exploitation of man by 
man, but on hostility to such exploitation.  According, there  was  “a natural striving on 
the part of the toiling masses towards unity in a single socialist family”.12  In Marxist-
Leninist theory, national self-determination was promoted as a mass movement. 
In 1941, the US and Great Britain announced in the Atlantic Charter—the 
precursor to the UN Charter, which was adopted in 1945, and which established the 
post World War II international security framework—that they desired to see no 
territorial changes that did not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples 
concerned.13  However, in the British House of Commons, Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill clarified that this was not meant apply to colonial peoples, (i.e.  the  “darker  
races” who he perceived as “economically   backward”), only to those states and 
nations in German-occupied Europe (i.e.  “the  lighter-skinned  races” who he perceived 
as “economically  productive”).14  The US Government was not, however, in complete 
accord with this view, and so in 1943, in furtherance of the policy enunciated in the 
Atlantic Charter of 1941, it drafted a Colonial Declaration of its own.15  This 
Declaration   provided   that:   “It is the duty and the purpose of those of the United 
                                                 
11 Hence  Karl  Marx   and  Friedrich  Engels   referred   to   the  French   revolution   as   “bourgeois”. See The 
Communist Manifesto (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, first published 1848), p. 18. 
12 Report Delivered at the Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, 26 December 1922 in Stalin, 
Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, supra n. 5, pp. 120-128 at pp. 123-124.  
13 The Atlantic Charter of 14 August 1941 is reproduced in 35, Supplement to the American Journal of 
International Law: Official Documents (1941), pp. 191-192. 
14 See Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), p. 37. 
15 See Colonial Declaration: Meeting of the Ministerial Committee, 28 March 1944, FO 371/ 40749.  
The Colonial Declaration reproduced in the file is dated 9 March 1943. 
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Nations which have, owing to past events, become charged with responsibilities for 
the future of colonial areas to co-operate fully with the peoples of such areas toward 
their becoming qualified for independent national status”.  It  added  that:  “While  some  
colonial peoples are far advanced along this road, the development and resources of 
others are not yet such as to enable them to assume and discharge the responsibilities 
of government  without  danger  to  themselves  and  to  others”.  Accordingly, it was the 
duty and the purpose of each nation having political ties with colonial peoples: 
 
a. To give its colonial peoples protection, encouragement, moral support and 
material aid and to make continuous efforts toward their political, economic, 
social and educational advancement; 
b. To make available to qualified persons among the colonial peoples to the 
fullest possible extent positions in the various branches of the local 
governmental organisation; 
c. To grant progressively to the colonial peoples such measures of self-
government as they are capable of maintaining in the light of the various 
stages of their development towards independence; 
d. To fix, at the earliest practicable moments, dates upon which the colonial 
peoples shall be accorded the status of full independence within a system of 
general security; and 
e. To pursue policies under which the natural resources of colonial territories 
shall be developed, organised and marketed in the interests of the peoples 
concerned and of the world as a whole.16 
 
This document displayed many of the features of what would follow in the form of the 
UN Trusteeship System.  Yet the suggestion that colonial peoples needed special 
assistance to assume and discharge the responsibilities of government because they 
would be “a danger to themselves and to others” was, as explained in Part Two, 
typical of imperial mentality.  Thus Britain opposed the suggestions outlined in 
subsections c. and d. that mentioned independence and which sought to set target 
dates to achieve that end. Accordingly, it was hardly surprising that Britain resolutely 
opposed both any extension of the principles enunciated in the Atlantic Charter to its 
colonial dependencies and the American initiative to the issuance of a Colonial 
Declaration.  In 1944 the British  cabinet  would  only  agree   to  “the establishment, as 
part of the general world organisation, of machinery which would help to promote 
good colonial administration and the material well-being of dependent peoples”.17   
In other words, the British approach went to the heart of the quality of 
government.  It was not concerned with independence or majority rule but rather it 
                                                 
16 See Colonial Declaration, ibid, March 1944. 
17 See War Cabinet: Proposed Colonial Declaration, 13 April 1944, CAB 78/20. 
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gave preference to a community that was in its eyes better equipped with the tools for 
self-government.18  As Sir Ivor Jennings explained, the real problem in colonial 
countries was not simply drafting a constitution or making laws, but finding the men 
and women who would be capable of running the machinery of government after 
independence.19  This was the approach that would find expression in the UN 
Trusteeship system characterised by a rather condescending Anglo-American attitude 
that subject peoples needed to be nurtured  in  their  “progressive development towards 
self-government or independence”.20  This was an idea first encapsulated in Article 22 
of the League of Nations Covenant where in line with the evolutionary ideas 
associated with social Darwinism the former colonies of the Axis powers were 
classified into A-, B-, or C- mandates  according  to  their  “stages of development”.  In 
stark contrast stood the Soviet and Non-Aligned approaches to self-determination in 
which no fetters were  to  be  placed  on  a  people’s  exercise  of  that  right  which  was  to  be  
granted immediately and unconditionally.21  These divergent approaches to self-
determination are best understood by comparing and contrasting the American 1943 
draft of a Colonial Declaration quoted above to the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples adopted by the UN in 1960. 
The latter Declaration was inspired by a fusion of Marxist-Leninist philosophy 
with the anti-colonialism inspired by those nations, which formed the non-aligned 
movement.  Thus it opened by proclaiming that:  “The subjection of peoples to alien 
subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human 
rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the 
promotion of world peace and co-operation”.  It added:    “All peoples have the right to 
self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status 
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”.  In this 
connection:      “Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness 
should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence”.  Moreover, immediate 
steps were to be taken in those territories which had not yet attained independence, “to 
transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or 
reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any 
                                                 
18 For a critique of this view,   see   the   chapter   entitled,   “Freedom First”, in Kwame Nkrumah, Africa 
Must Unite (London: Panaf books, 2006, first published 1963), pp. 50-56. 
19 Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1956), p. 24. 
20 See Art. 76 b. UN Charter.  
21 Rosalyn Higgins, Conflict of Interests: International Law in a Divided World (London: The Bodley 
Head, 1965), p. 153. 
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distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete 
independence and freedom”.  It clarified that in the transfer  of  power,   “any attempt 
aimed at partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a 
country” would be incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter.22 
Accordingly, no longer was colonialism described as benevolent and peaceful, 
but as a project that constituted “a denial of fundamental human rights” associated 
with “alien subjugation,  domination,  and  exploitation”.  Self-determination was thus 
firmly established in the lexicon of rights rather than as an abstract principle, and the 
irreverent Anglo-American attitude that only the colonial power could decide when a 
subject   people’s   moral   well-being and preparedness for self-government had been 
met, was expressly negated and deemed irrelevant.  Moreover, for the first time in the 
history of international relations, self-determination was proclaimed as a right of all 
peoples and not just some peoples.  Although the   word   “nation”   was   dropped in 
favour  of  “peoples”, conceptually this was meaningless since what was really meant 
was that all peoples colonised by Europeans who were able to form themselves into 
nations had the right to self-determination.   The Colonial Declaration did not intend 
to suggest that the peoples of Brooklyn, Soweto, or Stoke-on-Trent, or any other city, 
township, village, or refugee camp, had a right to self-determination.  As Rupert 
Emerson observed, the Declaration meant that “all  overseas  colonial  peoples  have  a  
right to be liberated from the over-lordship of their  alien  white  masters”.23  And in the 
transfer   of   power   to   the   colony,   no   distinctions  were   to   be  made   in   terms   of   “race, 
creed or colour”,  although  discrimination based on class was not mentioned at all. 
The colonial powers naturally abstained from voting in favour of the Colonial 
Declaration, which was nonetheless swiftly followed up by a further resolution 
demanding   that   there   was   “an international obligation” on the colonial powers to 
transmit information on their non-self-governing territories under Article 73 UN 
Charter to the UN Secretary-General.24  In a last minute attempt to forestall the 
adoption of this resolution, the British Foreign Office desperately and in haste drafted 
an   alternative   resolution   on   “Nation-Building”.25  One of the operative parts of this 
draft resolution prescribed that “independence to be real requires conditions of 
                                                 
22 GA Res. 1514, 14 December 1960. 
23 Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization, Occasional Papers in 
International Affairs, Number 9, December 1964, published by Harvard University, p. 63. 
24 GA Res. 1541, 15 December 1960. 
25 See Draft Resolution on Nation-Building in Colonialism and Target Dates:  Revised Draft 
Resolution, 31 May 1961, FO 371/160905. 
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political, economic and social stability and must draw its strength from adequate 
resources in all these fields”.26   It added: “an essential aspect of this problem is the 
adequate training of the inhabitants of the territory to meet the requirements of a 
modern state for skilled manpower of all kinds”.27  Clearly, Britain still had a 
fundamental dilemma with giving up control over its colonies until it thought the 
people there were ready for self-government, let alone independence.  It was as a 
direct result of the Cold War contest that human rights would be forced on to the 
international agenda.  As Bill Bowring reminds us, it was primarily due to Marxist 
ideology, and lobbying by the USSR that self-determination is even mentioned in the 
1945 UN Charter, the 1960 Colonial Declaration, and in the 1966 human rights 
covenants.28  This is underscored by the fact that the original language employed in 
Article 1 (2) UN Charter, omitted mentioning self-determination altogether.29 
In 1948, the Soviet Union also attempted to address self-determination and the 
colonialism in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights but it was thwarted by the 
colonial powers.30  During the drafting of the Universal Declaration the Soviet 
delegate in the drafting committee criticised   “the   absurd   theory   current   among  
colonial   powers   that   there  were   superior   races   and   inferior   races”.31  Indeed, it was 
largely due to the insistence by the USSR on the principle of the equality of races 
whatever their stage of economic development that a schism emerged between the 
Anglo-American and the Soviet / Non-Aligned approaches to self-determination.  This 
in turn had an impact in those territories where a nationality conflict emerged between 
Europeans and non-Europeans, such as in Palestine, and Southern Africa.  In these 
cases the national community which formed the majority of the population would 
insist upon its right of self-determination without regard for whether it satisfied the 
social, economic, or cultural indices of development which the colonial power insisted 
were relevant criterions upon which to assess whether a particular nation was ready 
for independence, which accorded to the Soviet / Non-Aligned view.  In contrast the 
                                                 
26 Draft Resolution on Nation-Building, ibid, para. 2 
27 Draft Resolution on Nation-Building, ibid, para. 3. 
28 See Bill Bowring, The Degradation of the International Legal Order?  The Rehabilitation of Law 
and the Possibility of Politics (Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2008), pp. 9-38, at pp. 30-33.  
29 During the conversations at Dumbarton Oaks, Article 1 (2) originally stated that one of the purposes 
of   the  Organization  was   “to   develop   friendly   relations   among   nations   and   to   take   other   appropriate  
measures  to  strengthen  universal  peace”.    See  volume  1  of  The United Nations Year Book (1946), p. 4. 
30 See Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), pp. 96-101. 
31 Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ibid, p. 101 (quoting Dimitri Z. Manuilsky). 
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nationality that formed the “superior   race”, to borrow Soviet language, would insist 
upon its right of self-determination irrespective of its minority status, according to 
Anglo-American view, because it deemed itself better prepared for independence. 
During the debates on the UN Partition Plan for Palestine with Economic 
Union in November 1947 a schism occurred between the colonial powers and its 
former colonies when opposition was expressed to that Plan.  The newly independent 
states argued that it would be contrary to self-determination to divide Palestine in the 
face of opposition from the majority of its inhabitants whereas most of the states that 
had formerly been members of the League of Nations looked to the identity of the 
communities claiming self-determination, which they considered to be of paramount 
importance.  India and Pakistan led the opposition to the Partition Plan for Palestine 
by pointing out that the partition of the Indian subcontinent had been accomplished on 
the principle of majoritarianism, i.e. by distinguishing rights to territorial sovereignty 
on the basis of whether a specific population formed the majority in an allotted 
territory, whereas Palestine was being divided to favour a minority community, 
mostly comprised of European immigrants, many of whom had not yet immigrated to 
Palestine, and most of whom had no prior connection to the territory.  The newly 
independent countries viewed Zionism as an agent of imperialism because it was a 
form of nationhood that did not develop organically within Palestine, but was instead 
nurtured by a colonial power, that had spent three decades administering the territory, 
and in the process, it had encouraged the colonisation of Palestine by European Jews. 
With the burgeoning of successful Soviet sponsored national liberation 
struggles, which reached their peak in the 1960s, the decade most associated with 
decolonization, “the   right   to self-determination” would be repeatedly invoked by 
colonised peoples as an explicative in heated debates in the UN, proclaiming the 
necessity of bringing colonialism “to a speedy end”, to borrow language from the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Two 
centuries after the revolutions that convulsed Europe and the Americas in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a similar phenomenon would occur in the 
colonies of the same powers where those revolts had originated.  The difference was 
that this time the peoples that revolted were mostly not of European origin.  In other 
words the nationalism that spread through the colonial system was being invoked 
against the colonial power in the name of self-determination.  Since the USSR did not 
fully participate in the European colonial project in the eighteenth and the nineteenth 
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centuries preferring to incorporate colonies closer to home, it had little to lose by 
promoting worldwide revolution in its contest with the European colonial powers and 
against the US that was aligned with those powers.  Moreover, support for national 
liberation was consistent with Marxist-Leninist philosophy, which sought to eradicate 
all the distinctions that divided mankind.   Thus, it was not a coincidence that by 1969, 
only one per cent of humanity remained living in Western created colonies.32   
                                                 
32 See Bowring, The Degradation of the International Legal Order? supra n. 28, p. 33 citing Tunkin.  
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IV.  Minority, Nation, People: 
Self-Determination and Partition in Plural Societies 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Throughout the course of the twentieth century international lawyers expressed 
differing opinions on what they understood by the term “self-determination” and who 
was entitled to invoke it.  In late twentieth century discourse this was expressed in 
terms of the rights of peoples rather than nations, although the difference was 
somewhat academic, because regardless of what term was used what really was in 
dispute were the qualities associated with nationhood. These qualities did not simply 
disappear because of a change of terminology.  Thus international lawyers invoke the 
term   “people”   today   in   conjunction  with   self-determination when their predecessors 
would have spoken of the nation.33  If we accept that at the turn of the twentieth 
century self-determination was equated with the right of a nation to seek independence 
it would seem absurd to suggest that any people could have invoked it when they may 
have comprised the population of a state, several states, as could a minority, or several 
minorities.  Thus the phraseology employed in Article 1 (2) UN Charter, which calls 
for  “friendly  relations  among  nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples”,  would seem to suggest that not all peoples have 
evolved into nations.34  Whilst nations are undoubtedly comprised of peoples, it would 
appear that something more is needed for the people in question to form a nation. 
The word minority does not appear in the UN Charter.35 This omission is 
curious since a nation, whilst undoubtedly being comprised of a people, could also be 
comprised of a minority, if the minority views itself as a nation or is viewed as a 
nation by others.  Whether a people amount to a minority or a nation all comes down 
to how the population of a specific territory is described.  In a word, the connecting 
                                                 
33 See  e.g.   Joseph  S.  Roucek,  “The  Problem  of  Minorities  and   the  League  of  Nations”  15  Journal of 
Comparative Legislation and International Law (1933),  p.  67,  at  p.  69.    (“From  the  democratic  idea  of  
liberty of the individual it is only a step to the demand for the liberty of a nation—the principle of self-
determination,  to  form  an  independent  state”.) 
34 A memorandum prepared by the UN Secretariat during the San Francisco conference noted that the 
term  ‘“nation’  is  used  in  the  sense  of  all  political  entities,  states  and  non  states,  whereas  ‘peoples’  refers  
to   groups   of   human   beings  who  may,   or  may   not,   comprise   states   or   nations”.      See  XXVIII  United 
Nations Conference on International Organization (1945), p. 142. 
35 One possible explanation for the failure to mention minorities in the Charter, in addition to the failure 
of the League of Nations minority regime in Eastern Europe, was the fear in the US that African 
American civil rights leaders might use minority rights machinery at the new UN to embarrass the US 
Government.  See Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace:  The End of Empire and the Ideological 
Origins of the United Nations (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 147. 
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factor between a minority, a nation, and a people, is territory. Whether or not a people 
are a minority in a state, which is in the process of formation, comes down to how the 
boundary or the boundaries have been demarcated and delineated.   Accordingly, the 
people who numerically form the smallest unit in the newly created state, will by 
mathematical logic be described as a minority, and those peoples who are numerically 
numerous, will be described as the majority.  Since in a liberal democracy, political 
power is generally vested in the numerically preponderant population (minority rights 
notwithstanding) where the boundary is drawn takes on added significance.  It is 
perhaps for this reason, that the word “partition”  has  acquired  a  pejorative connotation 
in those territories where there was a dispute as to which particular people amounted 
to  “a  nation”  entitled  to  “external self-determination”, which in the colonial era meant 
the right to establish a state, as opposed to the minority, which was not so entitled.36  
In this regard we can learn a lot about the history of minorities, nations, and 
peoples in international law by examining how they were understood in specific 
partition proposals in differing historical epochs.  As an example, consider the manner 
in which international lawyers expressed differing opinions on the lawfulness of the 
1947 UN Partition Plan for Palestine.  For instance, writing in 1968, Elihu Lauterpacht 
could confidently express the opinion that the Partition Plan  was  “a direct application 
of the principle [of self-determination].  The Jews were not to determine the future of 
the Arabs, nor were the Arabs to determine the future of the Jews. Each group was to 
determine its own future”.37  And yet in a lecture delivered at the University of 
Auckland only four years later, Michael Akehurst said that he found   Lauterpacht’s  
argument regarding the  1947  Partition  Plan  “very  odd”.  Referring to the unequal and 
one-sided territorial and demographic aspects of the UN proposal, Akehurst said he 
thought “the partition plan represented such a clear sacrifice of the interests of the 
majority [i.e. the Arabs] for the benefit of the minority [i.e. the Jews] that it cannot be 
regarded as compatible with the rights the [League of Nations] Covenant had 
conferred on the population of Palestine as a whole”.38 Bearing in mind that both 
                                                 
36 See Report of the Commission of Rapporteurs presented to the League of Nations Council, League of 
Nations on the Aaland islands Doc. B.7.21/68/106 (1921), p. 28 quoted in Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, 
Sovereignty, and Self-determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (University of 
Pennsylvania   Press,   1990)   p.   30.      (“To concede to minorities…the right of withdrawing from the 
community to which they belong…would be to destroy order and stability … and to inaugurate anarchy 
in international life”). 
37 Elihu Lauterpacht, Jerusalem and the Holy Places (London: Anglo-Israel Association, 1968), p. 18.  
38 Michael  Akehurst,   “The Arab-Israeli Conflict and International Law”, 5 New Zealand Universities 
Law Review (1973), p. 236.  
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Lauterpacht and Akehurst were reputable British international lawyers who had both 
studied at Cambridge, who inspired a generation of lawyers, students, as well as 
Professors, some of whom teach at Oxbridge, it is striking that they reached such 
conflicting conclusions regarding their understanding of self-determination in the 
context of the UN Partition Plan for Palestine.  For Lauterpacht the issue at hand 
seemed to be the irreconcilable national identity of the two communities in Palestine 
and the necessity to satisfy the national aspirations of both communities, without 
regard for population statistics, nationality laws, and the like, whereas for Akehurst it 
was his association of self-determination with decolonization, democracy, and 
majority rule, which informed his understanding of the UN Partition Plan for 
Palestine, and which led him to criticise it.  What led these two prominent 
international lawyers writing in the same era, to so boldly assert such opposed views? 
In order to answer this question and to provide points of reference for context 
and comparison, it is necessary to examine other partitions that occurred in British 
colonial territories in the twentieth century; namely the partition of Ireland in 1920 
and of India in 1947, as well as the proposals to partition Palestine, and vast tracts of 
territories in Southern Africa.  Indeed one feature that these partitions all have in 
common is that they were justified by the language of self-determination.  The other 
common feature is that there was a “minority problem” in each of these areas of 
conflict: the Unionists were a minority in Ireland; the Muslims a minority in India; 
and the Jews a minority in Palestine, comprised mostly of immigrants.  Only in South 
Africa was the minority problem inverted. There, the minority ruled.  In all these cases 
the political leadership who claimed to represent the minorities were not satisfied with 
their status as a minority.  They  did  not  want  to  be  “second  class”  citizens.    They all 
claimed that they were nations, not minorities, and therefore entitled to self-
determination, which they understood to imply a right to independence over a specific 
territorial unit.  Thus they called on the colonial power to partition the territory to 
safeguard their interests without pointing out that partition was also likely to create a 
new minority problem.  If the colonial power felt that the minorities claims had merit, 
either because it self-identified with these communities or considered the minorities to 
have the right to self-determination, the greater chance that partition would occur. 
One of the major differences between the partitions of Ireland, Palestine, India, 
and Southern Africa was that Ireland and Palestine were places of white settlement as 
were the numerous territories in Southern Africa, whereas India was not.  Another 
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difference was that Palestine, as a League of Nations mandate, was administered by 
Britain  under  a  “sacred  trust”. When Britain sought to relinquish that trust, it asked the 
members of the international community as it was then composed to suggest a 
solution, which they did in the form of partition.  Thus they were able to articulate 
their views on the UN proposal to partition Palestine in an international forum 
comprised of sovereign member states.  In contrast, Ireland and India were British 
colonies and they were partitioned by British Acts of Parliament in which the debates 
on those partitions were restricted to that Parliament.  This point is important because 
it was in the debates on Palestine in the UN General Assembly in 1947 that a new 
understanding of self-determination was articulated by those states which had recently 
achieved independence and that would later establish the non-aligned movement.  The 
principal states behind this new movement were from the Indian subcontinent, which 
had been partitioned by Britain in August 1947, three months before the UN General 
Assembly would recommend such a solution to resolve the conflict in Palestine. 
Before examining each of these cases of partition with regards to their 
international legal implications and the development of self-determination in 
international law and relations, brief reference ought to be made to the Marxist-
Leninist approach to self-determination.  This is because that approach to self-
determination challenged the Anglo-American approach in that it encapsulated a 
distinctive approach to addressing the claims of minorities, which it sought to resolve 
through the formation of autonomous socialist republics.  When the Marxist-Leninist 
approach to self-determination became fused with the Non-Aligned approach during 
decolonization it culminated in an attempt by the UN General Assembly to prohibit 
partition during the transfer of power from the colonial power to the colony.  In this 
connection it is important to remember that the manner in which international lawyers 
approach the question of self-determination and minority rights today differs 
significantly from the way it was understood and applied in the first half of the 
twentieth century.  In the first half of the twentieth century, it was the colonial power 
that determined who would be the beneficiaries of self-determination in its colonies.  
Accordingly it alone determined how this would be geographically expressed.  This 
was not challenged until decolonisation reached its apotheosis in the 1960s. 
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2. The Marxist-Leninist approach to self-determination 
 
During the First World War, the multi-national Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and 
Russian Empires collapsed.  The Austro-Hungarian Empire was dissolved at the Paris 
Peace Conference in 1919.39  The Ottoman Empire was obliged to cede sovereignty 
over its former provinces in the Middle East that were placed under colonial 
administration in the form of mandates, which included the area that would come to 
be called Palestine.40  The Russian Empire collapsed due to two revolutions, in 
February, and in October 1917. As a result of the second revolution, when the 
Bolsheviks seized power, Russia concluded a peace treaty with Germany, and 
withdrew from the war.41  V.I. Lenin, the leader of the Bolshevik Party, established 
the   world’s   first   multi-national socialist state based upon Marxist-Leninist theory.  
Karl Marx (1818-1883) had not imagined that the socialist revolution would happen in 
an Empire like Russia, which is why Lenin had to interpret, elaborate, and apply his 
theories to the practical realities of Russian society, when he assumed power in 1917. 
The focus on Lenin, rather than Marx, is crucial, because it was Lenin who 
determined the course of Russian history, the course of Communism, and the course 
of twentieth century international relations.  Of course, without Marx, there would be 
no Leninism.  But for the purposes of international law and relations, Lenin is the key 
figure, as he was the first international statesman to put  Marx’s  theories  into  practice.  
 It ought to be remembered that the Russia Lenin knew was a notoriously 
unequal society. The tsar Peter the Great had reinforced feudalism in the eighteenth 
century, which tied the peasants to the landowners.  This included establishing the 
Pale of Settlement where Jews were crowded into towns where they had no adequate 
basis for livelihood and had to rely on primitive handcraftsmanship and petty trade to 
survive.  A Jew in Russia could only alter his status by converting to Christianity.42  
Thus, Lenin’s  grandfather  on  his  mother’s  side  converted to eliminate the many social 
and economic obstacles that Jews faced in nineteenth century Russia.43  In the late 
nineteenth century, the situation of the Jews deteriorated, and pogroms became 
                                                 
39 See David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. I , (New  York:  G.P.  Putnam’s  Sons,  
1928), p. 102. 
40 See The Treaty of Peace with Turkey signed at Lausanne, 24 July, 1923 in Treaties of Peace 1919 - 
1923, Vol. II, (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924), pp. 959 – 1022. 
41 See the text of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty in Jane Degras (ed.), Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, 
Vol. 1, 1917-1924 (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), pp. 50-55. 
42 See Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism 1917-1923 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 6. 
43 Robert Service, Lenin: A Biography (London: MacMillan, 2000), p. 17. 
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commonplace.  This led many Jews to emigrate to safer climes in Western Europe, 
and the US.  It was during this period that various solutions to the Jewish Question 
were debated.44  Some Jews sought assimilation, whereas others found refuge in 
Zionism.  The Zionists were inspired by the European scramble for Africa, and sought 
to establish a colonizing corporation to facilitate Jewish settlement in Palestine.45  
Within Russia, the Romanov police state banned political parties, trade unions, and all 
forms of public protest.  Although Emperor Alexander II had tried to encourage 
reform, by freeing peasants from personal bondage to the nobility, there remained a 
huge gap between the rich and the poor. The Yusupov family, for instance, owned 
vast estates throughout the country, and ordered their meals to be shipped by train 
from Germany.46  Resentment against the establishment in Russia was acute.   
As  one   of  Lenin’s   biographers  has explained, this inequality gave Lenin the 
impetus to replace old Russia with a European socialist order that would liquidate all 
exclusions, privileges, and hierarchies.47 When Lenin was a young boy his favourite 
book  was  Harriet  Beecher  Stowe’s  Uncle Tom’s  Cabin (1852).      This  tale  of  a  slave’s  
attempt to flee the cotton plantations in the American South was given pride of place 
in his bedroom.48  Lenin’s   parents   were   a   liberal   couple   by   nineteenth   century  
standards and sought fair treatment for those subjects of the Russian Empire who were 
not Russian.  This sensitivity towards other national and ethnic groups was something 
that   exercised   Lenin’s  mind to the end of his life.49  This might also explain why 
Lenin opposed Zionism, viewing it as reactionary, since Zionism was opposed to 
assimilation, and as imperialist, because Zionism necessitated forging an alliance with 
the capitalists and their various colonial projects.  Later Lenin was also influenced by 
the Russian anarchist Mikhail Bakunin (1814-1976) who argued that everything 
should be attacked and challenged and   if   it   survived   then   according   to   Darwin’s  
theories, it was meant to do so.50  The execution   of   Lenin’s   brother   undoubtedly 
                                                 
44 See Victor Kattan, From Coexistence to Conquest: International Law and the Origins of the Arab-
Israeli Conflict 1891-1949 (London: Pluto Press, 2009), pp. 8-37. 
45 Mark  Levene,  “Herzl,   the  scramble,  and  a  meeting  that  never  happened:  revisiting  the  notion  of  an  
African  Zion”,  in  Eitan  Bar-Yosef and Nadia Valman (eds.) The Jew in Late-Victorian and Edwardian 
Culture (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 202-220. See also, Kattan, From Coexistence to 
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46 Robert Service, Lenin: A Biography, supra n. 43, p. 2. 
47 Robert Service, Lenin: A Biography, ibid, pp. 2-4. 
48 Robert Service, Lenin: A Biography, ibid, p. 43. 
49 Robert Service, Lenin: A Biography, ibid, p. 29. 
50 Christopher Read, Lenin:  A Revolutionary Life (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 13. Service, Lenin: A 
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contributed to his hatred of tsarism and old Russia.  As the brother of a convicted 
terrorist, Lenin, who was an exceptionally bright student,51 was prevented from 
attending the best universities in Russia, despite being well qualified to do so.  It has 
been suggested that this exclusion from Russian society meant that a regular career 
was closed to him pushing him further into radical and revolutionary activities.52 
One of the first major challenges that Lenin had to confront during and after 
the Civil War (1917-1923) was to preserve the territorial integrity of the vast Russian 
Empire, to stem the tide of rising nationalism, and to prevent the Empire from 
disintegrating.  This meant that Lenin had to rapidly come up with a solution to the 
nationality question.  Whilst orthodox Marxists have long abhorred nationalism, 
arguing that it was a distraction from creating a true socialist society, Lenin thought 
otherwise.  In his opinion only when national tensions were resolved through the 
establishment of a socialist nation-state, would the working classes set aside their 
differences, and coalesce in establishing an international socialist society.  Lenin also 
wanted to tackle Great Russian chauvinism in which Russia had been seen under the 
previous tsarist regime as an oppressor nation by its minorities. Only the right of self-
determination  could overcome that distrust.53  Alluding  to  Marx’s   theory  of  history,  
Lenin further argued that Marxists were obligated to analyse all social questions with 
regard  to  “the  concrete  historical  moment”  in  which  they  existed.  When considering 
the nationality question, Marxists therefore had to make a distinction between the 
period of developing capitalism and the period of developed capitalism.  Lenin 
explained that in the period of developing capitalism, when the bourgeoisie and the 
workers joined together to overthrow an absolutist regime, national movements 
became mass movements and drew all classes into politics.  This was not the case in 
the period of developed capitalism, when nations had already crystallised into states, 
and when nationalism created divisions between the bourgeoisie and the workers.  
Accordingly, national self-determination was only relevant in the context of 
developing capitalism, and the formation of the nation state, and it was because Russia 
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was passing through the phase of developing capitalism that the Bolsheviks required 
an item in their program on the right of nations to national self-determination.54 
In 1912, when Lenin took up residence in Krakow, in Poland, he had occasion 
to elaborate upon his approach to nationalism when he became involved in a series of 
intellectual disputes with the Polish socialist Rosa Luxemburg (1871-1919), and the 
Austro-Marxists Karl Renner (1870-1950) and Otto Bauer (1881-1938).  Luxemburg 
had  argued  that  Marx’s  approval  of  Polish  independence  movements,  whilst  they  were  
valid for the middle of the nineteenth century, were no longer valid in the twentieth 
century because Poland had ceased to be the bulwark of European absolutism and had 
advanced culturally, economically, and socially. She therefore favoured an 
autonomous Poland within a larger Russian federation, and explicitly came out against 
Polish independence.55  Renner  and  Bauer’s  theory  of  national-cultural autonomy, in 
contrast, was developed with a view to resolving the minority problem within the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire.  They sought to break the link between territory and 
nationalism by giving extraterritorial rights to dispersed national minorities to govern 
their own cultural affairs.56  Each nation was treated not as a territorial corporation, 
but as a union of individuals.  This was to result in the creation of a national register 
for each community who would be given the right to administer their cultural affairs 
autonomously as one body, regardless of where they happened to reside.57  
Luxemburg’s   thesis  was an affront to Lenin, and it prompted him to write a 
polemic entitled The Right of Nations to Self-Determination, which he published in 
1914.58  He argued that: “...if we want to grasp the meaning of self-determination of 
nations, not by juggling with legal definitions, or ‘inventing’ abstract definitions, but 
by examining the historic-economic conditions of the national movements, we must 
inevitably reach the conclusion that the self-determination of nations means the 
political separation of these nations from alien national bodies, and the formation of 
                                                 
54 For  an  excellent  summary  of  Lenin’s  views  on  the  national  question  summarised with reference to his 
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an independent national state”.59  He justified his argument with reference to 
Norway’s  secession  from  Sweden in 1905, which he described  as  “practicable”  and  a  
form   of   secession   that   was   assumed   “under   conditions   of   political   freedom   and  
democracy”.   Lenin   supported   the   secession   of   Norway   because the forces against 
secession were comprised of his bitter enemies, the Swedish landed proprietors and 
the clergy. Moreover, the secession resulted   in   a   “close   alliance   between   the  
Norwegian  and  Swedish  workers”,  and  “their  complete  fraternal  class  solidarity”.  In 
other words the secession of Norway from Sweden improved the relationship between 
the Swedish and Norwegian working classes, and resulted in amity and friendship. 
Lenin then referred to the resolution of the London International Socialist 
Congress in 1896, which had  affirmed  “the  full  rights  of  the  self-determination of all 
nations...”  Indeed  the  word  “self-determination”, which is derived from the German 
word Selbstbestimmungsrecht, was first explicitly expressed in that Congress.60  And 
the nation the International had in mind when they were debating that resolution was 
Poland.  The Polish nationalists had wanted the text of the resolution to explicitly 
support Polish independence, and they cited Marx, who had indeed approved of this.  
However, the Polish Socialist Party defeated the motion by arguing that Marx had 
been writing in a different historical epoch, that the national question was of 
secondary importance, the priority was to create a purely proletarian party in Poland, 
and to proclaim the principle that the Polish and Russian workers had to maintain the 
closest alliance in their class struggle.  In the light of this debate, Luxemburg had 
argued that the International inferred that self-determination did not give rise to a right 
of secession.  Lenin disagreed arguing that there was no contradiction between class 
struggle and the rights of oppressed nations to freedom and independence.  This is 
because Lenin recognized that there was a democratic content in the nationalism of 
oppressed nations, which should be supported, in spite of its bourgeois character.  He 
saw in the victory of the Serbs and Bulgars in the Balkan wars the destruction of 
Balkan feudalism and the creation of a free class of peasant landowners, which was a 
step forward.  It was on these grounds Lenin reminded his supporters that Marx had 
supported the Irish nationalist movement towards the end of his life.61  This history is 
important to note because the right to secession was incorporated into the 
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constitutional framework of the USSR for each of the autonomous socialist republics, 
and explains its later support for wars of national liberation as well as secession.62 
In response to the thesis on national-cultural autonomy advanced by the 
Austro-Marxists, Lenin asked Stalin, the Georgian Bolshevik expert on nationalities, 
to write an essay critiquing the idea of extraterritorial autonomy.  This was later 
published as Marxism and the National and Colonial Question by Stalin in 1935, 
although it was first written in 1913, under the guidance of Lenin.63  Lenin’s  views on 
what constitutes a nation entitled to self-determination were social democratic 
orthodoxy derived directly from Kautsky—who would later clash with the 
Bolsheviks.64  Before Lenin asked Stalin to write the essay, he had expressed strong 
opinions against extraterritorial autonomy, when he attacked the Bund (the 
Communist Jewish political party in Russia), which favoured it.65  In his opinion the 
Jews could not be a nation because they lacked a common language and territory.  
Instead he favoured Jewish assimilation.66  Stalin agreed although he also opposed 
extraterritorial autonomy because he thought it would lead to nationalism, which 
would distract the working classes from establishing a true socialist order.  The Bund, 
as Stalin explained,  wanted  to  adapt  “socialism  to  nationalism”67 instead of the other 
way around.  As a result, the Bund was heading for separatism, not in the sense of 
secession, because the Jews “do  not  constitute  a  majority  in  a  single  gubernia”,68 but 
by separating the working classes through seeking national existence in isolation.69  
Stalin thought that the abolition of the Pale by the Communists would hasten the 
                                                 
62 On the constitutional structure of the USSR see Harold J. Berman and John B. Quigley, Jr. (trans. and 
eds.), Basic Laws on the Structure of the Soviet State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969). 
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process of Jewish assimilation as they integrated into Russian society, which might 
also explain why in addition to Lenin, Stalin, as well as Trotsky, all opposed 
Zionism.70  The  USSR’s  recognition  of  Israel  in  1948  can  only  be  understood  in  the  
light of the failure of Soviet nationality policy towards the Jews, and the fact that 
Stalin thought the Jewish state would join the socialist camp.71 Stalin seems to have 
been influenced by the failure to establish a Jewish homeland in the USSR in 
Birobidzhan.  Of the 19,635 Jews who arrived in Birobidzhan between 1928 and 1933, 
11,450 departed.  This meant that in those years less than 10 per cent of the population 
of Birobidzhan was Jewish.72  As Stalin recalled at the Yalta Conference the Jews 
“had  only  stayed  there  two  or  three  years  and  then  scattered  to  the  cities”.73 
The   idea   behind   the   USSR’s   nationality   policy   in   the   early   years   of   its  
formation was to provide an outlet for nationalism through the creation of state-
controlled homelands, which connected nationalities to specific territories, often 
arbitrarily mapped, linking the political and cultural-linguistic positions of the 
nationalities with a degree of autonomy, through a hierarchy of union republics, 
autonomous republics, autonomous regions, and autonomous districts.74  Soviet policy 
systematically promoted the distinctive national identity and national self-
consciousness of its non-Russian populations.  Each homeland was encouraged to use 
its own national language, and to mark its national identity through national folklore, 
museums, dress, food, costumes, opera, poets, classical historical works etc.  The 
long-term goal was to establish national identities that would coexist in a framework 
of amity and peace within an emerging all-union socialist culture, which was 
supposed to supersede any pre-existing national tensions.75  The advantages of this 
system explained Stalin,  was  that  “it  does  not  deal  with  a  fiction  deprived  of  territory,  
but   with   a   definite   population   inhabiting   a   definite   territory”.  Moreover, it did not 
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divide people according to nationality, nor did it “strengthen   national   partitions”.    
Instead, it broke down “these partitions” and united the population in such a manner 
that a division emerged of a different kind; a division which was based on class.76  
Lenin and Stalin sought to break the conflict between minorities and 
majorities, by doing away with the system of representative government altogether.  In 
this connection it is crucial to understand that the Marxian concept of democracy, 
which inspired Lenin, was one in which the proletariat became the ruling class.77  It 
was not a multiparty system based on regular elections in which certain individuals 
might be given the vote depending on their status in society.  When Marx and Engels 
composed The Communist Manifesto (1848), England was a thoroughly unequal 
society:  In 1848, over 90 per cent of the British population could not be elected to 
Parliament or vote, children were wage labourers, most of the land was in private 
ownership, education was a privilege, and there were no trade unions etc.  This 
explains why Marx and Engels often fulminated against the minority ruling 
aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, which had concentrated property into a few hands.78  
As   they   noted,   “previous   historical  movements  were  movements   of  minorities   or   in  
the interest of minorities”. In contrast “the proletarian movement is the independent 
movement   of   the   immense   majority,   in   the   interest   of   the   immense   majority”.79  
Communism as Marx understood it was a mass movement aimed at breaking down 
barriers, removing divisions between the working classes everywhere.80 This is why 
the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie represented the interests of 
the entire proletariat and the movement as a whole. As Stalin explained, this is why 
the policy of Marxism-Leninism towards the nationality problem aimed  “to  unite  the  
workers of all nationalities in Russia into united and integral collective bodies in the 
various localities and to unite these collective bodies into a single party”.81 
The Marxist approach to democracy as developed by Marx and Lenin is 
crucial to understanding how self-determination as it developed during the course of 
the twentieth century became a mass movement.  Lenin, like Marx, and Rousseau 
before him, had articulated a vision of society in which the majority, meaning the 
whole people, ruled.  This envisaged the nation as an integral, complete whole, with 
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no distinctions, differentiations,  or  divisions.     As  explained   in  Part  One,  Rousseau’s  
general will was both inalienable and indivisible, which meant that it could never be 
alienated or divided.  This meant that the executive had to represent the whole people, 
and not just a part of it, in formulating policy.  How one could actually accomplish an 
identity  between  the  law  and  the  people’s  will through a representative assembly or an 
executive, became highly controversial.  The conundrum is in fact insolvable and 
circular.  This was understood by contemporary observers of the USSR as diverse as 
Karl Kautsky, Carl Schmitt, and even George Orwell, who noted that the Marxist 
approach to democracy merely established a new aristocracy in Russia in the form of a 
dictatorship of the workingmen’s  council.82  And indeed Lenin justified a  “temporary”  
dictatorship as the means necessary to establish his true ideal of a communist society: 
 
The dictatorship of the proletariat, the period of transition to Communism, 
will, for the first time, produce a democracy for the people, for the majority, 
side by side with the necessary suppression of the minority constituted by the 
exploiters. Communism alone is capable of giving a really complete 
democracy, and the fuller it is the more quickly will it become unnecessary 
and wither away of itself. In other words, under capitalism we have a state in 
the proper sense of the word: that is, a special instrument for the suppression 
of one class by another, and of the majority by the minority at that. Naturally, 
for the successful discharge of such a task as the systematic suppression by the 
minority of exploiters of the majority of exploited, the greatest ferocity and 
savagery of suppression is required, and seas of blood are needed, through 
which humanity has to direct its path, in a condition of slavery, serfdom and 
wage labour.83 
 
For Marxist-Leninists the elimination of the capitalist system and the establishment of 
the socialist system were to be attended by the abolition of the bourgeois nations and 
the establishment of new, socialist nations.  The economic basis on which these 
nations were formed was the socialist system of economy and socialist ownership of 
the implements of production. The overthrow of bourgeois power and the 
establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat were to be the decisive political 
prerequisite and basis for the foundation of the socialist state.84   It was Lenin, Stalin, 
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and  Trotsky’s  support  for  the dictatorship of the proletariat, which they put into effect 
during the revolution in October 1917 that prompted the break with Kautsky.85  This is 
why Trotsky accused Kautsky of having “a fetishism” for parliamentary democracy: 
 
This fetishism of the parliamentary majority represents a brutal repudiation, 
not only of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but of Marxism and of the 
revolution altogether.  If, in principle, we are to subordinate socialist policy to 
the parliamentary mystery of majority and minority, it follows that, in 
countries where formal democracy prevails, there is not place at all for the 
revolutionary struggle.  If the majority elected on the basis of universal 
suffrage in Switzerland pass draconian legislation against strikers, or if the 
executive elected by the will of a formal majority in North America shoots 
workers, have the Swiss and American workers the ‘right’   of   protest   in  
organizing a general strike?  Obviously, no.  The political strike is a form of 
extra-parliamentary pressure on the ‘national  will’,   as   it   has   expressed   itself  
through universal suffrage.86 
 
Whilst today human rights law has softened the impact of majority rule in democratic 
countries, in the 1920s when Trotsky was writing, this was not the case.  As explained 
later, it was not until the civil rights struggle during the height of the Cold War 
competition during decolonization that a universal system of human rights legislation 
was articulated in the form of the 1966 Covenants that would later find expression in 
individual states through the adoption of these treaties in domestic legislation.87 
One of the major consequences of the Marxist-Leninist approach to national 
self-determination is that when it was superimposed onto the international plane 
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of the realm, cannot fail to give effect to such legislation if it is clearly and unambiguously expressed”. 
There are of course huge political differences between Lord Bingham, a British Law Lord writing at the 
turn of the twenty-first century, and Leon Trotsky, a Marxist revolutionary, justifying the purges and 
civil wars of 1917-1920.  Yet, I think it is striking that, despite their differences, they both expressed 
concerns with the tyranny of the majority, and the lack of safeguards in a Parliament or a National 
Assembly, when a majority of the legislators have approved a law in clear and unambiguous terms that 
could have detrimental consequences for the welfare of the nation as a whole.  Indeed resolving 
majority tyranny in a democratic system remains a riddle.    For if the will of Parliament is supreme 
then laws and constitutions can be altered even if, in so doing, they infringe the rule of law, as Judge 
Bingham aptly observed. See Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (London: Penguin, 2011), pp. 168-170. 
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during decolonization, it was adapted to promote majority rule, which was to be 
achieved by all necessary means, including armed struggle.88  This meant that during 
the transition of political power from the colonial power to the colony, political power 
was to be vested in “the toiling masses”, the   “whole   people”,   rather than in the 
minority ruling elite, which was the model preferred by the liberal democracies. 
Moreover, the Marxist-Leninist approach to self-determination extended:  
 
to all nations without exception, as well as to the national groups which have 
not yet developed into nations.  Economic and cultural backwardness cannot 
be used as a pretext to deny a people the right to establish an independent 
state…The  Marxist  presentation  of   the  question, tested by life itself, smashes 
to smithereens the colonialist fable that the underdeveloped peoples are 
incapable of running a state.  The Soviet experience in national development 
shows that in socialist conditions the former backward peoples, which have set 
up their own national states, have rapidly succeeded in eliminating their 
economic and cultural backwardness with the help of other friendly peoples.89   
 
As explained later, during the height of decolonisation the Marxist-Leninist approach 
to self-determination became fused with the Non-Aligned approach to self-
determination and was successfully employed in combination to thwart the emergence 
of the minority-ruling regime of Ian Smith that was established in Rhodesia in 1965, 
and the continuation of minority rule in South Africa.  It also affected the discourse 
employed by Irish, Indian, Greek-Cypriot, and Palestinian nationalists who articulated 
an understanding of self-determination based on majority rule. Furthermore, the 
Marxist-Leninist approach to self-determination bore an uncanny resemblance to the 
manner in which it would be expressed in the 1970 Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.90 That Declaration accepted  that 
all nations are sovereign and equal and that they have a right to autonomy or to enter 
                                                 
88 This was of course opposed by the liberal democracies.  But words to this effect or words, which 
could be interpreted to this effect, were  included  in  the  UN’s  1974  Definition  of  Aggression annexed to 
GA Res. 3341 (XXIX), 14 Dec. 1974, Article. 7.  See also, Declaration on Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Amongst States of 1970, which also contains a 
provision on self-determination, in which peoples deprived of that right, are entitled to resist their 
occupiers in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, and are entitled to seek and to 
receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.  See further, Article 1, 
paragraph 4, of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. 
89 Starushenko, The Principle of National Self-Determination, supra n. 84, p. 51. 
90 See  “the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” annexed to GA Res. 2625, 24 
Oct. 1970. 
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into a federation—exactly as Lenin had explicitly prescribed some fifty years 
previously.91  Although the Declaration on Friendly Relations was silent on the 
question of secession, which had been forcefully promoted by the Marxist-Leninists, 
the Declaration left the door open by agreeing that another mode of exercising self-
determination in addition to establishing a state, a free association, or integration 
would  be  one  that  would  lead  to  “the emergence into any other political status freely 
determined by a people”  which  could  be  read  as  an  implicit  acknowledgement  of  the  
possibility of secession.  The Declaration also recognized the right of peoples 
struggling for self-determination to receive support from other states in their acts of 
resistance, which was another idea inspired by Lenin and Stalin.  And finally, it was 
made clear that self-determination, however it was construed, did not authorise or 
encourage  “any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the 
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting 
themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples ... and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people 
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour”.92   This 
provision would seem to amount to a reaffirmation of majority rule since the phrase, 
being possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the 
territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour could not be read to apply to 
minorities. Thus, for the first time in history, representative government was redefined 
as being truly representative on the international diplomatic and legal level in the 
sense that all classes, castes, creeds, and communities formed a part of the people. 
 
 
3. The Partitions of Ireland, India, and Palestine 
 
The Bolsheviks seizure of power in 1917 caused alarm and consternation amongst the 
Western liberal democracies, which responded by sending armies to assist the White 
Russians in restoring the old order.  This effort ultimately failed, and the USSR was 
founded in 1922, although it did not join the League of Nations until 1934.  Thus, the 
League of Nations was largely a Christian club mostly comprised of Western liberal 
democracies, dictatorships, and monarchies. Of its original members, only Haiti, 
                                                 
91 Compare the Declaration on Principles ibid to what Stalin (under   Lenin’s   guidance)   wrote in 
Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, supra n. 5, at pp. 18-19. 
92 Emphasis added. 
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Liberia, Japan, and Siam, could be described as having cultural traditions that differed 
significantly to the states of Europe and the Americas.  Although Abyssinia became a 
member in 1923, the League turned a blind eye when it was invaded by Italy.  After 
the  USSR’s  invasion  of  Finland,  when  the Council of the League of Nations resolved 
that through this act,   “the  USSR  has  placed   itself  outside   the  League  of  Nations”,93 
Moscow complained   that   the  League   “did   not   find   it   necessary   to   expel   Poland   for  
seizing Vilna or Italy for invading Ethiopia, but voted for expulsion of the Soviet 
Union when it deprived Germany  of  a  springboard  prepared  for  invasion”.94   
 Those who drafted the Covenant of the League of Nations were uncomfortable 
with according membership to states with vastly different ideological systems.  Thus, 
one of the British war aims during the First World War was to secure the expulsion 
from  Europe   of   the  Ottoman   Empire   “which   had   proved   itself   so radically alien to 
Western  civilisation”.95  Accordingly, it was hardly surprising that the USSR was only 
a member of the League for five years, and that Marxism-Leninism had no discernable 
impact on the policies of practices of the League of Nations in the inter-war years.   
The USSR was never an original member and so it did not participate in drafting the 
Covenant, which was mainly confined to Anglo-Americans who ensured that their 
approach to self-determination remained in the ascendancy.96  It was not until the UN 
was established in 1945 that self-determination would be explicitly mentioned in an 
international instrument, instead of being selectively applied in Europe, or by way of 
exception to the A-class mandates that were established in the Middle East.97   
Accordingly, the Anglo-American approach to self-determination was the 
predominant model in the inter-war years, and it was this model that contributed to the 
partitions of Ireland in 1920, India in 1947, as well as several British proposals to 
                                                 
93 4178, Appeal by the Finnish Government.  20 League of Nations Official Journal, 1939, p. 506. 
94 See   the   Soviet   publication   “War   and   the  Working   Class”   in   Leo   Gross,   “Was   the   Soviet   Union  
Expelled  from  the  League  of  Nations?”  39  The American Journal of International Law (1945), p. 35, 
note. 1 
95 Umozurike, Self-Determination in International Law, supra n. 60, p. 17.  Turkey did not become a 
member of the League of Nations until 1932. 
96 See F.P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations:  Volume 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1952), pp. 15-24.  The British League of Nations society was founded in 1915.  One of its most 
prominent  members  was  A.J.  Balfour’s  cousin,  Lord  Robert  Cecil.  Jan  Smuts  was  also  a  leading  player  
and he saw himself and his country as belonging to the Anglo-Saxon race, which included the 
membership in the Anglo-American   club.      On   Smut’s   role   in   formulating   the   ideas   that   led   to   the  
League of Nations and the mandate system see Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, supra n. 35, pp. 39-46. 
97 It  had  been  hoped  to  exclude  Germany’s  Pacific  and  African  colonies  from  the  mandate  system  on  
the  grounds  that   they  were  “inhabited  by  barbarians  who  not  only  cannot  possible  govern  themselves  
but to whom it would be impracticable to apply any idea of self-determination  in  the  European  sense”.    
See Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, ibid, pp. 82-83 (quoting Jan Smuts).  
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partition Palestine, which culminated with the UN proposal to Partition Palestine in 
1947.  Britain would also propose partition to resolve the conflict in Cyprus when it 
proposed to transfer power to the island in 1960.   However, by that time, the British 
liberal understanding of self-determination faced considerable challenge from the 
Soviet / Non-Aligned movement, and so the plan to partition Cyprus was withdrawn.98  
Instead, it is collecting dust in the archives.99  Similarly, the architects of separate 
development throughout Southern Africa took inspiration from British partition policy 
which they sought to emulate.  However, by the time they sought to establish Black 
Homelands in South and South West Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, state practice had 
changed and efforts to preserve minority rule were looked at with particular disdain.  
 Whilst most studies of the partition begin with Ireland and the Government of 
Ireland Act of 1920, the underlying rationale for that Act had in fact been decided 
during the negotiations that led to its adoption.  This is also the case with India and 
Palestine.  In India the justification for partition is not mentioned in the 1947 
Government of India Act.  Rather the justification for the partition of the Indian 
subcontinent is contained in the speeches that Mohammed Ali Jinnah gave before the 
All-India Muslim League.  Similarly, the underlying rationale for the partition of 
Palestine was not really contained in the UN Partition Plan for Palestine of 1947 or for 
that matter in the 1937 Peel Partition Plan although both documents adumbrated how 
partition was to be affected.  It was the attempt to establish representative government 
in Palestine, whilst maintaining the policy enunciated in the Balfour Declaration, 
which ultimately led to the proposals to partition Palestine between Arabs and Jews.   
 
 
The partition of Ireland100 
 
                                                 
98 Question of Cyprus, First Committee, Thirteenth Session, 996th meeting, 25 November 1958, in UN 
General Assembly, Official Records, vol. 13, 1958, 1-3 Committees, p. 247. 
99 See Cyprus: Report on Methods, Costs, and Consequences of Partition in The Future of Cyprus.  
Proposed Partition 1957.  CO 926/710.  This document was only declassified in 2009. 
100 In reviewing the partition of Ireland I have relied on the following:  Joseph M. Curran, The Birth of 
the Irish Free State 1921-1923 (Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1980); Michael Laffan, 
The Partition of Ireland 1911-1925 (Dundalk: Historical Association of Ireland, 1983); T.J. Fraser, 
Partition in Ireland, India and Palestine: Theory and Practice (London: MacMillan, 1984); Catherine 
B. Shannon, Arthur J. Balfour and Ireland 1874-1922 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 1988); Anthony Carty, Was Ireland Conquered?  International Law and the Irish 
Question (London: Pluto, 1996); and Bill Kissane, The Politics of the Irish Civil War (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005).   
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Partition was first suggested in the decolonization context to resolve the conflict that 
had arisen between the United Kingdom and Ireland, Britain’s   oldest   colonial  
possession, in the debates over Home Rule.101  As a result of the Acts of Union of 
1801 Irishmen were represented in the British Parliament.  However, there was a 
division  between  those  Irishmen  such  as  Daniel  O’Connell  (1775-1847) who sought to 
repeal the Union and advance the cause of Catholic emancipation, and those who 
sought to maintain the restrictions on Catholics and maintain the Union.  Those 
Irishmen in favour of the Union were largely Protestants, members of the Church of 
Ireland, Presbyterians, and Anglicans.  Those Irishmen who sought to repeal the 
Union were largely Catholic, although there were exceptional men like Wolf Tone 
(1763-1798) and Charles Stewart Parnell (1846-1891) who were not. The words 
“Catholic” and “Protestant” were thus not always synonymous with Nationalist and 
Unionist.  Nonetheless, since the partition of Ireland was undertaken on the basis of an 
assumed identity that was formed and distinguished by the colonial power, which 
implemented the partition, on religious lines, in its eyes, Catholics and Protestants 
were to all intents and purposes used as synonyms with Nationalists and Unionists.   
The legislation that led to the partition were the Government of Ireland Act 
1920102 (hereafter “GOI   Act’),   and   the   Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921103 (hereafter 
“Anglo-Irish Treaty”).  The former led to the establishment of Northern Ireland that 
remained in union with the United Kingdom whereas the latter led to the 
establishment of the Irish Free State that was to have “the same constitutional status in 
the Community of Nations known as the British Empire”.104  Article 1 (1) of the GOI 
Act provided for the establishment of a Parliament, Senate and House of Commons in 
Southern Ireland and a Parliament of Northern Ireland “consisting of His Majesty, the 
Senate of Northern Ireland, and the House of Commons of Northern Ireland”.  The 
key provision of this act, which established the partition, explained that:  “For the 
purposes of this Act, Northern Ireland shall consist of the parliamentary counties of 
Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry and Tyrone, and the parliamentary 
boroughs of Belfast and Londonderry, and Southern Ireland shall consist of so much 
of Ireland as is not comprised within the said parliamentary counties and boroughs”.  
                                                 
101 See Curran, The Birth of the Irish Free State, ibid, p. 1. 
102 See Government of Ireland, 1920. 10 & 11 George 5 Ch. 67. An Act to provide for the better 
Government of Ireland. Enacted the 23rd December 1920. 
103 See the Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland, signed at London, 6 December , 1921, 26 League 
of Nations Treaty Series, (1924), pp. 9-18. 
104 Art 1. Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland, ibid.  
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Article 12 of the Anglo-Irish Treaty provided for the opting out of the new Irish state 
of the six counties mentioned in Article 1 (2) of the GOI Act.  A three-man Boundary 
Commission was established pursuant to this provision and it was tasked to 
“determine   in   accordance   with   the   wishes   of   the   inhabitants, so far as may be 
compatible with economic and geographic conditions the boundaries between 
Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland, and for the purposes of the Government of 
Ireland Act, 1920, and of this instrument, the boundary of Northern Ireland shall be 
such  as  may  be  determined  by  such  Commission”.    The Boundary Commission took it 
for granted that most, i.e. not all, nationalists in Ireland were Roman Catholic and 
most Unionists, i.e. not all, were Protestant, of some sort of denomination.105    
The nationalists thought that almost half of Northern Ireland would be 
transferred to the Irish Free State on the basis that the nationalists in those counties 
with a majority Catholic population would desire this, whilst the Unionists said they 
would   “never   abandon   places   such   as   Derry   City   and   Enniskillen”   due   to   their  
historical and sentimental importance to Protestants, a view that ignored their Catholic 
majorities.106  Due to controversy the report of the Boundary Commission was not 
published until 1968 and its findings were never implemented.107  Rather, the status 
quo created by the GOI Act was preserved in the sense that the boundary it established 
presently remains the boundary, which still separates Northern Ireland from the 
remainder of the Republic.  In any event, the Boundary Commission was of the 
opinion that the partition of 1920 was legitimate and that there was already an existing 
boundary separating the six counties from the rest of Ireland as provided by the GOI 
Act.  As Anthony Carty explained, the Commission interpreted its terms of reference 
narrowly.  “It  started with the principle of the legitimacy of the Northern Irish entity 
and decided that no changes in the boundary should affect the integrity of this 
entity”.108  As a result the Commission merely recommended minor border 
adjustments giving priority to economic and geographical conditions over the wishes 
of the inhabitants affected by the division.  In other words, it avoided addressing the 
                                                 
105 See Geoffrey J. Hand, Report of the Irish Boundary Commission 1925 (Shannon: Irish University 
Press, 1969), pp. 30-31. 
106 Laffan, The Partition of Ireland, supra n. 100, p. 93. 
107 See the introduction in Hand, Report of the Irish Boundary Commission, supra n. 105, pp. vii-xxii.  
For archival documentation see Vol. II, Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, 1923-1926 (Dublin: Royal 
Irish Academy, 2000).  For a penetrating critique of the  Commission’s  terms  of  reference  see  Anthony  
Carty, Was Ireland Conquered?  supra n. 100, particularly chapter 7, pp. 135-166. 
108 Carty, Was Ireland Conquered? ibid, p. 141. 
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underlying rationale for partition.  It is precisely this underlying rationale that ought to 
be examined, as it was this rationale that ultimately resulted in the partition of Ireland. 
It is submitted that the partition of Ireland gave expression to the identity of 
the minority Unionist community whose claim to self-determination was favoured 
over the claims advanced by the majority nationalists. Thus, Lord Balfour, who was 
the chief architect of the decision to divide Ireland in 1920109 told a gathering in 
Nottingham that Ireland never had an organic political past as a single great 
community, and he claimed that when an Irishman asked Britain to restore to Ireland 
Irish institutions he was in fact asking them to restore what were English institutions:   
 
It is not the fault of the Irish; it implies no inferiority on their part.  It does 
imply that the contact between England and Ireland took place at a time when 
the civilisation of England, the political organization of England, was far more 
advanced than the tribal system that prevailed in Ireland.  But it is a fact that 
there are no Irish institutions, there are no Irish laws, there is nothing in 
existence at this moment that could possibly be restored to Ireland which is of 
itself of pure national Irish origin.110  
 
T.J. Fraser explained that during the negotiations, Balfour who was then President of 
the League, delivered  “a devastating riposte” to the idea of a nine-county Ulster that 
would have contained an even larger Catholic minority, which was initially being 
considered by the Cabinet, to be retained within the Kingdom, as opposed to a six-
county Ulster.  Balfour told the Cabinet:  “There  can  be  no  doubt…that  if  the  Peace  
Conference had been delimiting the new frontier [of what would become Northern 
Ireland], in accordance with the general procedure adopted at Paris [which was based 
on the principle of self-determination], we should not have included in the Protestant 
area so large and homogenous a Roman Catholic district as (say) that of the greatest 
part of Donegal”.111  Balfour feared that if the largely Catholic counties in historic 
Ulster (i.e. all nine counties) were included   then   it   would   create   a   “Hibernia 
irrendenta” (i.e. a movement to reunite the whole of historical Ireland in all thirty-two 
counties) that would scupper the partitionist project.  This was because the Protestant 
majority in the nine counties was too tenuous.  In order to ensure the success of 
partition the minority had to have a secure majority in the territory allotted it.  This 
could only be accomplished by restricting Northern Ireland to six counties.   
                                                 
109 Shannon, Arthur J. Balfour and Ireland, supra n. 100, p. 256. 
110 See Shannon, Arthur J. Balfour and Ireland, ibid, pp. 167-168 quoting The Times, 1 Feb. 1913. 
111 See Fraser, Partition in Ireland, India and Palestine, supra n. 100, p. 32 (emphasis in original). 
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In advocating a partition based on a six-country division, Fraser has argued 
that Balfour failed  “to consider the wishes and possible reactions of the nationalists of 
the six counties.  Balfour and others spoke of the six Ulster countries as if they were 
homogeneously Unionist, which, of course,  was   far   from  being   the  case”.112 This is 
because two of the counties—Tyrone and Fermanagh—had nationalist majorities and 
Catholics were dispersed throughout the remaining counties.  Alternatively, it could 
be argued that Balfour was aware of the nationalist presence but that he deliberately 
intended to thwart their political aspirations because in his mind the aspirations of the 
unionists were deemed of more import.  This is certainly consistent with  Balfour’s  
personal prejudices and those of his extended family, who expressed considerable 
anti-Catholic sentiments.  It was  also  consistent  with  Balfour’s  attitude  towards  other 
colonial hotspots.  In other words self-determination as Balfour understood it, and as it 
was allegedly being applied by the League of Nations, was inherently discriminatory.  
It only applied to those who were deemed by the colonial power to be entitled to it.  
The fact that most Irishmen wanted to secede from Britain was beside the point. 
Accordingly, Ireland was ultimately partitioned to safeguard the interests of 
the minority unionist community in those parts of Ulster where they formed, for the 
most part, the majority of the population.  But this principle was not applied to the 
whole of Ireland as a single geographical unit otherwise it would have resulted in all 
32 counties seceding from Britain.  Balfour argued that no one could think that Ulster 
should be “divorced” from Britain, because in his opinion this was manifestly not an 
act of self-determination.  As Balfour explained, “The only people who will grumble 
[about the partition] are those who imagine that this scheme deprives Ireland of a 
unity to which she had a historic claim.  But these people ignore the fact that such 
unity as Ireland possesses is mainly the work of England, and that she has never in all 
the centuries, been a single, organized, independent state and that if she were not 
surrounded by water, no human being would ever think of forcing the loyal and 
Protestant North into the same political mould as the disloyal and Roman Catholic 
south”.113  In   Balfour’s   eyes   the   nationalists did not form a nation in Ulster and 
therefore could not claim self-determination.  Balfour’s  views  are  important  because  
he was ultimately responsible for the partition. As Catherine Shannon observed, the 
                                                 
112 Fraser, Partition in Ireland, India and Palestine, ibid, p. 33. 
113 See Shannon, Arthur J. Balfour, supra n. 100 p.   250   quoting   from   Balfour’s   memorandum   on  
Ireland, 25 Nov. 1919, Cabinet Records, CP 193, CAB 24/93. Also, quoted in Fraser, Partition in 
Ireland, India and Palestine, ibid, p. 27. 
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memorandum drafted by Balfour considerably influenced the final shape of the 
Government of Ireland Bill of 1920, which provided for the six-county division.114 
In essence, the Unionist claim to self-determination was based on an identity 
that was manifested in contradistinction to the claim to self-determination advanced 
by the nationalists whose claim to self-determination was expressed in opposition to 
British rule.115  To use contemporary legal parlance, the Unionist claim to remain an 
integral part of the United Kingdom was an act of internal self-determination.  In 
contrast, the nationalist claim to secede from the Kingdom could be described as an 
example of external self-determination.  The partition of Ireland was a decision made 
and executed by the colonial power, without the wishes of the majority of the 
inhabitants of the island of Ireland being consulted.  Due to Sinn  Fein’s  victory  in the 
1918 elections and their call for independence, it is highly unlikely that a majority of 
Irishmen would have voted in favour of partition had there been a referendum.  It is 
for this reason that republicans have always maintained that Ireland had been denied 
the right to self-determination since the 1918 general election.116  The partition of 
Ireland thus favoured the interests of the colonial power that had a stronger and closer 
relationship with the unionists and which was in a position to disregard the wishes of 
the majority of Irishmen.  In essence, the colonial power viewed the Protestants in 
Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom.  They were viewed by the imperial 
centre as being one and the same, thus, there could be no division because it would 
amount to carving up a self-determination unit, in the  majority  of  Englishmen’s eyes.   
 
 
The Peel partition plan for Palestine117 
 
As in Ireland, in Palestine, Balfour denied that the Palestinian Arabs were a nation.   
Accordingly, it was only right that they should make way for the immigration of 
                                                 
114 Shannon, Arthur J. Balfour and Ireland, ibid, p. 250, and p. 255. 
115 On the use of self-determination by De Valera and Sinn Fein from 1917-1921 see Kissane, The 
Politics of the Irish Civil War, supra n. 100, especially chapter two, pp. 39-63. 
116 Kissane, The Politics of the Irish Civil War, ibid, p. 39. 
117 In reviewing the partition of Palestine prior to the 1947 UN Partition Plan I have primarily relied on 
Palestine Royal Commission Report Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament 
by Command of His Majesty, July, 1937, Cmd. 5479.  I have also considered T.J. Fraser, Partition in 
Ireland, India and Palestine: Theory and Practice (London: MacMillan, 1984), pp. 130-150;  T.G. 
Fraser,   “A Crisis of Leadership:  Weizmann and the Zionist Reactions to the Peel Commission’s  
Proposals, 1937-8”, 23 Journal of Contemporary History (1988), pp. 657-680; Penny Sinanoglou, 
“British Plans for the Partition of Palestine, 1929-1938”, 52 The Historical Journal (2009), pp. 131-
152; and the general knowledge I have acquired from my own research and writings. 
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European Jews.  This explains the policy enunciated in the 1917 declaration named 
after him, which called for establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine despite the 
fact that the population of Palestine was then 93 per cent Arab and 7 per cent 
Jewish.118  As Balfour explained to his colleague Lord Curzon: “Zionism,  be  it  right  or  
wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long tradition, in present needs, in future hopes, 
of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who 
now   inhabit   that   ancient   land”.119  In 1923, Lord Balfour, reflecting   on   his   “great  
experiment” in Palestine, told a meeting of the English Zionist Federation that if the 
principle of self-determination was applied logically and honestly in Palestine, then 
the majority of the existing population should have decided  Palestine’s future destiny.  
He,   added,   however,   that   “looking back upon the history of the world...the case of 
Jewry in all countries is absolutely exceptional, falls outside all the ordinary rules and 
maxims”, and  that  “the  principle of self-determination really points to a Zionist policy, 
however little in its strict technical interpretation it may seem to favour it”.120 
The sheer size of Palestine’s  Arab  majority prevented the British Government 
from establishing self-governing institutions as required under the mandate since it 
was feared that a representative legislative assembly that would reflect the interests of 
the native majority would block the Zionist project.121  And it was the failure to 
establish representative government that played a primary role in the development of 
the proposals to partition Palestine.122  In 1936, Sir Arthur Wauchope, the British High 
Commissioner of Palestine, submitted proposals for establishing self-governing 
institutions  in  Palestine.    Wauchope’s  proposals  attracted  vehement  opposition  in  the  
British Parliament.  As William Ormsby-Gore (1885-1964), the Colonial Secretary, 
observed, the entire House, bar the member of the Communist Party, was opposed to 
the  High  Commissioners’  plan  to  establishing  self-governing institutions in Palestine, 
                                                 
118 When Palestine was carved out of the Ottoman Empire, it had in 1918 a population of 688,957 
Arabs (including Christians, Muslims and other minorities) and 58,728 Jews.  See Justin McCarthy, The 
Population of Palestine: Population History and Statistics of the Late Ottoman Period and the Mandate 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), Table 2.2., p. 26. 
119 See   Balfour’s   memorandum   to   the   British   Foreign   Secretary,   Curzon,   11   August   1919,   Foreign  
Office No. 371/4183 (1919). This is reproduced in E.L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (eds.), Documents 
on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939 (London: HMSO, 1952), p. 345. 
120 See Israel Cohen (ed.) Speeches on Zionism by the Right Hon. The Earl of Balfour (London: 
Arrowsmith, 1928), pp. 25-26. 
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which would vest power in the Arab majority.123   As Winston Churchill recognised: 
“If you have an Arab majority...you will have continued friction between the principle 
of the Balfour Declaration and ... the wishes of the Arab majority.  I should have 
thought it would be a very great obstruction to the development of Jewish immigration 
into  Palestine  and  to  the  development  of  the  national  home  of  the  Jews  there”.124 
Parliament opposed the  Commissioner’s  proposals  to  establish  a  representative 
assembly in Palestine.  Lord Melchett told  the  Lords:      “You cannot settle the matter 
merely by setting up a Legislative Council and enfranchising an enormous electorate 
who have never used a vote in their lives and have not the remotest idea of how to use 
it  …  in  reality  the  Government  are  going  to  impose  upon  the  population  of  Palestine  a  
franchise which is totally unsuited to the people and in which they have never been 
instructed”.125  In the Commons, Captain Cazalet concurred:  “As I understand it, we 
are going to enfranchise some 250,000 or more people, the large majority of whom are 
completely illiterate. They have had practically no experience whatever in 
representative Government or in the manner in which they should exercise the vote 
and, however you like to interpret the numbers of the proposed legislative council, as 
a matter of fact it will develop into an Arab majority.126  Moreover, as Colonel 
Wedgewood observed it was unfair to side with the Arabs and to envisage the 
prospect of the Jews living under Arab rule when the Jews, especially those from 
Germany, were a people, “coming very near to ourselves in culture and 
civilisation”.127 The  fear  that  the  Commissioner’s  proposals  would  leave  the  Jews  in  a  
minority position was also a particular cause for  concern.      “For two thousand years 
[the Jews] have been homeless, a minority in every country”, exclaimed Sir A. 
Sinclair, which was why he was adamantly opposed to granting the Arabs political 
equality with the Jews, since they demanded “the repeal of the mandate”.128  Were the 
proposals implemented thought Lord Snell, the Jews would not be able to immigrate 
to Palestine “as of right but only on the sufferance of a hostile majority”.129 The 
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Marquess of Lothian concurred:  “I feel that civilisation does owe some redress to a 
people which for nearly two thousand years has been without a home”.130  
It was directly due to the opposition expressed in Parliament to the prospect of 
Arab majority rule that the leaders of the Arab national movement went on strike in 
1936.  This led to violence and an armed rebellion (the 1936-9 Arab revolt) that 
triggered a proposal to send a Royal Commission of Inquiry to Palestine (the   “Peel  
Commission”   named   after   its  Chairman)   to examine the causes of the disturbances.  
According to the terms of reference provided to the Commission, they were not to 
question the underlying policy of the Balfour Declaration, which led the Commission 
to conclude that the only solution to the conflict was partition.  “About 1,000,000 
Arabs are in strife, open or latent, with some 400,000 Jews.  There is no common 
ground between them.  The Arab community is predominantly Asiatic in character, 
the Jewish community predominantly European.  They differ in religion and language.  
Their cultural and social life, their ways of thought and conduct are as incompatible as 
their national aspirations.  These last are the greatest bar to peace”.131  In reaching this 
conclusion,   the  Commission   argued   that   Palestinian   citizenship  was   a   “mischievous  
pretence”  since  neither Arab nor Jews had any sense of service to a single state.132   
The Commission’s   report was   replete   with   references   to   “the   Asiatic  
character”  and  the  “old-fashioned  Arab  world”,  in  which  Arab  nationalism,  along  with  
Irish and Indian nationalism, was looked at with particular disdain.  Consider the 
following extract:  “The ugliest element in the picture remains to be noted. Arab 
nationalism in Palestine has not escaped infection with the foul disease, which has so 
often defiled the cause of nationalism   in  other   lands.     Acts  of   ‘terrorism’ in various 
parts of the country have long been only too familiar reading in the newspapers.  As in 
Ireland in the worst days after the War or in Bengal, intimidation at the point of a 
revolver has become a not infrequent feature of Arab politics”.133  If we contrast this 
statement with the manner in which the Jewish national home is described by the 
Commission   as   “a   highly   educated,   highly   democratic,   very   politically-minded, and 
unusually   young   community”   it becomes self-evident which community they self-
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identified with.134  Indeed  the  Commission’s  report  reads  like  it  should  be the subject 
of a serious case   study   in   Orientalism:   “With   every   year   that   passes,   the   contrast  
between this intensely democratic and highly organized modern community and the 
old-fashioned Arab  world   around   it   grows   sharper”.      The   Commission   then   added:  
“The literary output of the National Home is out of all proportion to its size.  Hebrew 
translations have been published of the works of Aristotle, Descartes, Leibnitz, Fichte, 
Kant, Bergson, Einstein and other philosophers, and of Shakespeare, Goethe, Heine, 
Byron,  Dickens,  the  great  Russian  novelists,  and  many  modern  writers  …  But  perhaps  
the most striking aspect of the culture of the National Home is its love of music.  It 
was while we were in Palestine, as it happened, that Signor Toscanini conducted the 
Palestine Symphony Orchestra, composed of some 70 Palestinian Jews...”135 
As an aside, the  Commission  added,  “there   is  Arab   literature,  of  course,  and 
Arab music, but the culture of Arab Palestine is the monopoly of the intelligenzia; 
and, born as it is of Asia, it has little kinship with that of the National Home, which, 
though it is linked with ancient Jewish tradition, is predominately a culture of the 
West”.136  No wonder then that the Commission expressed its opinion that democracy 
could not flourish in such a society because Palestine lacked a homogenous population 
that was essential for representative government to work: “…the  successful  working  
of representative government requires that the population concerned should be 
sufficiently homogenous.  Unless there is common ground enough between its 
different groups or classes to enable the minority to acquiesce in the rule of the 
majority and to make it possible for the balance of power to readjust itself from time 
to time, the working basis of parliamentary government or democracy as we 
understand it is not there”.  The Commission referred to the  “most patent example of 
this in present-day politics”,  which  was  “the impossibility of uniting all Ireland under 
a single parliament; and that the gulf between Arabs and Jews in Palestine is wider 
than that which separates Northern Ireland from the Irish Free State”.137 
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The major difference between Ireland, Palestine, and British India was that the latter 
was never a location of mass European settlement.  Instead British India consisted of 
an amalgamation of administrative units, crown agencies, and princely states, through 
which Britain exercised direct and indirect authority over the subcontinent.  Whilst 
some of these units would coalesce after independence, others would break away to 
form separate states:  India and Pakistan were established as a result of the partition 
announced by Admiral Mountbatten (1900-1979), last Viceroy of the British Indian 
Empire, on 3 June, and executed on 15 August 1947.139  Burma, which had formerly 
been part of British India, attained independence in the following year, and East 
Pakistan in 1971 after it seceded from West Pakistan to form the state of Bangladesh. 
When one speaks of the partition of India it ought to be remembered that one 
is principally speaking of the partition of the Punjab and Bengal.140  Jammu and 
Kashmir was not divided in 1947, and the line of control that divides Pakistan and 
Indian controlled Kashmir is the result of armed conflict, which erupted after 
partition.141   Similarly, the Rann of Kutch was not partitioned in 1947.  In 1968, it 
was delimited in arbitration after another Indo-Pakistan war failed to conclusively 
resolve its status.142  The Princely states were given the “choice” to accede either to 
India or to Pakistan.143  Despite   this   “choice”, some of the Princely states such as 
Hyderabad and Junagadh were forcefully incorporated into the Union of India after 
Prime Minister Nehru ordered his troops to take over.144  The June 3 Partition Plan 
instructed that the demarcation of the Punjab and Bengal would  be  undertaken  “on the 
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basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims”, 
although it also instructed the Commission to take “other factors” into account.145   
What is striking about the 3 June Plan for the partition of British India is that 
for the first time in the history of British imperial policy, the notion of majoritarianism 
i.e. distinguishing rights to territorial sovereignty on the basis of whether a specific 
population formed the majority in an allotted territory, was explicitly spelt out in an 
instrument of government policy.  This was not so in Ireland where the colonial power 
did not recognise the right of the majority of Irishmen to independence and drew the 
boundary separating Northern Ireland from the rest of Ireland even though two of the 
counties in the six-county division allotted to Northern Ireland—Tyrone and 
Fermanagh—had nationalist majorities.  Nor was it the case in Palestine where 
partition was above all an attempt to secure a national home for those European 
Jewish immigrants who had settled in Palestine and those who might desire to do so in 
the future in an area delineated by the colonial power in disregard of Arab interests. 
Britain began its rule of the Indian subcontinent in the eighteenth century at a 
time when the notion of Indian nationalism was still in its embryonic stage.  Initially, 
British rule in India had been administered through the British East India Company, 
but this changed after the mutiny of 1857, when Britain formally ended company rule 
and established rule of the Crown over the Indian Dominions of the Company.  From 
the late nineteenth century on, Britain began to steadily devolve power into Indian 
hands, in which new classes, castes, communities, and interests, were drawn into a 
competition for political power.146  As explained in Part Two, Britain had a tendency 
to view India in terms of monolithic caste and religious identities,  which  “in part arose 
from the interaction between British sources of knowledge of native society and 
perceptions of the significance of religious identity arising from the place of 
Christianity and the Catholic-Protestant divide in contemporary European ideas”.147   
The Indian National Congress claimed to represent all Indians, irrespective of 
caste or religion, and it initially sought to amalgamate all the Princely states as well as 
those parts of British India with majority Muslim populations into a single territorial 
unit   that   would   be   ruled   from   the   centre.      “Though   predominantly   Hindu   in  
membership”,   explained Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964),   “the   Congress   had   large  
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numbers of Muslims on its rolls, as well as all other religious groups like Sikhs, 
Christians, etc. It was thus forced to think in national terms.  For it the dominating 
issue was national freedom and the establishment of an independent democratic 
state”.148  Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), and the Muslim League, in contrast, 
claimed to represent Indian Muslims who it viewed as a separate political community.  
Established in 1906, one of their central demands was for Muslims to be treated as a 
separate political unit by the colonial power.  Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, one of the 
Muslim community’s earliest and ablest advocates, argued on the basis of a close 
reading  of   J.S.  Mill’s  views   in support of representative government that the liberal 
theory presupposed an ethnically and religiously homogenous society in which there 
was a basic harmony of interests.149  In 1906, the Aga Khan voiced his concern with 
Lord Minto, and asked him to establish safeguards for the Muslim minority by 
awarding   the   Muslims   representation   “beyond   its   numerical   strength”   in   order   to  
protect it from being a wholly ineffective minority and to give recognition to its 
political importance and its contribution to imperial defence.150  It has been argued 
that one of the reasons for creating the League was to foster a sense of loyalty to the 
British government among the Muslims of India.  In the first decade of its existence 
the League amounted to an alliance of Muslim landlords and British civil servants, 
who sought to collectively combat the increasing economic power of the Hindus.151 
In this regard the origins of partition in India have been traced to the evolution 
of self-government there, and the demand for separate electorates for Muslims at the 
provincial level, which provided the foundations for Muslim separatism that emerged 
in the form of Pakistan.152  Some scholars have argued that the perceived need for 
separate Muslim electorates arose as a protective   measures   due   to   “the   Muslim’s  
relative educational backwardness” when compared to high caste Hindus and Sikhs 
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who were wealthier and had better access to western education (at least until the late 
nineteenth century).153  One of the principal aims of creating separate electorates was 
to increase the Muslim representation in the system of elective local government.  One 
of  the  consequences  of  this  was  that  it  “strengthened  the belief that people following a 
particular religion naturally shared common interests from which others were 
excluded”.154  Nehru understood the Muslim demand for separate electorates although 
like most members of Congress he was suspicious of them, and was firmly of the 
opinion   that   the   genuine   emergence   of   nationalism   did   “not   come   to   a   nation   or   a  
community from mere numbers, or special seats in legislatures, or protection given by 
outsiders”.     Rather,   in  his  opinion,  “it   [came] from within and from the cooperation 
and goodwill of comrades in a common cause.  The minorities in India will not 
flourish by being spoon-fed  from  above  but  by  their  own  merits  and  strength”.155   
However, the League did not want to end up in a situation where non-Muslims 
would rule Muslims.  This was because “within  the  context  of  Islamic  political  values,  
it is more important to Muslims to be represented by Muslims than by elected, 
politically accountable, non-Muslims”.156  As Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938), the 
Muslim poet, philosopher, and the ideological father of Pakistan, explained:   “The  
units of Indian society are not territorial as in European countries.  India is a continent 
of human groups belonging to different races, speaking different languages, and 
professing different religions.  Their behaviour is not at all determined by a common 
race-consciousness.  Even the Hindus do not form a homogenous group.  The 
principle of European democracy cannot be applied to India without recognizing the 
fact   of   communal  groups”.157  Iqbal added that Islam could not be compared to the 
nationalist movements that arose in Europe.      “Islam is not a church” he told the 
Muslim League, before explaining that Islam was “a contractual organism long, long 
before Rousseau ever thought of such a thing”.  It is “animated by an ethical ideal 
which regards man not as an earth-rooted creature, defined by this or that portion of 
the earth, but as a spiritual being understood in terms of a social mechanism, and 
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possessing rights and duties as a living factor in that mechanism”.158  Accordingly, he 
demanded  “the formation of a consolidated Muslim State in the best interests of India 
and Islam.   For India, it means security and peace resulting from an internal balance 
of power; for Islam, an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian Imperialism 
was forced to give it, to mobilize its laws, its education, its culture, and to bring them 
into closer contact with its own original spirit and with the spirit of modern times”.159 
In contrast to the Islamic political ideology of the League, Nehru explained that the 
Congress   party   had   been   influenced   “by   the   ideas   of   the   French   and   American  
revolutions,  as  also  by  the  constitutional  history  of  the  British  Parliament”,  in  addition  
to   “the   influence   of   the   Soviet   revolution”.160  After the League parted ways with 
Congress, it sought to create a homeland for the Muslims in the Muslim majority 
provinces in the Punjab, Afghan Province (North-West Frontier Province), Kashmir, 
Sind and Baluchistan that would collectively come to be  called  “Pakistan”.161   
The foundations for the Congress-League split ultimately lay in the passing of 
the Government of India Act of 1935 (the  “GOI  Act”), which widened the franchise 
from 7 to 35 million people.162  The League was strenuously opposed to this as they 
feared that absent specific protection for the minority Muslim community, a widening 
of the franchise would   lead   to   the   formation   of   a   “Hindu Raj” with political power 
being vested in the Hindu majority.  Instead Jinnah urged that the Muslims of North-
West India and Bengal should be considered as nations entitled to national self-
determination in an arrangement that would safeguard their interests.163  One year 
after the outbreak of the Second World War, Jinnah spoke before an estimated crowd 
of 100,000 in a Presidential Address to the 27th session of the League enunciating his 
claim for a Muslim homeland.164  Rejecting the notion that the Muslims were just a 
minority, as opposed to a nation, Jinnah asserted: “The Musulmans are a nation by any 
definition”.  He pointed out that, “…even  according   to   the  British  map  of   India,  we  
[the Muslim League] occupy large parts of this country where the Musulmans are in a 
                                                 
158 See   Iqbal’s   address   to the All-India Muslim League in Allahabad in 1930, in Pirzada (ed.), 
Foundations of Pakistan, ibid, p. 160. 
159 Iqbal’s  address  in  Pirzada  (ed.),  Foundations of Pakistan, ibid, p. 160. 
160 Nehru, The Discovery of India, supra n. 148, pp. 420-421. 
161 Fraser, Partition in Ireland, India, and Palestine, supra n. 138, p. 77. 
162 Singh, The Origins of the Partition, supra n. 138, pp. 1-44. 
163 Fraser, Partition in Ireland, India, and Palestine, supra n. 138, p. 76. 
164 Presidential Address of Mr. M.A. Jinnah, All-India Muslim League, Twenty-Seventh Session, 
Lahore, March 22-24, 1940 in Pirzada (ed.), Foundations of Pakistan, supra n. 149, pp. 325-349 
 
 
237 
majority—such as Bengal, Punjab, N.W.F.P., Sind and Baluchistan”.165  In other 
words, in those areas where Muslims were populous they were not a minority, but a 
majority, with a long established cultural and social history, in the form of a nation.   
With his knowledge of the British parliamentary system, gained from his days 
at   Lincoln’s   Inn   and   nurtured   in England where he practiced as a barrister, Jinnah 
explained his opposition to the GOI Act:   “The British Government and Parliament, 
and more so the British nation, have been, for many decades past, brought up and 
nurtured  with  settled  notions  about  India’s  future,  based  on  developments  in  their  own  
country which have built up the British constitution, functioning now through the 
Houses of Parliament and the Cabinet system.  Their conception of party-government, 
functioning on political planes, has become ideal with them as the best form of 
government for every country; and the one-sided and powerful propaganda which 
naturally appeals to the British has led them into a serious blunder, in producing a 
constitution envisaged in the Government of India Act of 1935”.166  Jinnah warned 
that:   “Notwithstanding a thousand years of close contact, nationalities which are as 
divergent today as ever cannot at any time be expected to transform themselves into a 
one nation merely by means of subjecting them to a democratic constitution and 
holding them forcibly together by unnatural and artificial methods of British 
Parliamentary Statutes”. He added that:  “What the unitary Government of India for 
150 years had failed to achieve cannot be realized by the imposition of central federal 
government”.      In   Jinnah’s   opinion:   “The present artificial unity of India dates back 
only to the British conquest and is maintained by the British bayonet”.167  According 
to him, the Muslims had merely been amalgamated with the Hindus for British 
administrative convenience, but they were always a people apart:   
 
The problem in India is not of an inter-communal but manifestly of an 
international character, and it must be treated as such.  So long as this basic 
and fundamental truth is not realized, any constitution that may be built will 
result in disaster and will prove disaster and harmful not only to the 
Musulmans, but also to the British and Hindus.  If the British Government are 
really in earnest and sincere to secure the peace and happiness of the people of 
this Subcontinent, the only course open to us all is to allow the major national 
separate homelands, by dividing India into “autonomous national states”.168 
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Whilst some have argued that the term “autonomous national states” was an 
ambiguous phrase and did not mean the formation of an independent state, this cannot 
be   ruled  out   especially  when  one   considers   Iqbal’s   1930   address   to the League that 
specifically called   for   the   establishment   of   “a consolidated Muslim State” and 
Jinnah’s references to self-determination and international law.  Moreover, Jinnah 
always stressed that the Muslim-Hindu problem in India was an international problem 
and not merely a domestic matter.  Throughout the 1940s he consistently made 
reference to two nations.169  As Jinnah explained to Ghandi, in their inconclusive 
three-week conversation in 1944, “[we] maintain that Moslems and Hindus are two 
major nations by any definition or test of a nation.  We are a nation of a hundred 
million, and what is more we are a nation with our own distinctive culture and 
civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, 
sense of value and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, 
history and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions.  In short, we have our own distinctive 
outlook on life and of life.  By all canons of international law, we are a nation”.170 
At the heart of the ideological divide that emerged between Congress and the 
League in the 1930s and 1940s were their different philosophical approaches to 
nationhood and the question of representation.  The Congress hierarchy had been 
influenced by the revolutionary experiences in the US and Europe in the eighteenth 
century and by the revolution in Russia in 1917, and it sought to establish a centralised 
nation-state ruled from Delhi as a strong parliamentary democracy based on the 
principle of majority rule.171  This idea was alien to the League which did not look to 
the US or Europe or Russia for inspiration.  For the Muslim League majority rule and 
the  West’s  history  of  nationalism  was  extraneous.      In   terms  of   looking  at   the  Indian  
subcontinent  as  a  single  political  unit,  Jinnah  “repeatedly  and  categorically  dismissed  
the suitability of applying the principles of arithmetic to the problem of 
representation”.172 If, however, it was recognised that the Indian Muslims were a 
nation entitled to self-determination, then he was prepared to accept that on the basis 
of arithmetic, Muslims were entitled to majority rule in those areas where they formed 
the majority.  Indeed, this was to be the principle argument for partition.   
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In this regard,   Iqbal’s   and Jinnah’s   approach   to   self-determination was 
surprisingly similar to Anglo-American approach associated with the theories of J.S. 
Mill explored in the introduction to Part Two, which in turn had influenced British 
imperialists from Milner to Balfour, and which tended to favour minorities.  Indeed it 
would seem that they were merely parroting the “contractarian”   view   of   self-
determination, which focused, on identity, rather than on numbers.  Perhaps it was no 
coincidence that they had both been bestowed Knights of the British Empire.  In a 
word, it all came down to differing conceptions of the nation.  For Congress, the 
nation amounted to all Indians of whatever class, caste, and creed, whereas for the 
League, the Muslims were a distinctive political community; a nation within a nation. 
It   was   Jinnah’s   persistent   demand   for   Pakistan,   for   a   British   role   in   the   transfer   of  
power, and for maintaining post-independence military ties with the British Empire, 
which was an anathema to Congress, that led to partition.173  But in the end, Congress 
also came out in favour of partition because it wanted to create a strong centralised 
government in India, and parity with the League would have prevented that.174 
 
 
The UN Partition Plan for Palestine 
 
In April 1947, Britain decided to turn the Palestine Question over to the United 
Nations where its future destiny was to be determined by the international community 
as it was then composed.175 Britain realised that the Jewish minority was not prepared 
to live under Arab sovereignty in an Arab state, where they would remain a minority, 
and the Arab majority were not prepared to live under a Jewish minority in a Jewish 
state, when they would remain the majority.  Due to the fact that some of the states 
participating in this debate had recently achieved independence a schism occurred 
between the colonial powers and its former colonies when opposition was expressed 
in the debate at the UN General Assembly on the UN Plan to Partition Palestine in 
November 1947.  The newly independent states argued that it would be contrary to 
self-determination to divide Palestine in the face of opposition from the majority of its 
inhabitants whereas the colonial powers looked to the identity of the communities 
claiming self-determination, which they considered to be of paramount importance.  It 
was due to the schism that emerged during the debates on partition, which reflected 
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these two differing approaches, that Egypt and Syria sought to persuade the Assembly 
to seek an opinion from the International Court of Justice on the following question:   
 
Whether the United Nations, or any of its Member States, is competent to 
enforce or recommend the enforcement of any proposal concerning the 
constitution and future Government of Palestine, in particular, any plan of 
partition which is contrary to the wishes, or adopted without the consent of, the 
inhabitants of Palestine.176   
 
Although this resolution failed to secure enough votes in the General Assembly to be 
rendered before the International Court of Justice in the form of an advisory opinion 
India and Pakistan voted in favour of this question, as did France.  No records exist 
providing explanations for the vote but one might assume that India and Pakistan 
voted against it in light of their own partition and France because of its revolutionary 
history where the rights of man were first proclaimed.  Belgium, Czechoslovakia, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom decided to abstain rather than 
vote against it.177  Essentially, Palestine was trapped in the middle of two competing 
ideas of self-determination:  the liberal view which was associated with Western 
political philosophy that looked to the identity of the community and whether that 
community had acquired the attributes of a nation in the sense of having a cohesive, 
collective, and organised community, united in aptitude, political belief, and 
ideological outlook.  This meant that the community had to be comprised of a highly 
cultured and educated elite, which had substantial experience of self-government, and 
the emerging nations, which looked to population statistics and equal rights, and who 
were less concerned with whether the community in question had acquired Western 
cultural attributes or had a history of establishing western legal and political systems. 
On 26 November 1947, the world community, as it was then composed, met in 
New York to debate the merits of the UN partition plan for Palestine.178  Arguing in 
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favour of partition, the Netherlands referred to its failed union with Belgium.  The 
Dutch delegate explained that although Belgium and the Netherlands “had very close 
ties, relations and interests of a cultural, historical, ethnological and economic nature, 
this unitary state soon ended in failure”.  He added that the “differences between 
Arabs and Jews now are much greater and of an odder character than those between 
Belgium and the Netherlands in 1830”.  In the opinion of the Netherlands “in all parts 
of the world where there was to be found a difference due to historical causes between 
peoples—peoples whom destiny brought together—no solution in the direction of a 
unitary state has proved to be workable”.179  The USSR also supported partition and 
referred to its nationalities policy in its associated republics as an application of self-
determination.  As explained earlier, the Soviet vote may have also been affected by 
overtures from Jewish emissaries claiming that Israel would join the Communist 
camp.180 Alternatively, it has been suggested that the USSR’s support for partition was 
to sow discord in the hope that it would contribute to a quick British exit (which 
happened).181  The USSR said that it was sympathetic to the national aspirations of the 
nations of the Arab East and that its attitude towards the efforts of these peoples to rid 
themselves of the last fetters of colonial dependence was one of understanding and 
sympathy.182  However, in its opinion the decision to partition Palestine was “in 
keeping with the principle of the national self-determination of peoples”, which was 
consistent with the policy of the USSR in the sphere of nationality problems, which 
was “a policy of friendship and self-determination”.183  In other words the USSR saw 
both the Jewish community in Palestine and the Arab community in Palestine as 
separate national communities entitled to self-determination in separate states.184   
Mr  Chamoun  of  the  Lebanon  was  particularly  irked  by  the  USSR’s  support  for  
partition.  He pointed out that partition was being proposed contrary to the wishes of 
the  majority  of  the  inhabitants  of  Palestine.    In  Lebanon’s  opinion  this  was  contrary  to  
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self-determination.     Moreover,   the  USSR’s   understanding   of   self-determination was 
illogical: “The USSR   representative’s   argument,   if   it   were   pushed   to   its   logical  
conclusion, would lead to the following sequences of events:  self-determination for 
the Jewish people, therefore a separate Jewish State.  Now there is an Arab minority 
almost equal to the majority in this separate Jewish State, as you have envisaged it.  
Will the principle of self-determination, as the USSR representative understands it, 
apply to this Arab minority?  If it applies to the Arab minority, there will be a fresh 
sub-division in the Jewish State for the sake of the Arab part and the Jewish 
population”.185    When Canada challenged Mr   Chamoun’s   argument   that   self-
determination meant majority rule, the Lebanese representative replied by referring to 
Canadian history and the problem of Quebec.      “We   know   Canadian   history”,  
Chamoun replied.  “We know about the struggle of the French-Canadian population 
with the population of English origin.  We know that, during and after this struggle, 
Canada remained a united state because the wishes of the minority have never 
succeeded  in  partitioning  Canada  and  in  interfering  with  the  majority’s  wishes”.186   
Poland acknowledged that whilst it had struggled to regain its freedom for 
more than a century, the Polish Jewish survivors of the Holocaust needed a place to go 
to, which in its view could only be to Palestine.187  Poland recognised that the 
Palestine Arabs, as well as Palestine’s  Jews  both wanted national independence over 
the same territory.  This is why Poland had initially hoped that these national 
aspirations might find their expression in one Palestinian state in which both Arabs 
and Jews would be equal partners, free to develop their national life.  However, this 
had proved impossible and so the only solution was to establish an Arab state and a 
Jewish state, to provide for the national aspirations of the two communities that live in 
Palestine.188   Poland’s  explanation  for  its  vote  did  not  satisfy  the  delegate  from  Syria, 
however, who impolitely reminded the Polish delegate that whilst he was usually so 
punctilious when it came to interpreting the terms of the UN Charter, Poland suddenly 
fell silent when it was a question of violating the Charter to create a Jewish state in 
Palestine  “which  would  allow  Poland  to  get  rid  of  its  own  Jews”.  The Syrian delegate 
then reminded the   Polish   representative   that,   “when his country was partitioned 
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between its neighbours, Russia, Prussia and Austria, the only country that refused to 
recognize that partition was the Ottoman Empire, of which Palestine was part”.189 
In the debate, Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, the Foreign Minister of 
Pakistan, waded into the fray by tearing the partition plan to shreds. After making 
short shrift of the argument that Palestine was a solution to the Jewish Question by 
highlighting the hypocrisy of Western immigration policy before and during the 
war,190 Khan concentrated on the details of the plan.  Having become adept at reading 
maps and population statistics, Khan, who only three months previously had been 
given   a   week’s   notice   to   make   the   case for partition before the Punjab Boundary 
Commission, pointed out that there were 1,300,000 Arabs in Palestine and 650,000 
Jews—with room wanted for more—and that the problem had become insoluble.  
Since it was being argued that it was not right for the Jews to form a minority in a 
single state, it was being suggested that the only fair solution was partition and the 
establishment of two states, an Arab state and a Jewish state. The boundaries were 
accordingly drawn and the UN Committee that produced the Partition Plan envisaged 
establishing an Arab state with only 10,000 Jews and almost 1,000,000 Arabs in it.  
However, in the Jewish state the Committee envisaged a state where there would be 
498,000 Jews and 435,000 Arabs.  This prompted Khan to question whether the 
minority  problem  had  really  been  solved:    “Jews are not to live as a minority under the 
Arabs, but the Arabs are to live as a minority under the Jews.  If one of these is not 
fair then neither is the other; and if one is not a solution, the other is not”.191  
In critiquing the UN Partition Plan, Khan had deftly highlighted the dilemma 
of proposing a territorial solution for a minority problem.  For as soon as one 
community formed the majority of the population in a particular geographic sphere, 
the other community inhabiting that same territory would by mathematical logic 
become a minority.  The argument that Khan highlighted has had a recurring theme in 
critiques of partition plans which was also raised in the report produced by 
subcommittee 2 which also advanced a comprehensive challenge to partition.192  After 
having exposed the demographic fallacy inherent in the partition plan, Khan turned his 
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attention to boundaries, pointing out that Jews only constituted 33 per cent of the 
population of Palestine and Arabs 67 per cent, and yet 60 per cent of the area of 
Palestine was to go to the Jewish state—which he thought was hardly fair or equitable.  
He then mentioned a document which had been circulated to members of the 
Committees by the United Kingdom representative prior to the debate showing that, of 
the irrigated, cultivable areas, 84 per cent would be in the Jewish state and 16 per cent 
in the Arab state”.193  In the Negev, the inequity was even starker where Arabs owned 
14 per cent of the land and the Jews owned only one per cent, and yet the whole of the 
Negev was to be awarded to the Jewish state.  Moreover, there was an Arab 
population of over one hundred thousand inhabiting the Negev, and a Jewish 
population of only two thousand, and yet the Jewish state was to be awarded the lot.194  
The emerging consensus amongst newly independent states was that they 
associated self-determination as not only being the right of the majority of the 
population to determine its political destiny, but also to have a right to control its 
natural resources and territory.  They also made distinction as to the quality of the 
resources and territory for the future productivity of the state.   In this connection there 
was a particular point of agreement amongst the delegates opposing partition, that in 
ignoring the wishes of the majority of the population, which could be ascertained in a 
plebiscite, the plan was contrary to self-determination.  Khan criticised the UN for 
ignoring the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants of Palestine in proposing to 
implement the partition plan against their will.195  Cuba, Iraq, and Iran concurred.196  
In making these arguments these states associated the majority as being akin to the 
native majority i.e. those who inhabited the territory at the time of its colonisation.  As 
Palestinian scholars have argued, in Palestine not only were the Jews a minority, but 
most of them had not even acquired citizenship.197  Moreover, unlike in Ireland and 
India, the Jews who settled in Palestine never owned the majority of the land until 
after Israel was created in 1948.198  In other words, the Palestinians had good grounds 
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to argue that their country was being partitioned for the benefit of a minority 
community mostly comprised of immigrants who were being given the right to 
territorial sovereignty in which they would have more rights than the native majority. 
 
 
The schism during the UN vote 
 
Until the second half of the twentieth century, the Anglo-American approach to self-
determination remained predominant and partition was viewed as a policy the colonial 
power could employ to safeguard the interests of the minority at the expense of the 
native majority on the basis that the minority was also a nation.  However, in the eyes 
of the majority community, who never recognised the claims of the minority to a 
separate nationality, partition would acquire a pejorative connotation because it 
became associated in its eyes with the division of a nation.  After 1945, when the UN 
was created, the newly independent states were able, for the first time in their history, 
to assert themselves on the international plane.  They did this in many ways, but one 
of the most important, and overlooked methods they employed to this end was to 
challenge the view that self-determination could apply to favour the right of a 
minority community to self-determination and independence because the imperial 
power considered the minority to have reached a stage of cultural, economic, and 
political development, which the majority had yet to reach, when the majority claimed 
sovereignty over the whole of the territory, which they inhabited with the minority.   
In the process of criticising the UN Partition Plan for Palestine those states that 
had recently achieved independence articulated an understanding of self-determination 
that was associated with majority rule, an assessment which in turn was affected by 
demographic and territorial factors rather than on the quality of government, ideology, 
economic development, education, religion, or the pigmentation of a particular 
community that had a close affinity with the colonial power.  A closer look at the UN 
partition vote reveals that those states which voted in favour of partition were either 
European, Christian, settler-states, or former League members whose conception of 
nationhood was influenced by the Anglo-American approach to self-determination: 
 
In Favour: Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican 
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Republic, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Liberia, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of 
South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America, 
Uruguay, Venezuela. Against: Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, 
Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Yemen. Abstentions: 
Argentina, Chile, China, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Honduras, Mexico, 
United Kingdom, Yugoslavia.199  
 
What might surprise some is that India voted with Pakistan against the UN General 
Assembly resolution to partition Palestine in 1947, as did every single Arab 
country.200  India  also  voted  with  Pakistan  against  Israel’s  application  for  membership  
in the UN in 1949.201  Vijayalakshmi  Pandit,  Nehru’s  sister,  who  in  1947,  was  India’s  
Ambassador to the UN, explained in a cable to her brother, that the Arab demand for 
national   independence   in   Palestine   was   the   same   as   Congress’s   claim   to   represent  
India.  This was why India, in her opinion, had to support the Arab claim to Palestine:  
“The Arab demand is based on the same principle of right of self-determination and 
freedom,  which  Congress  in  India  has  always  fought  for.    India’s  support  of  the  Arab  
demand  will  also  therefore  be  ideologically  consistent  …”202  As P.R. Kumaraswamy 
has explained,  “Jewish-Israeli  exclusivism  in  Palestine  ran  counter   to  Nehru’s  vision  
of  a  partitioned  but  genuinely  multiracial,  multireligious,  and  multicultural  India”.203  
In  Nehru’s  view,  the  Jews  “preferred  to  take  sides  with  the foreign ruling power, and 
have  thus  helped  it  to  keep  back  freedom  from  the  majority  of  the  people”.204   
Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
and Yemen also voted with India and Pakistan against   Israel’s  UN membership.205  
Ireland in all likelihood would also have voted against the UN Partition Plan had it 
been a UN member in 1947.  In 1937, Eamon de Valera, then President of the 
Executive Council of Ireland, gave a stirring speech at the sixth committee of the 
League of Nations Assembly in Geneva in which he castigated Britain and argued that 
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partition was the cruellest wrong that could be done to any people.206  Ireland’s  
hostility to partition was no less fierce in the wake of the UN vote on partition in 
1947207 and the Irish press were virtually unanimous in their condemnation of the 
partition plan for Palestine when it was first proposed in 1937 as well as when it was 
proposed in 1947, which they compared to their own partition in 1920.208  However, 
Ireland was unable to participate in the debate in 1947 as it had been denied entry to 
the UN by a Soviet veto when it first attempted to join the organisation in 1946.209    
The newly independent states clearly associated ascertaining the will of the 
people with the will of the native majority, an assessment that depended on 
ascertaining the population of the whole people, in which it was necessary to examine 
population statistics, the location of the population, and the nationality of those who 
claimed to belong to the state.  In assessing a territorial division between two 
competing peoples these countries also paid close attention to land ownership, 
habitation, quality of land for cultivation, and the extent of minerals and resources 
located in the territory for industry.  However, in 1947, the notion that it was for the 
native majority to decide the fate of a political community was not generally accepted 
by the international community, as it was then composed, predominantly of colonial 
powers  and  those  from  the  “lighter  skinned”  countries.    In the early years of the UN 
its composition was still dominated by the former members of the League of Nations 
fixated with the old ways of thinking.  Then many members of the Council and the 
Assembly still thought of resolving nationality conflicts in terms of techniques that 
had been applied to Europe by the League of Nations including internationalization, 
treaties safeguarding minority rights, transfers of population, and partition.210   
This explains why there was an ideological split during the debates on the 
1947 UN Partition Plan as it straddled the early phase of decolonization associated 
with   the  League   era   and   its   “high   phase”   in   the   1960s  when  many   of   the   inter-war 
techniques for resolving minority conflicts would be challenged. This change would 
only progressively take place as more states won their independence and joined the 
international community avowedly  “as sovereign and equal members” in which they 
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could express their opinions in the UN and contribute to the development of a new 
kind of international law. This occurred when the Marxist-Leninist approach to self-
determination found an ally in the non-aligned movement and became fused with their 
approach to self-determination.  This change culminated in the 1960s in opposition to 
minority rule and the policy of separate development (apartheid) in Southern Africa.  
In order to understand how these approaches became fused it is necessary to take a 
closer look at the politics behind the 1960 Colonial Declaration which would attempt 
to prohibit future attempts to partition colonial territories undergoing decolonization. 
 
 
4. The non-aligned approach to self-determination 
 
In the decades following the discussions at the UN General Assembly on the UN 
Partition Plan for Palestine, the international community underwent a fundamental 
transformation from that which had hitherto existed.  For between 1945, when the UN 
Charter was adopted, and 1960, when the  UN’s  Colonial  Declaration  was  passed  by  
the General Assembly, no less than forty states with a population of 800 millions – 
more  than  a  quarter  of  the  world’s  inhabitants  – revolted against colonialism and won 
their independence.211  These fifteen years formed the high period of decolonization 
when   attempts   were   made   to   partition   two   of   Britain’s   colonies—Palestine and 
Cyprus—although they were thwarted on both occasions by political developments 
and armed insurrection.  As more states were admitted to the UN, the balance of 
power in the Assembly gradually tilted in favour of the non-aligned states whose view 
on self-determination became predominant.  It was during and after these fifteen years 
that self-determination  became  associated  with  “majority  rule”, the language of a new 
discourse specifically employed by those who opposed partition, on the basis that it 
was undemocratic to subject the majority to the whims of the minority even if that 
minority had reached a level of economic, cultural, and political development that the 
majority had yet to reach.  This is why those states (mostly from the Third World) that 
advocated a majoritarian notion of self-determination came up with the simple and 
effective slogan of “one   man,   one   vote”, in which self-determination was to be 
determined by a head count.  This discourse was most clearly expressed by the 
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international   community’s negative response   to   Rhodesia’s   unilateral   declaration   of  
independence in 1965 and to South  Africa’s  policy  of “separate  development”. 
This opposition to partition had principally arisen due to the non-aligned 
movement’s steadfast opposition to partition and minority rule, which was most 
graphically expressed in Southern Africa.  At the helm of this new movement was 
Nehru, who tried to stay clear from siding with any one side in the Cold-War rivalry 
along with Nasser of Egypt, Nkrumah of Ghana, Sukarno of Indonesia, and Tito of 
Yugoslavia.  Non-alignment was summed up nicely by Nehru, who in a speech he 
gave in 1943, explained that a future independent   India  would  stand  up  “for  certain  
ideals  in  regard  to  the  oppressed  nations”,  rather  than  “trying  to  align  ourselves  with  
this great power or that and becoming its camp follower in the hope that some crumbs 
might  fall  from  their  table”.212  In the 1950s, the USSR recognised the importance of 
this  new  movement  and  made  strenuous  attempts  to  influence  it  in  the  hope  that  “the  
military position in the Third World would eventually improve in the wake of 
revolutionary structural socio-economic changes which, they believed, would orient 
the  policies  of   the  majority   of   the  developing   countries   firmly   against   the  West”.213  
Soviet officials believed that these states shared important common attributes and 
accepted similar restraints on their foreign policies, in the form of neutralisation.214 
Indeed many of the states that would later become associated with the non-aligned 
movement  “felt  that  both  Communist  China and the Soviet Union were closer to them 
in  outlook  than  the  Western  countries  who  still  controlled  many  African  lands”.215 
As early as 1928, Nehru advocated a collation of progressives, open to the 
USSR  and  its  “new  civilization”,  as  an  obstacle  to  imperialism, which he hoped would 
extricate Indians from their   “curious  mentality  of   subservience   to  England”.216  The 
year before, Nehru had explained to the International Congress against Colonial 
Oppression and Imperialism at Brussels, that judging by developments in Latin 
America, American imperialism would become the major threat to the world. Nehru 
surmised that American imperialism would either replace British imperialism or lead 
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to the formation of “a  powerful  Anglo-Saxon bloc to dominate   the  world”.217  After 
India’s   independence,   Nehru   continued   to   distrust   the   Americans   because   of   its  
support for Western powers that still had colonies.  Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
said that Nehru was one of the most difficult people with whom he had ever had to 
negotiate. The author of a top-secret US report suggested that Nehru’s   hostility  
towards America was due to multiple factors, including his socialism, America’s  
perceived imperialism, and the fact that Nehru was “a frustrated revolutionary who 
was still at core an aristocrat despite his professions of commitment to democracy”.218 
Nehru’s politically combative temperament and his vision of a unified India 
were instilled in him from childhood in British India where he had been born to a 
wealthy and politically sophisticated Kashmiri Brahmin family, whose father Motilal 
was a Congress party stalwart.219  The family had left Kashmir in the early eighteenth 
century to take up service in Delhi under the Mughal Emperor.220  Educated at Harrow 
School,   one   of   Britain’s   leading   public   schools for boys, where the rich send their 
children, and Cambridge University, Nehru was part of the educated elite of British 
Indians, which included M.K. Gandhi who studied at University College London and 
Zafrullah Khan  who   studied   at  King’s  College,   London.221 In the 1920s, the young 
Nehru came under the  influence  of  Gandhi’s  politics,  whose  satyagraha (campaign of 
non-violent resistance against British rule) he had fully supported, and for which he 
had spent considerable time in gaol.222  After the death of Motilal in 1931, Nehru 
became even closer to Gandhi, despite their disagreements over the merits of 
socialism, western culture, and materialism in the struggle against Britain.223  During 
his travels in Europe, where he hoped his wife would recover from her tuberculosis, 
Nehru came into contact with Marxist thinkers, and became convinced that Russia, a 
primarily agricultural country with a large illiterate population, had a great deal to 
teach India. This made him sympathetic to Communism, an ideology that Gandhi 
opposed.224  Despite their differences, Nehru recognised that Gandhi had the ability to 
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touch a wider swathe of the population than any other Indian politician, and that 
independence would only come through the Congress in alliance with Gandhi.225 
Although Gandhi was opposed to Communism, and particularly to that aspect 
of Marxist-Leninist thought that advocated armed struggle, in actual fact his basic 
political philosophy, was not that far removed from that aspect of Marxism that 
viewed social inequality as a product of the Western capitalist society and its racist 
modes of thinking.  For Gandhi, one of the problems with Communism was that it was 
still based on Western modes of thinking in that it espoused economic forms of 
development in which peoples would inevitably be exploited.  The only difference 
was that the economic development it espoused was undertaken though public rather 
than through private institutions.  But for Gandhi modern civilization—whether 
capitalist or communist—was problematic because they always led to exploitation:  
For Gandhi true civilisation placed the interest of humankind at the centre and 
measured its greatness in terms of its ability to produce men and women possessing 
such distinctive human power as self-determination, autonomy, self-knowledge, self-
discipline, and social co-operation. In his opinion, modern civilization did the 
opposite.  By encouraging men and women to alienate their powers to large 
organizations run by experts, it rendered them passive, helpless, and heteronomous.226  
For Gandhi, capitalism was highly problematic because consumers were 
manipulated into desiring things they did not need and which were not in their long-
term interests.  Workers were made to work at subsistence wages under inhuman 
conditions and given little opportunity to develop their intellectual potential.   The 
weaker races were treated as if they were animals, and the weaker nations were 
conquered and used as dumping grounds for surplus goods.227 For Gandhi, 
communism was also problematic because like capitalism it was based on the 
materialist view of man and did not represent a new or higher civilization.  Rather, it 
was   capitalism’s   twin   and   only   claimed   to   offer more of the same. It represented a 
statist approach to social problems, deified the state, impoverished the individual, and 
dried up local sources of initiative and energy. By combining both economic and 
political power in the state, it posed a grave danger to human self-respect and dignity. 
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Moreover, it needed a violent revolution to establish it, and such revolutions 
inevitably led to greater evils than those Communism was designed to eradicate.228 
Whilst  Nehru  disagreed  with  many  of  Gandhi’s  views,  especially  his  views  on  
development and modern technology, among other things, he was in agreement with 
his view that modern India needed to develop a path of its own and steer clear from 
taking sides in the Cold War struggle.  Accordingly, Nehru tried to steer India in a 
direction, which was neither Communist nor capitalist, and this was reflected in his 
policy of non-alignment.  This led to a differentiated approach to international 
relations that combined the merits of the liberal democratic approach to self-
determination (free press, regular elections, rule of law, etc.) with the Marxist-Leninist 
approach (state control of natural resources, industrialization, free education).  Nehru 
thought that the India he had inherited from Britain was “an   odd   mixture   of  
medievalism, appalling poverty and misery and a somewhat superficial modernism of 
the   middle   classes”.229  Accordingly, Nehru argued that it was necessary to bring 
modernisation to the masses, by the middle classes understanding and promoting the 
needs of the masses—very similar to the approach adopted by the USSR and China.230  
But  what  made  Nehru’s  approach  a   little  difference  was  his   support for those states 
that tried to maintain their independence from the Anglo-American camp as well as 
from the Communist camp, even though he was closer to the latter ideologically. 
In 1947 and 1949, Nehru inaugurated the process that would eventually lead to 
the establishment of a non-aligned movement by convening Asian Relations 
Conferences in New Delhi, which, among other things, supported national liberation 
movements, condemned racism, and sought the elimination of colonialism.231  Ghandi, 
Nehru, and Zafrullah Khan, were particularly concerned about their compatriots in 
South Africa.232  Thus when South Africa introduced a new piece of anti-Indian 
legislation—the 1946 Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act—Nehru 
seized on the issue to push his anti-colonial, anti-racism, and pro-self-determination 
agenda.233  The new Bill, while giving South African Indians the right to vote, 
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qualified this right to educational, and property qualifications, and residence 
restrictions, which it was feared would create ghettos. Nehru raised the legislation at 
the UN General Assembly, where it was debated despite South African opposition that 
the UN had no right to consider the matter since it was an issue within its domestic 
jurisdiction.  The USSR assisted India in preventing the matter from being rendered 
before the International Court of Justice, which was the route favoured by the US, 
Britain, and South Africa, since it thought the legal route “would   minimise   the  
political   importance  of   the   issue   and  weaken   the  prestige  of   the  United  Nations”.234  
This resulted in the passage of a resolution, which expressed the opinion that the 
treatment of Indians in South Africa should be in conformity with the international 
obligations in treaties between the two countries, and under the UN Charter.235 
In 1955, the famous Bandung Conference took place in Indonesia where 340 
delegates from 29 Asian and African countries attended.236  The Conference agreed 
that  “colonialism  in  all  its  manifestations  is  an  evil  which  should  speedily  be  brought  
to   an   end”   and   declared   “its   full support of the principle of self-determination of 
peoples and nations as   set   forth   in   the   Charter   of   the   United   Nations”,   which   it  
declared  was  “a  prerequisite of  the  full  enjoyment  of  all  fundamental  human  rights”.    
The   Conference   also   “deplored   the   policies and practices of racial segregation and 
discrimination”,  and  made  special  note,  in  this  regard,  of  “the  peoples  of  African  and  
Indian   and   Pakistan   origin   in   South   Africa”.237  In 1960, these goals were 
reformulated in the form of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples adopted by the UN.  A year later, the non-aligned 
movement was formally established in Belgrade in  Tito’s  Yugoslavia.238  In 1964, the 
non-aligned movement met in Nasser’s Cairo where, among other issues, it 
condemned imperialism in the Middle East, the racist minority regime in Southern 
Rhodesia, opposed apartheid in South Africa and South West Africa, and called for 
boycotts and sanctions against the apartheid government.  The Conference also 
expressed its sympathy with the problem of divided nations.  It exhorted the countries 
concerned to seek a just and lasting solution in order to achieve the unification of their 
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territories by peaceful means.239  No doubt that Nehru might have been thinking of his 
own country, Nasser of Palestine, and Nkrumah of South and South-West Africa.   
Indeed throughout Southern Africa attempts were employed by the respective 
white minority communities to maintain political power and thus to subordinate the 
political aspirations of the black majority.  In South Africa this was accomplished at 
first by “petty apartheid”, and later by the establishment of the Homelands—
pejoratively referred   to   as   “Bantustans”. In Rhodesia, white supremacy was 
accomplished by manipulating the franchise so that only white people were deemed 
eligible to vote in general elections. Whilst the international community had 
previously tolerated the efforts by Rhodesia and South Africa to maintain minority 
rule, these policies were no longer considered politically acceptable following the 
adoption of the Colonial Declaration in 1960.  As more African nations joined the UN, 
a competition for political power opened up between the US and the USSR who 
lobbied each of these countries to join their respective rival camps.  The US realised 
that it would not win this contest if the Jim Crow laws, which were mentioned in Part 
Two, and which were still in force in many states, were not fundamentally reformed.  
How could the US ever hope to influence the newly emerging African states, when its 
Ambassadors were refused food in restaurants, beds in motels, the use of public 
transportation, and whose children could only attend segregated schools and 
universities?  Embarrassing incidents like these provided fodder for the Soviet 
propaganda mill, which it used to great effect in the newly emerging nations.240 
It was out of this ideological contest between the US and the USSR and the 
associated battle for ideas, that the liberal interpretation of self-determination would 
ultimately be rejected in favour of the non-aligned understanding of self-determination 
that was colour blind and that was predicated on equality and majority rule.  This 
found expression in several provisions of UN General Assembly resolution 1541 on 
the concepts of independence, free association, and integration, which for the first 
time in the history of international relations used phrases such  as  “a   full  measure  of  
self-government”,  “the  wishes  of  the  people”,  “democratic  means”,  “equal  status  and  
rights   of   citizenship”,   “democratic   processes”,   and   “universal   adult   suffrage”   in  
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association with the rights that were being granted to non-European peoples.241  As 
Britain soon found out, much to its consternation, the new Kennedy administration 
was determined to do what it  could  “to show that they still stand by the beliefs of the 
Founding Fathers in the rights of nations to freedom and independence”.242 
Consequently, the new US administration would not guarantee that it would abstain 
on future UN resolutions that condemned colonialism as they had done when they 
abstained from voting in favour of UN General Assembly resolution 1514.243  
Paralleling this ideological contest on the international plane were the efforts of the 
civil rights movement in the US, where a range of techniques were used to overhaul 
the Jim Crow laws through the use of public protests, strikes, and court room battles.  
By the early 1960s, segregation had become such an embarrassment that the US State 
Department began to actively issue amicus briefs in race relations cases up and down 
the country advocating civil rights, including before the US Supreme Court.244   
 
  
The 1960 Colonial Declaration in context 
 
British racial policy in Rhodesia provided the catalyst that provoked the politics that 
culminated in the Colonial Declaration, widely heralded by international lawyers as 
being the first international document to recognise   that   “all   peoples   have   a   right   to  
self-determination”.245  When that declaration was being negotiated, drafted, and 
debated, a heated exchange broke out mired by Cold War politics and the North-South 
divide in which the non-aligned states attacked the policies of the colonial powers.  
Significantly, it was the USSR, which paved the way for the adoption of the 
Declaration.246  Aware that seventeen colonial territories were scheduled to gain their 
independence in time for admission to the fifteenth session of the UN General 
Assembly, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev (1894-1971) seized the initiative in 
what one US diplomat described as “a  brilliant  tactical  manoeuvre”  by  allocating  the  
question of colonialism directly in plenary session, which was more productive of 
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world headlines, rather than in the Committee, which had been the custom.247   The 
United Kingdom was particularly perturbed by this strategy since it was the state with 
the largest number of colonial possessions.248  Although it failed in preventing the 
Declaration from being debated and adopted, the British Foreign Secretary David 
Ormsby-Gore (1918-1985), did his best to defend the British colonial record in the 
UN debate by launching a full frontal assault on the policies of the USSR.   
Ormsby-Gore   told   the  Assembly   that   since  1939,   “some  500  million  people,  
formerly under British rule, have achieved freedom and independence, and their 
representatives   sit   here”.      In   contrast, in   the   same   period,   “the  whole   or   part   of   six  
countries with a population of 22 million, have been forcibly incorporated into the 
Soviet  Union;;  they  include  the  world’s  three  newest  colonies:    Lithuania,  Estonia  and  
Latvia”.249  In a sharp exchange of words, Ormsby-Gore’s   depiction   of   British  
colonial rule bringing millions of people freedom was immediately seized upon by 
Bulgaria and the Soviet Union who pointed out that Britain only granted those 
territories independence because it no longer had the money or the military capacity to 
keep order where wars of national liberation were being waged against it.250  The 
delegate from Bulgaria even read out aloud extracts from Sir Stafford Cripps and 
Winston Churchill in which they announced that Britain would have preferred to have 
stayed in British India but that that they had no choice but to withdraw since they did 
not possess the military power necessary to maintain their colonial domination of that 
country.251  The Soviet delegate was characteristically blunter, reminding Ormsby-
Gore, an aristocrat, whose father had also been a British Colonial Secretary, one who 
had played a crucial role in nurturing Zionism in Palestine, that many of the leaders of 
the national liberation movements in India, Burma, Pakistan, and Ghana had spent a 
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good deal of their adult lives languishing in British prisons.252  He then mocked the 
British colonial record in Africa marked by its peculiar penchant for minority rule: 
 
So far as concerns East Africa, which Mr. Ormsby-Gore mentioned, the 
obvious  aim  of  the  United  Kingdom  Government’s  policy  is  to  create  States  or  
Unions on the lines of the Union of South Africa, that is, ostensibly 
independent States in which all power and all positions of control are in the 
hands of the European settlers who constitute a quite insignificant minority of 
the population. Instead of satisfying the just demands of the peoples of 
Northern and Southern Rhodesia [modern-day Zambia and modern-day 
Zimbabwe] and of Nyasaland [modern-day Malawi], the British colonists have 
in defiance of the wishes of these peoples set up the so-called Central African 
Federation [i.e. a federation of modern-day Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Malawi], 
and have extended the power of the upper stratum of the white settlers in 
Southern Rhodesia to cover Nyasaland [Malawi] and Northern Rhodesia.  By 
this means they hope to carry through their plan to establish in the centre of 
Africa   another   racist   State   on   the   lines   of   the  Union  of  South  Africa…In   its  
territories in East Africa [Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika], the United Kingdom 
has carried out measures by means of which all political power and control has 
been  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  European  minority.  Thus  the  “racial  harmony”  
which the colonialists are attempting to ensure in Africa, where the population 
is 97 per cent African and only 3 per non-African, is one under which the 3 per 
cent of Europeans and other outsiders are to dominate the 97 per cent Africans, 
within the framework of so-called independent States.253 
 
The Soviet delegate  added  that  in  Southern  Rhodesia  “the  Europeans  who  make  up  no  
more   than  9  per  cent  of   the  country’s  population,  now  own  more   than  half   the   total  
land area, while the Africans, or 90 per cent of the population, are crowded into 22 per 
cent of the territory’s  area”.254  In  highlighting  the  UK’s  support  for  minority  rule, the 
USSR   was   well   aware   that   it   was   hitting   at   the   Achilles’   heel   of   British   colonial  
policy, which as explained in Part Two, was based on the principle of aristocracy, the 
notion of a social contract, and minority rule, which did not go down well with its 
former colonies, and those still seeking independence.  Here we can see the sharpest 
contrast between the Anglo-American and the Non-Aligned approaches to self-
determination. The USSR had clearly abandoned its early support for the liberal 
approach to self-determination, which it had articulated in Palestine in 1947, by 
comparing the situation there to its own nationality problem, and was now articulating 
an understanding of self-determination consistent with the non-aligned approach.   
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Implicit in the liberal approach to self-determination was the assumption that 
the  white   population  was   in   a   better   position   to   assume   the   responsibility   of   “good 
government”   than   the  black  majority.     This might explain the language used by the 
Rhodesian government when it issued its declaration of independence in 1965, in 
which it becomes apparent that the people who drafted that declaration only 
considered white Rhodesians as belonging to the nation.  For only white Rhodesians 
could  have  “demonstrated  their   loyalty  to   the  Crown  and  to  their  kith  and  kin  in   the  
United  Kingdom  and  elsewhere  through  two  world  wars”  and  were  “prepared  to  shed  
their blood and give of their  substance”  for  “freedom-loving  people”.    Despite opting 
to secede from the UK, loyalty to the British Crown was, however, still key to 
Rhodesian identity, thus the declaration ended with the words,   “God   Save   The  
Queen”.255  Thus previous British policy had been reversed.  Rather than self-
identifying with the European minority and proposing partition to secure that identity, 
instead the white minority in Rhodesia sought to maintain its identity with the United 
Kingdom, by maintaining the pre-existing economic, political, and social hierarchy.    
 
 
The attempt to prohibit partition 
 
Thirteen years after the UN General Assembly passed its resolution recommending a 
Plan of Partition for Palestine with Economic Union in 1947, that same body would 
implicitly declare that any further attempts at partition would be contrary to the UN 
Charter.  In the words of the Colonial Declaration:  “Any attempt aimed at the partial 
or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is 
incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations”.256  Whilst some scholars have interpreted paragraph 6 of that Declaration to 
amount to a prohibition of secession,257 a closer analysis of the historical context 
reveals that its drafters had partition, not just secession, in mind.  Although partition 
and secession are linked, the key difference is that the former is externally imposed by 
a third actor, which results in the division of a nation without its consent. When 
paragraph 6 is read in conjunction with paragraph 3, it is apparent that in awarding 
independence, the colonial power was not to partition the territory even if in its 
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opinion, the minority community was better prepared than the majority, to assume the 
burden of self-government, because that community was in its view, more advanced in 
terms of political, economic, social, or educational development, than the majority.258  
During the debate in the UN General Assembly on the Colonial Declaration, 
several states openly singled out paragraph 6 for approval.  Unlike paragraphs 3, 4, 
and 5 of that Declaration which attracted criticism from the colonial powers, 
paragraph 6 was adopted without controversy.259  Cyprus expressed its view that 
paragraph 6  was   “vital”   and   “essential   in   order   to   counter   the   consequences   of   the  
policy  of  ‘divide  and  rule’”.260  Even Pakistan admitted that the provision enunciated 
in   paragraph   6   embodied   “an   important   safeguard”.261  The Republic of Ireland 
concurred:   “In Ireland, we have not yet recovered the historic unity of our national 
territory.  We therefore note with particular satisfaction the principle declared in 
operative   paragraph   6…We  have   every   hope that, with the growth of goodwill and 
better understanding, the unity of our country will be recovered with reasonable speed 
and in a peaceful and orderly manner, in keeping with the interests of the Irish nation 
as a whole, and of the United Kingdom as well”.262 Morocco explained that when 
paragraph   6  was   discussed   its   drafters   “had   in  mind   a   long   list   of   examples   of   the  
partitioning  and  disruption  of   the  unity  of  national   territories”,   although   it explicitly 
mentioned only three examples: Palestine, Katanga, and Mauritania.263 
Article 6 of the Colonial Declaration must be read in light of the provision that 
was subsequently adopted on self-determination in the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations in 1970.264  The exact phraseology used in the Declaration on Friendly 
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Relations departed slightly from paragraph 6 in stipulating:  “Every state shall refrain 
from any action aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and 
territorial integrity of any other state or country.  It is noteworthy that the prohibition 
of partition in the Declaration on Friendly Relations applied to “other states”   and  
“countries”.  In other words, it applied to the situation when a third party or agency 
made arrangements to divide another state or country as distinguished from secession 
i.e. when part of an existing state breaks away.265  This would have precluded the 
partitions of Ireland, India, and Palestine that were undertaken by a third party i.e. the 
UK or by an external agency i.e. the  UN.     The   reference   to   “a   country”  was   broad  
enough to apply to any attempts to internally divide a nation and disrupt its territorial 
integrity, thus precluding the establishment of Homelands in Southern Africa.  
The  reference   to   the  words  “country”  and “state”   in   the  Colonial  Declaration  
and the Declaration on Friendly Relations were deliberate.266  The  term  “country” was 
broad enough to include any territory that had not yet attained independence in the 
form of the legal fiction of a state but that broadly constituted a national or political 
unit.  The use of the word state covered those national entities that were already 
independent.  Thus the drafters of these provisions drew a link between a people 
seeking political control over the integrity of its territory in exercising its right to self-
determination and a people who already had acquired independence by exercising 
self-determination and were constituted as a state.  Neither could be divided if the 
division was aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial 
integrity of a state or a country.  Thus partition was not supposed to affect the national 
identity of a particular political unit as expressed geographically, whether that 
particular unit was sovereign or semi-sovereign in the eyes of the colonial powers. 
 
 
5. South  Africa’s  Homelands and the failure of partition 
 
The heyday of separate development in South Africa began in 1948 with the election 
of National Government, which campaigned on a platform of further white-black 
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segregation.267  However, as explained in Part Two, the legal and political 
infrastructure of apartheid was established in South Africa when Britain was the 
imperial power, and prior to the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910.  After 
the National Party gained power two divergent views on African policy were given 
expression in two reports known as the Fagan Report and the Tomlinson Report.  The 
Fagan Report insisted that any colour policy ought to be based on the assumption that 
there would eventually be a multi-racial   society   in   South   Africa   in   which   “the  
European   and   Native   communities   scattered   throughout   the   country…will  
permanently continue to exists side by side economically intertwined and should 
therefore be accepted as permanent and as being part of a   big   machine”.268  In 
contrast, the Tomlinson Report urged a separation of the races into national 
homelands—a policy which the Odendaal Commission would also recommend for 
South West Africa.269   It was the Tomlinson Report of 1954, officially  known  as  “the 
Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the 
Union of South Africa” (hereafter, the  “Tomlinson Commission”) that was adopted as 
official  government  policy.    As  Gideon  Jacobs  explained,  “the  composition and terms 
of reference of the Commission made its findings   in   favour   of   the   Government’s  
‘apartheid’  or  separate  development  policy  a  foregone  conclusion”.270  Consequently, 
the Tomlinson Commission, after observing that the partition of British India “was 
somewhat analogous to our own situation”   recommended the creation of separate 
Bantu Homelands throughout the Union of South Africa to prevent racial conflict and 
to maintain white supremacy.271  Several justifications were advanced for this policy 
and in opposition to integration, including the fear that the ultimate result of the two 
races intermixing in South Africa would  be  “complete  racial  assimilation,   leading  to  
the  creation,  out  of  the  two  original  communities,  of  a  new  biological  entity”.272   
                                                 
267 For an insightful and concise history of apartheid in South Africa see Nigel Worden, The Making of 
Modern South Africa: Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy (London: Blackwell, 2007). 
268 See   Gideon   Jacobs,   “Hazards   of   the   Homeland   Policy”,   in   N.J.   Rhoodie   (ed.), South African 
Dialogue:  Contrasts in South African Thinking on Basic Race Issues (Johannesburg: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1972), p. 151 at pp. 153-154. 
269 See the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into South West African Affairs, 1962-63, RP 12 / 
1964.   On   South  West   Africa   controversy   see   Anthony   A.   D’Amato,   “The   Bantustan   Proposals   for  
South-West  Africa”,  4  The Journal of Modern African Studies (1966), pp. 177-192. 
270 Jacobs,  “Hazards  of  the  Homeland  Policy”,  supra n. 268, p. 154. 
271 See Summary of the Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu 
Areas within the Union of South Africa (Pretoria:  The Government Printer, 1955), p. 104, para. 24. 
272 See  “Consequences  of  Integration”,  ibid,  p.  102,  (v). 
 
 
262 
However, the underlying reason for the homeland policy was the fear of 
eventual African hegemony due to their superiority in numbers.  In this regard the 
Commission’s   fears were similar to those of John Locke who, as mentioned in Part 
Two, helped to draft the preamble to The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina in 
1669, which sought to   avoid   “erecting   a   numerous   democracy”.   The Tomlinson 
Commission likewise sought to avoid erecting a numerous democracy by 
enfranchising Africans since it feared that were they given equal civil and political 
rights in a single South African state, political power would pass into their hands: 
 
At whatever speed, and in whatever manner the evolutionary process of 
integration and equalisation between European and Bantu might take place, 
there can be no doubt as to the ultimate outcome in the political sphere, 
namely that the control of political power will pass into the hands of the Bantu. 
It is possible that European paramountcy might be maintained for some 
time, by manipulation of the franchise qualifications; but without a doubt the 
government of the country will eventually be exercised by those elected by the 
majority of voters. Theoretically, it is possible that the non-Europeans who 
then constitute the majority of voters, might prefer to have the country ruled by 
Europeans. Such a supposition appears highly doubtful, and certainly 
improbable. But, even if such were to be the case, the rulers of a democratic 
country would have to carry out the will of the majority of the people, which 
means to say, that the European orientation of our legislation and government 
will eventually disappear.273 
 
The Tomlinson Commission thus opted to create Bantu Homelands as a way in which 
both whites and blacks could exercise their respective, but separate, rights to self-
determination in homelands that would resolve the majority-minority conundrum.  
The Commission recognized that “on the part of the European population, there is an 
unshakeable resolve to maintain their right of self-determination as a national and 
racial entity; while on the part of the Bantu, there is a growing conviction that they are 
entitled to, and there is an increasing demand for, the fruits of integration, including 
an ever-greater share in the control of the country”.274  Accordingly, the Commission 
interpreted  what  they  understood  by  the  term  “self-determination”  so  that  they  could  
align it with their policy of separate development.  The Commission applied the idea 
of self-determination to both communities in separate territorial and political entities 
linked by an economic union in a single South Africa.  This form of separate self-
determination was similar to the Anglo-American model in that it focused on the 
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separate identity of the communities rather than on population statistics or the 
territorial integrity of South Africa as a whole.  In the context of decolonization this 
would allow black South Africans to develop according to the customs and traditions 
of each of the respective communities in which they could develop at their own pace.  
South Africa hoped that its policy of separate development would produce a new 
version of apartheid in line with contemporary international standards.275 
 
 
Presenting the Homeland policy to the UN 
 
In September 1959, South Africa articulated its policy of separate development before 
the UN by explaining that it was not a new policy, but one that had been pursued by 
Jan Smuts, who drafted the UN Charter.276  The South African representative 
explained that both the Bantu who arrived from central Africa and the white settlers 
who arrived from Europe came to South Africa in the seventeenth century as 
immigrants.  Thus,  “the often repeated assertion that the present European descended 
population of South Africa is aliens and settlers…could equally be applied to the 
Bantu group that moved down the East Coast from Central Africa later to cross the 
Limpopo River”.277 As more African states joined the UN and attacked white South 
Africans as being alien to the African continent, this view would be increasingly 
reasserted in later sessions of the UN when South Africa forcefully reasserted its view 
that   “…the  White   population   of   South   Africa   is   a   permanent   one   whose   ancestors  
came  to  the  country  more  than  three  hundred  years  ago.    We  are  not  “colonists”,  as  is  
so often erroneously alleged.  We cannot return to the countries of our forefathers.  
We are strangers in those countries, just as the Roosevelts, the Eisenhowers, the 
Diefenbakers and the Vanderbilts are today strangers in the countries of their 
forebears”.278  Conversely, the South African representative argued that “…the Bantu, 
or black, peoples of South Africa are not the original inhabitants of the country.  Their 
ancestors moved southwards from East and Central Africa and crossed the Limpopo 
River at about the same time as the original Dutch settlers arrived at the Cape”.279 
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It was directly due to the external pressure being applied from the UN, other 
African and socialist countries, that in 1959, South Africa passed the Promotion of 
Bantu Self-Government   Act   and   removed   three   “native”   representatives   from   the  
House of Assembly.280  The preamble to this Act provided: “Whereas the Bantu 
peoples of the Union of South Africa do not constitute a homogenous people, but form 
separate national units on the basis of language and culture; and whereas it is desirable 
for the welfare and progress of said peoples to afford recognition to the various 
national units and to provide for their gradual development within their own areas to 
self-governing   units   on   the   basis   of   Bantu   systems   of   government  …”281  The Act 
established a number of white Commissioners-General to act as agents of the Central 
Government in the homelands, and set up eight Bantu authorities.282  It also completed 
the  process  of  removing  African’s  civil  rights  in  South  Africa  with  the  elimination  of  
the native representatives from the National Assembly.283  After the Sharpeville 
massacre in 1960, and after calls to be expelled from the UN, South Africa became a 
Republic, and its statements became increasingly defensive.  The South African 
representative to the UN complained that the annual sessions of the General Assembly 
have “provided opportunities for international intrigue and for the formation of racial, 
geographical, and ideological blocs.  Not content with an East-West rivalry, a so 
called third force seems to be in  the  process  of  establishment”.284  Noting that one of 
the outstanding features of events in Africa had been the twenty-eight African 
territories that attained independence during the past three years, South Africa 
attacked the view that representative government was suitable for non-Europeans: 
 
The leaders of the anti-colonial campaign here in the United States, in Europe 
and also in the General Assembly, labored under the mistaken impression that 
the parliamentary system of government, born in Britain and adopted by other 
Western countries, including the United States of America, could be grafted on 
to the traditional customs and practices of the African peoples—or, shall I say, 
transplanted to the alien soil of age-old African tradition.  It simply does not 
work  that  way  …  It  is  a  foreign  plant  that  will  not  thrive on African soil.285 
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This was an argument that was strikingly similar to the arguments which had been 
advanced by the British colonists in the United States to deny equality to African-
Americans, by Balfour to deny granting Irish nationalists self-determination over the 
whole of Ireland, by the Houses of Parliament in Britain to deny the Arabs the right of 
self-government in Palestine, and by the Muslim League at its annual sessions in 1930 
and 1940 in favour of the partition of British India.  Indeed, as in the US, in Ireland, 
Palestine, and India, at the heart of this argument was the fear of majority rule.  For in 
a parliamentary democracy, political power passes into the hands of the community 
that could ensure a majority of votes in a general election.  This was precisely the 
prospect that the South African government wanted to avoid.  As Dr. Verwoed 
explained in a 1961 Parliamentary debate in Pretoria, the Homelands were: 
 
…  a  form  of  fragmentation  which  we  would  not  have  liked  if  we  were  able  to  
avoid it. In light of the pressure being exerted on South Africa there is, 
however, no doubt that eventually this will have to be done, thereby buying for 
the white man his freedom and the right to retain domination in what is his 
country  …  If  the  Whites  could  have  continued  to  rule  over  everybody,  with  no  
danger to themselves, they would certainly have chosen to do so. However, we 
have to bear in mind the new views in regard to human rights …  the  power  of  
the world and world opinion and our desire to preserve ourselves.286 
 
In 1963, South Africa began to articulate a more sophisticated argument before the 
UN in support of its Homeland policy, which arose with the announcement that the 
first of these, the Transkei, would become a self-governing independent homeland.287  
As the South African representative told the General Assembly “Africa is not the 
exclusive preserve of any one race, whatever the   general   image   abroad   may   be”.  
Rather,   “Africa has over the millennia of recorded history been the home of many 
widely differing nations.”288   One  of   the   consequences   of   this  was   that   “the South 
Africans of European origin have been forged into a single and a distinctive nation.  It 
is no longer a European nation although it is closely linked with Western culture and 
civilization.  It is a nation of Africa, with its roots and traditions deeply embedded in 
the  soil  of  that  continent”.289  Accordingly,  “…in  claiming  for  ourselves  a  distinctive 
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destiny of our own, we do not deny to the emerging Bantu nations their right to 
achieve distinctive destinies of their own—each in his own homeland with its own 
culture, heritage, language and concept of nationhood”.290  It was upon this basis that 
“each  nation”  would  be  afforded the opportunity of achieving full nationhood “within 
its own traditional homeland with full political equality”.291  In the following year, 
South   Africa’s   representatives   at the UN described this policy in more detail by 
arguing that South Africa was a multinational rather than a multiracial country, in 
which the whites, like the Bantu, were a part of Africa.  Starting from the premise that 
whites and not only Africans were also a part of Africa, the representative declared:  
“We [referring to white South Africans] have been part of Africa for 300 years.  And, 
like any other nation, we too are entitled to insist upon our right of self-
determination…”292  This was, in many respects, a reformulation of the argument 
advanced by the Muslim League in India i.e. that Indian Muslims were not a minority, 
but a nation.  Accordingly, being a nation, white South Africans were entitled to self-
determination in South Africa despite only forming a minuscule minority of the 
population.  As the South African representative told the General Assembly: 
 
We  are  …  not  the  only  nation  within  the  borders  of  South  Africa,   living  in  a  
traditional territory of its own.  For South Africa is, in fact and in the first 
place, a multinational country rather than merely a multiracial country.  Apart 
from the South African nation of European descent, it includes the homelands 
of a number of other nations having their own separate identities, each with its 
own undeniable right to separate nationhood in a land which has always 
likewise been its own.  Here I refer to the various Bantu nations, differing from 
one another in language, culture, traditions and in everything else that 
determines national identities, rights and aspirations—differing as do other 
nations of the world, of whatever race, colour or creed, on whatever continent 
they may be found.  Because of what has happened in the course of history, all 
these nations are at present still under the sovereignty of the South African 
Parliament, but progressively they are developing towards self-government 
and ultimate independent statehood … our problem in South Africa is different 
from the so-called racial problems of certain other countries with multiracial 
populations.  In those countries a multiracial structure is not accompanied, as 
with us, by a multinational character.  There may be problems of interracial 
adjustment, but these are questions of adjustments within the ambit of a single 
nationhood.  The crucial difference is this: our task in South Africa is not 
primarily that of solving a problem of races; it is a problem of nations, a 
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problem of bringing about a situation where peaceful coexistence of the 
various nationals living in our country will be possible.293 
 
South Africa cautioned that the multiracial policy being advocated by its critics would 
“lead to strife and violence”,  which would be “in conflict with the Charter”.  In its 
view, a fully integrated multiracial society would completely ignore the rights of the 
various distinctive nations comprising multinational South Africa.294  Perhaps, 
anticipating the kind of criticism that was levelled at the UN Partition Plan for 
Palestine in 1947, South Africa, in advocating eventual independence for the Transkei, 
stressed that it was “situated in the heavier rainfall belt and in one of the most fertile 
regions of the country, nearly 17,000 square miles in area”.      Accordingly,   South  
Africa justified the establishment of the Transkei before a sceptical UN on this basis 
as well as on the fact that “the people who will exercise their full political rights as 
citizens of that country, namely, the Xhosa nation which comprises some 3 million 
people, constitute almost one third of our total Bantu population”.295  In advancing 
this argument, South Africa hoped to avoid the odium incurred upon Rhodesia which 
had opted for the policy of manipulating the franchise to ensure white supremacy. 
Accordingly, South Africa announced that ten other homelands were to be 
established   in  which   each  of   the  South  African   “nations”  would  be   able   to   exercise  
their respect rights to self-determination.  These included, in addition to the Transkei, 
Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Lebowa, Venda, Gazankulu, Qwaqwa, KaNgwane, 
KwaNdebele, and KwaZulu. In December 1963, the Transkei was granted   “self-
government”   status   and   in   1976   it   was   declared   “independent”.  In the following 
years, three other Homelands were also declared independent: Bophutatswana (1977), 
Venda (1979) and Ciskei (1981).  The situation in South Africa was similar in South 
West Africa, where in 1964 the Odendaal Commission recommended that 40.07 per 
cent of the territory be allocated for non-white homelands296 whilst the whites were 
allocated control of 43.22 per cent of the land, even though the majority of the 
population was African.297  Moreover, the bulk of the industrial and mineral wealth 
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was situated in the areas allocated to the European population.298  In 1968, the South 
African Government passed the Development of the Self-Government for Native 
Nations in South-West Africa Act and the homelands established there were divided 
into ten blocks: Basterland, Bushmanland, Damaraland, East Caprivi, Hereroland, 
Kaokoland, Kavangoland, Namaland, Ovamboland and Tswanaland—although only 
East Caprivi, Hereroland, and Kavangoland, were granted self-rule.299   
 
 
The rejection of the Homelands 
 
In 1971, the UN General Assembly denounced   the   policy   “artificially to divide the 
African   people   into   ‘nations’   according   to   their   tribal   origins”   and   justify   “the 
establishment of non-contiguous Bantu homelands on  that  basis”  and  condemned  “the 
establishment of Bantu homelands and the forcible removal of the African people of 
South Africa and Namibia to those areas as a violation of their inalienable rights, 
contrary to the principle of self-determination and prejudicial to territorial integrity of 
the countries and the unity of their peoples”.300  Two days after the granting of 
“independence” to Transkei, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 31/6A 
(1976), which condemned  “the establishment of Bantustans as designed to consolidate 
the inhuman policies of apartheid, to destroy the territorial integrity of the country, to 
perpetuate white minority domination and to dispossess the African people of South 
Africa of   their   inalienable   rights”.  It further rejected Transkei’s   independence   as  
“invalid”, and  called  upon  all  governments  “to deny any form of recognition to the so-
called independent Transkei”.  This call for collective non-recognition of the Transkei 
would be endorsed by the UN Security Council in resolutions 402 (1976) and 407 
(1977) when it condemned South Africa for trying to coerce Lesotho to recognise 
them through closing the border crossings, harassing its nationals, and through 
applying various forms of economic pressure.301 Similar resolutions and denunciations 
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299 See Sagay, Legal Aspects of the Namibian Dispute, supra n. 297, pp. 363-369 (describing the 
homelands of Ovamboland, Kavangoland, Damaraland, Hereroland, the Caprivi Strip, Bushmanland, 
Rehoboth Gebiet and Namaland).  
300 General Assembly Resolution 2775 of 29 November 1971. 
301 See SC Res. 402, 22 December 1976 and SC Res. 407, 25 May 1977.  See Geoffrey E. Norman, 
“The  Transkei:  South  Africa’s  Illegitimate  Child” 12 New England Law Review (1976–77), pp.  585-
646; Donald E. de Kieffer and David A. Hartquist, “Transkei: A Legitimate Birth” 13 New England 
Law Review (1977–78), pp. 428-452; Geoffrey E. Norman, “The Transkei Revisited” 13 New England 
Law Review (1977–78), pp. 792-801; and Merrie Faye Watkin, “Transkei: An Analysis of the Practice 
of Recognition – Political or Legal?” 18 Harvard International Law Journal (1977), pp. 605-627. 
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were passed by the UN General Assembly calling on all states not to recognise the 
“independence” of Bophuthatswana in 1977, Venda in 1979, and Ciskei in 1981.302 
International rejection of the Bantustan strategy in Namibia was equally 
categorical.  For instance, in 1965, the UN General Assembly endorsed the findings of 
the report of the Special Committee on Decolonization, which had condemned the 
Odendaal Commission for South-West Africa, which had approved of establishing 
Black Homelands.303  The UN General Assembly stressed   that   it   considered   “any  
attempt to partition the Territory [of South West Africa] or to take any unilateral 
action, directly or indirectly, preparatory thereto constitutes a violation of the Mandate 
[for South West Africa] and of resolution 1514 (XV)”.304  In 1966, the UN General 
Assembly terminated the Mandate of South Africa over Namibia.305 In 1968, after the 
South African parliament passed the Development of Self-Government in South-West 
Africa Act, the UN General Assembly denounced the black self-government plans as 
being designed  to  “destroy the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia”.306 
The UN Security Council described the establishment of Bantustans in Namibia as 
“contrary to the provisions of the United Nations  Charter” and condemned the Native 
Nations  Act  as  “a violation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly”.307  
In 1976, the UN Security  Council  declared  that,  “in order that the people of Namibia 
may be enabled freely to determine their own future, it is imperative that free elections 
under the supervision and control of the United Nations be held for the whole of 
Namibia as one political entity”.308 In paragraph 11 (c) of that resolution, the UN 
Security Council called on the South African Government to abolish the application to 
South West Africa of  “all racially discriminatory Bantustans and homelands”.309 
With the collapse of the apartheid system of government and successful 
negotiations leading to a transfer of power, the Security Council in 1994 welcomed 
“the   establishment   of   a   united,   non-racial and democratic government for South 
                                                 
302 See John Dugard, Recognition and the United Nations (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1987), pp. 
98-108. 
303 Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa, supra n. 257, p. 106. 
304 GA Res. 2074, 17 Dec. 1965, para. 5. 
305 Ibid. See also, GA Res. 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966 (where the General Assembly terminated 
the Mandate of South West Africa and assumed direct responsibility for the Territory until its 
independence). 
306 GA Res. 2403 (XXIII) of 16 December 1968. 
307 SC Res. 264 of 20 March 1969. 
308 SC Res. 385 of 30 January 1976, para. 7 (emphasis added). 
309 Ibid. 
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Africa”. 310 Accordingly, the Homelands were reincorporated into South Africa.311  
Similarly, no Bantustan in Namibia became   an   “independent” state due to 
international opposition.  In 1990, Namibia was admitted to the UN as an independent 
state, its territorial integrity intact.312  In this regard critics of the Homeland policy 
have  pointed  out  that  it  was  not  “the  people”  of  South  or  of  South  West  Africa who, as 
a whole, were exercising their respective rights to self-determination.  Instead, it was 
the white minority South African government that was exercising  “self-determination” 
by demarcating and delineating the boundaries of each Homeland.313  Indeed, the 
reality of separate development was that black South Africans who comprised 80 per 
cent  of  the  country’s  population were to be confined to a mere 12-13 per cent of the 
area of South Africa, whilst the whites who comprised 20 percent would rule over the 
remaining 88 percent of the land.314 The situation was similar in South West Africa 
where Europeans were accorded control over territory where the main centres of 
industrial and mineral wealth were located.  South Africa was essentially applying the 
Anglo-American thesis of self-determination to suit its own ends so that those South 
Africans of European origin were to be granted most  of  South  Africa’s  fertile  land  and  
access to its vast natural resources whilst the Africans were allocated territory in 
smaller units, and were expected to travel from those areas to the white areas for work 
or to labour in factories in the Homelands, where they would be expected to remain.315 
  It has been argued that South Africa was able to advance its theory of separate 
development because it was speaking of nations rather than races.  Accordingly, when 
South  Africa’s  representative  to  the  UN  spoke  of  granting  “every  individual  the  fullest  
chance   of   development   within   his   own   nation”,   he   was   excluding   eight   million  
Africans   in  White   South  Africa   because   they   are   not   “individuals  within   their   own  
nation”.    And  when  he  spoke  of  “respect  for  human  dignity”  he  excluded  them  again  
because  “they  are  not  a  nation”.316  The South African jurist John Dugard explained 
                                                 
310 SC Res. 930, 27 Jun. 1994. 
311 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa No. 108 of 1996, promulgated 8 December 1996. 
312 SC Res. 652, 17 April 1990. See further, Cedric Thornberry, A Nation is Born: The Inside Story of 
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315 See Christopher R. Hill, Bantustans: The Fragmentation of South Africa (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1964), p. 4. 
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that the Homelands were seen as an escape route for a government whose policies of 
apartheid and overt racial segregation and discrimination had attracted widespread 
international criticism and condemnation, particularly from the United Nations.317  In 
this respect, the proceedings brought against South Africa before the International 
Court of Justice by Ethiopia and Liberia had a direct impact on the South African 
government who rushed to grant the  Transkei  “the legal trappings of self-government 
in 1963”.      This   was   “in order to impress on the International Court of Justice the 
sincerity   of   the   Government’s   intentions   in   respect   of   separate   development”.  He 
added,  “the constitution [of the Transkei] cleverly adopt[ed] the rhetoric of advanced 
self-government and the uninitiated might be forgiven for believing that the Transkei 
was given powers similar to those  of  a  state  under  a  federation”.318 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Towards the end of the 1960s, the decade most associated with decolonization, the 
political practice had changed and self-determination became associated in the minds 
of many with majority rule, which correspondingly had an impact on the language of 
diplomacy, which changed as well.  In 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) proclaimed in Article   19   of   its   Charter,   that:      “The partition of Palestine in 
1947 and the establishment of the state of Israel are entirely illegal, regardless of the 
passage of time, because they were contrary to the will of the Palestinian people and 
to their natural right in their homeland, and inconsistent with the principles embodied 
in the Charter of the United Nations; particularly the right to self-determination”.319  
As Yasser Arafat (1929-2004), the Chairman and Executive of the PLO told the UN: 
 
As a result of the collusion between the Mandatory Power and the Zionist 
movement and with the support of some countries, this General Assembly 
early in its history approved a recommendation to partition our Palestinian 
homeland. This took place in an atmosphere poisoned with questionable 
actions and strong pressure. The General Assembly partitioned what it had no 
right to divide -- an indivisible homeland. When we rejected that decision, our 
                                                 
317 See generally, John Dugard,   “The  Legal  Effect   of  United  Nations  Resolutions   on  Apartheid”,   83  
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272 
position corresponded to that of the natural mother who refused to permit King 
Solomon to cut her son in two when the unnatural mother claimed the child for 
herself and agreed to his dismemberment. Furthermore, even though the 
partition resolution granted the colonialist settlers 54 per cent of the land of 
Palestine, their dissatisfaction with the decision prompted them to wage a war 
of terror against the civilian Arab population. They occupied 81 per cent of the 
total area of Palestine, uprooting a million Arabs. Thus, they occupied 524 
Arab towns and villages, of which they destroyed 385, completely obliterating 
them in the process. Having done so, they built their own settlements and 
colonies on the ruins of our farms and our groves. The roots of the Palestine 
question lie here. Its causes do not stem from any conflict between two 
religions or two nationalisms. Neither is it a border conflict between 
neighboring States. It is the cause of people deprived of its homeland, 
dispersed and uprooted, and living mostly in exile and in refugee camps.320 
 
Similarly,   in   1969,   Dr.   Patrick   Hillery,   Ireland’s   Minister   of   External   Affairs,  
reflecting on the troubles that had engulfed Northern Ireland as well as on Irish 
history, more generally, informed the UN Security Council that:  “Partition was 
accomplished by the British Government as a concession to an intransigent minority 
within the Irish nation.  Ireland was divided as a result of an Act of the British 
Parliament in 1920, an Act in favour of which not one Irish vote, either North or 
South,  was   cast…”321  In formulating his address Dr. Hillery alluded to the tension 
between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus and racial tensions in South Africa where 
partition was proposed before citing Article 6 of the Colonial Declaration.322   
  The opposition expressed to partition in Ireland and Palestine on the basis that 
it violated the self-determination of the majority was not an argument that was 
accepted by the colonial powers in 1920.  Indeed it was still questioned by many in 
1947, when Egypt and Syria attempted to refer the legality of the proposed UN 
Partition Plan to the ICJ for an advisory opinion.  It was only as a result of pressure 
from the USSR and the non-aligned movement, and the loss of US support during 
decolonization, that Britain was forced to concede that self-determination applied to 
the native majority in its colonial territories irrespective of their lack of education and 
economic development.  Accordingly, the attempt to secure minority rule in Rhodesia, 
South Africa, and South West Africa, faced opposition from the anti-colonial majority 
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in the UN General Assembly.  The British liberal understanding of self-determination 
tended to favour minority groups that it self-identified with such as the Unionists in 
Ireland, the Jews in Palestine, and the white European minorities in Southern Africa.   
The underlying assumption of those international lawyers who opposed 
partition is that they believed a nation was being divided, whereas the assumption of 
those who favoured partition was that there was never a nation to be divided in the 
first place.  Rather, there was more than one nation.  For those international lawyers 
holding the first view, the word partition acquired a pejorative connotation whereas 
for those holding the latter view it was deemed a practical solution.  As mentioned in 
the Introduction, Elihu Lauterpacht’s understanding of self-determination was 
associated with the liberal Anglo-American approach, which was still the predominant 
view in 1947.  According to this view, self-determination was associated with 
representative government which was only suited for a people who formed a national 
cohesive community, who were literate, who understood parliamentary democracy, 
who were economically developed, and socially advanced.  This approach tended to 
favour vesting political power in elite minorities.  In diametrical contrast, Michael 
Akehurst’s understanding of self-determination was influenced by the Non-Aligned 
approach which became fused with the Marxist-Leninist political theory during 
decolonization and its understanding of self-determination in which self-determination 
was a revolutionary right to be granted immediately to all subjugated peoples 
irrespective of their political, economic, social or educational development.  This 
approach was an all-encompassing mass movement associated with majority rule. 
Accordingly, when Lauterpacht and Akehurst were expressing their opinions 
in the 1960s and 70s, at the height of decolonization, the predominant view then, was 
majority rule.  However, when the UN proposed partition in 1947, the Anglo-
American view of self-determination was still predominant as most developing 
countries were colonies.  In fact it was only in 1947 that the notion of majority rule 
would gain expression in the 3 June Plan when India was partitioned on the basis of 
ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims through an 
analysis of population statistics by geographic district.  This was the first time that the 
principle of majoritarianism was applied to non-Europeans and which would be 
invoked in subsequent years by Nehru and the non-aligned movement to oppose the 
partitions proposed in South Africa, and in South West Africa, a view which found 
expression in both the Colonial Declaration and the Friendly Relations Declaration.  It 
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is therefore surely no coincidence that it was only after 1960 that international lawyers 
began to concede that self-determination was a rule of customary international law.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
The postmodern world has to start to get used to double standards.  Among ourselves, we 
operate on the basis of laws and open cooperative security. But when dealing with more old-
fashioned kinds of states outside the postmodern continent of Europe, we need to revert to the 
rougher methods of an earlier era - force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary 
to deal with those who still live in the nineteenth century world of every state for itself. 
Among ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use 
the laws of the jungle. 
 
Robert Cooper, Foreign Policy Adviser to Prime Minister Tony  Blair,   on  “The  new   liberal  
imperialism”,  The  Observer, 7 April 2002, p. 27. 
 
Whilst the British Empire ended some time ago, and whilst the British influence on 
international law, although still considerable, is waning, the prevalence of its ideas on 
empire, nationhood, representative government, and democracy still persist with us to 
this very day.  The American Empire, after all, is a product of British colonial history 
and democracy is its mantra.  And American and British ideas have largely informed 
the men and women who created the machinery of international organization in the 
form of the United Nations, and before then in the form of the League of Nations.  
Then, as now, the fear of the other, of non-Christian societies, who avowedly lack 
“civilisation”,  still  influences  contemporary  discourse  and policy, especially with the 
Islamic world.  Revolutions are a recurrent theme, as the revolutions and the unrest 
sweeping North Africa and the Middle East attest.  Culture and self-identification 
between   societies,   which   are   considered   to   have   a   “shared   history”,   still   forms an 
integral part in the formation of military alliances, and balance of power politics.   
 For the same reasons, that is, a shared history, it was perhaps inevitable that 
socialism   would   sweep   across   the   “Third  World”   during   decolonization.  Many of 
these countries had been subjected to various systems of European imperialism that 
resulted in the formation of elite systems of government akin to European court 
societies, which were themselves remnants of European monarchical and feudal 
civilization.   No wonder then that the lonely image of Che Guevara taking on the 
might of Anglo-American   imperialism   in   America’s backyard or in the depths of 
Africa, would provide ideological inspiration not only in Latin America, but also 
across the diverse cultures and societies of the Middle East and Asia long after his 
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summary execution in Bolivia.1  The only connection all these countries had with his 
image was that they too had shared in the European colonial experience.  They too had 
struggled against a powerful usurper that had destroyed their indigenous systems of 
governance, and that had instead established a system of government that placed 
political power in handpicked and often corrupt former colonial administrators who 
were culturally closer to the customs and manners of their former colonial masters 
than with the great majority of people whose lives they were now responsible for 
safeguarding.  No wonder that the colonized resorted to the same methods to destroy 
the inequalities that had been established by the colonial powers in their societies, 
which European peoples had resorted to in the nineteenth century to destroy the 
inequalities that existed in monarchical European states.  It was hardly surprising 
therefore that during the Cold War the colonized would adopt an ideological system 
like socialism, which, in many ways, was just as alien as the political system that had 
justified the initial conquest of their lands, because it gave succour to such struggles.    
Since 1989, Communism, with a few notable exceptions, has collapsed and the 
ideology that sustained it no longer has a powerful political sponsor. As Professor 
Roth observed, with the demise of Communism, and   many   “Third   Word”  
revolutionary regimes,   “the   partisan stance of the West has naturally come to be 
advanced all the more as a universal standard, liberal democracy being touted as the 
‘emerging’  sine qua non of governmental legitimacy in the international community”.   
And yet, as Professor Roth also noted,  “the  liberal-democratic discourse prevalent in 
the West has generally tended to obscure the fact that revolutionary opponents of 
liberal  democracy  offer  competing  conceptions  of  democracy  and  human  freedom”.2 
Indeed, and as I have argued in this study, this competing conception of democracy 
and human freedom is almost as old as liberal democracy itself, and existed in 
political theory long before Karl Marx ever established his theory of Communism.  It 
was there with Rousseau, and one can even detect “socialist”   inclinations   in   the  
writings of Puffendorf and Wolff as Professor Richard Tuck has argued, and which 
                                                            
1  Che Guevara was executed by the Bolivian army with the support of US military intelligence 
personnel who had been hunting him in the Congo. I have always been struck by the image of Che in 
the various countries I have travelled to in the Middle East, particularly in Palestine and Lebanon, 
places that probably never entered his political consciousness or imagination when he was alive. 
2 Brad R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), p. 76.  
  
277 
was evident in some of the policies adopted in England during the Commonwealth.3 
As I explained in Part One these theories emerged after the execution of Charles I in 
order   to   justify   the   Instrument   of   Government   established   by   Cromwell’s  
Commonwealth, and was later expressed in opposition to the partitions of Poland.4  
Even Edmund Burke, the defender of the old order and chief opponent of the French 
Revolution, would have been opposed to contemporary Anglo-American imperialism. 
Whilst Communism might be dead today, the ideas and spirit of socialism is not and 
has reasserted itself in various forms in line with other cultural and political systems.5 
 In this regard there is a striking connection between self-determination and 
democracy.  In fact the two are intimately inter-twined.  But it is not the type of 
democracy that most people in the West would recognise today.  This is because most 
people today associate democracy with liberal democracy as Professor Roth aptly 
observed. This system began with the deposition of James II in 1688 and his 
replacement by the Protestants William and Mary who became sovereign in his stead 
in conjunction with Parliament, which led to a system of government known as 
Parliamentary Democracy. This is the democracy that continues to exist today in the 
United Kingdom.  Sovereignty is manifestly not vested in the British people but in the 
Queen and in her representatives in Parliament.  This is not just a theoretical anomaly.  
It has important practical political consequences because it preserves the pre-existing 
culture of deference, of hierarchy, and ultimately of elitism and indifference, which 
was forged through the creation of a theory of society based on a social contract that 
deliberately sought to exclude the vast majority of people from participating in 
political society. This form of democracy can be starkly contrasted with the variant of 
                                                            
3 See Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from 
Grotius to Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 140-165, pp. 187-191, pp. 231-232. 
4 I also argued  in  Part  One  that  what  separated  the  “sociability”  of  Puffendorf  and  Wolff  from  the  other  
“liberals”  like  Hobbes  and  Locke  who  justified  colonial  conquests  was  not  just  a  consequence  of  their  
moral opposition to wars of glory and imperialist expansion which also threatened the central German 
states at the time, but was connected to their support for popular sovereignty, which seemed to 
influence their opposition to balance of power contests between sovereign princes. In this connection 
Wolff’s  praise  for Confucius, which led to his dismissal at the pain of the halter from Halle is intriguing 
because  of  Confucius’s  support  for  social  harmony,  which  many  have  likened  to  socialism.   
5 I am thinking here of the Islamic Republic of Iran whose system of government is a mix of religious 
ideology and totalitarianism through the institution of velayat-e faqih, which is strikingly similar to 
Rousseau’s  concept  of  vesting  power  in  a  single  individual  (in  this  case  Khomeini  and  now  Khatami),  
and   to  Lenin’s   theory of the  dictatorship  of   the  proletariat   to   “guide”   the   revolution  and   transform  a  
capitalist society into a socialist one (in the case of Iran from a monarchy into an Islamic republic).  For 
a detailed study of the Iranian Constitution see Asghar Schirazi, The Constitution of Iran: Politics and 
the State in the Islamic Republic (London: IB Tauris & Co. 1998), particularly pp. 8-19 and pp. 74-76. 
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democracy that began with the execution of Charles I in 1649 and led to a chain of 
events that culminated with the execution of Louis XVI, and which led to the 
formation of a system of government known as Republican Democracy. A similar 
system was established in America but in name only.  In America republicanism was 
associated with replacing the British monarchy although as explained in the 
Introduction no attempt was made to disperse political power amongst the populace.  
Instead several safeguards were put in place to prevent that.  Instead of a House of 
Lords the American revolutionaries created a Senate, whose only difference with the 
Lords, was that the senators were elected whereas the Lords were hereditary.  The 
execution of Nicolas II in Russia led to the formation of a system of government 
known as Communist Democracy.  This  was  inspired  by  the  creation  of  Cromwell’s  
Commonwealth and the French Republican model but the difference was that it sought 
to reorient social structure, which Robespierre had failed to accomplish in 1793-4.   
But in order to accomplish this social transformation Lenin had to theorize his 
dictatorship of the proletariat modeled on the Committee of Public Safety in 
revolutionary France in order to transfer political power and the modes of production 
from the minority ruling elite and vest it in the hands of the masses, the workers, and 
the poor.  The paradox was that in every single one of these cases, political power was 
withheld from the majority of people whose name was invoked in vain to legitimize 
these various systems of government.  They were democracies in name only.   Perhaps, 
as Rousseau understood, only a nation of gods could be governed democratically.6 
These  differing  ideological  approaches  to  “democratic”  government  lead me to 
the extract that I quoted in the opening of this Conclusion by Robert Cooper, Tony 
Blair’s   former chief foreign policy advisor.  In the year prior to the Iraq war, he 
advocated in a British broadsheet newspaper resorting  to  “the rougher methods of an 
earlier era” to  deal  with  what  he  called  “the  more  old-fashioned kinds of states outside 
the postmodern continent of Europe”.  In other words, Mr. Cooper was justifying the 
use of force on ideological grounds and despite the fact that the use of force for any 
other reason, other than self-defence, is expressly forbidden by the Charter of the 
United Nations. 7   The “rougher   methods”   Mr. Cooper was referring to include 
                                                            
6 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (1762), (Ware: Wordsworth Edition 1998), p. 68. 
7 The use of force can also be sanctioned by the UN Security Council by a majority of votes plus the 
concurring votes of the permanent five. The only exception where this is not necessary is self-defence, 
which can only be exercised according to the Charter language when an armed attack has occurred.  
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“[armed] force, pre-emptive attack, and deception”—hardly novel or exceptional 
methods when one considers British imperial history. Indeed there is nothing that Mr. 
Cooper argued for that  would  have  put  him  out  of  step  with  Gentili’s  justification  of  
pre-emption in the sixteenth century to attack the Spanish and Turkish Empires, or 
with   J.S.  Mill’s   assertion   that   “[d]espotism is a legitimate mode of government in 
dealing with barbarians” when he was justifying British rule in India in the nineteenth 
century.8  In fact, Mr. Cooper should be applauded for his honesty, for it is part of a 
mentality that goes hand in hand wherever liberal democracy rears its head.  For Mr. 
Cooper and his friends will only advise their government to promote peace, prosperity, 
and  freedom  in  the  West,  where  states  “keep the law”, but they will not advise their 
governments to keep the law when they are “operating in the jungle”.    Mr. Cooper’s  
ideas are strikingly similar to the views that had been advocated by the theorists and 
jurists of less enlightened times to conquer the New World, to displace the indigenous 
inhabitants, and to destroy their systems of government.  As explained in Part Two, 
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Emmer de Vattel only envisaged the concept of 
political society in a form that only accommodated the cultures and communities that 
they were familiar with from living in Europe. In Europe and amongst Europeans in 
the overseas settlements like New England English law applied.  But English law did 
not  apply  to  “the  barbarians”  that  already  inhabited  New  England.    It is this mentality 
of  “us”  and  “them”  of  “our  rules”  and  “their rules”  of  our concern for human suffering 
only  when  it  impact  on  “our  lives”  but  not  on  “their lives”  or  in  “their countries”  that 
has led to the  “humanitarian”  bombing  of  Kosovo, to the invasions of Afghanistan and 
Iraq, and to the bombing to  “free”  Libya.  It will lead to new conflicts in other parts of 
the world wherever there is resistance to liberal forms of democracy. And until a new 
superpower emerges with a new ideology that challenges it, nothing will stop it.  
 So why is any of this relevant to partition or self-determination? It is relevant 
because ideological systems that advocate the use of force will inevitable lead to the 
conquest of new territories.  Whilst conquest is outlawed today, for the vast majority 
of European imperial history conquest was inherently lawful.  Conquest only became 
illegal because of a political theory or an ideology that was created to stop it and 
which came to fruition through the Marxist-Leninist approach to national self-
                                                            
8 J.S. Mill, “On Liberty” (London: 1859) reprinted in John Gray (ed.) John Stuart Mill: On Liberty and 
Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 14-15. 
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determination in contrast to the liberal approach that claimed that colonialism and 
tutelage were necessary to raise the standards of non-European peoples. Partition 
fractured and dislocated the territorial integrity of a   people’s homeland through the 
use of force, through conquest, or as a result of a prolonged military occupation born 
of conquest.  It was as a result of the experiences of conquered peoples that they rose 
up to throw off the shackles of imperialism that contributed to the emergence of a 
theory of self-determination that justified the use of force in self-defence in order to 
regain the freedoms they had lost during the initial conquest and which had been 
justified by another theory of self-determination based on the notion of self-
government. This latter theory was linked to the concept of tutelage and found 
expression in the League of Nations mandate system and in UN trusteeship system.  It 
was  thought  that  “backwards”  peoples  needed  to  be  educated  to  be taught how to raise 
their living standards in order to participate as full members of the international 
community. In contrast, the Marxist-Leninist approach considered the concept of 
tutelage to be condescending and supported immediate independence for all colonies.  
When Marxism-Leninism became inter-twined with the anti-colonial rhetoric and 
practice of the non-aligned movement in the 1960s it produced a powerful ideological 
cocktail that in combination brought European colonialism to an unceremonious end. 
Accordingly, partition represented a fissure, rupture, schism, or fault line 
between two competing and diametrically opposed views of self-determination.  
These diametrically opposed views of self-determination were the Liberal view, which 
is associated with representative government and constitutional democracy, and the 
Socialist view, which for most of the twentieth century was almost exclusively 
associated with Marxist-Leninist political theory. The liberal approach to self-
determination was based on a limited form of politics, which required inculcating in 
the  colonial  community  Western  cultural  attributes  that  encouraged  them  to  “think”, to 
develop  “good  character”, and to behave with “appropriate decorum”.  This resulted in 
the emergence of a new aristocracy within the colonial polity, which was invariably 
formed of a minority caste, class, or religious community that was vested with 
political authority in order to subdue the majority. In contrast, the Marxist-Leninist 
approach to self-determination espoused an inclusive form of mass politics in which 
no fetters were to be placed   on   a   people’s   right   to independent national existence, 
which was to be granted immediately and unconditionally, irrespective and regardless 
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of whether the peoples who were to assume power had acquired the economic, 
political, or social attributes necessary to assume the burden of self-government. Both 
approaches to self-determination were concerned with identifying the people who 
could exercise this right.  The difference was that the conception of the people in 
Marxist theory encompassed all economic, political, and social classes, to include the 
entire people as a united, single, integrated, and complete collectivity, to encompass 
even those peoples who were viewed as economically, politically, and socially 
“backward”. In contrast, the liberal approach associated with the Anglo-Americans 
tended to restrict its conception of the nation to colonial elites that it viewed as having 
acquired the necessary attributes   to   maintain   the   colony’s independence, without 
threatening the balance of power.  The liberal approach to self-determination was an 
elite movement, in contrast to the Marxian mass movement.  Accordingly, the Marxist 
approach required revolution and immediate independence for all oppressed 
nationalities regardless of what impact this may have on the balance of power, 
whereas the Anglo-American approach was based on a hierarchy, which bore a 
striking resemblance to the evolutionist theories of social Darwinism. The Anglo-
American approach to self-determination tended to vest political power in a minority 
community if the minority was better able to govern than the majority in line with J.S. 
Mill’s   theories   on   representative   government.   This   envisaged   a   civilized,   cohesive  
community, well versed in both the machinery and theory of government.  This 
approach put the Anglo-Americans at diametrical loggerheads with the Marxist 
approach to self-determination that was avowedly based on creating a classless society.  
The Anglo-American approach to self-determination was ultimately influenced 
by the historical development of representative government in England and in the 
Thirteen Colonies, and later in the Thirteen United States, and was connected to the 
notion of self-government, which they then projected onto the non-European world in 
the high period of imperialism.  If today, in  the  aftermath  of  Communism’s  collapse,  
there is only one view of self-determination – the liberal democratic conception – then 
there are unlikely to be new partitions because there is no ideology to oppose it unless 
a new ideology emerges backed up by a superpower that can stand its own ground.  
Indeed the lack of partition may signify the dawn of a new era, that of the universal 
monarchy of days gone by, and of unadulterated power, that prompted the humanists 
in the sixteenth century to argue for a balance of power in the first place, which is now 
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moribund in the collective security architecture of the UN, which has never stopped 
the great powers from breaching the use of force provisions in the UN Charter.  Is it 
any   surprise   the  UN’s   biggest   critics   today   are   those   that   justify  wanton   aggression 
and who find the prohibition of the use of force anachronistic and cumbersome?  And 
is it not a paradox that the  critics  are  from  the  world’s  most  powerful  democracy  and  
that they attack an institution built on the foundations of the League of Nations, which 
had been fashioned by the Anglo-Americans to preserve their vision of the world? 
 What the history of partition tells us about the evolution of self-determination 
is that it refers to the process of state formation in which pluralities of opinions were 
expressed and which was linked to the form of government that each state 
established.9  These opinions were also part and parcel of a wider narrative that was 
dependent upon the dominant political ideology of an epoch.  This is because only 
those views that had the ability to determine the course of international relations had 
the greatest impact, that is the views of the great powers.  This is why the views of the 
liberal democracies emerged triumphant during the vote in the UN General Assembly 
on the UN Partition Plan in 1947.10  It also explains why Britain failed to partition 
Cyprus in 1957 when Britain was economically, militarily, and even morally (after 
Suez) at its lowest ebbs, and succumbed to pressure form the Third World and 
particularly India to maintain the island’s territorial integrity.  In this connection, I 
have comes across little evidence in my analysis of the state practice of partition to 
support the view that self-determination  “introduced  a  new  criterion  in  order  to  judge  
the legitimacy of power in the international setting: respect for the wishes and 
aspirations   of   people   and   nations”.11  If anything, what partition tell us about self-
                                                            
9 Consider the debates on the partition of Palestine and Cyprus at the UN mentioned in Part Three.  
10 And of course one cannot overlook the kinds of economic and diplomatic pressure employed by the 
great powers to get their way.  Indeed, the pressures that the US resorted to, to ensure the passage of the 
UN Partition Plan in 1947 prompted the US Secretary of Defence, James Forrestal to make the 
following   note   in   his   diary:   “I   thought   the   methods   that   had   been   used   by   people   outside   of   the  
Executive Branch of government to bring coercion and duress on other nations in the General 
Assembly   bordered   closely   on   scandal”.   See   Walter   Millis   (ed.)   The Forrestal Diaries: The Inner 
History of the Cold War (London: Cassell & Co., 1952), p. 346. According to Sumner Welles, the 
Under-Secretary of State, American officials were exerting all kinds of pressure on recalcitrant states to 
vote for partition. See Sumner Welles, We Need Not Fail (Cambridge: Massachusetts, The Riverside 
Press,  1948),  p.  63.  (“By  direct  order  of   the  White  House  every  form  of  pressure,  direct  and  indirect,  
was brought to bear by American officials upon the countries outside the Moslem world that were 
known to be either uncertain or opposed to partition. Representatives or intermediaries were employed 
by the White House to make sure that the necessary majority would  at  length  be  secured.”) 
11  Antonio Cassese, Self-determination of peoples: A legal reappraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), p. 316. 
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determination is that it has had very little to do with the wishes and aspirations of 
people and nations.  Moreover, such a view is too simplistic because it does not 
account for a plurality of views.   When international lawyers and politicians 
pontificate about the wishes and aspirations of “the people”, what people do they have 
in mind?  What if those people have different views, and different aspirations?   How 
are these views to be accommodated in a single territorial unit?  The answer is to grant 
them minority rights.  But how can this then be described as self-determination?  
 The answer to this is  to  give  them  “internal”  self-determination in the sense of 
allowing the people in question to have a say in the way they are governed.  What 
international lawyers have called “internal”   self-determination is contrasted with 
“external”   self-determination, which is understood to relate to the question of 
independence. But my analysis of the history of partition leads me to conclude that 
there is no such thing as “internal” and “external” self-determination.  Rather these 
distinctions have been  conjured  up  in  the  international  lawyer’s  imagination.    This is 
why I disagree with the late Professor Antonio Cassese’s   argument   that   there is a 
contradiction at the heart of self-determination.  There is no contradiction.  Whatever 
contradiction exists is something international lawyers have created through making 
an   artificial   distinction   between   “internal”   and   “external”   self-determination and by 
misunderstanding the application, nature, and history of self-determination.  Consider 
the following extract that appears in the Introduction to Professor Cassese’s book: 
 
Let us consider, for a moment, the contradictory nature of self-determination.  
Internally, self-determination could be used and has been used as a vehicle for 
enfranchisement, for ever expanding circles of citizens against all manner of 
ancien régimes.     On   this   score,   the   ‘self’   of   the   nation   has   shifted:    it is no 
longer embodied in a Monarch ruling over a State but in the citizens of the 
State.  Self-determination is thus the reflection in international law of a 
movement that begun with the American and French Revolutions and reached 
its climax in the twentieth-century notions of universal suffrage. 
Externally, self-determination has been no less of a challenge to established 
authority—that of the small circle of  ‘civilized  nations’  which constituted the 
international  legal  order  …  self-determination was the vehicle through which 
this international ancien régime could be challenged by the admittance of new 
  
284 
members.  One of the major developments of twentieth-century international 
law has been the expansion of the family of nations to include, sometimes after 
bloody conflict, States of the so-called Third World—as development in which 
the notion of self-determination was at the conceptual centre.12  
 
The problem with the artificial distinction conveyed by Professor Cassese in the 
extract above, is that what he describes as internal self-determination is directly linked 
to its external aspect. The peoples struggling for enfranchisement, which he 
characterizes as internal self-determination, were the same peoples challenging 
established authority, which he characterizes as external self-determination.  
Unfortunately, Cassese has conflated the American and French Revolutions, and it is 
his lack of historical knowledge of those revolutions that had led him to create a 
contradiction that does not exist.13  And of course Cassese is not the only international 
lawyer to have done this. I am only using him as an example. It is part of a general 
phenomenon. This is because international lawyers by focusing in depth on the 
political practices adopted by states in particular international institutions over a very 
limited historical period, which is usually limited to the twentieth century, have 
missed   “the   bigger   picture”.  What Cassese and others have misunderstood is so 
fundamental that it is a little baffling and worrying that no one else spotted it sooner.  
As I explained in the Introduction and in Part One of this thesis, the American 
and French Revolutions were poles apart ideologically.  America did not willingly 
grant universal suffrage to all its citizens until well into the second half of the 
twentieth century. Neither did the American revolutionaries aspire to universal 
suffrage. Martin Luther King was killed as late as 1968 when he said he had a dream 
of an America in which there would be equal rights and racial equality for all. In sharp 
contrast to the American revolutionaries, the French revolutionaries did aspire to 
enfranchise the majority of is citizens—albeit at the time this was limited to adult 
males.  But   this  was   still   “revolutionary”   in   an   era  when   human   bondage  was   still  
lawful and widely practiced.  The American revolutionaries did not aspire to tear 
down the barriers to social inequality, which is why they did not outlaw the institution 
of slavery.  In contrast the   French   revolutionaries   (at   the   revolution’s   height)  
                                                            
12 Cassese, Self-determination of peoples, ibid, p. 5. 
13 Cassese, Self-determination of peoples, ibid, pp. 11-13. 
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abolished slavery, taxed the wealthy, and lowered the price of basic foodstuffs so that 
the masses that were starving could afford to feed themselves. No such thing ever 
happened in America.  To cite the American Revolution of 1776 as a reflection of a 
movement that reached its climax in the twentieth-century notion of universal suffrage 
is just wrong.  As I explained in Part Three of this study, what led to universal 
suffrage in the 1960s was the result of centuries of struggle and strife, primarily from 
the men and women who were politically aligned to ideas and movements that 
belonged to the left, to socialism. This is because the liberal approach to self-
determination as I explained in Part Two, was based upon the theory of a social 
contract, which was a contraption designed to exclude undesirables from forming part 
of political society.  The liberal approach to self-determination was like a gentleman’s  
club; not everyone could gain access and there were certain manners and norms that 
each individual had to adhere to before it could be adopted as a member of the club.14 
In other words, the so-called “external” aspect of self-determination was intimately 
linked to its “internal” aspect, that is, the struggle for equal rights, which again was a 
revolution of the left, a revolution that took inspiration from France and later from 
Russia.  Moreover, it was not by chance that the Third World that emerged during 
decolonization was supported by the USSR, and not by the USA, who for a good part 
of the 1960s did not even let African Americans use the same facilities—motels, 
schools, buses, public toilets—as white Americans, just as black South Africans were 
not allowed to use such facilities in South Africa when it was an apartheid state.15    
We must never forget that historically the liberal democracies never supported 
majority rule either in their colonies or even, in some instances, in their own societies.  
                                                            
14 This is why today international organizations like the UN, the WTO, NATO, EU, etc. are effectively 
gentlemen’s  clubs  or gatekeepers that decide which states can join their clubs and which states must 
stay out. Today, when the institutionalization of international law is at its apex, the process of becoming 
a state, that is, self-determination, is meaningless if one cannot join an international organization. 
15 Let  me  indulge  my  argument  that  the  distinction  between  “internal”  and  “external”  self-determination 
is  untenable  a  little  further  by  referring  to  South  Africa’s  transition  to  majority  rule.    Was  this  “internal”  
or   “external”   self-determination? On the face of it one could argue that it was a classic example of 
internal self-determination.  Majority rule refers to the system of government, which is internal to the 
state.  On the other hand one could argue that it was external self-determination because the question of 
majority rule in South Africa did not simply affect the internal government of the state (because 
apartheid South Africa had always claimed to be a Western liberal democracy, with a free press, a 
capitalist economy, the rule of law, etc.) but led to a complete change in the political orientation of the 
country’s   very   identity.      It   also   led   to   territorial   changes,   since   the  Bantustans  were   dismantled   and  
reincorporated into the territory of the Republic of South Africa.  Furthermore, South Africa’s  political  
transition was spearheaded by a revolutionary vanguard in the form of the African National Congress 
(ANC), and its allies, in coalition with socialist progressives throughout the Third World. 
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It was only during the Cold War competition, and after the passage of the 1960 anti-
Colonial Declaration by the UN General Assembly during decolonization, and later 
when the human rights revolution took place as encapsulated in the 1966 International 
“Bill  of  Rights”  that  the liberal democracies belatedly and halfheartedly embraced the 
notion of equality, which had always been one of the hallmarks of social democratic 
orthodoxy.  Thus, it was only in 1963 that Dame Rosalyn Higgins could explain that 
the right of self-determination  “refers   to   the   right  of   the majority within a generally 
accepted   political   unit   to   the   exercise   of   power”.      She   illustrated   her   view   by  
explaining that, “there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  self-determination for the Nagas.  The 
Nagas  live  within  the  political  unit  of  India,  and  do  not  constitute  a  majority  therein”.  
And yet, as one sharp commentator spotted, Higgins   did   not   comment   “on   the  
question why, if the Pakistanis were accorded self-determination, the Nagas cannot 
enjoy   it   too”.16  The   international   lawyer’s  answer   to   this  question is to say that the 
state practice had changed.  What self-determination meant in 1947 was not what it 
meant in 1963 when Dame Higgins wrote her manuscript.  But of course, this does not 
explain how state practice changed.  Or what brought about that change. International 
lawyers still need to account for why self-determination in 1947 meant Pakistan but 
did not mean this for the Nagas or for Turkish Cypriots or for white South Africans or 
for any other minority that might want to break away to form a separate state.  The 
explanation cannot  be  found  in  law.    It  cannot  be  found  in  any  notion  of  “internal”  or  
“external”   self-determination.  The answer is provided by the history of political 
ideology that came to a head at the height of the Cold War during decolonization. 
Accordingly, whether self-determination   is   “internal”   i.e.   to   be   exercised  
within the governmental apparatus of the state   or   “external”   i.e.   in   support   of  
revolutionary movements to achieve national independence – is dependent not on 
international law, not even on state practice, but on the ideological system adopted by 
the people concerned.  And the ideological system that is adopted by the new political 
entity upon independence, will, in turn, be dependent upon the political pressures it is 
subjected to as part of that process.  In other words, the so-called   “external”   self-
determination is nothing but Marxist-Leninism, that is, the revolutionary right of all 
peoples to self-determination.  Ultimately, the so-called  “internal  self-determination”  
                                                            
16  See   Vernon   Van   Dyke,   “Self-Determination and Minority   Rights”,   13   International Studies 
Quarterly (1969), p. 223 at p. 238 (also providing the reference for the Higgins quote in his response). 
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is nothing but the liberal democratic right of some people to self-determination in the 
form of self-government. The Marxist-Leninist approach to self-determination was 
attractive to Irish, Indian, Palestinian, Greek-Cypriot, and South African nationalists 
because it promoted an approach to self-determination based on majority rule and 
which could be used to attack the legitimacy of the minority ruling aristocracy. 
Now that the Western liberal democracies have avowedly embraced the notion 
of equality, what will be the impact of this on those societies that continue to seek to 
exclude communities from the body politic on account of their class, creed, or colour?  
The question is highly pertinent.  We are still living with the consequences of British 
racism as expressed geographically in the early twentieth century in Ireland, and later 
in Pakistan, in the Middle East, and in Cyprus, through the combined doctrines of uti 
possidetis juris and inter-temporal law.  Hundreds of thousands of people died during 
these partitions, and in India, it is estimated that over a million were killed.17  Nor has 
conflict abated in any one of these instances.  The question for international lawyers is 
whether this is a legacy that we wish to preserve in an international society that has 
repeatedly condemned such practices in other parts of the world, even if, in these 
particular instances they were lawful, because of the time the partitions took place?  Is 
this even a question that is appropriate for international lawyers, or has the time come 
to recognise that self-determination is in fact nothing more than a political ideology?   
 
  
 
 
                                                            
17 See Madhav Godbole, The Holocaust of Indian Partition: An Inquest (New Delhi: Rupa & Co. 2006), 
pp. 1-2 (“…the  biggest  price  for   independence  was  paid  during  the  partition  of  India   in  August  1947  
when over a million people died (estimates vary from as low as 200,000 to two million) and nearly 
eighteen million were uprooted from their homes and hearths and became refugees”.) 
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